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Abstract 
 
There are eight inseparable storylines about the role of science and learning for 
democracy and its governance. National statistics originated around 1890 from 
political economy and the management of the state (Dutch “staathuishoudkunde”). 
National (economic) planning evolved decades later as a separate function. The 
governance of statistics and planning still leaves much to be desired. A solution 
approach may be found in Forum Theory and A National Assembly of Science and 
Learning. The argument is highlighted by these eight connected storylines. 
(1)  There is censorship of science since 1990 by the directorate of the Dutch 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB). This gives “Dutch economics”. Some 
important structural imbalances between economies in the European Union 
can be resolved when this censorship is lifted. 
(2)  In national accounting and environmental statistics there is the approach by 
Nobel Prize in Economics laureate Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994) and UNEP 
Global 500 Award recipient Roefie Hueting (born 1929). This approach is not 
treated well in (environmental) economics and at CBS Statistics Netherlands.  
(3) There was the 2007+ financial crisis, the ordeal in Greece and the euro-crisis. 
(4) The UK Royal Statistical Society (RSS) rejected action when alerted that the 
Brexit Referendum Question wasn’t fitting even for a statistical questionnaire. 
(5a) In 2018 the Greek Supreme Court convicted El.Stat Statistics Greece director 
Andreas Georgiou for breach of duty, because in November 2010 he sent 
figures to Eurostat without first seeking approval by his board. Statistical 
organisations ISI, RSS, ASA, IAOS, FENStatS and SFdS now protest against 
Georgiou’s conviction as a miscarriage of justice, but they have failed to check 
(a) the original Greek law of March 9 2010 (that created El.Stat), and (b) the 
European Code of Practice of 2005: which both gave authority to the board. At 
that time the EU and IMF insisted upon a change of this law, which means that 
they acknowledged the original law that gave authority to the board. 
(5b) Walter Radermacher was DG of Eurostat in 2008-2016. He had started his 
career in environmental statistics. Since 1994 Radermacher treated the 
Tinbergen & Hueting approach with confusion, and thus hindered the 
monitoring of economic policy on climate change and extinction of species. In 
his position at Eurostat and involved with El.Stat in 2010, Radermacher must 
have known about the 2010 Greek law and the 2005 European code, but he 
still collaborated with Georgiou in bypassing the authority of the El.Stat board.  
(6) There are the governance and integrity of national statistical offices (NSO), in 
particular within the European Statistical System (ESS). The ESS changed its 
Code of Practice, from authority for a board in 2005 towards authority for only 
the director-general in 2011, so that DG = single head = head = board = NSO. 
However, a single person is much more at risk of commercial and political 
pressure. It is better to return to the situation of 2005 with multi-person boards. 
(7)  The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic highlights the role of science and learning. 
(8) There is Forum Theory. Let researchers create National Assemblies of 
Science and Learning, to better deal with issues of science, knowledge and 
information in our ever more complex societies. With better investigation of 
problems, of which this book indicates some, we may get better policy making.  
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Prolegomenon 
High priests of high treason 
 
March 7 2012 1 
In the evolution of mankind there is a curious competition between the Prince 
and the Priest. The Prince bases his power upon the strong men, the knights of 
armour, the mafia mob, the army and police. The Priest foretells the paths in 
heaven, interpretes the astrological signs, reads the goat entrails, baptises the 
children and performs the rites of passage into the other world. In some cases the 
Prince is stronger than the Priest, and pays him with bread and wine to cement his 
power. In other cases the Priest is stronger than the Prince, and pays him with 
meat and beer to cement his power. In some cases Priest and Prince are united in 
one person and then he can pick his meal. 
Traditionally there are three Estates: clergy, nobility, and the commoners (a.k.a. 
peasants). Charlemagne sent out his officials in pairs, clergy and secular. Yet he 
got his crown only from pope Leo. Apparently he held annual meetings with his 
“important men” (wikipedia 2). When parliaments developed they had those three 
estates in three Chambers. The dukes of Burgundy establised the States General 
in 1464. 3 The separation of church and state apparently started with Martin Luther 
1528. 4 
In the French Revolution in 1789 the Chamber for the clergy was abolished. 
Apparently the high priests had committed high treason. 
My suggestion is that the Priest could have developed into the Scientist. 
Studying the stars and wondering about the future could have become a serious 
enterprise. Many priests like Thomas Aquinas indeed had such imagination. Sadly 
the Priest failed. The wine tasted too good, the stars looked nicer at leisure. 
Rather than developing hard science, the Priest relied on magic with “hocus 
pocus” (thought to be derived from “hoc est corpus, Pilato passus”). 5 
The Priest thus committed treason with respect to his historical and evolutionary 
role in society indeed. 
In an alternative history, the Priest could have become the Scientist, and we 
would still have that third Chamber. We could call it the Economic Supreme Court. 
It would play an important role in scientific advice for government. 
Thus, adaptation of the Trias Politica and installing an Economic Supreme Court 
would actually be a repair on the flow of history. 
Si no è vero è ben trovato. 
(One drawback to this tale is that some people might think that economists 
already are our high priests and that they committed high treason again.) 
                                                                
1 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/03/07/high-priests-of-high-treason/ 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_the_Carolingian_Empire 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States-General_of_the_Netherlands 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_church_and_state 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hocus_Pocus_(magic) 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Political economy and econometrics 
This book is an exercise in political economy and econometrics. 
• Economics is the field that studies human behaviour towards optimisation, and 
concerning the use of scarce means for alternative ends. 
• Political economy concerns the management of a state or a political unit. It 
focuses upon the subject (the state) and not the approach. Proper analysis of 
the subject requires other fields like law, history, (social) psychology, etcetera.  
• Econometrics combines economics or political economy with mathematical 
modeling and empirical analysis by means of statistical methods. It is no 
specialisation but a generalisation, as it requires the use of more fields. 
• National accounting and national statistics originated in the context of political 
economy, see Appendix 38 for the history in Holland. Section 20.1 discusses 
the distinction between accountancy (application of rules) and statistics 
(research on reality). 
The subject of this book is that the management of a state relies upon science 
and learning, and all three upon (1) (low level) data and (high level) information 
generated by national accounting and statistics, (2) information by planning.  
On many aspects in this book, the present author is only a generalist and no 
specialist. It remains possible to highlight questions though. One would especially 
be interested in questions that may be overlooked by specialists. 
1.2 Forum theory and Assemblies of Science and Learning 
The main argument of this book suffers from these handicaps: 
• A.D. de Groot (1914-2006) presented Forum Theory for science and 
learning. There is an English paper De Groot 1984 but there seems to be no 
easy access to it. My own main sources are in Dutch. I do not regard it as so 
very useful to extend much on Forum Theory when English readers cannot 
check easily. It would be better to refer to an English translation of De Groot 
& Visser (2003) that eventually would come available anyhow. 
• Assemblies of Science and Learning do not exist yet, and it depends upon 
developments in each nation if they ever come about, in what format.  
Subsequently, I cannot write much on the main argument of this book. The 
discussion below will mainly collect the relevant storylines and indicate why it 
makes sense to strengthen the forum and create such assemblies. 
1.3 A diagram 
Figure 1 gives the conventional mind map of democracy. National government 
has the separation of powers of the Legislative, Executive, and Judidiary. Often 
people wrongly associate “government” with the executive. The National Statistical 
Office (NSO) provides national accounts and statistics of the past. The planning 
agencies look to the future. Science and Learning are at academia and research 
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institutes. The news in this book are the Economic Supreme Court as part of 
government for planning, and Forum Theory and the Assembly of Science and 
Learning. 
Figure 1. Mind map of convention (solid) and the news (dashed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Genesis of this book and the storylines 
This book started while writing Colignatus (2020a) (THAENAES). Looking at 
national accounting and environmental statistics at CBS Statistics Netherlands, 
the name of Walter Radermacher came up. A check showed that he had started in 
environmental statistics and had become director general (DG) of Eurostat, and 
there had become involved with Statistics Greece. Subsequently there arose eight 
inseparable storylines and roots for this book, fitting above diagram. 
Democracy  
with separation 
of powers 
Government 
National accounting 
and statistics (Economic) Planning 
Science and Learning 
Forum Theory Assembly of  
Science and Learning 
Economic Supreme Court 
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2. Eight inseparable storylines and roots for this book 
 
This book highlights eight inseparable storylines. The first seven are roots for 
this book and the 8th issue of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic forms a confirmation. 
2.1 From Central Planning Bureau to Economic Supreme Court 
Colignatus (2000, 2011) discusses mass unemployment and the structure of 
national economic planning. The Trias Politica structure of current democracy 
allows too much room for political manipulation within economic planning. The 
solution is the extension with an Economics Supreme Court, see Chapter 14, into 
a Tessares Politica. In Holland, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) is supposed to 
be a scientific institute but mass unemployment in Holland since 1970 can be 
explained by taking into account that there have not been adequate safeguards, 
either in respect by policy makers for CPB or in processes internal to economic 
science. Since 1990 there is censorship of science continuing to this day of 
writing. In 1988 / 1989 an official from the government bureaucracy, Gerrit Zalm, 
see Chapter 34, was appointed director of CPB without adequate background in 
science. Overall, the situation gives rise to the term “Dutch economics”. 
2.2 Environmental economics and national accounting 
There was environmental economics. Colignatus (2008) “The Old Man and the 
SNI” (now eSNI) is an interview with Roefie Hueting (born 1929). Jan Tinbergen, 
the Nobel Prize in Economics laureate of 1969, had been a pioneer in national 
accounting at CBS Statistics Netherlands already in the 1930s. Tinbergen read an 
article by Hueting 1968 that there still was a major error in national accounting on 
the environment. Tinbergen agreed with Hueting’s insight and advised CBS 
Statistics Netherlands to appoint Hueting in 1969 with the task to correct the 
national accounts for damages to the environment. Eventually Hueting found the 
solution approach of environmentally sustainable national income (eSNI) and the 
distance eΔ = NI – eSNI towards environmental sustainability. The Tinbergen & 
Hueting (1991) article presents that solution approach and also expresses 
Tinbergen’s support. The way how CBS handled the analysis is very problematic, 
and results into the case of “Dutch national accounting”. Colignatus (2009a) 
(2020a) (THAENAES) looks at the reception of the Tinbergen & Hueting approach 
and eSNI. See there for the problem at CBS, but it must be indicated here. 
The Colignatus (2008) interview with Hueting also mentioned Walter 
Radermacher, who had become DG of Eurostat in 2008-2016, and who had 
started in environmental statistics at the German Statistisches Bundesamt. 
Radermacher judged eSNI to be politics rather than science, which Tinbergen, 
Hueting and I regard as a confusion. eSNI is based upon conditional assumptions 
required for statistical measurement and not upon policy decisions. In 2019, there 
was the new book Hueting & De Boer (2019), in which these authors present their 
analysis afresh, while I had assisted them at points, making drafts for better 
didactics. With their book finished, I had occasion in 2019 and 2020 to continue 
with the evaluation of the reception of the analysis, and also to look deeper at 
Radermacher’s confusion, see Chapter 33 below on this.  
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2.3 The 2007+ financial crisis, Greece and the subsequent euro crisis 
There was also the 2007+ financial crisis. Colignatus (2000, 2011) had warned 
in 2000 that the financial system was risky. Subsequently, the risk materialised, 
and the problem with the Greek deficit and debt turned the financial crisis into the 
euro-crisis. Colignatus (2011b) is my discussion of a haircut on debt. 6 Colignatus 
(2012b) collects papers about the crisis up to then. Remember how the two 
Mario’s saved Europe, 7 though not tackling the main issues. For a perspective: 
apart from “Greek statistics” there is also “Dutch economics” to be wary about. 8 
See my weblog texts about Greece 9 and statistics. 10 Colignatus (2012a) is a 
letter 11 to the International Statistical Institute (ISI), suggesting that ISI sets up an 
investigation into the issue of Greek statistics and El.Stat Statistics Greece. I 
called attention to the point that not only director Georgiou but also the statistic 
and econometric members of the dismissed board of El.Stat were fellow scientists 
who deserved a fair hearing.  
NB. Any investigation should at least follow the money. I also alerted ISI to some 
allegations of financial speculations on Credit Default Swaps (CDS), 12 see Section 
30.8 below. Greek courts in 2013 and 2014 convicted economist and Greek 
parlementarian Panos Kammenos for libel on such allegations, 13 see Section 
30.8.2. I still wonder (as wikipedia is a portal, and no source, and cannot really 
give answers) whether Interpol has investigated (and internet blogs neither 
provide such information). I later discovered that Georgiou (2009) (October 1) at 
IMF had been studying government policy w.r.t. financial speculation. 14  
2.4 Brexit and a statistically inadequate 2016 Referendum Question 
There was Brexit. The outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum caused me to 
look into the issue. The Referendum Question would likely be rejected (at least I 
do) for a statistical questionnaire, as highly confusing. It is binary only in legal 
manner but not on policy choices. See my reports in the Newsletter of the UK 
Royal Economic Society (RES). 15 The UK Electoral Commission apparently is 
unaware of voting paradoxes, and uses a criterion that “people understand the 
question” while people are actually confused about policy issues and 
consequences. 16 When I wrote the UK Royal Statistical Society (RSS) about the 
issue, their reaction was dismissive, and the RSS executive director Hetan Shah 
appeared to have no background in statistics, see Section 39.11. 
                                                                
6 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2011-11-18-Haircut.html 
7 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/03/28/a-dangerous-trick-by-the-two-marios/ 
8 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/02/19/dutch-censorship-versus-greek-statistics/ 
9 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/?s=Greece 
10 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/?s=statistics 
11 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/06/10/letter-to-the-isi-on-greek-statistics/ 
12 https://web.archive.org/web/20120111064120/http://www.sovereignindependent.com/ 
?p=21184 
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panos_Kammenos#Political_positions_and_controversies 
14 A.V. Georgiou, “Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout 
Expectations“, IMF WP/09/233, 2009. 
15 https://www.res.org.uk/site-search.html?q=Colignatus 
16 https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-
referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/testing-eu-referendum-question 
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2.5 The role of statistics in Environment, Greece and Brexit  
There were the statistical organisations and their journals. When I looked at the 
journals of official statistics for making reviews of the Hueting & De Boer (2019) 
book, like (a) the Journal of Official Statistics or (b) the Statistical Journal of the 
IAOS or (c) EURONA: the Eurostat Review on National Accounts and 
Macroeconomic Indicators, I also noticed discussions about the El.Stat and 
Georgiou case, like Georgiou (2019). I saw statements by ISI and other statistical 
organisations, but all defending only director Georgiou and mostly neglecting the 
other fellow statisticians who had been dismissed from the board.  
Subsequently I also discovered:  
(i)  Protests by ISI and other statistical organisations neglected the very law of 
March 9 2010 that established the El.Stat board as the governing body. 
They referred to a later law that established the El.Stat director as the single 
authority. Thus, they hadn’t checked for the proper law. 
(ii)  There arose the combination that Walter Radermacher as DG of Eurostat 
also was involved with Statistics Greece. From his position and involvement, 
Radermacher must have known that the March 9 2010 law gave authority to 
the board, but he still makes the same reference error ? 
(iii)  Also Georgiou (2019) refers to the European Code of Practice 2011, while 
the 2005 Code was in force when he was in breach of duty in 2010. He must 
have known that he originally worked under the 2005 Code, but refers to a 
later code ? 
2.6 Governance of CBS Statistics Netherlands 
There was the governance of CBS Statistics Netherlands. Contacting CBS on 
the Hueting & De Boer (2019) book (see their kind invitation for an internal 
presentation 17), I observed that its governance had been changed in 2016. The 
independent Dutch Central Commission for Statistics (CCS) that had existed since 
1892 had been abolished in 2016. All authority had been given to the DG, so that 
DG = chief = single head = head = board = CCS = CBS. Since Colignatus (2008) 
& (2020a) (THAENAES) also use interviews with CBS former deputy DG H.K. van 
Tuinen, I asked him about his view on this. He gave me the letters of protest 
addressed to the Dutch Senate by the former CBS DG Van Noort and deputy DG 
Van Tuinen (2016). 18 The abolition of CCS thus gets attention in Chapter 21. 
2.7 Forum Theory 
In earlier years I had been writing on Forum Theory. Chapter 7 gives an 
overview of this writing. The forum of science and learning had obviously failed on 
these issues on Environment, Greece and Brexit, and even in this seemingly 
inoccuous area of statistics. Up to the writing of this book, I had very much relied 
upon the notion of an Economic Supreme Court (ESC), see Colignatus (2000, 
2011). However, such an ESC would tend to look at planning for the future and not 
at statistics of the past. This puts the following question in focus:  
                                                                
17 http://www.sni-hueting.info/EN/NA-eSNI/index.html 
18 http://thomascool.eu/Others/2016-oudCBS-VanNoort-VanTuinen-aan-EersteKamer-over-CCS-
en-CBS.pdf 
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What kind of organisation in science and learning might have prevented 
these mishaps to develop into the disasters that they have become ? 
What kind of organisation might have produced the information in time, 
and provided sound advice to the relevant decision makers ?  
2.8 A second diagram 
The first seven storylines generate the second diagram in Figure 2. This 
diagram would basically fit within the first diagram in Section 1.3.  
Figure 2. Mind map of the seven storylines 19 
 
Legend: WR = Walter Radermacher, GZ = Gerrit Zalm, TC = Thomas Colignatus, 
CBS = Statistics Netherlands, CPB = Dutch Central Planning Bureau,  
RSS = UK Royal Statistical Society 
2.9 The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic 
No discussion about the role of science and learning for society will seem 
complete without a perspective upon pandemics, like with the SARS-CoV-2 virus 
and Covid-19 disease. The 2nd edition of this book of July 2020 has the pandemic 
as the 8th storyline, in Chapter 36. Originally, the 1st edition of this book appeared 
on February 9 2020, just after the WHO Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) of January 30 and before the pandemic declaration of March 11. 
                                                                
19 See Hueting & De Boer (2019) for the finding inHueting’s thesis 1974, translation 1980, that 
the environment, due to the new scarcity, has become part of the subject matter of economics. 
Alongside GDP for production there is eSNI = eGDP for environmentally sustainable production. 
CPB  
banks 
TC  
Economy and economics (theory and practice) 
Environment ↔ Production (GDP) 
 
National accounts and statistics (past) ↔ Planning (future) 
Eurostat / CBS / El.Stat 
eΔ = GDP – eSNI WR 
euro 
GZ  
Brexit RSS 
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2.10 Towards a possible answer 
The 1st edition of this book had the first seven storylines. The 8th storyline of 
specifically the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic of the first half of 2020 comes as 
confirmation in a case already built. There is no need to fundamentally rewrite this 
book, and it suffices to affix the chapter on the pandemic. However, the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic changed the world for years to come and a discussion is no 
longer complete without discussing it. NB. The SARS-CoV epidemic of 2003 had 
been part of my research experience since 2003 when I worked at Erasmus MC in 
2002-2004 on the modeling of screening for the human papilloma virus (HPV) and 
cervival cancer. Warnings about pandemics form an ingredient of environmental 
sustainability. For this book, the pandemic may attract readers from public health 
who would tend to regard the pandemic as their point of departure. For all readers 
and thus also those new ones: the overall point of entry for this book forms the 
management of the relation of society on one hand and science and learning on 
the other hand. Relevant distinctions are (i) between statistics and planning, and 
(ii) between advice (advisor) and decision making (politics) and control of the 
quality of information (expertise) – no longer only two but three functions. 
The first seven storylines other than the pandemic already generated a rather 
large puzzle. Clear angles have been: 
• For official statistics, it remains important to distinguish its management and 
its researchers. The researchers would be encouraged to study with an open 
mind and without pressure. Researchers are human and can make errors, and 
those errors can be discussed under colleagues and be reconsidered. 
Researchers are accountable on scientific integrity. Management is 
accountable for management issues. Criticism on official statistics unavoidably 
causes what some may see as pressure, but many issues would commonly be 
directed at management and not at individual researchers for who it would be 
important to maintain their open mind.  
• Official statistics and national accounting has been maltreating the Tinbergen 
& Hueting approach. Somehow younger statisticians at official statistics no 
longer have the theoretical background to understand this approach. They 
neither have the respect to properly study it. This better changes. For an 
econometrician, the Tinbergen & Hueting approach is a no-brainer. 
• Walter Radermacher was deficient as an environmental accountant. Who is 
deficient in his own area of expertise should rather not be trusted with 
responsibility for also other areas. (However, he may have gained popularity 
by giving a (wrong) reason to reject the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, when 
others did not know much about that approach but were not inclined to change 
and were happy to be given such an excuse.) 
• In the Georgiou case, organisations in official statistics fail to check the facts, 
and suffer from mass hysteria. They treat the other statisticians of the El.Stat 
board of 2010 in biased manner. When information is lacking, one should not 
take sides, but establish a proper investigation. 
• The governance and integrity of national statistical offices (NSO) has been 
affected and is at stake. The European Statistical System (ESS) has arranged 
that all authority now is assigned to the DG = chief = single head = head = 
board = NSO. This is unwise, and it is better to have multi-person boards.  
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• Subsequently, there is the issue of the overall governance of science and 
learning. 
For political economy, the main steps are the recognition of the Economic 
Supreme Court and Forum Theory and the suggestion of a National Assembly of 
Science and Learning. Arranging the puzzle, my presumption is that the last point 
in above longer list is most important for the world at large. The last two points in 
the list are the most relevant for the world of official statistics itself. Other issues 
are subsidiary to governance and integrity. However, the Tinbergen & Hueting 
approach is vital for the world too, and there is an urgent need for repair of past 
errors in management.  
For the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic it is important to refer to Colignatus (2020c), 
with the redesign of didactics of some epidemiological models. In my current 
position I cannot contribute to actual epidemiological modeling but I may help a bit 
on didactics for quantitative researchers and students new to this area. The 
didactic exercise also clarifies that if the pandemic had run its course with R0 = 4 
and an infection fatality factor of 1.5% in Holland with 17.4 million persons then 
some 250,000 deaths could have occurred instead of the current 9000 deaths 
(517 per million, all excess mortality 20). The conditional (if) is a big one, because 
said scenario does not account for endogenous reactions to rising mortality. 
Perhaps Sweden indicates such endogenous reactions, with 388 per million (4000 
deaths on 10.3 million persons, all excess mortality), 21 though this does not 
correct for Sweden’s much lower population density. 22 (Pueyo (2020), 23 overall) 
With endogenous reactions, the base scenario might be a factor 10 lower (at 
25,000 rather than 250,000 deaths) before making cost-effectiveness calculations 
on policy, but both would involve an economic downturn anyway (Koolman 
(2020),24 Dutch 25). For cost-effectiveness, see Juneau et al. (2020). The statistical 
information about the pandemic still is remarkably weak but it would seem to be a 
correct conclusion that Holland and its Center for Disease Control RIVM did not do 
well, though it avoided a much worse outcome. See Chapter 36 for a discussion. 
Interconnections are: (1) RIVM also plays a role concerning the Tinbergen & 
Hueting analysis on environmental sustainability, see Colignatus (2020a). (2) In 
May 2020 Angelique Berg has been appointed as DG CBS Statistics Netherlands, 
26 who has little background in statistics and who was DG Public Health since 
2015 and who there did not prepare Holland for the pandemic, see e.g. Section 
36.7. Her appointment was upon recommendation by the CBS advisory 
commission chaired by Gerrit Zalm, see Chapter 34. 
 
                                                                
20 https://ourworldindata.org/covid-excess-mortality 
21 https://analysis.covid19healthsystem.org/index.php/2020/06/04/how-comparable-is-covid-19-
mortality-across-countries/ 
22 https://www.maurice.nl/2020/04/27/zweedse-aanpak-kost-30-doden-per-dag-meer-2/ 
23 https://medium.com/@tomaspueyo/coronavirus-should-we-aim-for-herd-immunity-like-sweden-
b1de3348e88b 
24 https://aheblog.com/2020/05/28/its-the-virus-stupid/ 
25 https://esb.nu/blog/20059629/het-is-het-virus-niet-de-lockdown 
26 https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/corporate/2020/21/angelique-berg-appointed-as-new-director-
general-of-cbs 
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3. Democracy and its governance with and by science and 
learning 
 
3.1 Economic planning 
Colignatus (2000, 2011) looks at economic planning: 
• Econometricians must forecast what policy makers will do in the future. 
• Complications are: Policy makers might uncritically follow such forecasts 
(“self-fulfilling prophecies”) or policy makers might even deliberately do the 
opposite of the forecast. 
• The governance of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) appears to be 
deficient, with also censorship of science and abuse of power since 1990 by 
the directorship. 27 
Colignatus (2000, 2011) gives the logic of an Economic Supreme Court (ESC), 
as an extension of the Trias Politica with a fourth pillar into a Tessares Politica. 28 
Galbraith 2019 “The next great transformation” 29 (of which I read only the first 
page) would seem to get a partial answer from the suggestion of an Economic 
Supreme Court per nation. 30 31 
3.2 Research fields other than economics 
While the ESC is a logical approach from the point of view of Political Economy, 
with its subject of the management of the state – and “management” is actually the 
same as “economics” – there arises the question what to do with the other fields in 
science and the humanities, like psychology, biology, physics and engineering, 
and so on. Would we need to exend the Tessares Politica with a Psychology 
Supreme Court, and a Biology Supreme Court, and so on ?  
A clear answer is no: the issue is the management of the state, and thus we are 
dealing with economics, and thus the extension with an Economic Supreme Court 
should be adequate. When relevant, all issues on psychology, biology etcetera 
can be translated into issues of management (e.g. how to adapt the law to a 
particular issue), and then be submitted to all branches of the Tessera Politica: 
legislative, executive, judiciary, and economic supreme court.  
3.3 But science and learning themselves are not perfect 
As correct as this is, it still causes some dissatisfaction. Over the years I have 
encountered various topics with these properties: 
(i) mishaps that are internal to science 
(ii) huge consequence for policy making and society. 
                                                                
27 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
28 I have used “tetras” en “tessera” but Ancient Greek “tessares” (foursome) is best. 
29 https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/the-next-great-transformation-by-james-k-galbraith-
2019-11?barrier=accesspaylog 
30 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
31 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Environment/2020-01-31-THAENAES.pdf 
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Examples of mishaps internal to science are: 
(a) Research in didactics and teaching of mathematics, Colignatus (2015e), 32 
see e.g. Chapter 10. 
(b) Political science on electoral systems, see Colignatus (2020b), 33 see 
Chapters 11 and 12 
(c) Demographers do not succeed in clarifying to Climate Change engineers 
(collaborating in UNFCCC) what the relevance of education and family 
planning would be for the control of the world population and its impact on 
climate change, see Chapter 13. 
If one could establish some misdemeanor somewhere then these cases are 
similar to the CPB-directorate censoring science (while CPB is supposed to be 
scientific), and the CBS maltreating the Tinbergen & Hueting approach (while CBS 
is supposed to be scientific), and in this book also the El.Stat director breaching 
his duty and sending figures to Eurostat without seeking approval by his board. 
This risk of mishaps exists more in general, whenever there is a science-society 
overlap. Scientific and learned organisations, like the statistical organisations ASA 
and RSS mentioned above, are focused upon research and the publication of 
journals, and not upon management (economics) of science and learning. The 
incompetence of the statistical organisations in the El.Stat case is shocking, but 
actually the executive bodies of such organisations are not trained and focused on 
management (economics) of science and learning. (There is also the psychology 
that managers like directors and dislike people who are dismissed like the other 
El.Stat board members.) 
3.4 Defence, support and promotion of science and learning 
Philosopher of science A.D. de Groot developed “forum theory”, see De Groot & 
Visser (2003) (in Dutch) 34 and Chapter 7 below. Above phenomena arise when 
the forum doesn’t function properly. It is management of science and learning to 
make sure that the forum functions in adequate manner. The world needs bodies 
for such management.  
Some might claim a hierarchy: that professors are more informed about science 
and learning than the other members of the faculty and the PhD students. This 
gives the conventional hierarchical approach with top professors appointed at the 
national academy. Instead, forum theory suggests that science and learning are 
performed by all people involved, and there are ample arguments to apply the 
“one woman, one vote” principle also to the work floor in science and learning. 
The Prolegomenon on page 17 highlights the genesis of current parliaments 
(locations to talk) at the time of Charlemagne in 800 AD. 35 The EU started as a 
collaboration of Member States and subsequently developed a European 
Parliament. Colignatus (2005) reflected that the United Nations require a World 
Parliament. In fact, citizens can already create a World Parliament and do not 
need to wait for the UN.  
                                                                
32 https://zenodo.org/communities/re-engineering-math-ed 
33 https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/202001/index.cfm 
34 https://www.knaw.nl/nl/actueel/publicaties/het-forumwaarmerk-van-wetenschap 
35 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/03/07/high-priests-of-high-treason/ 
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In similar fashion, the world of science and learning may create National 
Assemblies of Science and Learning, with the task to make the forum work 
adequately in a nation, manage science and learning, and monitor their quality.  
• The Floor of the Assembly would be elected by all researchers in a nation 
(registered at the Assembly of Science and Learning) 
• The Senate of the Assembly could be the current National Academia of 
Science and Learning. (In Holland the KNAW, dating from Napoleon.)  
An example is that Assemblies of Science and Learning could support and 
promote open access publishing, without the current excessive “article processing 
charges” (APC), see my proposal for author databases at their alma mater 36 (and 
see perhaps discussions at the Society for Scholarly Publishing (SSP)). 37 
Key points are: 
• Assemblies of Science and Learning would supervise national statistics. 
• Assemblies of Science and Learning can enact investigations as discussed 
here on the El.Stat, CBS and CPB cases. 
PM. On the notion of democracy with and by science and learning, Dutch 
readers may be interested in Colignatus (2019a). 
3.5 Creation of Assemblies of Science and Learning 
The creation of an Assembly of Science and Learning is rather straightforward. 
A group or association of scientists and/or scholars – and do not think about only 
universities but include the research institutes and possibly think tanks – sets up a 
foundation of such name, (i) with a governance structure that is comparable to a 
national parliament, with a Floor (elected in equal proportions, see Colignatus 
(2020b), by an electorate of registered researchers) and a Senate (likely the 
national academy), (ii) with a stipulation who might be eligible for the electorate 
(masters degree, having research at least once in the last 20% of one’s life), and a 
registry of the (screened, accepted and paying) actual electorate. The Floor might 
consist of 99 members with a term of three years and annual replacement of 33 
members. Subsequently, the various associations of science and the learned 
societies are informed, they pass on the information, members of the electorate 
are recruited, elections are organised, the Floor has a constitutional assembly, 
and starts its daily routine.  
At first the Floor might convene perhaps twice a week, with four working days for 
its members. The annual salary of a member then is 4/5 of EUR 50 thousand. The 
annual wage bill would be EUR 99 × 40 thousand ≈ 4 million. Institutes like 
universities would support the Floor by maintaining employment and counting 
membership of the Floor like teaching or research. The membership fee for the 
electorate would be used to pay for the salaries of elected members of the Floor 
who originate from a less financially strong background. With 100,000 accepted 
members in the electorate and an annual memberschip of EUR 50, then a budget 
                                                                
36 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2016/10/12/letter-to-vsnu-and-others-on-membership-
dues-and-open-access-publishing/ 
37 https://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/about/ 
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of EUR 5 million would be available to cover costs. Eventually, the membership 
would grow to all researchers in a country. 
The following are examples of associations who might either set up a new 
foundation or morph into the Assembly of Science and Learning. Such are 
examples only. Basically any motivated and resourceful group can do so. 
 
USA American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 38 39  
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). 40 41 
UK British Science Association 42 43 
The British Academy 44 45 
Holland Koninklijke Hollandse Maatschappij der Wetenschappen 46 47  
or WOinActie 48 
 
 Ever since the creation of national academies, there was the discussion about 
the allocation of seats. It often was easier to e.g. set up a “national academy of 
medicine” than try to discuss the number of seats for doctors in the national 
academy. One extreme is to grant each field an equal share, another extreme is to 
allocate in proportion to the number of graduates, or gainful employment in the 
economy. Table 1 is an example somewhere between these extremes.  
Table 1. Example seat allocation in a Floor of Science and Learning 
 
15 Science 
15 Engineering 
3 Mathematics 
10 Teaching (evidence based) 
15 Humanities (other) 
15 Social sciences 
5 Medicine 
3 Law 
1 Theology & Religious studies 
17 Free 
99 Total 
 
A tricky issue is that mathematics would generally not be regarded as an 
empirical science and thus actually belongs to the humanities, even though it is 
                                                                
38 https://www.aaas.org/mission 
39 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Association_for_the_Advancement_of_Science 
40 https://www.acls.org/ 
41 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Council_of_Learned_Societies 
42 https://www.britishscienceassociation.org/ 
43 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Science_Association 
44 https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/about 
45 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Academy 
46 https://www.khmw.nl/over_ons/ 
47 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koninklijke_Hollandsche_Maatschappij_der_Wetenschappen 
48 https://woinactie.blogspot.com/p/over-wo-in-actie.html 
 33 
considered to be “exact”. 49 Theology might not be relevant here, i.e. not be 
regarded as one of the sciences or humanities, since the notion of a supreme 
being is as diverse as humanity itself, and perhaps religious studies might be 
regarded as a combination of history and sociology of religion. On the other hand, 
theology was the dominant faculty in the Middle Ages, and it would not be wise to 
exclude a prime interest for large sections of the population and encourage an 
environment with its own bubble outside of science and learning. 
                                                                
49 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/10/02/pierre-van-hiele-and-gerald-goldin-2/ 
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4. Conclusions upfront 
 
(1) In the Netherlands, the Central Commission for Statistics (CCS) was created 
in 1892. There appeared to exist a great demand for statistical data, so 
subsequently in 1899 CBS Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek) was created, with a Director and department within the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The CCS determined the programme (also non-CBS) and the CBS 
Director established the actual figures. In 2003 the DG had established an internal 
board for CBS itself, consisting of three persons while the deputy DG was charged 
with looking after the quality of the data. An Eurostat peer review by O’Hanlon et 
al. (2015) was quite positive about this structure. However, the ordeal with El.Stat 
Statistics Greece caused a reflex within Eurostat and the European Statistical 
System (ESS) to put all authority in the hands of only the director of the National 
Statistical Office (NSO). Also in Holland the law has been adapted now, so that 
multiperson head = board = CCS = CBS = DG = single chief. This development is 
unfortunate. It is better to return to the status quo ante. The role of information in 
society is too important to put all responsibility for national statistics both in the 
hands of a single person and closer to politics. Advisable for the countries in the 
ESS is to have a CCS for the work programme (also non-CBS) and the DG as the 
chair of a multi-person board with collective responsibility.  
(2) The ESS Code of Practice of 2005 allowed that a statistical authority was 
headed by a multiperson board – apparently also to fit the Dutch situation, that 
was looked upon with favour by Eurostat. This Code of Practice was changed in 
2011, potentially to better fit the ambition for Greece, to encourage the 
interpretation that DG = chief = single head = head = board = NSO. The 
discussion about the Greek case is much contaminated by authors who refer to 
the 2011 Code while they should refer to the 2005 Code that was in force in 2010.  
(3) (i) The March 2010 law for El.Stat apparently had created a board that was 
also responsible for the data. (ii) The memorandum by the Greek government and 
the IMF in 2012 stipulated that this had to change. We can infer that the IMF in 
2012 agreed that the situation in 2010 according to the Greek government and law 
gave authority to the El.Stat board for the data too, otherwise IMF would not have 
insisted upon change. (iii) The Greek Supreme Court in 2018 judged that the 
Greek law of 2010 was that Andreas Georgiou, director of El.Stat, had to seek 
approval by the board for the data that he submitted to Eurostat. (iv) Georgiou 
himself actually agreed with this, since in 2010 he had engaged in confidential 
efforts – advised by Eurostat’s representative Hallgrimur Snorrason, former DG of 
Statistics Iceland – to have the law of March 2010 adapted, in order to assign all 
responsibility to himself as the director. The law was indeed already much adapted 
in December 2010. (v) However, apart from this confidential effort supported by 
Snorrason, and, in the open, to the board of El.Stat in 2010, to the Greek courts, 
to outside statistical organisations and to the (international) press, Georgiou 
claimed that legally only he, the director, was responsible for the data. Supported 
by Snorrason, he stated this to statistical colleagues of the International Statistical 
Institute (ISI), the UK Royal Statistical Society (RSS) and the American Statistical 
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Association (ASA), and he stated this while he and Snorrason and Eurostat knew 
that he actually wasn’t. (vi) The Greek Supreme Court in 2018 convicted Georgiou 
for a breach of duty, since he hadn’t sought approval by the board for the figures 
that he sent to Eurostat. He was guilty as charged. If he has been under oath, he 
also committed perjury. It is useful to put Eurostat and Snorrason under oath too. 
To his statistical colleagues, Snorrasen presents himself as an independent 
outsider but he was a participant, and hired as a representative of Eurostat. 
(4) Walter Radermacher, director at Eurostat 2008-2016, made his career in 
environmental statistics, becoming (deputy) director of the German Statistisches 
Bundesamt in 2003-2008 before going to Eurostat. His work shows 
misconceptions, logical errors and misrepresentation about the approach by Jan 
Tinbergen (Nobel Prize in economics 1969) and Roefie Hueting (UNEP Global 
500 Award 1994) about environmentally sustainable national income (eSNI). With 
his positions, Radermacher has played a key role in blocking the Tinbergen & 
Hueting approach. With such errors in his field of expertise it is remarkable that he 
made this career. But, blocking eSNI has been popular amongst national 
accountants, and this might explain such career. In the case of El.Stat 2010, he 
knew that Georgiou should not bypass the board but still assisted him in doing so, 
thus assisting him in violating the law of an EU Member State. Radermacher did 
not inform his colleagues at ISI, RSS, ASA, IAOS, FENStatS and SFdS but 
stimulated them while covering up the true state of affairs. He also put these 
falsehoods in his thesis of 2019 at Sapienza Univ. di Roma. 
(5) The world of science and learning is advised to create an Assembly of 
Science and Learning per nation. A Floor would be elected by national scientists 
and scholars, and the Senate could be formed by the national Academia of 
Science and Learning. The governance of statistics is only one of many other 
cases that require attention. The role of information becomes ever more crucial for 
society, and some organised quality control by the world of science and learning 
thus becomes crucial too. An Assembly of Science and Learning in a nation could 
monitor the quality of science and learning in a nation. Such assemblies provide 
for an environment in which such investigations, as discussed here, can be 
organised and monitored. 
(6) The financial and Eurozone crises and the unemployment in Southern 
Europe have been much larger than otherwise could have been the case because 
of “Dutch economics”. There is censorship of science since 1990 by the 
directorate of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB). Fellow economists, policy 
makers and the general public are blocked from key new insights that, when 
published, will allow for more and better employment and welfare. It is unwise to 
blame much unnecessary hardship to the directorate of CPB. Each nation better 
takes responsibility for its own actions. The economic conditions in Southern 
Europe were favourable at first because of the lower rate of interest due to the 
convergence into the euro. Southern European countries had an opportunity to 
increase their productivity. History took another turn. Apart from this, the CPB 
case must be judged on itself and with criteria of science. The world should not 
accept censorship of science. Thus my advice is to boycott Holland till the 
censorship by the directorate of CPB has been lifted.  
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5. Structure of this book 
 
5.1 Top-down versus bottom-up 
An Anglo-Saxon manner of exposition is bottom-up, compare Common Law, 
going from the particular to the more general – if there is any generality anyhow. A 
Continental approach is top-down, compare Roman law, with first a general theory 
and then cataloguing the particulars. This books has a mixture of these.  
After Part 1 with the introduction, Part 2 has the main argument on Forum 
Theory and a National Assembly of Science and Learning. Part 2 contains the 
main propositions of this book, and it is basically self-contained. It also sets the 
stage for the subsequent Parts with illustrating examples. The examples from 
economics, national accounting and statistics dominate the book, but Part 3 
emphasizes that there are many more problems in the world that require an 
Assembly of Science and Learning in each nation.  
5.2 Education, democracy, world population 
Part 3 provides indications for the research fields on education, democracy, and 
world population. Its chapters indicate problems that seem to be overlooked by the 
specialists in their fields and the chapters suggest solution approaches that fit 
theory and empirical research but also appeal to common sense. If I were a 
member of an Assembly of Science and Learning, then I would submit the 
chapters for discussion so that others (not only members of the Assembly) could 
recognise that it would be useful to have a hearing of the specialists. For example, 
political scientists on electoral systems now develop a tendency to refer to 
themselves as “electoral engineers” but they fundamentally lack a background in 
engineering and one would tend to warn the world of engineering. The example 
concerns the USA but this is easily translated to the UK and France. For Greece it 
is remarkable that the largest party in elections for the House of Parliament 
receives a bonus of 50 seats: 50 which is counterproductive since you would want 
to see that parties learn to respect each other and form coalitions. 
5.3 Dutch economics 
Part 4 is a top-down discussion of the notion of an Economic Supreme Court, 
and then focuses upon the example of unemployment. This Part also provides for 
the general macro-economic context of the Greek economy in 1990-2020, which is 
important for the subsequent Greek ordeal in statistics and its current economy. 
The International Statistical Institute (ISI) claimed in 2013 that the Greek 
economy went wrong because it lacked adequate statistics, see Appendix 40, but 
this is reverse causality. ISI doesn’t do macro-economics. Adequate statistics are 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for adequate policy making. The Greek 
economy went wrong because of its economic policies. The policy makers merely 
tried to make it look good, whatever the real figures. Our discussion on statistics 
does not quite concern a Potemkin Village (façades only) but rather a House of 
                                                                
50 A portal no source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hellenic_Parliament#Election 
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Mirrors with different agents constructing their own distractions and narratives. 
Thus from economics we move onwards to official statistics and national 
accounting. 
5.4 Dutch official statistics and national accounting 
Part 5 is a top-down discussion on official statistics and national accounting. 
Since there is no “general framework” for such, it uses the particular Dutch 
situation. The discussion provides a wetting stone to judge the Greek case. Dutch 
official statistics has a sound reputation in the world of official statistics, and the 
International Statistical Institute (ISI) historically has its seat in the building of CBS 
Statistics Netherlands. However, in this Part we will also meet with the scandal of 
Dutch national accounting with respect to environmental sustainability. 
5.5 Greek statistics and the events in 2010 
For some readers the present recantation will rekindle bitter-sweet and even 
disgusting-hilarious memories of the events of 2010, when this Greek Drama 
etched itself in the collective memory of our generation. 
We will use the term “Greek statistics” though “Greek national accounting” would 
be proper since the issue concerns the national budget deficit and debt. 
In the Conclusions upfront, above, we already established – purely by referring 
to the Greek law – that El.Stat had a multiperson board and not a chief (single 
head). This observation is corroborated by the fact that the EU, Eurostat and IMF 
wanted this law to be changed, which means that they recognised the original 
setting. Obviously there is the judgement by the Greek Supreme Court that also 
used the actual law of 2010. Below we will elaborate on the details: not to further 
prove this elementary fact but to show how others evade it. We must check on the 
versions of the European Statistical System (ESS) Code of Practice 2005, 2011 
and 2017. 
Part 6 then looks at the details of the Greek case. The Georgiou case is a maze, 
with remarkable sloppiness in reporting by many, also about what Code of what 
year applies. Let us walk through this maze, step by step. Subsequently, while the 
major point has been established over and over again that Georgiou was guilty as 
charged, we can proceed with the more relevant issues. There is stewardship of 
how to publish a statistical figure that might send your country down the drain. 
There is the uproar of international protests by statisticians who didn’t do a proper 
fact-check on Georgiou’s breach of duty. Finally, we may give some attention to 
the hacking of Georgiou’s computer and the criminal charges on falsifying figures. 
(These tantalising aspects cause questions below too.) 
PM. The name “El.Stat” is used consistently, and has also been adjusted in 
verbatim quotes when other authors used different monikers, except for the Greek 
law that had “ΕΛ.ΣΤΑΤ.” and the ECB that used “HSTAT”. 
5.6 Some key agents 
As already highlighted by Figure 2, these storylines assign particulare relevance 
to some key agents. By a combination of factors and not recognised yet in the 
public limelights, some agents have failed in their publicly assigned tasks, and 
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though these were major failures they also had a much greater impact than they 
likely were aware of themselves at the time.  
Part 7 looks at two directors (Radermacher and Zalm) and two ministers (Zalm 
and Dijsselbloem). The example cases of Dutch economics, Dutch national 
accounting, and Greek statistics cannot be discussed adequately without a 
deconstruction of the confusion that these key agents caused in these matters. 
5.7 The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic 
Part 8 reviews the Dutch performance within the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The 
death toll was limited to 9,000 persons (all excess mortality) in the first part of 
2020, but this is still high and comes at a high cost to the economy and people’s 
savings. It is remarkable how weak the quality of statistics still is, including the 
evaluation in (quality adjusted) life years and cost-benefit analysis. The review 
indicates that there was (quite) some dissatisfaction with lack of information by the 
authorities. 
5.8 Readership of this book 
This book targets all researchers in science and learning.  
Part 2 and Part 3 might suffice for most researchers.  
Part 4 on economics would appeal to economists, but everyone interested in 
democracy would want to know about the failure of the Trias Politica and the need 
for a Tessares Politica.  
Part 5 is relevant for all researchers who use statistics. You would want to make 
sure that the National Statistical Office is managed by a multiperson board at a 
distance from politics and commerce. 
Part 6 is for the small minority who is interested in Greek statistics. However, the 
members of the statistical associations should worry how their councils, boards 
and executives have failed to check the data about the Georgiou case. The part 
may also be enlightening for the generations that watched the ordeal at some 
distance. 
Part 7 would be relevant for parliamentarian enquiries. Some agents were in 
official capacity when they made their major mistakes. It would be curious when a 
parliament allows censorship of science (CPB director Zalm) and collaboration 
with the breach of the law of an EU Member State (Eurostat DG Radermacher). 
Obviously, I only give my own assessment here, and it is up to the proper 
authorities and in particular the bodies of democratic control of power to determine 
what they think about the events and errors discussed here. 
Part 8 on the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic would likely be relevant for all readers, 
since the pandemic has reshaped our world for the years to come. Readers from 
other countries may want to compare their own country with the experience in 
Holland. 
Overall, the book is for readers who are interested in most of these angles. 
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Part 2. Forum Theory & Assemblies of Science and 
Learning 
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6. A.D. de Groot (1914-2006) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Adriaan Dingeman de Groot (1914-2006) 51 may require an introduction for most 
readers. He studied mathematics with Gerrit Mannoury (1867-1956) at the 
university of Amsterdam. De Groot got a bachelor in mathematics, switched to 
psychology with an MA in 1941, and got his 1946 PhD in mathematics & physics, 
with supervisor psychologist Geza Revesz who remarkably worked at that science 
department. This study is Thought and choice in chess. 52 Original Dutch: Het 
denken van den schaker. 53 Because of this book, De Groot is regarded as one of 
the founding fathers of cognitive psychology. His book also affected Pierre van 
Hiele (1909-2010) and his theories on didactics of mathematics. 54 De Groot 
moved on with his book Methodology. Foundations of inference and research in 
the behavioral sciences (1969), known for his definition of the “empirical cycle”. 55 
However, De Groot grew dissatisfied with his Methodology, since its approach was 
(in mathematical or ideal-theoretical manner) prescriptive and not empirically 
practical. He developed Forum Theory by focusing on what researchers actually 
did, and finding ways to improve proceedings. 
6.2 Forum Theory 
In his obituary of De Groot, Gobet 56 gives a nice summary of Forum Theory.  
“A first theme is related to the notion of truth in science. The Forum 
Theory , which he had been developing over thirty years, insists on the 
idea that science is a communal activity directed towards rational 
consensus. As there is no absolute truth in science, all that scientists can 
do is to strive for truth, that is, to strive for theories having the highest 
possible level of certainty. This criterion is met in the case of statements 
that are unanimously endorsed by all pertinent scientific experts. Such 
statements then are scientifically true to the best of our present 
knowledge. Neither are the rules for the correct way of conducting 
science unchangeable or indisputable. These, too, are to be discussed, 
and agreed upon in what de Groot calls the forum of expert opinion.” 
6.3 Translation of some key Dutch texts on Forum Theory 
De Groot “Academie and Forum” (1982:9):  
                                                                
51 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adriaan_de_Groot 
52 http://dare.uva.nl/aup/en/record/301853 
53 http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/groo004denk01_01/ 
54 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/06/pierre-van-hiele-and-adriaan-de-groot/ 
55 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical_research#Empirical_cycle 
56 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238691465_ADRIAAN_DE_GROOT_ 
MARRIAGE_OF_TWO_PASSIONS_A_PERSONAL_SUMMARY 
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“Perhaps a modern democracy should not be equipped with a trias 
politica but with a tetras politica, [actually tessares politica 57] the fourth 
independent power being science and the humanities. One could think of 
a corresponding Supreme Court, which in serious cases can condemn 
the government for political prostitution of research, for abuse of 
expressions such as "it is scientifically proven that ..." and for scientifically 
irresponsible applications. In principle, it seems like a good idea, at least 
– in the current situation – a nice castle in the air.” 58 
“That message is that development of science and the humanities and 
real, valuable growth of our knowledge cannot be guaranteed nor justified 
by imposing non-human, logical or methodological criteria. It is ultimately 
the quality of a culture that makes science possible. This culture must be 
maintained, improved and defended by people; people who are aware of 
the tradition of the scientific attitude, people who – for the most part tacitly 
– have agreed to honestly adhere to a system of fundamental, rational 
rules of conduct: the rules of the Forum.” 59 
“Those rules must be learned; and that is partly a matter for the 
Academia. But, this learning only works well if the living environment of 
the researcher does not hinder learning but promotes it. This requires a 
democratic state but this is not sufficient. For the fruitful development of 
the social sciences in particular, which are politically so sensitive, it also 
requires: a government that understands its main mission for science 
policy well; namely the task, also for those fields of science, to support, 
promote and protect the tradition of critical research, rational discussion 
and the pursuit of objective judgment – in short: the Forum culture.” 60 
                                                                
57 https://en.wiktionary.org/ and Ancient_Greek (Dutch “viertal”, English “foursome”) 
58 Dutch: “Misschien zou een moderne democratie niet met een trias maar met een tetras politica 
toegerust moeten worden, met als vierde onafhankelijke macht die van de wetenschap. Men zou 
kunnen denken aan een bijbehorende Hoge Raad, die in voorkomende ernstige gevallen de 
overheid kan veroordelen voor politieke prostitutie van onderzoek, voor misbruik van 
uitdrukkingen als "wetenschappelijk is aangetoond dat..." en voor wetenschappelijk 
onverantwoorde toepassingen. Het lijkt in principe een goed idee, althans – in de huidige situatie 
– een mooi luchtkasteel.” 
59 Dutch: “Die boodschap is dat wetenschapsontwikkeling en echte, waardevolle groei van onze 
kennis niet te garanderen noch te legitimeren zijn door het aanleggen van niet-menselijke, 
logische of methodologische criteria. Het gaat uiteindelijk namelijk om de kwaliteit van een 
cultuur die wetenschap mogelijk maakt. Die cultuur moet worden onderhouden, verbeterd en 
verdedigd door mensen; mensen die doordrongen zijn van de traditie van de wetenschappelijke 
houding, mensen die – voor een belangrijk deel stilzwĳgend – overeengekomen zĳn zich eerlijk 
te houden aan een stelsel van fundamentele, rationele gedragsregels: de regels van het Forum.” 
60 Dutch: “Die regels moeten worden geleerd; en dat is mede een zaak van de Academia. Maar, 
dat leren lukt alleen goed‚ als de leefomgeving van de onderzoeker dat leren niet belemmert 
maar bevordert. Daartoe is een democratisch staatsbestel nodig, maar niet voldoende. Voor een 
vruchtbare ontwikkeling van de politiek zo gevoelige gamma-wetenschappen in het bĳzonder is 
tevens nodig: een overheid die haar voornaamste taak van wetenschapsbeleid goed verstaat; 
namelĳk de taak om, ook op die wetenschapsgebieden, de traditie van kritisch onderzoek, 
rationele discussie en streven naar objectieve oordeelsvorming – kortom: de Forumcultuur – te 
steunen‚ te bevorderen, te beschermen.” 
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De Groot (1982:22): 61 
“It seems that there is a tendency in the Netherlands – stronger than in 
most other countries – that differences between groups receive an 
ideological charge, so that they can be interpreted as "fundamental" 
points of difference; with the result that a social structure is created 
consisting of a large number of separate, relatively independent sub-
establishments with their own territories and well-defended borders 
between them. Somewhat in caricature, the consequence of this structure 
is that no matter of any importance can be the subject of a national 
decision if not all sub-groups, individually, are represented in decision-
making. This means that committees and other decision-making groups 
have a tendency for us to become too large, too extensive to be able to 
work; and this, in turn, causes that many fundamental issues are not 
resolved in actual decisions. Elsewhere I have pointed out that, 
unfortunately, this situation lends itself perfectly to a government policy of 
the type: Divide and rule.” 
6.4 Criticism 
Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1977) gave the criticism that De Groot presented 
a "theory of truth" that was only a form of conventionalism, and that his reasoning 
is circular since he does not specify who would be member of a particular forum. 
He also puts emphasis on "rational argument", and refers other types of 
argumentation to "councils that might use majority decision making", leaving it 
vague how often the one or the other would happen. 
Smaling (2008) calls attention to dialogue and empathy as the real ways towards 
progress. He rejects De Groot's idea that issues could be resolved by rational 
argument. We might add ourselves that the special case of mathematics is a 
rational reconstruction after a historical development in views that were not so 
rational in origin. 
One can only agree with such criticism. Most likely De Groot would have agreed 
too. In the following we will keep this criticism in mind as highly valuable, but not 
dwell on it, since these issues concern implementation. The point remains that we 
are discussing rational reconstruction. When looking for current views in science 
and learning, we want to hear the rational story, even when it takes a longer route 
to get there. Definition of membership etcetera are practical issues. The only 
answer is to simply start. Practice makes perfect. 
                                                                
61 Dutch: “Het ziet ernaar uit dat er in Nederland een tendentie bestaat – sterker dan in de 
meeste andere landen – waardoor verschillen tussen groepen een ideologische lading krĳgen, zó 
dat zij kunnen worden opgevat als ‘principiële’ verschilpunten; met als gevolg dat er een sociale 
structuur ontstaat bestaande uit een groot aantal afgescheiden, betrekkelijk onafhankelijke sub-
establishmcnts met eigen territoria en goed verdedigde grenzen ertussen. Enigszins in karikatuur 
beschreven is de consequentie van deze structuur dat over geen zaak van enig gewicht een 
nationale beslissing kan worden genomen indien bĳ de besluitvorming niet alle subgroepen, 
apart, vertegenwoordigd zijn. Dat betekent dat commissies en andere besluitvormingsgroepen bĳ 
ons de neiging vertonen om te groot, te omvangrijk te worden om nog te kunnen werken; en dit 
leidt er dan weer toe dat over veel fundamentele zaken geen werkelijke beslissingen worden 
genomen. Elders heb ik erop gewezen dat deze situatie zich, helaas, uitstekend leent tot een 
regeer-politiek van het type: Verdeel en heers.” 
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7. Forum theory 
 
7.1 Continued from above 
The following continues the discussion of Forum Theory by De Groot in Chapter 
6. The present discussion is not systematic. My basic sources for Forum Theory 
are in Dutch: De Groot (1982) and De Groot & Visser (2003). 62 The reader must 
hope that someone (Dutch KNAW) provides for an English translation of De Groot 
& Visser (2003) (published by KNAW). I have not yet retrieved the English: De 
Groot (1984), “The theory of science forum: Subject and purport”, Methodology 
and Science, 17(4), 230-259 (a journal that existed in 1968-1995). 
I have discussed aspects in my weblog. 63 Since education is so relevant for 
forum theory, this letter by me to VOR is quite relevant as well. 64 (Above quotes 
by De Groot (1982) were already used there, and have been translated into 
English now above.) 
7.2 Core notion 
The core notion (as I understand it) is:  
(i) discover what processes in science and the humanities have worked,  
(ii) protect, support and promote such processes.  
Since there is no objective notion of what would count as a success, we have 
nothing else but the scientists and scholars living now, who do their best and who 
give their view about what would count as a success. 
There is no need to re-invent the wheel. Improve the current situation, step by 
step. Do so consciously, and prudently, and not like a leaf in the wind or a sheep 
in the herd. 
7.3 Scientific integrity, prevention better than cure 
Current discussion about research integrity is often focused on what to do when 
things go wrong, and how to clean up the mess, while the prime focus should be 
on how to prevent that things go wrong. 65  
It is a grey area how researchers respond to criticism, but it would very much be 
the idea of forum theory that conjectures and refutations are encouraged. It would 
rather be part of research integrity to be open and responsive to critical questions. 
Many problems in (Dutch) society persist because researchers hide in the ivory 
tower and do not respond to criticism. 
7.4 Discussion, storage, harvesting, support alumni 
The forum of science and the humanities can improve upon the current situation 
by facilitating discussion by open access databases for such discussions. 
Universities who grant scientific titles would support their alumni by allowing them 
                                                                
62 https://www.knaw.nl/nl/actueel/publicaties/het-forumwaarmerk-van-wetenschap 
63 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/06/pierre-van-hiele-and-adriaan-de-groot/ 
64 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Math/2016-05-09-Letter-to-VOR-and-Trainers-of-teachers.pdf 
65 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/26/allea-defines-research-integrity-too-narrow/  
 48 
to store their work in such databases, with subsequent discussion, while journals 
can harvest from those. 66 For a journal it suffices to provide links to peer-review 
reports in such databases. 
There is no need for commercial publishing houses, since editorial boards can 
harvest from the databases, and provide links to the papers and peer reviews. 
Commercial publishers are expensive while databases for alumni are cheap. 
There may be commercial companies who provide for nice typographic layouts. 
Forum theory has the straightforward logic: (i) graduation leads to improved 
discussion, (ii) open access to this discussion, (iii) harvesting for journals, (iv) 
prevention of problems with integrity because of open discussion. 
7.5 Paradigm shifts 
While forum theory supports everyday science, its hallmark would be the easier 
change when there are paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions. The latter would 
be intellectual shifts and conceptual revolutions, not changes in personal ranks 
(waiting till the professor has retired). 
7.6 Culture, democracy, education 
Issues of culture, democracy and education are obviously important. I have 
looked at democracy 67 68 and education 69 but remarkably little at culture yet.  
7.7 Dissatisfaction amongst current Dutch scientists and scholars 
Microbiologist and newspaper columnist Rosanne Hertzenberger states her 
opinion about Dutch academia in 2016: 70 71 
“Science has become an extremely grumpy world, with a surprising 
number of deeply disappointed, pessimistic and cynical people. Maybe 
                                                                
66 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2016/10/09/let-higher-education-he-create-working-
paper-archives-wpa-for-alumni/ 
67 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
68 https://zenodo.org/record/291985 
69 https://zenodo.org/communities/re-engineering-math-ed/about/ 
70 Dutch: “De wetenschap is een buitengewoon chagerijnige wereld geworden, waar een 
verrassende hoeveelheid diep teleurgestelde, pessimistische en cynische mensen rondloopt. 
Misschien zijn er daarom niet zoveel boeken over. Begrijp me niet verkeerd, er zijn genoeg grote 
ideeën, bevlogenheid, brille. Toch lijken de meeste mensen als kuddedieren vast te zitten in 
hetzelfde systeem. Een systeem waar iedereen continue wacht op goedkeuring. Goedkeuring 
van je ideeën, je plannen, je aanvragen, je referentiebrieven, je cv. Wetenschappers zijn 
loonslaven en flexwerkers ineen. Ze hebben niet de vrijheid van het ondernemen, maar ook nooit 
de zekerheid van een baan in loondienst. Telkens weer moet je bewijzen dat je je plek verdient, 
je genoeg stickers in je schriftje hebt behaald, door genoeg hoepels bent gesprongen, genoeg 
geld hebt binnengehaald. Oh wee als iemand je voor gek verklaart. Of neem het 
publicatieproces. Dat ingewikkelde spel dat we met elkaar spelen over waar we wat schrijven 
over onze ontdekkingen. Boek je een bijzonder resultaat of doe je eeninteressant experiment, 
dan schreeuw je dat niet van de daken, je gooit het niet online, op een blog of op Facebook of 
Twitter, zoals de rest van de wereld. Nee, eerst moet je steggelen met anonieme vakgenoten 
over wat je er wel en vooral niet overmag zeggen, en of het überhaupt bijzonder genoeg is om 
aan het publiek te vertonen. Soms gaat er een paar jaar overheen voor een bevinding aan de 
wereld wordt geopenbaard. En dan staat het nóg achter betaalmuren."  
71 http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2016/04/17/het-is-tijd-voor-een-elon-musk-van-de-wetenschap-
1609245 
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that's why there aren't that many books about it. Don't get me wrong, 
there are plenty of big ideas, enthusiasm, brilliance. Yet most people 
seem to be stuck like herd animals in the same system. A system where 
everyone is constantly waiting for approval. Approval of your ideas, your 
plans, your applications, your reference letters, your resume. Scientists 
are wage slaves and flex workers in one. They do not have the freedom 
of doing business, but never the certainty of an employed job. Time and 
time again you have to prove that you deserve your place, that you have 
obtained enough stickers in your logbook, that you have jumped through 
enough hoops, and that you have collected enough money. Woe if 
someone calls you a maverick. Or take the publication process. That 
complicated game that we play together about where we write something 
about our discoveries. If you score a special result or do an interesting 
experiment, then you don't shout it from the rooftops, you don't throw it 
online, on a blog or on Facebook or Twitter, like the rest of the world. No, 
you first have to haggle with anonymous colleagues about what you can 
and cannot say about it, and whether it is special enough to be shown to 
the public at all. Sometimes it takes a couple of years before a finding is 
revealed to the world. And even then it is behind paywalls." 
Since 2018 Holland has an action group “WOinActie” 72 with complaints of 
structural unpaid overtime work and other dismal working conditions. 73 74 The 
weblog of WOinActie states that they are supported by university boards: 75 
QUOTE 
WOinActie is a movement that defends the interests of university education 
and the link with scientific research, which is under great pressure due to 
substantial long-term cutback and a rapid increase in student numbers. 
WOinActie is a national platform for local action united by the following three 
demands: 
• abolishment of the efficiency cuts of 183 million euros. 
• restoration of the government funding to the level of 2000. 
• abolishment of the lumpsum cut of 19 million euros. 
WOinActie is a community of students and employees that defends the 
univerity and her future. Information of our upcoming actions can be found 
here. 
Currently WOinActie is supported by the following organisations: De FNV, 
ISO, PNN, de Jonge Akademie, De LSVb, Platform Hervorming Nederlandse 
Universiteiten, VAWO, Rethink VU, the VSNU and the Executive Boards of all 
the universities in the Netherlands, see below for a number of expressions of 
support: 
• De universiteit van Tilburg, 
• De Erasmus universiteit, 
                                                                
72 https://dub.uu.nl/nl/opinie/waarom-zou-ik-woinactie-steunen 
73 https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/wetenschappers-doen-structureel-onbetaald-
overwerk-blijkt-uit-inventarisatie-actiegroep~bae33b4d/ 
74 They focus on academia and do not seem to mind censorship by the directorate of CPB. 
75 https://woinactie.blogspot.com/p/about-woinactie.html 
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• De Vrije Universiteit, 
• Radboud Universiteit, 
• De universiteit van Amsterdam, 
• Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 
• Universiteit Utrecht 
UNQUOTE 
(Thus all university boards support this but some have not provided explicit 
statements.) 
My diagnosis is that the Dutch royal academy of science and the humanities 
(KNAW) has seriously been neglecting De Groot’s forum theory since it was 
formulated in the 1970s and even published by KNAW in 2003. 
7.8 Independent funds like NWO and NSF 
In Holland, the Ministry of Education distributes funds to both universities and 
NWO (the Dutch version of the US National Science Foundation). Universities use 
these public funds to do education and own research. Tuition fees are only a 
minor source in funding. NWO distributes additional funds for research, with its 
own system for submitting applications and evaluation (in which academics 
partake in time-consuming peer reviewing).  
In the US, many universities have private funding and high tuition fees, and then 
it makes more sense to have a government funded NSF.  
In Holland, the NWO is rather superfluous, since the funds may also be given 
directly to the universities, who are government funded anyway. However, NWO 
has been set up by the government with the explicit purpose to have more control 
about how the funds are allocated, in particular for improvements in the economy. 
In this, the government apparently doesn’t trust the universities in providing 
adequate transparency and accountability.  
NWO has the annual Spinoza awards. In a complex process, nominations are 
collected, candidates screened, and four or five winners are selected, and their 
award consists of EUR 2.5 million each, to be spent on new research at their own 
discretion. 76 77 In my view the whole is a charade, and a rather expensive way for 
NWO to advertise and justify its own position, with the cheap logic of picking 
winners, at the cost of young researchers who would deserve the benefit of the 
doubt. Spinoza would never have satisfied such NWO criteria, and it is a blamage 
to name the award after him. 78 
7.9 Funding individual researchers, trust and the H-citation index 
The H-citiation index was proposed by Jorge E. Hirsch, and in 2020 he has an 
article “Superconductivity, What the H ? The emperor has no clothes”. 79 80 
                                                                
76 https://www.nwo.nl/en/funding/our-funding-instruments/nwo/nwo-spinoza-prize/nwo-spinoza-
prize.html 
77 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinoza_Prize 
78 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/the-dutch-spinoza-prize/ 
79 https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/202001/index.cfm 
80 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H-index 
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My suggestion is that Forum Theory would support the notion of trust. A student 
working on a MA or MSc degree would require more supervision, but the idea of 
the degree is that one learns about independent thinking. The idea of a PhD is that 
the candidate has shown to be able to conduct scientific research by himself or 
herself. Thus the supervision during PhD research should be rather minimal, 
except for as is common in that type of research itself.  
Given the demonstrated competence, the researcher could be funded for the 
next two years and be trusted to spend the funds wisely. Findings are stored in the 
database, including the record of impact, and those can always be reviewed at a 
later moment. When the researcher thinks that an extension of funding is feasible, 
say after one year or one year and a half, he or she can do an application with 
reference to the work done. It is always easier to review work done than plans. 
The idea is that work done is the base for trust, and funding should not be based 
about perspectives for possible results, since it would be rather curious that others 
would be better able to judge about those perspectives than the very researcher 
who is the specialist on the issue.  
Apart from this essential point, there seems to be no general format. One can 
imagine all kinds of schemes and criteria and kinds of funding, but those would 
differ per type of research. 
7.10 The lingua franca of mathematics  
Overall, there is the lingua franca of mathematics. Stephen Wolfram has been 
very sensitive to the use of this language on the computer, and the computer 
algebra system Mathematica has many features that are natural to mathematical 
thinking. Let me again encourage Stephen to turn his company into an open 
access public utility, because it is unfortunate that such beauty and core 
effectiveness and efficiency is locked behind a paywall and less accessible to 
education and research. Overall, (i) the programming language of Mathematica 
cannot be proprietary, since it is a language, (ii) one can imagine different 
competing companies providing for interpreters and compilers of that language, 
(iii) the “frontend” interface between human and computer would rather be a public 
utility. See Elegance with Substance. 81 
 
                                                                
81 https://zenodo.org/record/291974 
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8. A general theory of knowledge 
 
8.1 Summary on the background 
The following has been taken from a 2016 draft article on Mannoury and two of 
his students. 82 Its summary will form an introduction for the subsequent general 
theory of knowledge (GTOK). 
A discussion on epistemology and its role for mathematics and science and the 
humanities is more fruitful when it is made more specific, namely by focussing on 
didactics of mathematics and methodology of science and the humanities. Both 
philosophy and mathematics run the risk of getting lost in abstraction, and it is 
better to have an anchor in the empirical science of the didactics of mathematics.  
Trying to get a link to reality by means of historical research is not enough, when 
one doesn't understand how knowledge comes about. The General Theory of 
Knowledge (GTOK) presented by Colignatus in 2015 has roots in the work of three 
figures in Holland 1926-1970, namely G. Mannoury (1867-1956) and his students 
P.M. van Hiele (1909-2010) and A.D. de Groot (1914-2006). The work by Van 
Hiele tends to be lesser known by philosophers, because Van Hiele tended to 
publish his work under the heading of didactics of mathematics. This article 
clarifies the link from Mannoury (didactics and significs / semiotics) to the 
epistemology and didactics with Van Hiele levels of insight (for any subject and not 
just mathematics). The other path from Mannoury via De Groot concerns 
methodology. Both paths join up into GTOK. 
This article has an implication for education in mathematics. The German 
immigrant Hans Freudenthal (1905-1990) was a stranger to Mannoury's approach, 
and developed "realistic mathematics education" (RME) based upon Jenaplan 
influences (by his wife) and a distortion and intellectual theft of Van Hiele's work 
(which distortion doesn't reduce the theft). RME is wreaking havoc in mathematics 
education. It is important to set the record straight, not just for accuracy, but also 
since there is a tendency to regard the work by Van Hiele as part of RME. Authors 
like mathematician Henk Visser (ca 2005) or psychologist Ben Wilbrink (website) 
who want to eliminate RME for good reason also tend to erroneously denounce 
the work by Van Hiele. Mannoury must be saved from obliteration but also Van 
Hiele. Both Hans Freudenthal (1905-1990) and recently David Tall in 2013 
claimed a result that however had been achieved by Van Hiele in 1957. It is 
valuable that the result is confirmed but it is better to recognise Van Hiele and his 
better reasoning. 
8.2 Mannoury and significa / semiotics 
Semiotics is already discussed by Locke (1632-1704) and may have earlier 
roots in Spinoza (1632-1677). Kant (1724-1804) and Peirce (1839-1914) must be 
mentioned. 83 
                                                                
82 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Math/2016-02-18-Mannoury-VanHiele-DeGroot-06.pdf 
83 J.F.A.K. van Benthem criticised around 1980 that I referred to Kant without having read him, 
but he did not explain why I for my purposes could not rely on what H.J. Störig had written, or 
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Shortly before 1900 it was an eye-opener that the verb "to be" could be analysed 
in (at least) the distinction of element, subset, identity. Georg Cantor (1845-1918) 
developed this as set theory in mathematics, but such core “awakenings” shape 
our thinking, and they are crucial for didactics. In philosophy we see the 
development into Analytical Philosophy (IEP (2016)). 
With such predecessors, Gerrit Mannoury (1867-1956) cannot really be called a 
pioneer. He developed his version of this line of analysis and had an influence that 
is still important today. Beth (1956/1958:432) states about Mannoury's inaugural 
lecture of 1903: "He defends the view, now familiar but at that time highly 
provocative, that philosophy originates from linguistic problems; (...)". Wittgenstein 
(1889-1951) had the phases of the Tractatus and the Investigations. Before the 
latter, Mannoury already defended the view that "the meaning of terms is their 
use", see Heyting (1966). 
Lady Welby was in correspondence with Peirce, and one wonders whether her 
term "significs" and his "semiotic" denote the same: a "theory of the use of signs". 
For convenience I regard these as the same indeed.  
It is necessary to link up to Claude Shannon (1916-2001) and information 
theory. A message is sent from source to destination. The message is encoded to 
fit the medium or channel. The intention by the sender may differ from the 
interpretation by the receiver. When you are interested in improving 
communication or didactics then it can help to analyse the various steps in this 
set-up. 
I have had no time yet to look at a recent thesis on Mannoury. 84 
8.3 Van Hiele’s levels and De Groot’s forum 
Pierre M. van Hiele (1909-2010) and Adriaan D. de Groot (1914-2006) had 
classes by Mannoury. PM. It is not likely that they had classes by E.W. Beth 
(1908-1964). They refer to Beth however.  
De Groot got his baccalaureat in mathematics and switched to psychology. He is 
well-known for his study of cognition in chess, which contributed to the advance of 
cognitive psychology. De Groot (1961) is a classic on methodology, in which he 
coined the term "empirical cycle". This book arrives at the negative insight that we 
will never know the truth. Kuhn (1962, 1970) described the social dynamics of 
scientific revolutions. De Groot (1982) and De Groot & Visser (2003) present 
Forum Theory, with the positive insight how the social dynamics in science and 
the humanities could be regulated so that we might not know truth but at least 
have some warrants w.r.t. what we tend to "accept as true". De Groot worked on 
testing of students, and helped create the CITO testing bureau. It is still an issue 
that cognitive psychologists and psychometricians may have insufficient insight in 
the didactics of mathematics, so that their tests can be invalid, see Colignatus 
(2016c). Significs / semiotics is instrumental for arriving at valid tests. 
Van Hiele graduated as mathematician and followed his early preference to 
become a teacher of mathematics. His 1957 Ph.D. thesis started out on didactics 
                                                                                                                                      
what correction he wanted to send to Störig, so I still wonder why Van Benthem didn't deal with 
the subject of our conversation and went off on this kind of "criticism". See Colignatus (1981, 
2007, 2011). 
84 https://repub.eur.nl/pub/116694/ 
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of geometry, but he in fact developed a general theory of epistemology of levels of 
insight, that he only demonstrated by the didactics of geometry (and 
"demonstration" is a term used in didactics (of geometry)). In his thesis, Van Hiele 
clearly states that the levels of insight are relevant for rather any subject. Van 
Hiele's theory is of fundamental importance.  
A discussion of the relation between A.D. de Groot and P.M. van Hiele is in 
Colignatus (2015a). This relation is virtually non-existent. It appears that De Groot 
(1961, 1994) "Methodology" refers to Van Hiele (1957) but gives it a wrong 
presentation. Apparently De Groot was too busy writing his book to take the time 
to digest Van Hiele's crucial contibution to general epistemology and cognitive 
psychology. Remarkably, both authors had written about the didactics of 
geometry, namely the first presentation of (formal) geometry to students of age 12, 
but the communication failed. Historians of science hopefully can check whether 
Van Hiele and De Groot later found an opportunity to correct the issue. See Visser 
(2015) for De Groot on didactics of mathematics, in which Van Hiele is mentioned, 
but not bridging the gap. Visser (ca 2005) shows some misconceptions about Van 
Hiele himself too, see elsewhere. 
My advice in 2008 was the creation of a Simon Stevin Institute for research in 
the didactics of mathematics and subsequent application in education.  
8.4 Definition & Reality Methodology and a General Theory of Knowledge 
Van Hiele (1957) presented a theory of levels of insight. These levels have a 
logical structure. The base level is in the realm of sensations. A student at this 
level doesn't have a well-developed memory and relies on direct experience to 
feed the mind. Language is used to label properties. The second level concerns a 
growing awareness of relations between those properties. This requires memory, 
and obviously, this level cannot be attained when the student has no idea about 
such properties, or memory of such properties, at the base level. The highest level 
is deductive, when the student arrives at a logical model.  
In educational practice, students at different levels have different languages, in 
which the same words have different meanings. Teaching can get slow at level 
transitions, and didactics must be developed to facilitate such transitions. 
Colignatus (1992) (2000, 2005, 2011) (pdf online 85) presents a "Definition & 
Reality Methodology". The idea is to choose definitions to best capture empirical 
information, so that we aspire truth by definition. The empirical problem shifts to 
the question whether the definitions apply or not. Popper's theory of falsifiability is 
less relevant when the empirical issue is applicability. (Mannoury’s / Wittgenstein’s 
meaning = use; this potentially shifts the field from science to engineering.) 
Colignatus (1994) refers to De Groot (1982) and Forum Theory in the analysis that 
the Trias Politica model of democracy is deficient and requires a constitutional 
Economic Supreme Court to safeguard the role of economic science in economic 
policy making. A short memo in the RES Newsletter relating this to the 2007+ 
economic crisis is Colignatus (2014a), in this book Chapter 14. 
Colignatus (2015b) 86 explains the relation of Van Hiele levels to the D&R 
methodology. The power of the Van Hiele levels is they can be defined logically, 
                                                                
85 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
86 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/pierre-van-hiele-and-epistemology 
 56 
whence we arrive at truth by definition. It is a matter of research and engineering 
to identify and manage the actual processes. 
Colignatus (2015c) presents a General Theory of Knowledge (next section), that 
integrates these three elements: the D&R methodology, Van Hiele levels and De 
Groot's Forum Theory.  
Figure 3 has been taken from there. See the discussion there. Obviously 
Mannoury affects his two students Van Hiele and De Groot. A deserved place is 
for Otto Selz (1881-1943) who influenced Popper, De Groot and Van Hiele. I lost a 
reference on that Selz also influenced Mannoury.  
The link between Piaget and Van Hiele is that Piaget already hypothesized 
levels of understanding, but linked those to age, which makes this an issue of 
antropology. Van Hiele started there, but eliminated age as a factor, and found the 
general logical relations that create a theory of epistemology.  
Beth is not in this diagram. Van Hiele was in contact with Piaget and Beth was in 
contact with Piaget, but I am not aware of cross references. Van Hiele (1957) 
refers to Beth (Euclides XVI no 1 and Beth 1955) but I have not checked its 
importance. 
Beth & Piaget (1966) do not refer to Van Hiele. They quote Mannoury but don't 
fully agree with it. 
"Enriques and Mannoury both propose to show that every attempt to 
base pure mathematics on absolute self-evidence will be in vain, and to 
disclose the psychic mechanism which gives rise to such an endeavour. 
This intention is expressed perfectly clearly by Mannoury: “But all that 
mathematics is still tricked out [overdressed fancily] in, its absolute 
character and perfect accuracy, its generality and autonomy, in a word, 
its truth and eternity, all this (if I may be forgiven the expression) all this is 
pure superstition!"” 
8.5 A General Theory of Knowledge 
2015-11-24 87 
There is a General Theory of Knowledge (GTOK) implicit in former weblog 
entries. It can better be made explicit. Let me first draw the diagram and then 
discuss it. Relevant weblogs are: 
• Pierre van Hiele and epistemology 88 – for the link to the Definition & Reality 
methodology 
• Pierre van Hiele and Adriaan de Groot 89 – for the link to methodology and 
Forum Theory 
• The About page 90 about the Definition & Reality methodology 
8.5.1 Discussion of the diagram 
Figure 3 with above weblog entries is rather self-explanatory. 
                                                                
87 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/a-general-theory-of-knowledge/ 
88 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/pierre-van-hiele-and-epistemology/ 
89 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/06/pierre-van-hiele-and-adriaan-de-groot/ 
90 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
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• What I may need to explain is how this relates to my own work. 
• A nice introduction to epistemology, at the level of the international 
baccalaureate (IB) programme is the book by Richard van de Lagemaat (CUP, 
now a new 2015 edition). 
• A general principle is that philosophy should use mathematics education as its 
empirical field of reference. When philosophy hangs in the air then it is at risk 
of getting lost. The education of mathematics has adequate challenge for 
dealing with abstract notions. 
Figure 3. Genesis of a General Theory of Knowledge 
 
Some main steps in the diagram are: 
(1) Jean Piaget introduced stages of development. Epistemology tends to focus 
on the last stage, with a fully developed rational being who wonders what can 
be known and how this can be achieved. It makes sense to distinguish stages 
in such questions however. Pierre van Hiele removed Piaget’s dependence of 
stages upon age, and turned the issue into a logical framework for 
epistemology. With the Definition & Reality methodology this framework is also 
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empirically relevant. This is also very useful for the link of philosophy to 
education. See Pierre van Hiele and epistemology. 91 
(2) Karl Popper turned Otto Selz’s methodology for psychology into a philosophy 
of science in general. This uses falsifiability as a demarcation between science 
and non-science. Since the Anglo-saxon world tends to distinguish science 
and the humanities (humaniora), the general term “theory of knowledge” 
(epistemology) will do. 
(3) Selz inspired Adriaan de Groot to create his experiments with chess masters. 
Later De Groot continued in methodology, and it seems that he is the one who 
introduced the empirical cycle. His book Methodologie ends in depressing 
awareness that science cannot establish truth as in mathematics. Thus De 
Groot advances the uplifting Forum Theory, that focuses on the rules of 
conduct within the scientific community. While we may not discover the real 
truth we still can ask why we should trust these guys and gals. 
(4) De Groot and Van Hiele were also inspired by their UvA math teacher Gerrit 
Mannoury (1867–1956). See this project 92 about Mannoury and significa. 
(5) The dashed arrow from Van Hiele to De Groot is the unfortunate failed transfer 
of the theory of levels of insight. De Groot refers to the thesis but missed this 
notion, see this discussion. 93 
(6) My book A Logic of Exceptions (ALOE) (unpublished 1981, 2007, 2011) 94 is 
already deep into methodology. ALOE looks into the logical paradoxes and 
suggests that empirical sense may help to get rid of mathematical nonsense. 
There is a distinction between Gödel’s theorems and the interpretation that he 
gave to them. For the issue of volition, determinism and chance there is no 
experiment that allows to distinguish what is empirically the case. (I haven’t yet 
looked at the interpretation of the recent experiment with Bell’s equation at TU 
Delft, see the websites by Ronald Hanson and Richard Gill.) 
(7) The abbreviation DRGTPE stands for the book Definition & Reality in the 
General Theory of Political Economy. 95 This 2000, 2005, 2011 book had a 
precursor already called Background Papers to DRGTPE that collected papers 
from 1989-1992. This essentially gave the framework for political economy, in 
both mathematical model and empirical methodology. The 1994 book Trias 
Politica & Centraal Planbureau (TP & CPB) (in Dutch) referred to De Groot’s 
Forum Theory to clinch the argument for an Economic Supreme Court (ESC). 
Subsequently, DRGTPE 2000 contains a constitutional amendment how the 
ESC should satisfy such Forum rules. 
(8) Since 2015 I have grown more aware of the importance of Forum Theory for 
the selection of definitions for applications. This element is implicit in the 
earlier development but it is useful to state it explicitly, given the importance of 
the role of definitions. Research groups might be characterised by the 
definitions that they select. It can depend upon the quality of the rules how 
flexible research groups are with experiments and adverse information. 
                                                                
91 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/pierre-van-hiele-and-epistemology/ 
92 https://www.nwo.nl/onderzoek-en-resultaten/onderzoeksprojecten/i/86/8486.html 
93 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/06/pierre-van-hiele-and-adriaan-de-groot/ 
94 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/ALOE/Index.html 
95 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
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Thus, to restate in text what is depicted in the last box in the diagram: This 2015 
GTOK has the standard logic (with ALOE), methodology (with Forum Theory), and 
epistemology, and has more awareness of: 
• levels of insight or understanding 
• Definition & Reality methodology 
• Forum Theory is especially required for the application of definitions. 
8.5.2 Application 
Some applications of this GTOK are: 
(1) See Part 4 on Dutch economics, and especially Section 16.1.  
(2) The scheme allows us to deal with the confusions by Stellan Ohlsson 96 
(abstract to concrete) and Ben Wilbrink (Van Hiele’s theory of levels wouldn’t be 
empirical). 97 
(3) The scheme allows us to deal with the problem of universals. Van Hiele 
“demonstrated” the general applicability of the theory of levels by using the 
example of geometry. (And geometry uses demonstration as a method of proof 
too.) He mentioned that the theory had general applicability and mentioned 
chemistry and didactics as other examples, without working out those examples. 
Freudenthal neglected Van Hiele’s general claim, put him into the box of 
“geometry only”, and claimed that he, Freudenthal himself, had shown the 
applicability to mathematics in general. (See here. 98) Of course, Freudenthal also 
had the problem that a universal proof is impossible, since you would need to 
check each field of knowledge. However, now with the definition & reality 
methodology, we can take the levels of insight as a matter of definition. Like the 
law of conservation of energy defines what we regard as “energy”. The problem 
shifts to application. For this, there is Forum theory. 
                                                                
96 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/09/03/pierre-van-hiele-and-stellan-ohlsson/ 
97 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/09/05/pierre-van-hiele-and-ben-wilbrink/ 
98 http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1930 
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9. Economic Supreme Court & Assembly of Science and 
Learning 
 
9.1 Functions for science and learning themselves and for policy making 
As Figure 1 on page 22 clarifies, there are multiple relationships between the 
old institutes and the newly proposed institutes, about which more may be said. 
De Groot (1982:9), quoted in Chapter 6 above, indicates that forum theory 
allows for at least two functions:  
(i) regulation of the internal processes of science and learning, with advice 
for policy making,  
(ii) judgement about policy making. 
For economics, I already hit independently from De Groot upon the latter idea for 
the Economic Supreme Court (ESC), see Chapter 14, but I enjoyed the reference. 
This Court is an essential part of government in a democracy, with the separation 
of powers between Legislative, Executive, Judiciary and Epistemic branches.  
For other fields than economics: As discussed in Chapter 3, the reference to an 
ESC leaves much unsaid about science & learning apart from economics. For 
policy making, aspects from science and learnng can be translated into items that 
are relevant for allocation process of the national budget. However, a National 
Assembly of Science and Learning now would provide structure. 
9.2 Starting when ? 
An assembly of science and learning can simply start, see Section 3.5. Its first 
focus will be upon the internal regulation of science & learning itself, and 
restructuring the current advice for policy making.  
Subsequently, there will be suggestions for governance structures that would 
also involve judgement.  
At some point the national parliament, consisting of the two chambers of House 
and Senate, might invite the Assembly of Science and Learning to join up, and 
form the third chamber in parliament, commonly identified as the Study. 
It might even be that such later developments happen before the creation of the 
ESC. However, it remains advisable that current parliaments set up enquiries on 
the creation of their ESCs, since such issue is focused and essential. 
NB. In a draft of this book, I used the phrase “parliament of science and 
learning” but this is a wrong term, since “parliament” belongs to the Trias Politica 
structure, and science & learning would only form an assembly in parliament. 
9.3 Further evolution 
Holland already has the Council of State, an “Advisory body on legislation and 
highest general administrative court”. 99 Some functions that would naturally 
belong to an Assembly of Science and Learning may presently be performed by 
                                                                
99 https://www.raadvanstate.nl/talen/artikel/ 
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this Council. However, when an Assembly of Science and Learning comes upon 
the scene, then all bodies will evolve to some new equilibrium. 
The present analysis uses the example case of a nation state, but could also 
apply to a city council, county / province, state in a federation. Also a city council 
would benefit from its local (regional) council on science and learning. The 
university of Groningen 100 was founded in 1614 (for theology and pastor training) 
and at that time the cities of Groningen and Friesland counted about 50,000 
persons. 101 One would think that a region of 100,000 persons should be able to 
support a minor university, for local interests and live long learning, and adequate 
facilities via the internet. 
There are also the media and their journalists. A good question is why the media 
don’t manage to report adequately about the issues discussed here. Media focus 
on politics and its theatre. Perhaps, when there are Assemblies of Science and 
Learning, that also the media will start to function better. Likely though there will 
always be some excuse to blame it all on the media. (In Holland, journalists of 
sciende and learning do not report about censorship of science by the directorate 
of CPB. 102) 
 
 
                                                                
100 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Groningen 
101 https://www.rug.nl/staff/r.f.j.paping/urbanisatietilburg2009powerpoint.pdf 
102 Dutch: http://www.thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2016-08-24-
Wetenschapsjournalistiek.pdf 
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Part 3. Education, democracy, world population  
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10. Medical School as a model for education 
 
2014-07-18 103 104 
 
In Medical School, doctors are trained while doing both research and treating 
patients. Theory and practice go hand in hand. We should have the same for 
education. Teachers should get their training while doing theory and learning to 
teach, without having to leave the building. When graduated, teachers might teach 
at plain schools, but keep in contact with their alma mater, and return on occasion 
for refresher updates. 
Some speak about a new education crisis (e.g. in the USA). The above seems 
the best solution approach. It is also a model to reach all existing teachers who 
need retraining. Let us now look at the example of mathematics education. 
Professor Hung-Hsi Wu 105 of UC at Berkeley is involved in improving K12 math 
education since the early 1990’s. He explains how hard this is, see two 
enlightening short articles, one in the AMS Notices 2011 106 and one interview in 
the Mathematical Medley 2012. 107 These articles are in fact remarkably short for 
what he has to tell. Wu started out rather naively, he confesses, but his education 
on education makes for a good read. It is amazing that one can be so busy for 30 
years with so little success while around you Apple and Google develop into multi-
billion dollar companies. 
Always follow the money, in math education too. A key lesson is that much is 
determined by textbook publishers. Math teachers are held on a leash by the 
answers books that the publishers provide, as an episode of The Simpsons shows 
when Bart hijacks his teacher’s answers book. 108 As a math teacher myself I tend 
to team up with my colleagues since some questions are such that you need the 
answers book to fathom what the question actually might be (and then rephrase it 
properly). 
At one point, the publishers apparently even ask Wu whether he has an example 
textbook that they might use as a reference or standard that he wants to support. 
The situation in US math education appears to have become so bad that Wu 
discovers that he cannot point to any such book. Apparently he doesn’t think about 
looking for a UK book or translating some from Germany or France or even 
Holland or Russia. In the interview, Wu explains that he only writes a teacher’s 
education book now, and leaves it to the publishers to develop the derived books 
for students, with the different grade levels, teacher guides and answers books. 
One can imagine that this is a wise choice for what a single person can manage. It 
doesn’t look like an encouraging situation for a nation of 317 million people. One 
                                                                
103 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2014/07/18/the-medical-school-as-a-model-for-
education/ 
104 Also included in Colignatus (2018f), “A child wants nice and no mean numbers”, 
https://zenodo.org/record/1434693 
105 http://math.berkeley.edu/~wu/ 
106 http://www.ams.org/notices/201103/rtx110300372p.pdf 
107 http://math.berkeley.edu/~wu/Interview-MM.pdf 
108 http://www.wired.com/2013/11/simpsons-math/ 
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can only hope that the publishers would indeed use quality judgement and would 
not be tempted to dumb things down to become acceptable to both teachers and 
students. In a world of free competition perhaps an English publisher would be 
willing to replace “rigour” by “rigor” and impose the A-levels also in the US of A. 
In my book Elegance with Substance (2009, 2015) I advise the parliaments of 
democratic nations to investigate their national systems of education in 
mathematics. Reading the experience by Wu suggests that this still is a good 
advice, certainly for the US. 
About the subject of logic, professor Wu in the interview p14 suggests that 
training math teachers in mathematical logic would not be so useful. He thinks that 
they better experience logic in a hands-on manner, doing actual proofs. I disagree. 
My book A Logic of Exceptions (1981 unpublished, 2007, 2011) would be quite 
accessible for math teachers, shows how important a grasp of formal logic is, and 
supports the teaching of math in fundamental manner. The distinction between 
necessary and sufficient conditions, for example, can be understood from doing 
proofs in geometry or algebra, but is grasped even better when the formal reasons 
for that distinction are seen. I can imagine that you want to skip some parts of 
ALOE but it depends upon the reader what parts those are. Some might be less 
interested in history and philosophy and others might be less interested in proof 
theory. Overall I feel that I can defend ALOE as a good composition, with some 
new critical results too. 
Thus, apart from what parliaments do, I move that the world can use more logic, 
even in elementary school. 
Update 2015:  
Editing the 2nd edition of Elegance with Substance (2009, 2015), now available, I 
was struck again by the empirical observation on the diversity of students and 
pupils. Evidence based education (EBE) may never attain the sample sizes that 
are required for statistical testing of theories that allow for such diversity. This fits 
the Medical School model: there is an important role for individual observation and 
personal hands-on experience to deal with empirical variety. Methodology and 
statistics remain important, of course, but in balanced application. 
It appears that professor Wu is updating some files. There is a rationale that 
such updates cause new file names and hence new links. A consequence is that 
old links break. My suggestion is to keep the old file names and links, and only 
insert the updated text. I have done so on my website and it works fine. Major 
changes can always be discussed in an appendix. Only fundamentally new texts 
require new links.  
One such update concerns professor Wu's text on fractions. 109 The text follows 
from professor Wu's objective to present the tradtional approach. Reading it again, 
I am struck again by the cumbersomeness of that approach. Much more elegant is 
the suggestion by Pierre van Hiele to abolish fractions, and use the multiplicative 
form. See this short introduction 110 and the longer discussion in A child wants nice 
and no mean numbers (2015, 2018). 111 
 
                                                                
109 https://math.berkeley.edu/~wu/CCSS-Fractions_1.pdf (new link, as long as it lasts) 
110 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2014/09/04/with-your-undivided-attention/ 
111 https://zenodo.org/record/1434693 
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11. Brexit without the will of the people 
 
2020-01-31 112 
 
Today, January 31 2020, at midnight Central European Time, Brexit will happen, 
even though it is unclear what the British voters think about it. Brexit is neither “by 
the will of the people” nor “against the will of the people” but merely “without the 
will of the people“. 
11.1 A proto-democracy generates uncertainty 
The UK is only a proto-democracy and no proper democracy, see this evaluation 
113 in the APS Newsletter Physics and Society, January 2020, p18-24, (reproduced 
in next Chapter 12), which looks at the USA but the argument for the UK is quite 
similar.  
On Brexit, uncertainty abounds: 
• The Brexit Referendum Question of 2016 was a political manipulation and 
unacceptable for a decent statistical questionnaire, see here p14. 114 The 
situation was “garbage in, garbage out”, with ample opportunity for 
populism.  
• The UK preferences were rather dispersed about the options for Leave or 
Remain, see here p6. 115 
• See my summary about Brexit’s deep roots in confusion on democracy 
and statistics p18. 116 
• The UK election of December 12 was for the House of Parliament and not 
about Brexit. Boris Johnson had all candidates for the Conservative Party 
pledge 117 to support Brexit, which runs against the principle that members 
of the House must represent their district. These elections thus violate the 
very principle of the UK proto-democracy.  
The UK proto-democracy has “district representation” with “first past the post“, 
which means that a party may get a majority in the House of Parliament without a 
majority in the electorate. In the UK 44% voted for the conservatives but they still 
got 56% of the seats. Thus 56% of the UK voters do not want a government by the 
Conservatives. 
Thus we still do not know what voters think about Brexit too. While Brexit was 
much discussed, and caused voters to switch to the Conservative Party, it still was 
                                                                
112 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2020/01/31/brexit-without-the-will-of-the-people/ 
113 https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/202001/index.cfm 
114 https://www.res.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/431d0819-d3a2-4b36-
8f80297d6db2285a.pdf 
115 https://www.res.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/235c92d4-e9dc-4153-
aab450b2b77bd847.pdf 
116 https://www.res.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/edabb350-7014-4fdf-853b0919b932271e.pdf 
117 https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-election-johnson/johnson-all-conservative-election-
candidates-pledge-to-back-my-brexit-deal-idUKKBN1XQ0QM 
 68 
not the only issue on the table, and it still is unclear what voters think about Brexit 
on balance. 
The UK has the curious phenomenon of the “Re-Leavers”. These voters chose 
Remain in 2016 but now switch to Leave merely because this was the majority 
outcome in the referendum, and they “want to respect the outcome”. However, this 
is not how democracy works. A vote is about what you think yourself and not 
about what the former outcome was. Obviously these Re-Leavers are free to 
exercise their democratic right to think whatever they want, but this kind of thinking 
destroys the possibility to determine what people actually want. 
11.2 YouGov tracker 
The YouGov tracker 118 is the best summary information about the general 
sentiment on the issue, but it is a poll and no electoral statement. Let me quote the 
tracking at this moment, because it always changes: 
 
 
 
11.3 Between-party dynamics 
Adam McDonnell and Chris Curtis of YouGov discuss a post-election survey of 
December 17 2019, 119 and here are their underlying data (for us page 3). 120 The 
                                                                
118 https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/01/28/political-trackers-24-26-jan-
2020-update 
119 https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-
general-election 
120 https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/wl0r2q1sm4/ 
Results_HowBritainVoted_2019_w.pdf 
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dynamics between the UK parties are remarkably large. Their key graph for our 
purposes is the following. 121 (Printed in gray, the parties can be identified by the 
stated order.) For example 27% (figure not printed) of the Conservatives voted 
Remain in 2016: 22% of those (shown in the 2nd bar from above) switch to the 
LibDem, likely because LibDem are Remain. However, 65% of the Remain 
Conservatives stick to their party, perhaps because they regard the issue less 
relevant than other issue of the Conservatives, or perhaps they are ReLeavers. Of 
the LibDem who voted Leave in 2016 still 46% (5th bar from above) voted LibDem 
though it had become a Remain party, perhaps because they thought that LibDem 
would not gain power anyway. 
 
 
 
Labour and LibDem could have made a deal to oppose the Conservative 
candidates with only one candidate from Labour / LibDem, in proportion to the 
forecasted vote shares. In that case, the LibDem could have assured a 
referendum on Brexit. During the elections, Jeremy Corbyn was criticised that he 
did not take a stand on Brexit, but his party was clearly divided, and his offer of a 
referendum was a fair option [but see below]. At most five years from now there 
will be new elections. These are the Conservative “battlegrounds“, 122 where this 
party could lose a seat by small number of voters. 
11.4 Beware of John Curtice 
John Curtice’s 123 diagnosis on Channel 4, November 27 2019, 124 was: 
                                                                
121 https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-
general-election 
122 http://www.electionpolling.co.uk/battleground/defence/conservative 
123 A portal and no scource: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Curtice 
124 https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1208867/General-Election-news-poll-polls-John-Curtice-
Brexit-prediction-2019-opinion-tracker-UK 
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“This is pretty much a binary election. Hung parliament, then we’re almost 
undoubtedly heading towards an extension and a second referendum, 
and lord knows what the outcome of that will be. Or we get a majority and 
we go out on January 31 and Boris is charged with the task of negotiating 
an alternative outcome. Ironically at the end of the day we’ve kind of 
stumbled into this election, but as the way it’s turning out, it’s actually 
providing us with a fairly clear binary choice.” 
This statement is clearly nonsense, already before the election outcome. Above 
dynamics of UK voters shows that voters did not see a binary vote on Brexit and 
clearly had various considerations other than Brexit. 
John Curtice is a renowned professor who on Election nights predicts the district 
outcomes with amazing accuracy. The problem however is that Curtice doesn’t 
see or explain that the true problem for the UK lies in the lack of equal 
proportionality in the general election. Curtice is locked in his electoral worldview 
like a hamster in a running wheel. Whatever he thinks and says here is in service 
of the current disproportionate electoral system in the UK, and then still produces 
nonsense. 
In sum, it is the current electoral system that created the mess on Brexit and its 
misleading referendum question in 2016. If the UK had had equal proportional 
representation (EPR) like in Holland to start with, then Nigel Farage could have 
gotten his 12,5% of the seats in the House, and then the political discussion would 
have had greater restraint on the truth of the matter. 
11.5 Brexit is still a mess, and now the eggs are scrambled 
The solution for the present mess lies not in a new referendum on Brexit, as 
Curtice accepts, but in equal proportional representation (EPR). Referendum 
questions are manipulative, and voters cannot negotiate in polling stations. With 
EPR, representatives in the House can deconstruct manipulation and can 
negotiate. The current UK system gives only district winners, and they may be 
locked to a party line and cannot represent the diversity of views within their 
districts. The latter was already a fairy tale in 1900 and even more in 2020. Again, 
see my evaluation in the APS Newsletter Physics and Society (reproduced in next 
Chapter 12). 
Let the UK reboot itself. A big problem for UK voters now is: if the UK would 
rejoin the EU then it would have to accept the euro. 
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12. A buddy-system of physicists and political scientists 
 
The USA is only proto-democratic. More than a third of US voters have taxation 
without representation. A buddy system of physicists and political scientists may 
clear up confusions and would likely have a positive impact on society. 
 
November 2018 – November 2019 – January 2020 125 
 
12.1 Summary and introduction 
World society has a worrying trend of threats to notions and systems of 
democracy, see Wiesner et al. (2018) in the European Journal of Physics. It might 
be a fair enquiry whether physicists might play a role in enhancing democracy, 
also in their off-physics-research moments. Physicists have scientific training with 
a focus on empirics and a command of mathematics and modeling, and they 
would be ideally placed in providing sound reasoning and debunking confusion, 
potentially also in off-physics discussions about democracy. However, whatever 
this ideal position, when physicists don’t study democracy then they are likely to 
be as uneducated as other people. One would expect that the true experts are 
political scientists, who might provide for such education also for physicists. This 
article will show however that political science still appears to be locked in the 
humanities on some crucial issues. Such political science rather creates confusion 
in the national educational system and the media, instead of providing the 
education that a physicist would need. The suggestion here is that the APS Forum 
on Physics and Society helps to set up a buddy system of physicists and political 
scientists so that the buddies – for all clarity consisting of a physicist and a political 
scientist per team – can educate and criticise each other in mutual respect, not 
only to each other’s enjoyment, but likely with positive impact on society.  
Democracy is a large subject, and the present article focuses on electoral 
systems. I will present some findings that are new to political science on electoral 
systems, and these will be indicated by the label News. They provide good points 
of departure when a physicist would begin a discussion with his or her political 
science buddy.  
12.2 Why would physicists be interested in electoral systems ? 
Physicists meet with elections once in a while. Within faculties and professional 
organisations sometimes formal voting procedures are used. In such cases, often 
the actual decision has already been made in (delegated) negotiations so that the 
formal voting procedure only serves for ratification and expression of consent by 
the plenum. Physicists may also vote in local, state or national elections, in which, 
one would hope, the outcome has not been predetermined. The often implicit 
suggestion is that such electoral systems have been well-designed so that they no 
longer need scrutiny. However, the highly worrying and disturbing diagnosis 
provided in this article is that countries like the USA, UK and France appear to be 
                                                                
125 American Physical Society, Newsletter Physics and Society, January 2020, p18-24, 
https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/202001/index.cfm with some small edits here 
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only proto-democratic (News). They are not the grand democracies as they are 
portrayed by political science in their books, the media and government classes in 
highschool. Physicists might be as gullible as anyone else who hasn’t properly 
studied the subject. Physicists might consider to rely upon mathematicians who 
write about electoral systems but mathematicians tend to lack the training on 
empirical research and create their own confusions, see Colignatus (2001, 2014) 
(News). Physicists might however be amongst the first scientists who would be 
able to perceive that proper re-education would be required, and that the creation 
of said buddy system would be an effective approach, and perhaps even a 
necessary approach given the perplexities in the issue (News). 
The US midterms of November 6 2018 allow for an illustration of a new finding 
from August 2017. This new insight is a game changer (News), compare the news 
that the Earth is not flat but a globe. Policy makers might need more time to adapt 
US electoral laws but the new information can be passed on quickly. It appears 
that more than a third of US voters have taxation without representation (News). It 
presents a problem that buddies of physicists and political scientists can delve 
into, to each other’s perplexion. 
12.3 Discovery in August 2017 
Some readers will be familiar with the distinction between “district 
representation” (DR) versus “equal proportional representation” (EPR). In DR the 
votes in a district determine its winner(s) regardless of totall outcomes. In EPR 
parties are assigned seats in equal proportion to the vote share, with particular 
rules to handle integer numbers. Before August 2017 I thought that the properties 
of DR and EPR were well-known, and that the main reason why the USA, UK or 
France did not change from DR to EPR was that a party in power would not easily 
change the system that put it into power. Then however I discovered that the 
literature in the particular branch of “political science on electoral systems” 
(including referenda) did not discuss the properties with sufficient scientific clarity 
(News). Many statements by “political science on electoral systems” are still 
locked in the humanities and tradition, and they aren’t scientific when you look at 
them closely. For its relevance for empirical reality this branch of political science 
can only be compared to astrology, alchemy or homeopathy (News). The 2018 
proof is in paper 84482 in the Munich archive MPRA, Colignatus (2018a) 
(News).Thus the academia have been disinforming the world for the greater part 
of the last century (News). Americans express a preference for their own political 
system – an excellent book in this respect is Taylor et al. (2014) – but they are 
also indoctrinated in their obligatory highschool Government classes, which in 
their turn again are disinformed by the academia, like indeed Taylor et al. too 
(News). Rein Taagepera (born 1933) started as a physicist and continued in 
political science with the objective to apply methods of physics. Shugart & 
Taagepera (2017) present marvels of results, yet run aground by overlooking the 
key distinction between DR and EPR, as discussed here (News). Let us now look 
at the US midterm of 2018, and apply clarity (News). 
12.4 US House of Representatives 2018 
In the 2018 Midterms for the US House of Representatives, 63.6% of the votes 
were for winning candidates and 36.4% were for losing candidates, see the 
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barchart (News). This chart is novel and is conventionally not shown even though 
it is crucial to understand what is happening (News). The US system of district 
representation (DR) has “winner take all”. The traditional view is that the losing 
votes are “wasted”. Part of the new insight is that the latter terminology is 
distractive, too soft, and falsely puts the blame on the voter (who should be wiser 
than to waste his or her vote) (News). In truth we must look at the system that 
actually discards these votes (News). These votes no longer count. These voters 
essentially have taxation without representation (News).  
 
12.5 Legal tradition in the humanities versus empirical science 
Economic theory has the Principal – Agent Theory (PAT). Supposedly the voter 
is the principal and the district representative would be the agent. However, a 
losing voter as principal will hardly regard a winning candidate as his or her agent 
(News). The legal storyline is that winning candidates are supposed to represent 
their district and thus also those who did not vote for them. Empirical science and 
hardnosed political analysts know that this is make-believe with fairy tales in cloud 
cuckoo land. In practice, losing voters in a district deliberately did not vote for the 
winning candidate and most losing voters commonly will not regard this winner as 
their proper representative but perhaps even as an adversary (surely this cannot 
be News ? But textbooks in political science do not work the point). The textbook 
by Taylor et al. (2014) refers to PAT but applies it wrongly as if legal formality 
suffices (News). Under the legal framing of “representation” these House winners 
actually appropriate the votes of those who did not vote for them. Rather than a 
US House of Representatives we have a US House of District Winners, but we 
might also call it the US House of Vote Thieves (News). 
These voting outcomes are also highly contaminated by the political dynamics of 
district representation (DR). The USA concentrates on bickering between two 
parties, with internal strife and hostile takeovers in the primaries (Maskin & Sen 
(2016)). Many voters only voted strategically in an effort to block what they 
considered a worse alternative, and originally had another first preference. In a 
system of equal proportional representation (EPR) like in Holland, there is 
“electoral justice”. Holland has 13 parties in the House and allows for the dynamic 
competition by new parties. Voters are at ease in choosing their first preference 
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and thus proper representatives. They might also employ some strategy but this 
would be in luxury by free will. In the USA voters often fear that their vote is lost, 
and the outcome is also distorted by their gambling about the odds. Thus we can 
safely conclude that even more than a third of US voters in 2018 are robbed from 
their democratic right of electing their representative (News). 
12.6 Legal tradition versus the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 states: 
“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.”  
When votes are not translated into representation of choice, then they are 
essentially discarded, in violation of this human right (News). The USA helped 
drafting and then ratified the UDHR but apparently did not realise that its own 
electoral system violates it (News). The USA has been saved somewhat by the 
workings of the Median Voter Theorem and by parties defending their voters in 
losing districts (which runs against the principle of representing your own district 
(News)). The loss of economic well-being must be great (News), e.g. compare 
Sweden and Holland, that switched from DR to EPR in 1907 resp. 1917, that are 
among the happiest countries. 126  
12.7 Confirmation by a scatter plot 
We see this diagnosis confirmed by the district results of the US Midterms, see 
the scatter chart (News) with horizontally the number of votes per winner and 
vertically the share of that winning vote in the district. Some districts are 
uncontested with 100% of the share. The key parameter is the electoral quota, 
defined as the total number of votes divided by the 435 seats in the US House. 
This is about 246 thousand votes, given by a vertical dashed line [on the right].  
 
                                                                
126 Caveat: these countries must thank the USA and UK for saving them from the Nazis. A 
common line of argument is that DR protected the USA and UK from dictatorship, and that EPR 
allowed the Nazis to seize power. Instead, EPR made it more difficult for the Nazis, and they only 
got in control by the fire of the Reichstag and arresting communists in the Weimar parliament, 
see Boissoneault (2017). (This is not News since some specialists know this, but it still is not 
common knowledge amongst political scientists.) 
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In EPR a seat in the House would be fully covered by this electoral quota, and 
practically all dots would lie on this line except for some remainder seats. In DR in 
the USA in 2018 only some 11 dots manage to reach this quota, helped by having 
large districts. Gerrymandering can help to create such districts. There can be 
more districts with fewer voters in which the gerrymandering party hopes to have 
an easier win, remarkably often with even less than half the electoral quota at 123 
thousand. While some people speak out against gerrymandering, it is the very 
point of having districts itself that disenfranchises voters (News). 
In the USA the winners tend to gain more than 50% of the votes in their districts, 
which plays into the storyline that they gain a majority in their district, but this still 
is a make-believe fairy tale because they fall brutally short of the electoral quota 
for proper representation (News). That winners tend to get more than 50% merely 
reflects the competition between only two parties, at the detriment of other views. 
12.8 Ordinary language instead of scientific precision  
Above observation on taxation without representation could be an eye-opener 
for many (News). Perhaps two eyes may be opened. This unscientific branch of 
political science relies upon ordinary language instead of definitions with scientific 
precision (News). Physics also borrowed common words like “force” and “mass”, 
yet it provided precise definitions, and gravity in Holland has the same meaning as 
gravity in the USA. The “political science on electoral systems” uses the same 
words “election” and “representative” but their meaning in Holland with EPR is 
entirely different from the USA with DR. We find that the USA, UK and France are 
locked into confusion by their vocabulary. The discussion above translates into the 
following deconstruction of terminology (News). 
• In EPR, we have proper elections and proper representatives. Votes are 
bundled to go to their representative of choice (commonly of first preference), 
except for a small fraction (in Holland 2%) for tiny parties that fail to get the 
electoral quota. Those votes are wasted in the proper sense that the 
technique of equal proportionality on integer seats cannot handle such tiny 
fractions. A solution approach to such waste is to allow alliances 
(“apparentement”) or empty seats or at least to require qualified majority 
voting in the House (News). 
• In DR, what is called an “election” is actually a contest (News). A compromise 
term is “election contest”. What is called a “representative” is rather a local 
winner, often not the first preference. This is often recognised in the PS 
literature and thus no News, but remarkably political scientists then switch to 
the legality of representation and continue as if a winner is a representative 
indeed. The legal terminology doesn’t fit political reality and Principal – Agent 
Theory (News). 
An analogy is the following (News). Consider the medieval “trial by combat” or 
the “judgement of God”, that persisted into the phenomenon of dueling to settle 
conflicts. A duel was once seriously seen as befitting of the words “trial” and 
“judgement”. Eventually civilisation gave the application of law with procedures in 
court. Using the same words “trial” and “judgement” for both a duel and a court 
decision confuses what is really involved, though the outward appearance may 
look the same, i.e. that only one party passes the gate. It is better to use words 
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that enhance clarity. The system of DR is proto-democratic while proper 
democracy uses EPR (News). 
Shaun Lawson (2015) in the UK laments how elementary democratic rights are 
taken away but still doesn’t understand how. Now we know. The problem lies first 
of all with the academia (News). 
12.9 Blame also the unscientific cowardice of R.A. Dahl and C.E. Lindblom 
Both eyes might be opened even further by a glance at the US presidency, that 
currently occupies the USA so much, and that creates such needless national 
division. Arthur Schlesinger, “The Imperial Presidency”, 1973, was concerned that 
the US presidency exceeded its constitutional boundaries and was getting 
uncontrollable. Robert Dahl & Charles Lindblom, “Politics, Economics, and 
Welfare”, 1976, page 349, take this into account and provide their answer:  
"Given the consequences of bargaining just described, what are the 
prerequisites of increasing the capacity of Americans for rational social 
action through their national government? (...) Certainly the adoption of a 
parliamentary system along British lines, or some version of it, may be 
ruled out, not only because no one knows enough to predict how it would 
work in the United States, but also because support for the idea is 
nonexistent. Although incremental change provides better opportunity for 
rational calculation than comprehensive alternations like substitution of 
the British system, there is little evidence even of a desire for incremental 
change, at least in a direction that would increase opportunities for 
rational calculation and yet maintain or strengthen polyarchal controls.”  
This is a statement of unscientific cowardice (News). A scientist who observes 
climate change provides model, data and conclusion, and responds to criticism. 
Dahl & Lindblom show themselves as being afraid of stepping out of the line of 
tradition in the humanities. They fear the reactions by their colleagues. They want 
to keep saying that the US is a democracy rather than conclude that it is only a 
proto-democracy (News). They resort to word-magic and present a new label 
“polyarchy” as a great insight while it is a cover-up for the failure on democracy 
(p276) (News). The phrase about predicting how a parliamentarian system would 
perform in the USA is silly when the empirical experience elsewhere is that it 
would be an improvement (this cannot be News since the evidence exists but it 
might be News to political scientists that D&L close their eyes for the evidence). 
Nowadays, the US House of Vote Thieves can still appoint a prime minister 
(News). For this goverance structure, it is only required that the US president 
decides to adopt a ceremonial role, which is quite possible within the US 
constitution, and quite logical from a democratic point of view (News). For the 
checks and balances it would also be better that the (ceremonial) president 
doesn’t interfere with the election of the legislature, but we saw such meddling in 
2018. See also Juan Linz, “The perils of presidentialism”, 1990. The reference by 
Dahl & Lindblom to Britain partly fails because it also has DR, while the step 
towards proper democracy includes the switch to EPR, also for Britain (News). 
See Colignatus (2018de) for an explaination how Brexit can be explained by the 
pernicious logic of DR and referenda, and for a solution approach for Britain to first 
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study electoral systems, switch to EPR, have new elections, and then let the UK 
parliament reconsider the issue (News). 
In his obituary of Dahl, Ian Shapiro stated in 2014: “He might well have been the 
most important political scientist of the last century, and he was certainly one of its 
preeminent social scientists”. Also the informative and critical Blokland (2011) 
does not deconstruct this image. The truth rather is, obviously with all respect, that 
Dahl was still locked in the humanities and tradition (News). He lacked the 
mathematical competence to debunk Kenneth Arrow’s interpretation of his 
“Impossibility Theorem”, see Colignatus (2001, 2014) (News). Dahl’s unscientific 
cowardice has led “political science on electoral systems” astray (News), though 
political scientists remain responsible themselves even today. Scandinavia has 
EPR but its political scientists can still revere Dahl. Teorell et al. (2016) follow 
Dahl’s misguided analysis, and their “polyarchy index” puts the USA, UK and 
France above Holland, even while at least a third of US voters are being robbed 
from representation because of the US House of Vote Thieves. Hopefully also the 
Scandinavians set up a buddy system for their political scientists (News).  
12.10 Incompetence may become a crime 
If the world of political science would not answer to this criticism and burke it, 
then this would constitute a white collar crime (News). The US has a high degree 
of litigation that might turn this into a paradise for lawyers (not really news). Yet in 
science as in econometrics we follow Leibniz and Jan Tinbergen (trained by 
Ehrenfest), and we sit down and look at the formulas and data. Empirical scientists 
tend to be interested in other things than democracy, and when they haven’t 
studied the topic then they may have been indoctrinated in highschool like any 
other voter (not really News). Scholars who are interested in democracy 
apparently have inadequate training in empirics (this is News). Those scholars 
have started since 1903 (foundation of APSA) with studying statistics and the 
distinction between causation and correlation, but a key feature of empirics is also 
observation. When it still is tradition that determines your frame of mind and 
dictates what you see and understand, then you are still locked in the humanities, 
without the ability to actually observe what you intend to study. It is crucial to 
observe in DR that votes are discarded and are not used for representation of first 
preferences, unhinging the principal-agent relationship that you claim would exist 
(News). Also FairVote USA is part of the problem (News), who do not clearly 
present the analysis given here and who misrepresent equal proportionality by 
trying to make it fit with DR, while the true problem is DR itself. The USA is locked 
in stagnation. 
12.11 A buddy-system of scientists and scholars from the humanities 
The obvious first step is that real scientists check the evidence (at MPRA 
84482), which would require that scientists in their spare time develop an interest 
in democracy, and that scholars in “political science on electoral systems” 
overcome their potential incomprehension about this criticism on their 
performance. The suggested solution approach is to set up a buddy-system, so 
that pairs of (non-political) scientists (physicists) and (political science) scholars 
can assist each other in clearing up confusions.  
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Some may fear what they might discover, and fear what they might have to 
explain to (fellow) US voters, but like FDR stated in 1933: There is nothing to fear 
but fear itself.  
Thomas Colignatus is the scientific name of Thomas Cool, Econometrician 
(Groningen 1982) and teacher of mathematics (Leiden 2008), Scheveningen, 
Holland. http://thomascool.eu, ORCID 0000-0002-2724-6647. He is close to 
retirement without current professional affiliation, secretary of the Samuel van 
Houten Genootschap (the scientific bureau of an initiative for a new political party), 
and he publishes his books via Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics. 
PM 1. The evidence for this article is provided in Colignatus (2018a) at MPRA 
84482. Appendix A [Section 12.12] summarizes supplementary evidence by 
Colignatus (2018b). Appendix B [Section 12.13] discusses seeming inconsist-
encies in this article. For consequences for UK and Brexit, see Colignatus (2018d) 
in the October 2018 Newsletter of the Royal Economic Society. See Colignatus 
(2018e) for a suggestion of a moratorium. 
PM 2. The data in the charts are from the Cook Political Report of November 12 
2018, with still 7 seats too close to call but presumed called here.  
PM 3. I thank Stephen Wolfram for the programme Mathematica used here. For 
the creation of Mathematica, Wolfram was partly inspired by the program 
Schoonschip by Martinus Veltman. 
12.12 Appendix A. Supplementary evidence on inequality / disproportionality of 
votes and seats (News) 
The following is from Colignatus (2018b). Political science on electoral systems 
uses measures of inequality or disproportionality (ID) of votes and seats, to 
provide a summary overview of the situation. Relevant measures are (i) the sum of 
the absolute differences, corrected for double counting, as proposed by 
Loosemore & Hanby (ALHID), (ii) the Euclidean distance proposed by Gallagher 
(EGID), and (iii) the sine as the opposite of R-squared in regresssion through the 
origin, as proposed by me (SDID). For two parties, or when only one party gets a 
seat so that the others can be collected under the zero seat, then Euclid reduces 
to the absolute difference.  
The following table gives the US data for 2016 and preliminary 2018. 
Conveniently we use data and indices in the [0, 10] range, like an inverted report 
card (Bart Simpson: the lower the better). The ALHID of 2016 gives a low value of 
0.63 in a range of 10, but SDID provides a magnifying glass and finds 3.24 on a 
scale of 10. In 2018 the inequality / disproportionality seems much reduced. 
Observe that the votes are not for first preferences, due to strategic voting, and 
outcomes thus cannot be compared to those of countries with EPR. 
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Taylor et al. (2014:145) table 5.6 give electoral disproportionalities in houses of 
representatives in 31 democracies over 1990-2010, using EGID. Proportional 
Holland has 0.1 on a scale of 10 (there is little need to measure something that 
has been defined as equal proportional), and disproportional France has 1.95 on a 
scale of 10. The USA has 0.39 on a scale of 10. Taylor et al. p147 explain the 
much better performance of the USA compared to France by referring to the US 
two-party-system, including the impact of the US primaries. This statement is 
curious because it doesn’t mention strategic voting and thus the basic invalidity of 
the measure. In 2018 more than a third of the votes in the USA are discarded, so 
their table 5.6 does some number crunching as if it were science but misses the 
key distinction between EPR and DR. 
Taylor et al. may be thanked for their mentioning of the primaries, because this 
highlights that the USA labels of “Republican” and “Democrat” are only loosely 
defined. District candidates have different origins and flavours. A Southern 
Republican in 2018 may rather derive from the Southern parties who supported 
slavery and thus be less rooted in the original Republicans of Lincoln who 
abolished slavery in 1863. Condoleezza Rice may wonder which Republican Party 
she joined. Thus, above aggregate measures are dubious on the use of these 
labels too. In the aggregate we see that district winners are supposed to defend 
losers of the same party in other districts, but this runs against the notion that a 
representative ought to represent the own district. This objection is stronger when 
the party labels over districts are only defined loosely.  
Thus, as an innovation for the literature (News), it is better to use the ALHID = 
EGID and SDID measures per district, and then use the (weighted) average for 
the aggregate. In each district there is only one winner, which means that the 
disproportionality is large, and we see more impact from the phenomenon that 
losing votes are not translated into seats. When we weigh by seats, or the value 1 
per district, then we get the plain average. Alternatively we can weigh by the votes 
per district. We find that the 2018 aggregate ALHID of 0.18 rises to the average 
3.50 (weighted by seats) or 3.64 (weighted by votes) on a scale of 10. SDID uses 
a magnifying glass. These outcomes are still distorted by strategic voting, of 
course, but the outcomes show the dismal situation for representation in the USA 
much better. In the best measure (SDID) on a scale of 0 (best) to 10 (worst), the 
USA is 6.57 off-target. 
 
 
 
12.13 Appendix B. Seeming inconsistencies 
This article runs the risk of an inconsistency (A): (i) The information was known 
around 1900 so that Sweden and Holland could make the switch from DR to EPR, 
(ii) There is News for the political science community so that now the USA, UK 
and France can make the switch too. Formulated as such, this is a plain 
inconsistency. However, political scientists in the USA, UK and France invented 
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apologies to neglect the information under (i). The News under (ii) debunks such 
apologies. Thus there is no inconsistency. There is a distinction between full 
information (with arguments pro and con) and an apology to neglect information. 
Sweden and Holland did not invent such apologies and thus were informed back 
then, and are not in need of debunking now. One might consider that Sweden and 
Holland were too rash in their switch from DR to EPR, since they overlooked such 
apologies to neglect information. This however would be like arguing that a proper 
decision also requires putting one’s head under the sand, at least for some 100 
years, in order to see the full spectrum of possible choices. 
This article runs the risk of inconsistency (B): (i) It is a strong claim that 
something is News, and this would require knowledge of all political science 
literature, (ii) The author is no political scientist. Formulated as such, this is a plain 
inconsistency. However, Colignatus (2018a) selects a political science paper that 
is “top of the line” and then debunks it. For all practical matters this is sufficient. 
Colignatus (2001, 2014) discusses single seat elections. My intention was to 
write a sequel volume in 2019 on multiple seat elections, combining (2018a) and 
(2018b) and related papers. This present article is a meagre abstract of this 
intended sequel. I got sidetracked in 2018-2019 on the environment and climate 
change by assisting Hueting & De Boer (2019) and drafting Colignatus [2020a]. 
The News in this article has not been submitted to political science journals, so 
that the underlying diagnosis maintains its validity for a longer while, i.e. that 
political science on electoral systems still is locked in the humanities (News). This 
News has been indicated to the board of the Political Science association in 
Holland, but they are likely unaware about the econometric approach to Hume’s 
divide between Is and Ought, see Colignatus (2018c), p6-7. 
The News in this article has not been submitted to political science journals 
because the community of political science has had ample opportunity since 1900 
to listen and we can observe as an empirical fact that they do not listen but invent 
apologies not to listen, and thus don’t do science properly (News). While Sweden 
and Holland switched from DR to EPR so early in the 1900s, the USA (“American 
exceptionalism”) and UK (“the world’s first democracy”) had the same discussion 
but kept DR, and the very manner of reasoning does not show rationality but 
traditionalism verging on mystic glorification of national history. France had a 
phase of EPR but then some political parties tried to stop the popular Charles de 
Gaulle by switching to DR, and they in fact created a stronger power base for the 
Gaullists. Instead of disseminating the News via a submission to a political science 
journal where it will be handled by methods of astrology, alchemy and 
homeopathy, it is better to call in the cavalry. Let the world observe the dismal 
situation of political science on electoral systems, and let the scientific community 
put a stop to it (News). 
An example of a physicist [mathematician] looking at democracy is Karoline 
Wiesner. The paper Wiesner et al. (2018) is not presented as the final truth here. 
There is no guarantee that such study will be useful without the News provided 
here as points of departure. For example, their article uses the The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) Index of Democracy, that does not catalog the proto-
democratic electoral systems in the USA, UK and France as major threats to 
democracy. 
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13. To keep global warming below 1.5°C, a key strategy for the 
crucial next decade is to try convince women to wait and 
have their first child at age 30+ 
 
February 2 2020 
 
Hueting (UNEP Global 500 Award) & De Boer (2019) 127 clarify that national 
statistical bureaus present Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as “national income” 
while a large part of GDP is no proper income, but depletion of resources that are 
necessary for the survival of future generations. Providing policy makers with 
additional information about emissions of CO2 leaves ambiguity about the causal 
relation with GDP. Policy makers tend to think that “economic growth” is required 
to reduce pollution while it actually tends to increase it. Environmental 
sustainability assumes that people would at least want to give children, born this 
century, an environment without climate change and other such catastrophes. 
Standards for environmental sustainability – another result of the Hueting & De 
Boer book – allow to determine that there is overpopulation. The national 
statistical bureaus have stewardship, or a duty of care. This requires that the 
figure of GDP is presented alongside information about the distance to 
environmental sustainability, eΔ = GDP – eGDP. Hueting was appointed in 1969 
at CBS Statistics Netherlands to create a new department on environmental 
statistics with the objective to correct the figure of GDP for environmental damage. 
Colignatus (2020a) (draft) 128 discusses the reception of this analysis. The 
following result derives from this context, and concerns a tentative finding about a 
factor in family planning and climate change.  
This present discussion: (i) reports upon this tentative finding, Colignatus 
(2019b), 129 (ii) suggests a policy strategy for the UN / UNFPA and national 
government agencies on health and education, and, since I am only an 
econometrician and no demographer, medical doctor or family planner, (iii) invites 
other researchers to check the tentative finding, for research itself, but also to 
allow a clearer view on the relevance and details of such a policy strategy. 
This new tentative finding stands in stark contrast with an earlier far more 
conservative conclusion by Bradshaw & Brook (2014). 130 It supports Bongaarts & 
O’Neill (2018) 131 but highlights an unmentioned but crucial didactic point. 
                                                                
127 Hueting, R. and B. de Boer (2019), “National Accounts and environmentally Sustainable 
National Income”, Eburon Academic Publishers, also via University of Chicago Press, 
http://www.sni-hueting.info/EN/NA-eSNI/index.html, 
https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/N/bo50552329.html 
128 Colignatus, Th. (2020a), “The Tinbergen & Hueting Approach in the Economics of National 
Accounts and Ecological Survival”, draft at http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Environment/2019-11-
18-THAENAES.pdf, to be used for an update at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63904/ 
129 Colignatus, Th. (2019b), “A numerical exercise on climate change and family planning: World 
population might reduce from 11 to 8 billion in 2100 if women of age 15-29 wait and have their 
first child at age 30+”, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97447/  
130 Bradshaw, C.J.A. and B.W. Brook (2014), “Human population reduction is not a quick fix for 
environmental problems”. PNAS November 18, 2014 111 (46) 16610-16615; first published 
October 27, https://www.pnas.org/content/111/46/16610 
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13.1 Policy strategy and new finding 
The policy strategy is to try to convince young women to have their first child at 
age 30 or later. A delay in primiparity means that there is no infringement upon 
procreation and fertility rights themselves. The next decade is crucial for climate 
change and keeping the rise of global temperature below 1.5 degrees Celsius, see 
UNEP (2019). 132 Currently 2/3 of all births are with mothers with ages 15-29. If 
such births could be delayed then the next 15 years would see a direct reduction 
of world population by 0.8 billion compared to “business as usual” (BAU). When 
this delay is sustained in the future, then, when the later born babies grow up, they 
themselves will wait till they are 30+, which causes further reduction. The 
cumulative effect would be that world population can be reduced from 11 billion to 
8 billion people by 2100. It would cut projected emissions by some 20-25%. 
Colignatus (2019b) contains the rough estimate of the effect size. Figure 4 
shows the population sizes for BAU and two alternative scenario’s to 2100: (i) just 
delay and (ii) delay with a learning effect of 20% lower fertility.  
Figure 5 shows the dependency ratio’s, with the active age group 15-64 in the 
denominator and the other age groups in the numerator. The ratio first drops to 
40% and rises to 80% for a while. When the population reduction comes with 
improvements in income and health, then retirement might rise from age 65 to 70, 
reducing the number of dependents and increasing the denominator. 
13.2 Contrast with Bradshaw & Brook 2014 
This new finding starkly contrasts with Bradshaw & Brook (2014): "Humanity’s 
large demographic momentum means that there are no easy policy levers to 
change the size of the human population substantially over coming decades, short 
of extreme and rapid reductions in female fertility; it will take centuries, and the 
long-term target remains unclear."  
It appears that the latter study used a rather cautious scenario: “We also 
emulated a shift toward older primiparity by allocating 50% of the fertility in the 
youngest reproductive age class (15-24) evenly across the older breeding classes 
(25-49), following a linear change function from 2013 to 2100 (...)."  
Since so much is unknown, the latter caution may be understood, but the current 
challenge – to keep global warming below 1.5°C – is such that humanity better 
looks at all options on the table, including a more ambitious delay in primiparity. 
13.3 Other research 
Bradshaw & Brook (2014) were criticised by O’Sullivan (2015) 133 on the 
relevance of regional differences, and we can support her statement now on the 
topic of primiparity: “Bradshaw and Brook’s (...) paper seriously understates the 
hazard of our current population course, and underestimates the impact of fertility- 
                                                                                                                                      
131 Bongaarts, J. and B.C. O’Neill (2018), “Global warming policy: Is population left out in the 
cold? Population policies offer options to lessen climate risks”, Science, 17 AUGUST 2018 • VOL 
361 ISSUE 6403, p650-652 
132 UN Environment Programme (2019), “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, November 26, UNEP 
133 O’Sullivan, J.N, (2015), “Letter: Population stabilization potential and its benefits 
underestimated”, PNAS February 10, 2015 112 (6) E507; first published January 23, 
https://www.pnas.org/content/112/6/E507 
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reduction efforts. The authors clearly intend to reinforce the importance of 
population on total environmental impact, but the effect of this paper can only be 
perversely to diminish political will for family-planning efforts.” O’Sullivan (2016) 134 
criticises the UN Population Division for being less creative in clarifying the policy 
options. The UN Division might function more as a statistical instead of indicative 
planning agency. We need supercomputers with integrated modeling, since it is 
science fiction to suppose that there can be 11 bn people without restraining 
feedbacks. O’Sullivan (2018) 135 is highly recommendable, e.g. on the causality of 
fertility and development, and current undermeasurement of population. Her 
chapter highlights the effect of population momentum for the long run, and 
unfortunately doesn’t specify the importance of primiparity for the next decade. 
O’Neill et al. (2012) 136 review the literature on population and emissions, but not 
yet quite on the effect discussed here. Remarkably, the Worldwatch Institute 
(2016) 137 looked at more than 900 papers and concludes (p1): “Peer-reviewed 
scientific research published since 2005 has rarely considered directly the 
hypothesis that family planning benefits environmental sustainability. Not 
surprisingly, given this relative lack of attention, no scientific consensus is 
apparent in the literature.” 
Gerlagh, Lupi & Galeotti (2018) 138 take the age group 15-45 as a single 
generation (unit), so that they cannot simulate this (intra-unit) effect. They consider 
taxing the external effects of births (a fertility tax) instead of ways to avoid the 
problem and such tax. They directly challenge procreation and fertility rights. 
However, their model seems to be adaptable to include the option of delay. 
Lutz et al. (2014) 139 at IIASA suggest that education is important and should not 
be overlooked, compared to a focus on infrastructure for adaptation. Lutz et al. 
(2019) 140 argue that education rather than the age structure brings the relevant 
demographic dividend.  
13.4 Communication and didactics 
The UNFCCC tends to focus on keeping global warming below 1.5°C in 2020-
2030. Such framing comes from failure of earlier targets so that mitigation and 
adaption seem a second-best solution. However, the current 1°C already has 
disastrous effects. It makes more sense to target both a population of 3 bn and 
removing the current surplus of CO2. 
                                                                
134 O’Sullivan, J.N, (2016), “Population Projections: Recipes for Action, or Inaction?”, Population 
& Sustainability: The Journal of Population Matters, 1, 1, 2016, pp. 45-57 
135 O’Sullivan, J.N. (2018), “Synergy between Population Policy, Climate Adaptation and 
Mitigation”, chapter 7 in M. Hossain et al. (eds.), “Pathways to a Sustainable Economy”, Springer, 
p103-125 
136 O'Neill, B.C. et al. (2012), “Demographic change and carbon dioxide emissions”, The Lancet, 
Volume 380, Issue 9837, 157 – 164 
137 Worldwatch Institute (2016), “Family Planning and Environmental Sustainability: Assessing 
the Science”. FPESA.net 
138 Gerlagh, R. and V. Lupi, M. Galeotti (2018), “Family Planning and Climate Change”, CesIfo 
working papers 7421, https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7421.pdf 
139 https://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/news/20141127-Science-Pop.html 
140 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6600906/ 
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Economist Hueting presented his findings in terms of national income, as eGDP 
≈ 70% GDP. It can be more didactic to infer that at least one in three persons is 
too many. An even larger reduction of population is needed to cut net emissions to 
zero. 
Bongaarts & O’Neill (2018) are critical that UNFCCC neglects demographers 
and family planners. The 1994 Cairo population conference emphasized fertility 
rights, which caused 25 years of unchecked population growth. UNFCCC 
apparently didn’t want to be slowed down by this kind of discussion. Textbooks on 
demography state anyway that there are no effects in the medium run (the next 
decade 2020-2030), and that population momentum works like steering a 
supertanker. Apparently UNFCCC and demographers are in a stalemate. This can 
be resolved by better didactics on delay in primiparity. Bongaarts & O’Neill (2018) 
know about its existence but did not specify it, and they did not indicate the 
presently indicated effect magnitude. UNFCCC might be surprised that there is an 
approach that (i) doesn’t infringe upon fertility rights (ii) with a direct effect in the 
next decade. 
13.5 Conclusions 
Paul Ehrlich in “The population bomb” of 1968 spoke about a “heat limit” rather 
than climate change. The book caused much discussion, and a bet with Julian 
Simon (1932-1998). Many people regret now that humanity hasn’t listened more 
carefully. This new tentative finding on delay in primiparity has a similar urgency. 
Humanity has a real opportunity for the 2020-2030 decade – namely a delay that 
maintains fertility rights – and many will regret later when it would not be used now 
to the fullest practical extent possible. 
The indicated effect magnitude warrants the conclusion that more research on 
delaying births would be interesting. Not to establish whether this road might be 
taken, since education already is a human right, but to explore the details that can 
be communicated in education on family planning. 
The indicated effect magnitude also identifies this approach as a suggestion for 
a high priority strategy by the United Nations / UNFPA and the national 
government agencies on health and education.  
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Part 4. Dutch economics 
 
 88 
 
 89 
14. An Economic Supreme Court 
Newsletter of the Royal Economic Society, October 2014, p20-21 141 
14.1 Management by crisis by management 
Policy making in the European Union is often described as ‘management by 
crisis’. Countries are only willing to agree on common solutions when 
circumstances force them. This may be an exaggeration for the daily handling of 
minor issues but the last decades have shown a core truth with also the 
companion element of ‘crisis by management’. The crises in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) were answered by the euro, and the crises in the euro are 
being answered by Van Rompuy’s Roadmap: (i) a banking union, (ii) stricter fiscal 
co-ordination, with deficits of at most 0.5%, (iii) squaring the circle on both 
competition and the social impact, and (iv) more hoped-for democratic legitimacy. 
The Eurozone sticks to an architecture in which fiat money (the euro) still works 
out as a gold standard, since governments have debt in a currency they have no 
control over. It is the hyperinflation of 1921-1924 in the Weimar Republic that 
drives Germany, quite differently from the 1929-1940 Great Depression deflation 
and unemployment that worries the rest of the world. Berlin now imposes bank 
rules and the 0.5% deficit target that will cause continued contraction in Europe. In 
this manner it becomes unavoidable that German taxpayers would eventually 
have to pay for the unemployed and pensioners in Southern Europe. One only 
wonders how large the crisis must become before the German government will tell 
its people the bad news. 
14.2 Rationality as an alternative 
We may wonder whether there is an alternative for this ‘management by crisis 
by management’. Though the rational expectations hypothesis remains what it is, 
rationality has appeal over chaos. After World War II Jan Tinbergen created the 
Dutch Central Planning Bureau, France got its Commissariat général du Plan, 
Germany its Sachverständigenrat, the UK recently its [Office of Budget 
Responsibility] OBR. They have a role that appears to be too limited for what is 
demanded here. These bureaux only provide information but do not have the 
power to block neglect or distortion. Reading Connolly (2012) on the ERM with the 
onset of the euro makes one wonder about the limited role of these economic 
agencies too. Thus: (i) they lack a power role in the democratic process, and (ii) 
there are no constitutional safeguards for scientific quality (with implied 
independence) where it matters, in particular for such a power role. Thus we may 
consider that each nation adopts a constitutional Economic Supreme Court with 
the role to check the quality of information in policy making.  
Arthur Okun (1983:580), chairman of the US Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA) in 1968-1969, reflected on how current chairpersons are member of the 
President’s cabinet, so that the CEA is partial to official policy. He imagined a 
situation with impartiality:  
                                                                
141 https://www.res.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/d0f470de-3d71-40db-
92aa8d77b543b361.pdf 
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“Given these constraints, members of the Council of Economic Advisers are 
clearly recognized as the President’s men. If they speak publicly, they will be 
identified as spokesmen for administrative positions. (...) One wishes for a 
more effective way of influencing public and congressional opinion in the 
areas of professional consensus. There is a role to be played by a Supreme 
Court in the profession, although a less important one than that actually 
fulfilled by the Council and the Bureau ofthe Budget in recent years.”  
I had not been aware of Okun’s view and only traced it after thinking along this 
line myself and looking for evidence in the literature. My book DRGTPE (2011) 
presents more evidence and gives also a formal result with a reduced form model 
that highlights the importance of sound information for policy making. I regard the 
issue as more important than Okun though. 
The analysis suggests that democratic nations would do well to improve the 
current checks and balances with an additional Economic Supreme Court (ESC). 
DRGTPE gives a draft constitutional admendment. The ESC can be compared to 
the Judiciary. This Supreme Court will likely have its internal differences of 
opinion, but it is better to discuss those within the framework of an independent 
Judiciary rather than with politics looking in. The same holds for differences in 
approaches in economics. The ESC is based in economic science and is open to 
the public but has a veto power over the budget if they deem the information 
misleading to the public. In principle each nation would have its own ESC. For 
Europe, the ESCs would exchange information and thus help to provide a 
backbone of co-ordination.  
14.3 A key role for the current crisis 
Creation of the ESC(s) would be an important element in a proper resolution of 
the economic crisis both in the USA and Europe. Parliaments can already upgrade 
their official economic advisers in common procedure while the constitutional 
wheels turn slower. A constitutional change in Holland requires an affirmation by a 
newly elected Parliament. But a regulation can be created to start working like the 
intended ESC already.  
More evidence for this key role for the ESC(s) lies in the issue of unemployment 
and the redesign of the welfare state. Colignatus (2013c) is a video (somewhat 
slow since I am still learning for this). An abstract of Colignatus (2014) is:  
“The welfare state was created after 1950 with counterproductive mechanisms and 
this caused high inflation and high unemployment and stagnating growth by 1970, 
called stagflation. Since 1970 governments redressed the welfare state but did not 
succeed in finding workable mechanisms. They rather fought stagflation with the 
ideology of the day, shifting from vulgar Keynesianism first to monetarism and then to 
neoliberalism, and now ‘muddling through’. The deregulation of financial markets 
seemed to solve stagflation but only repressed it and resulted into the crisis since 
2007. The return of regulation also causes the return of stagflation: what was 
repressed before now is into the open again. Re-regulation is required indeed but the 
fundamental cure lies in focussing on workable mechanisms for the welfare state. 
Return to the 19th century laissez-faire will generally be rejected. If economic 
management had made better use of the available information then these policy errors 
could have prevented. A mixed economy requires a constitutional Economic Supreme 
Court to monitor the quality of information for policy making.” 
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15. A macro-economic lesson from Holland  
15.1 Abstract, March 31 2009 142 
The US and Europe have welfare states that cause stagflation but they have 
been repressing this stagflation by financial deregulation. Holland has been 
repressing its problems with the welfare state also by a low wage policy. The 
Dutch economy has been running a surplus on the external account for years in 
the same way as China and Japan. The focus by policy makers on finance is 
misguided and does not solve the real problem in the current crisis. The basic 
problem in the world is how to structure the welfare state. Next to the structural 
solution, a temporary solution of a reduced working week is superior to the rise of 
unemployment. 
15.2 Introduction 
Obscured in international statistics, Holland has been creating sizeable 
surplusses on the external account (Figure 6). The country thus is much like 
China and Japan, and it is only that it is so much smaller, so that this does not 
draw attention. The reason for the Dutch surplus is basically the same as for 
China and Japan too. To fight unemployment at home, the Dutch have resorted to 
a low wage policy. Thus they not only export Heineken, cheese and flowers but 
also unemployment. 
As Spilimbergo e.a. (2008) explain, a single country may escape from the 
current economic crisis by exports but it is a bit difficult for all countries to do so. 
By implication, it is interesting to find out what caused this Dutch reliance on 
exports. When we can determine what caused the economic imbalance then the 
world might avoid it. 
Figure 6 
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Source: calculated from CPB (2009). 2010 forecast.  
 
                                                                
142 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2009-03-31-MacroLesson.pdf 
also included in Colignatus (2012) 
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15.3 Exposed versus sheltered sectors 
Van Schaaijk (1983) provides the basic step. The Dutch policy to fight 
unemployment consisted of a general wage restraint. This general restraint 
implied too little restraint for the sheltered sectors and too much restraint for the 
exposed sectors. That is, in the exposed sectors, mostly Dutch agriculture and 
manufacturing, workers are very productive and their incomes might grow faster. 
However, a general restraint blocks that faster growth. A better policy alternative 
would have been a tax policy, to support the net incomes of the lower productive 
sheltered workers (services), so that one could allow higher wages for the more 
productive exposed workers. This however never got sufficient attention 
apparently since there was no clear need for an alternative. 
The same conclusion now holds for China and Japan. They would be wise to 
develop their home markets and divert resources away from exports. Indeed, 
exports generate foreign exchange reserves but those need not keep their value. 
The Dutch and their pensioners have been big investors in the US as well but 
those investments haven’t quite kept their value. 
15.4 Extension to the world as a whole 
Colignatus (1990a, 1996, 2005a) digs deeper into the Van Schaaijk (1983) 
analysis. The problem in Dutch society has been caused more fundamentally a bit 
by the mismanagement of the “Dutch disease” following the discovery of large 
resources of natural gas but much more importantly by mismanagement of the 
welfare state. This analysis actually can be extended to the world at large, for all 
countries that developed a welfare state. General misconceptions caused the 
problems of Stagflation, the unfavourable combination of inflation and 
unemployment.  
The period since 1970 can be called the Great Stagflation, and the last period is 
one of “repressed stagflation”. While the Dutch have been fighting stagflation by a 
recourse to exports, the US has relied on deregulation and financing the Iraq war 
by borrowing from China. 
The path towards recovery consists of three elements: (a) institutional 
safeguards, (b) restoration of the optimal path, (c) measures to get to that path. 
Colignatus (2009d) considers element (a), the institutional setting. Colignatus 
(2009c) considers elements (b) and (c), i.e. the macro-economics of the recovery.  
15.5 The key point is to keep people in jobs 
The key point for the current situation is to keep people in jobs. A good solution 
is a temporary reduction of the working week. A reduction of working hours is 
inappropriate when there are structural problems e.g. with the level of wages but 
now that we know what happened it follows that a job (at reduced hours) is better 
than an unemployment benefit.  
The analysis by Spilimbergo e.a. (2008) and the review by Lane (2009) rely too 
much on the notion that “there will be unemployment” that “hence” must be tackled 
with “fiscal or monetary policy”. That approach puts huge sections of the public 
through periods of high personal insecurity and financial distress, and quite 
unnecessarily so.  
 93 
Obviously, we need to restructure the financial system as well. A separation 
between savings banks, investment banks, and insurance is obvious, while hedge 
funds can be put into a public utility until the finance community knows better how 
to regulate them. And fiscal and monetary policy undoubtedly will play a role. But 
there is no need to put people into a state of unemployment. It is a source of 
amazement that economists are trained to think so. 
15.6 A word of caution 
The basic cause lies with the structure of taxation and welfare state. 
Unfortunately, the epiphenomenon in the US is a financial crisis. By consequence, 
the team composed by President Obama is weighted heavily with advisors from 
the world of finance, and subsequently they develop plans on finance, with 
apparently also a bias to protect shareholders of banks rather than the (future) 
unemployed. Krugman (2009) and The Economist (2009a) rightly point to the 
overall risks of this. The Economist calls nationalisation “politically unpalatable in 
America” but this is precisely because of the bias of the team picked. And they 
apparently lock themselves up in isolation and groupthink. The G20 meeting was 
intended to make a difference but is already being toned down or may highlight 
rifts between the major regions that can upset the markets. It is regrettable. 
President Obama started out with great promise but sees himself confronted with 
a failing restructuring of the financial system, soaring national debt, a dropping 
dollar, rising inflation and unemployment, a loss of confidence, and a loss of 
strength to fulfill the promise. Europe can help Obama by clarifying what advice he 
needs, yes, we can. 
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16. The export of unemployment 
 
16.1 At the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 1990 
My forecast in 1990 (CPB memo 90-III-38) 143 was that unemployment in Europe 
would continue to be high unless Parliaments would redesign both the structure of 
policy making and some policies and markets. I repeated this forecast in 1992, 
1994, 2000 extending with other risks like on environment and financial markets, 
and the condition of the Economic Supreme Court.  
In the period 1990-2007 Holland seemed to have a lower level of 
unemployment, which might be a cause for people not paying attention to the 
analysis. This lower level wasn’t achieved by better policies but by welfare 
payments (financed by natural gas) and by exporting unemployment by means of 
maintaining low wages (beggar thy neighbour). The 2007+ crisis and return to 
higher unemployment confirms my analysis. Though a major element relies on 
definitions, the forecast as a whole still was falsifiable. Of course the forecast was 
vague, and not specified with the year 2007, but we are dealing with structure. 
This also explains why I emphasize that Dirk Bezemer misinforms Sweden and 
Dutch Parliament: 144 because he keeps silent about the theoretical confirmation 
given by the empirical experiment of 1990-2007. 
My analysis at CPB 1990 has been hit since then by censorship of science by 
the CPB directorate. This case has been documented as much as possible, see 
more references here. 145 The world is advised to boycott Holland till the 
censorship of science there has been lifted. My economic analysis in content can 
only appear once the censorship has been lifted. Parts have been documented as 
much as possible in Colignatus (2000, 2005a, 2011) and (2012). The first dates 
basically before the 2007+ crisis and has only been giving a warning about the 
financial markets. The second is a collection of papers relating to the crisis.  
Since this core of “Dutch economics” has been documented elsewhere, there is 
no need to repeat this here. There are some aspects that can be mentioned 
though, specifically in relation to the economic conditions for Greece. 
16.2 Europe’s internal economic tension 
Due to the German reunification in 1989, and the tension between the 
productivities in East and West, so that the wage in the East was too high, there 
was a general downward pressure upon German wages, and this caused export 
surplusses, that also could be lended on the international markets. 
In the period towards the introduction of the euro, Southern Europe enjoyed a 
reduction of their interest rates. Spain thought to take a middle road by investing in 
home construction, which indeed is a form of capital, but when the crisis came 
then it appeared that this capital could not be exploited. Much borrowing was used 
for more consumer spending rather than investments in productive capacity, and 
such imports also were the exports of other countries like Germany and Holland. 
                                                                
143 http://thomascool.eu/Thomas/Nederlands/TPnCPB/Record/1990/12/18/index.html 
144 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/11/17/dirk-bezemer-disinforms-dutch-parliament/ 
145 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
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 In the crisis, capital in Southern Europe evade tax and moved to foreign banks. 
Southern Europe thus can blame a large part of the ordeal to itself. However, 
there still is the stewardship of creditor nations. 
Johan Witteveen (1921-2019) was Managing Director of the IMF in 1973-1978 at 
the time of the first oil crisis. 146  
• For many years he pointed to the problem that the export surplusses of 
Germany and Holland formed the counterpart of the import deficits of 
Southern Europe.  
• In 2014 he took the opportunity of a “valedictorian speech” to repeat the 
message. With his permission the speech and my comments are 
reproduced here. 147 See next Chapter 17. 
Germany and Holland are creditor nations. Such nations are wary to help debtor 
nations, like reducing debts or admitting to changes, since such changes would 
tend to diminish their position of (seeming) advantage. After World War 2, the USA 
was the creditor nation, and J.M. Keynes was the advocate for the debtor nations 
like the UK. As a feat of high diplomacy, Keynes succeeded in the creation of the 
Bretton Woods institutes, the IMF and the World Bank (though complaining that 
“the Bank is a fund, and the Fund is a bank !”). The major argument that 
convinced the USA however was the threat by communist Russia.  
The EU basically has been founded to broker these internal economic tensions. 
However, the EU has tended to focus on the French-German relationship, and 
only dimly grows aware that more needs to be done on North-South and East-
West. The creation of the euro resolved the tension on the exchange rates but 
also tended to hide the trade flows.  
The economic mantra became that France and Southern Europe must improve 
their competitiveness, but this is the mantra of the creditor nation that puts the 
blame on the debtor nations.  
One suggestion of mine is that European funds are used to restore historical 
buildings in Southern Europe – though the Colosseum would of course be 
maintained in its form of a ruin. When a European fund buys a deteriorating 
building and restores it, then the particular country loses the ownership of a bit of 
its cultural heritage, but it gains in employment and attractiveness to tourism, in a 
way that doesn’t create unfair competition with other market forces. It is an 
intermediate strategy and the subsequent issue naturally is to look for productive 
investments.  
A key component of course is that Germany and Holland must raise their wages, 
to mimic the effect that without the euro their exchange rates would rise. See 
Colignatus (2000, 2005a, 2011) and (2012). Obviously, when each EU Member 
State has its own Economic Supreme Court then these courts will allow for closer 
co-ordination, and there would be less anxiety that one region would gain an unfair 
advantage. 
 
                                                                
146 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Witteveen 
147 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2014-05-21-Comments-on-Valedictory-
Lecture-by-Witteveen.html 
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17. Former IMF-director Johannes Witteveen on IS-LM 
 
2014, 148 edited 2020  
 
17.1 Introduction 
H.J. (Johannes) Witteveen (1921-2019) 149 is best known as managing director 
of the IMF in 1973-1978. Please note that the Bretton Woods Institutions IMF and 
Worldbank have wrong names. J.M. Keynes already complained to the 
Americans: "The Fund is a bank and the Bank is a fund !" (no exact quote). It 
would be better that the IMF is renamed to World Central Bank and the Worldbank 
into World Investment Bank, since this would strengthen their role and position 
also in public perception and discussion. 
Because of the First Oil Crisis 1973-74 150 Witteveen created the Supplementary 
Financing Facility, unofficially known as the Witteveen facility, 151 to channel 
revenues from oil producers back to the consuming countries, to prevent a liquidity 
crisis amongst those consumers. The IMF book by James Boughton "The silent 
revolution" 152 assigns a later major role to Witteveen's successors Jacques de 
Larosiere and Michel Camdessus, but underestimates how Witteveen paved the 
way.  
In the current crisis of 2007+, Witteveen pointed to requirements for a New 
Bretton Woods (Nov 20 2008, Financial Times).153 For Europe he advised a similar 
"facility" again by the IMF rather than the ECB (Aug 22 2011, Financial times, 154 
Business Insider 155). 
Below, Witteveen looks at the Dutch export surplus and the need for an 
investment strategy in the Netherlands itself. 
We can observe that the Dutch surplus exists since 1981. When Germany 
started copying that, Southern Europe got into problems. I tend to agree with 
Witteveen on IS-LM but advise at the level of each nation: (a) an Economic 
Supreme Court, (b) National Investment Banks (NIBs), (c) the overall approach to 
reduce unemployment as discussed in my book DRGTPE. My pre-crisis book is 
Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy (DRGTPE). 156 My 
2007+ papers on the crisis are collected in Common Sense: Boycott Holland 
                                                                
148 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2014-05-21-Comments-on-Valedictory-
Lecture-by-Witteveen.html 
149 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Witteveen 
150 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis 
151 https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6727/78-cbo-027.pdf 
152 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/chapter1.pdf 
153 http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2008/11/to-recreate-the-bretton-woods-ideal-we-must-
first-look-at-its-history/ 
154 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5b1453da-ca8d-11e0-94d0-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1VqhWBrEO 
155 http://www.businessinsider.com/former-imf-director-imf-will-provide-solution-to-eu-debt-crisis-
2011-8 
156 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
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(CSBH). 157 A boycott of Holland is warranted because of the censorship of 
economic science by the directorate of the Dutch CPB and the Dutch government. 
That censorship pertains to the issue discussed below, and professor Witteveen's 
discussion suffers seriously from not having the material under censorship. 
Witteveen had been professor at Erasmus University since 1948. Apparently he 
never got time for an official farewell, and last week the old fox took the 
opportunity of a Valedictory Lecture to gather an audience and to present his 
analysis on that Dutch investment strategy (May 15 2014). The Lecture was 
published by the Dutch economics journal Economisch Statistische Berichten 
(ESB May 17 2014 p294-298). 158 I thank the editors for permission to reproduce 
the lecture with my comments.  
Witteveen also wrote books on universal sufism159 (not to be confused with 
islamic sufism 160), see his personal website. 161 As a personal remark on my side: 
my father is also from 1921 but has stopped reading and writing. I am much 
impressed by Witteveen's command of economics. Admittedly, Keynes solved 
these issues by IS-LM itself already in 1936 and by his proposal for an 
international trade currency (bancor). 162 Our main problem since 1945 has been 
that politicians arrogantly proclaim to know it better.  
Witteveen's Valedictory Lecture is a major event in economics. It deserves to be 
treated with much respect and critical comment. It shows that the problem is not 
lack of knowledge from economic science but that the problem lies in the structure 
of decision making about economic policy. 
 
17.2 The meaning of our enormous 
structural current account surplus. 
A neglected opportunity 
ESB May 17 2014 p294-298 163 
by Dr. H.J. Witteveen (1921), 164 
Central Planning Bureau (1947-1963), 
professor of Economics in Rotterdam 
(1948-2014), Minister of Finance of The 
Netherlands (1967-1971), IMF Managing 
Director (1973-1978) 
Comments 
May 21 2014 
by Thomas Colignatus,  
econometrician and teacher of mathematics, 
Central Planning Bureau (1982-1991) 
A 
 “Our enormous current account 
surplus has hardly received any attention 
in the discussion about the government’s 
budget deficit and the need for large 
budget cuts." 
Part of the problem is that the present 
Dutch premier Mark Rutte (trained as a 
historian, of the same political party VVD as 
Witteveen) has rejected to discuss the issue 
in depth, leaving Witteveen on the side-line. 
This is not only disrespectful but also 
B 
                                                                
157 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/CSBH/Index.html 
158 http://www.economie.nl/artikel/meaning-our-enormous-structural-current-account-surplus 
159 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Sufism 
160 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sufism 
161 http://hjwitteveen.com/h-johannes-witteveen/ 
162 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bancor 
163 http://www.economie.nl/artikel/meaning-our-enormous-structural-current-account-surplus 
164 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Witteveen 
 99 
economically disastrous. Dutch readers may 
look at this interview with Witteveen, Vrij 
Nederland Sept 22 2013. 165 One quote: 
"Dijsselbloem is only an agricultural 
economist." The word "only" is an 
understatement: Dutch farmers want to 
export. See my note "Dijsselbloem on Dutch 
exports". 166 
For a long period the Netherlands 
already have a sizeable surplus on the 
current account on the balance of 
payments, the total of trade in goods and 
services and capital income. From 2000 
that surplus was never less than 3.2% of 
GDP. In 2000, it was 5.2%, in 2007 8.4% 
and in recent years – 2013 and 2014 – 
9.7% and 9¾%. This is a very large 
amount and among European countries it 
is the largest. Germany with 7.6% in 
2013 is the next big one. [1] 
The Dutch surplus actually started in 1981, 
see my 2009 paper “A macro-economic 
lesson from Holland". 167 
Gerhard Schröder (BRD Kanzler 1998-
2005) started to copy the Dutch model of 
wage restraint. The consequence was that 
Germany and Holland out-competed the rest 
of Europe, creating the imbalances of the 
eurozone. 
See The Economist "Model Makers", May 2 
2002. 168  
In VoxEU Feb 3 2014, 169 Dustmann et al. 
look at wage-bargaining structures and argue 
that it wasn't Hartz 2002-2005 170 that caused 
the German low wage policy, but rather the 
German Reunification in 1989. Okay, but: (1) 
The Dutch example helped Schröder to target 
lower rather than higher wages, (2) It remains 
important to maintain macro-economic co-
ordination. Herein lies the main policy 
objective rather than in such wage-bargaining 
structures. The analysis by Dustmann et al. 
might be interpreted as suggesting the 
abolition of national bargaining but that would 
be false. My advice is also an Economic 
Supreme Court per country. 171 
C 
Ftnt 1: All figures on the Dutch 
economy have been taken from the 
Central Economic Plan 2014 
Data and analyses from the CPB cannot be 
trusted given the censorship of economic 
science there since 1990. The (former) 
colleagues there may do their best but they 
lack important scientific information. They are 
D 
                                                                
165 http://www.vn.nl/Archief/Politiek/Artikel-Politiek/Interview-Johannes-Witteveen-VVD-Rutte-
begrijpt-het-niet.htm 
166 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2013/08/23/dijsselbloem-on-dutch-exports/ 
167 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2009-03-31-MacroLesson.pdf 
168 http://archive.today/L6Ol0 
169 http://www.voxeu.org/article/german-resurgence-it-wasn-t-hartz-reforms 
170 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartz_concept 
171 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
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like doctors who do not wash their hands, 
even though Ignaz Semmelweis 172 showed 
that this would be important (and was he 
censored?). 
In our public discussion very little 
attention has been given to this 
remarkable aspect of our economy, 
neither in politics nor in announcements 
of the Dutch Central Bank has any 
attention been given to this. Perhaps 
because it seems to throw some doubt 
on the need of large economies by the 
government. In the European Union 
there is a rule about balance of 
payments, deficits and surpluses. 
Surpluses should not at any length of 
time be higher than 6% of GDP. But 
neither the European Commission nor 
the Dutch government seem ever to have 
evoked this rule in discussions of the 
budget deficit. 
Well, I tried to do my best, see the above 
2009 paper. 
See my VoxEU column 173 and this weblog. 
174 
In Dutch, see these two entries on Joop.nl: 
a link to the Great Depression, 175 and a 
warning for the risk of a greater crisis. 176 
Cassandra 177 better entertains a sense of 
humour 178 though. 
 
E 
17.2.1 2 [Gold standard] 
In itself, such a surplus is of course 
favourable. It increases our international 
reserves and wealth. But is it also 
favourable for the growth of our 
economy? In a system where the 
exchange rate cannot be adjusted – as in 
the present Monetary Union – the 
balance of payments cannot be brought 
to an equilibrium by an adjustment in the 
exchange rate. As in the old system of 
the gold standard, equilibrium would then 
be brought about by movement of the 
national income. Deficits with gold losses 
would force a country to follow a 
restricted policy reducing incomes and 
imports. Surplus countries on the other 
hand would receive payment in gold, 
which would increase their reserves. This 
 
(1) It does not have to be favourable at all. 
If the reserves are held in a currency that is 
depreciated, one loses. It may be better to 
directly spend the sums so that there is no 
surplus. 
We see China accumulating dollars, that 
later however may depreciate. They may buy 
up companies in Europe while Europeans are 
under the money illusion that those dollars 
are still valuable.  
(2) Yes, the EMU works out as a gold 
standard. While Americans had learned that 
the gold standard wasn't so smart (because 
of the deflation in the Great Depression), the 
EMU-designers targetted it (because of the 
German fear for hyperinflation).  
See my paper Money as gold versus 
money as water (2013a). 179 Also see this 
F 
                                                                
172 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ignaz_Semmelweis 
173 http://www.voxeu.org/debates/commentaries/current-economic-crisis-solution-lies-buried-and-
obscured-mass-false-theory 
174 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
175 http://www.joop.nl/opinies/detail/artikel/20139/ 
176 http://www.joop.nl/opinies/detail/artikel/21935_er_dreigt_een_gigantische_crisis/ 
177 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cassandra 
178 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2013/05/30/salute-to-art-buchwald/ 
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would enable them also to introduce an 
expansionary policy, but they would not 
be forced to this. They could maintain 
their surplus situation and accumulate 
more gold. This was called the 
“deflationary tendency of the gold 
standard”. The present European 
Monetary Union also clearly suffers 
from such a deflationary tendency. 
[made bold by TC]  
Thus, our enormous balance of 
payments surplus does not force us to a 
more expansionary policy, although in 
itself it would create a tendency for a 
certain growth of the national income that 
would increase imports and therefore 
reduce the surplus. The extra income 
increased in this process would then also 
increase consumption, tax payments and 
savings. A stationary situation would be 
reached when the total of additions to the 
income stream would equal the leakages 
from it. This would be when the budget 
deficit and the payments surplus would 
together equal the saving surplus. In this 
way, a multiplier process can be put in 
movement, showing how much the 
income would increase as a 
consequence of an increase in exports, 
or otherwise, of additional government 
expenditures. The size of this multiplier 
depends on how much of extra income 
flows away from the income stream by 
imports, savings or taxes. It is also 
important then in how far these savings 
would cause larger investments, so that 
there would be no leakage anymore and 
whether additional tax receipts would be 
spent by the government. 
paper for the reforms discussed below. 
 The ECB is very prim on printing money. 
But we don't mind when the USA does, and 
when China earns those dollars and then 
starts shopping in Europe. See also Jens 
Weidmann: "We are not lemmings" 180 while 
Germans are lemmings on the fear for 
inflation. 
(3) The multiplier is in itself a technical 
question while for current purposes it is more 
important to have the proper analysis. 
(Estimation from a wrong model gives GIGO: 
garbage in - garbage out.) 
(4) The savings - investment issue is quite 
complicated. The current situation is also 
special.  
(4a) The years 1981-2007 were also 
Keynesian years because of the deregulation. 
181 
(4b) Investment bankers are like spoiled 
children. They could invest in anything in 
those years and take huge risks (ICT, 
dotcom) and still show a profit, but now face 
risks they cannot deal with. We urgently need 
national investment banks. 182 
  
17.2.2 3 [Export surplus] 
In the present Dutch situation, we have 
a balance of payments surplus of more 
than 9% and a budget deficit of 3% of 
GDP. That means, that there should be a 
 
 
These are important observations. 
A point is that such relationships aren't 
"forgotten". The label "forgotten" puts you on 
G 
                                                                                                                                      
179 http://rwer.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/issue-no-64-of-real-world-economics-review/ 
180 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/jens-weidmann-we-are-not-lemmings/ 
181 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/02/21/the-keynesian-years-1981-2007/ 
182 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2013/11/23/confirmation-by-krugman-and-summers/ 
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savings surplus of no less than 12% of 
GDP. That is the other side of the 
balance of payments surplus. How 
should we judge that? There are two 
components of this savings surplus: 
business saving in the form of retained 
profits that are not used for investment in 
our country; and the savings of pension 
funds and life insurance companies that 
are not invested within our country. 
There are no exact figures on the size of 
these components. But we know from an 
investigation by DNB that only 14% of 
the investments of pension funds stays 
inside our country. As these savings are 
more than 6% of GDP, it follows that their 
contribution to the savings surplus must 
be 5% of GDP. That would then leave 
7% of GDP for business companies. This 
saving surplus has helped to bring down 
the rate of interest to levels below 2% but 
investment did not react to this with an 
increase. In this way a recession 
developed. This failure of an equilibrium 
mechanism on the capital market is the 
essential element of the theory that J.M. 
Keynes developed in 1936 (The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money). The experience during this 
recession completely confirms this 
theory. But it is disappointing that policy 
makers in Europe seem to have 
completely forgotten these relationships. 
In the United States, this is also the case 
in the Republican party, but the chairman 
of the Federal Reserve system, Ben 
Bernanke, has shown clear insight in the 
business cycle mechanism, but could 
only instigate a very expansionary 
monetary policy because congress left 
too little room for stimulating additional 
expenditures. 
the wrong foot. 
There was and is competition from a false 
theory. That false theory or ideology is the 
"need of austerity to create investor 
confidence again". 
If something is merely forgotten, then it 
would be easy to remind people about it. 
In this case, policy makers have been 
reminded about it, but this didn't help, 
because they relied on another theory. 
That false theory didn't work and the 
recession and stagnation continued. This was 
interpreted as only more evidence that more 
austerity was needed ... These policy makers 
and their economists aren't scientists but they 
form a cult with almost religious faith in 
Reaganite / Thatcherite "neoliberalism". 
It is important to observe that much money 
was squandered in Southern Europe. The 
USA had its frauds too. 
However, curiously, that squandering and 
frauding is less investigated. It is easier to 
squeeze the budget than to investigate 
mismanagement and fraud within the system. 
17.2.3 4 [Return of Keynes] 
But we have to recognise that the 
development of economic science has a 
great responsibility for this. After the 
Second World War, new economic 
theories have been developed on the 
basis of “rational expectations”. With that 
 
What professor Witteveen calls "neo-
classical" should be "neoliberal". 
 
(1) I regard myself as a neoclassical 
economist in the sense of Paul Samuelson 
(see his thesis): a synthesis of Walrasian 
classicism and equilibrium analysis with 
H 
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assumption they could build on earlier 
equilibrium theories, as for example the 
system of Leon Walras (16th December 
1834 – 5th January 1910), who 
formulated a general economic 
equilibrium with beautiful mathematical 
equations. These new theories made far-
going assumptions, for example letting all 
markets would always exactly and 
immediately reach an equilibrium. All 
economic subjects would act rationally 
for their own interest and they could 
completely foresee the future. Because 
in the markets all economic subjects 
together create an equilibrium that 
reflected their preferences, government 
intervention would not be needed. The 
inventors of these neo-classical [bold 
TC] theories, as for example Robert 
Lucas Jr. (American economist, 15th 
September 1937 - ) have won Noble 
prizes in economics and were rather 
generally supported. In these equilibrium 
systems there could therefore be no 
business cycle. As there is clearly some 
fluctuation in the real world, theories 
were developed that explain fluctuations 
by changes in real data for the economy. 
In this way, economists have created a 
“platonic world” of perfect efficiency, as 
Robert Skidelski put it in his clear and 
amusing book “Keynes, the return of the 
master”. That world has little to do with 
the real world of unexpected events, 
mass psychological reactions, with are 
often unreasonable and dangerous 
disequilibria. But the political visions 
developed in the Reagan-Thatcher 
revolution were strongly influenced by 
these neo-classical [bold by TC] 
theories. These theories were in tune 
with their political instincts: budgets 
should be balanced and monetary policy 
should only be focused on price stability 
and carried out by independent central 
banks. The unfortunate deregulation of 
Keynesian dynamic disequilibrium. 183  
This does not nessarily mean that we have 
a complete model how this would work, but 
the ideas are guiding. 
PM. Keynes himself already adjusted the 
classical approach, thus essentially was a 
neoclassical economist too. Thus 
Samuelson's "synthesis" is a bit overdone. 
But the word has been accepted in the 
literature. 
(2) The Lucas critique was mainly a 
technical issue. The idea that forecasts can 
be self-defeating was already known.  
(3) The revolution by Reagan and Thatcher 
didn't come from new theory but from policy 
failure in the period before that. 
Policy makers didn't properly implement 
ideas about the Welfare State. As 
unemployment and inflation exploded in the 
1970s, ideologues against the Welfare State 
gained the political upper hand. The new 
theory of "rational expectations" and "supply 
side economics" was only embraced in the 
capitals of the world because it suited that old 
ideology.  
(4) Dutch readers may look at my 
discussion in 2013 of the impact of Margaret 
Thatcher on the Dutch Eduard Bomhoff 184 
and Mark Rutte 185 respectively. 
  
 
 
                                                                
183 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoclassical_synthesis 
184 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2013-04-19-Bomhoff-Thatcher.html 
185 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2013-09-02-Schoo-Lezing-Rutte.html 
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the financial sector in the United States 
by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
also resulted from this thinking that saw 
all markets as working perfectly. 
17.2.4 5 [The Netherlands] 
Returning now to the situation in the 
Netherlands we have seen a very large 
savings surplus. (Difference between 
savings and investments) This surplus 
started around the year 2000, when 
investment fell below savings. After that, 
the saving surplus increased to 6% to 8% 
of GDP. Saving increased to the highest 
level ever, while investments sank to a 
long time low. This is shown clearly in the 
following graph from an article by 
Schotten and Leering. [2] [See Figure 7.] 
 
 
(1) Did it start only after 2000 ? I haven't 
looked at that particular IS-saldo since 1981 
(and haven't even looked whether I could get 
those data). But above we saw the surplus 
on the external account, and it stands to 
reason that this is reflected in IS.  
But Holland has been losing a lot of capital 
on investments abroad, so beware of the 
distinction between ex ante (expenditure) and 
ex post (effect). 
(2) The graph should also use Germany 
separately, and not hide it in "core EU". 
I 
Ftnt 2: Schotten en Leering, De puzzel 
van het Nederlandse spaarover-schot, 
Me Judice, 2 February 2012 
This article clearly suffers from the 
censorship by the directorate of the CPB. 
J 
This also shows that saving and 
investment in the Euro Union and in the 
core countries of the Euro Union remain 
close together and are at a much lower 
level. So, we can say now that this 
large saving surplus is a rather unique 
Dutch phenomenon. [bold by TC] We 
must see that as a serious disequilibrium 
in the economy for although it means that 
our national wealth increases, it also 
implies that our production capacity 
expands inefficiently, so that not enough 
employment is created for our workers. 
This could lead to structural 
unemployment, which would be very 
damaging, bringing suffering to a part of 
our working population and limiting 
growth of our national product. 
(1) I would need to see the graph for 
Germany separately before accepting the 
"uniqueness" of Holland. 
(2) This story is proper from traditional 
international economics. 
(3) However, there is the amendment by 
three economic scientists from the CPB 
1983-1990, namely by Marein van Schaaijk, 
Anton Bakhoven and my own innovation of 
these, see my 1996 paper "Differential impact 
of the minimum wage on exposed and 
sheltered sectors". 186 Dutch readers are 
referred to these two books: W&A 187 en D&S. 
188 
K 
17.2.5 6 [Deficits] 
The government has worsened the 
recession by a policy of severely cutting 
the budget deficit, in order to satisfy the 
European maximum of 3% for the budget 
 
 
(1) The EMU rules are based upon some 
ideas. One idea is to get more control over 
budgets in Southern Europe.  
L 
                                                                
186 http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wpawuwpgt/9608001.htm 
187 http://thomascool.eu/SvHG/Hulst/Persaankondiging.html 
188 http://thomascool.eu/SvHG/DenS/Index.html 
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deficit. European policy makers were 
strongly influenced by Germany and by 
the neo-classical economic theories 
[bold by TC] in setting an aim for the 
necessary coordination of budgetary 
policies in the Eurozone, so that the final 
aim has been set very low, at 0.5% while 
the earlier goal of 3% became an 
absolute maximum. As most European 
countries have large budget deficits and 
the recession tended to increase the 
deficit still further, this led to very severe 
and painful austerity measures. In the 
Netherlands, the budget deficit was still 
very low at 0.8% in 2000 but in the 
recession – with falling tax receipts and 
rising unemployment expenditures – it 
increased to 5.6%, and that 
notwithstanding severe budget cutting 
policies the deficit remained above 3% 
until 2013, when the recession seemed 
to end. These budget cuts of course 
decreased incomes and caused 
unemployment – setting in motion a 
negative multiplier mechanism. 
Economic studies in the International 
Monetary Fund made it clear that these 
multipliers were much larger than 
assumed in the past. Different estimates 
have been made of this multiplier. It has 
become clear that the size of it depends 
on the business cycle situation. In a 
situation of full employment and fully 
used capital equipment an increase in 
savings would also give larger room for 
investments but in a recession, that 
would not be the case. On the contrary, 
investments would also fall because of 
the reduction in demand. In that way, a 
savings surplus would result. The rate of 
interest might fall but this would not lead 
to a larger investment as is assumed in 
classical economic theories. In the 
Central Economic Plan of 2013, the 
conclusion is that in this recessionary 
situation these multipliers are much 
higher than one, so that expenditure cuts 
(2) Yes, Germany, but not "neo-classical" 
but "neoliberal" and "Friedman-monetarist". I 
am a neoclassical economist in the sense of 
Paul Samuelson (see his thesis). See point 
H. 
(3) Yes, the final aim is 0.5%. This 
Eurozone target is strangely absent in the 
debate in Holland. Minister Dijsselbloem 
announced that the recession is over, and the 
budget deficit dropped below 3%, but he did 
not mention that the target now is 0.5% so 
that we might get into a third dip. 
(4) With apologies to Olivier Blanchard: 
Those estimates only reflect the data, and 
you already have those data ... The use for 
analysis differs from that for forecasting. The 
IMF discussion on the multiplier compares a 
bit with the discussion about the number of 
angels on a pin. Above analysis on the 
regime change from pre-2007 to post-2007 is 
much more important. A decision to institute 
an Economic Supreme Court (ESC) and 
National Investment Banks (NIBs) must be 
based upon such a wider analysis, not upon 
such estimates on the multiplier.  
(5) The CPB-models tend to be 
neoclassical too, since they clearly allow for 
negative cycle feedback. But they are 
deficient because of the censorship. They 
tend to be neoliberal rather than "on the 
classical side" of the Keynesian synthesis. 
(6) You cannot simply ask for the "Return of 
the master". The situation is now different 
than in 1936 and 1945. If you put yourself into 
the mind of J.M. Keynes (i.e. try if you can), 
you might agree with some suggestions of 
mine from 1990: see my books DRGTPE 
(pre-2007) and CSBH (update on crisis 
particulars). 189 
(7) Unfortunately, Robert Skidelsky also 
proposes a Basic Income. This abolishes the 
Welfare State and doesn't provide for ESC 
and NIBs. Robert Skidelsky is much too 
subtle to show cult sect behaviour, but many 
adherents to the Basic Income show cult sect 
behaviour. 190 
                                                                
189 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html 
190 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2014/04/10/the-pure-evil-of-a-basic-income/ 
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would scarcely succeed in reducing the 
deficit.  
In this way we are pushed into a negative 
vicious cycle: budget cuts reducing 
incomes that diminish tax receipts and 
increase unemployment benefits so that 
the budget deficit increased again. Thus, 
expectations that deficits would come 
down were disappointed every time. This 
unfortunate process caused great losses 
in production and the painful experience 
of the growing number of unemployed 
and bankruptcy of many small-scale 
companies. In the Netherlands, 
unemployment now is around 8%; in 
some of the southern European 
economies much higher percentages 
were reached, hitting especially younger 
workers. Of course, this also made the 
European Union very unpopular. 
This is the tragic consequence of the 
total lack of Keynesian anti-cyclical 
budgetary policies. It is indeed time for 
the “Return of the master”, as Robert 
Skidelski suggested. 
 
 
 
17.2.6 7 [Reform and expand] 
Nevertheless, we have to ask: how and 
in how far Keynes can return in the 
present situation? The situation in 
Europe is now in two aspects quite 
different from that in the United Kingdom 
in 1936, when Keynes wrote his “General 
theory of employment, interest and 
money”.  
In the first place, there are limits to the 
possibility to finance budget deficits. 
When government debts increase too 
much they can cause an escalating crisis 
where the payment of interest increases 
the budget deficit further and further. 
Repayment of the debt becomes then 
more difficult, so that investors want 
higher rates of interest for financing the 
deficit. In this way, the financial markets 
acquired a very important role in the 
European Union. In the beginning of the 
Monetary Union, they made it very easy 
 
 
(1) Professor Witteveen read the Central 
Economic Plan 2013. But he is not aware that 
the directorate of the CPB has been 
censoring economic science since 1990. 
(2) The CPB directorate does not accept 
that the crisis confirms my analysis since 
1990. 
I am treated as a pariah, whose work is 
untouchable since 1990. Nothing that 
happens might cause that the CPB-
directorate looks into the analysis, stops the 
censorship, and allows me to publish my 
analysis, as science should require. (It would 
be nice if I could turn this into a Ph.D. thesis 
then.) 
(3) Also the IMF is not aware of the 
situation. See my email to the IMF IEO 
integrity office, on which I did not receive a 
reply. 191 
(4) For the current situation, see (a) the 
M 
                                                                
191 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/02/13/to-the-ieo-of-the-imf/ 
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for some countries to profit from the 
lower European interest rates. But this 
situation turned sharply around when the 
crisis came and the rates of interest for 
loans of these countries increased 
unsustainably. That many investors in 
these markets have also been influenced 
in their thinking by neo-classical [bold 
by TC] theories made these barriers so 
much stronger. 
Economic Plan for Europe, (b) the paper on 
the regime ladder, and (c) the paper on 
money. 192 
So, what kind of policies could a 
Keynesian European Commission and 
Council have followed in this situation of 
our Monetary Union and what policies 
should they follow now? It seems to me 
essential to make a clear distinction 
between structural deficits and temporary 
cyclical elements in the budget. The 
structural deficit is what would result if 
normal growth would continue with 
reasonably fully occupied production 
capacity. This structural deficit will often 
be hidden by cyclical influence on tax 
proceeds and spending. It is very 
necessary that this structural deficit is 
kept below 3% or less of GDP. That is a 
difficult task, for there are many 
categories of expenditures that have a 
strong tendency to increase more than 
national income. The expenditures for 
our health care are a clear example. The 
continuing improvement of medical 
technology often causes huge increases 
of cost and, as we live longer – also 
because of this improving health care – 
more older people require more 
expensive care. There is also a growing 
need for social care at home for older 
people. 
(1) The distinction between structure and 
cycle is old. See the Cees van den Beld CS 
model at the CPB. 
(2) The problem is to estimate what 
investments contribute to the long term. Is the 
government to know better than investors 
(say those at Google Inc.) ? 
(3) Neoliberals hold that austerity is 
required to restore "confidence" in capital 
markets. This however is a political ploy to 
destroy the Welfare State.  
It is okay if they are clear about their 
objective, but it is not okay if they hide it 
behind texts that suggest science while it isn't 
science. 
(4) Peter Bofinger in Amsterdam 193 was 
clear: Germany cannot invest because of its 
Schuldenbremse. 
N 
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A very different factor is our system of 
deducting interest of mortgage payments 
fully from taxable incomes. This has 
caused large reductions in tax receipts 
and has created a “bubble” in the 
housing market. It has given us a 
relatively high mortgage debt, which 
becomes painful as house prices have 
fallen. 
Besides all such influences, there are in 
many countries – not so much here in 
our generally so well-organised country – 
increasing expenditures, favouring 
certain groups in the population that have 
been granted for political support. So, it 
is an essential task for governments to 
push through structural reforms of these 
expenditures and of course also to 
abolish unreasonable favours or “political 
clients”. When Keynes would now be 
living he would certainly fully support 
such structural measures. 
(1) The Dutch housing market is an 
example where an Economic Supreme Court 
could have worked wonders. It shows that a 
CPB with its weak position doesn't help.  
(2) However, there are many such 
examples. 
My major example in 1990 was 
unemployment. In the years after 1990 it 
seemed that the policy of wage moderation 
by prime minster Wim Kok solved it, but it 
merely hid the problem. (So that Dutch 
people did not understand what I was 
speaking about.) 
(3) The current low rate of interest of 2% 
could be used to restore the housing market. 
See the appendix of my discussion 194 of the 
cheating by the Dutch banking committee of 
Herman Wijffels (former CEO of Rabobank). 
O 
But in a recession, such measures 
have the great disadvantage that they 
reduce incomes and cause the vicious 
spiral of a shrinking economy, as we 
have seen. What Keynes then could 
have done is to combine these 
permanent structural reforms with 
temporary stimulating measures that 
would help the struggling economy but 
would not increase the structural deficit. 
For this purpose I have as Minister of 
Finance in 1970 created a mechanism – 
with the unanimous support of parliament 
– of temporary additions or deductions of 
maximum 5% of the most important 
taxes. These changes could be 
introduced immediately for reasons of 
business cycle policy by the government 
with approval of parliament after their 
introduction. In that way, the government 
could act quickly, which is very 
necessary in business-cycle policy. I 
(1) Well, the EMU decided to other rules. 
Curiously, Holland accepted the Zalm-norm 
195 as an improvement on budgettary rules, 
but Zalm did not negotiate this rule for 
Europe.  
(2) Holland is in the Eurozone. If it would 
not accept the EMU rules while it has only an 
unemployment of 8%, how can it argue that 
Southern Europe should do so, that has a 
much higher rate of unemployment (Eurostat 
12-26%) 196 ?  
 
                                                                
194 http://thomascool.eu/Thomas/Nederlands/Wetenschap/Artikelen/2013-07-03-Wijffels-
CommissieStructuurBanken.html 
195 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zalmnorm 
196 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-02052014-AP/EN/3-02052014-AP-
EN.PDF 
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have used this so-called “wobble tax” 
myself to put a break on the economy in 
1970 when it was growing too fast and 
my successor increased this temporary 
tax increase still further and abolished it 
afterwards. After that, it has never been 
used. It could have been used now as a 
strong antidote to the overpowering 
negative influence of structural 
expenditure cuts.  
Besides this, the government could 
also increase the investment in needed 
infrastructure that could be financed now 
with an exceptionally low rate of interest 
and that would then alleviate budgetary 
problems later. I have suggested several 
times an acceleration of implementation 
of the Delta Plan for strengthening our 
defences against the rising sea level that 
we have to expect. Eventually, this could 
be financed through a special fund in 
order to keep it separate from all other 
expenditures under the austerity regime. 
An important aspect of such a policy 
stance is that the government would be 
able to show confidence in the future. As 
I will show in my conclusion, basic 
confidence is an essential need for our 
economy at the present time. 
It goes without saying that our large 
balance of payments surplus will give us 
ample room for such stimulating 
measures. They would also be 
favourable in the context of the European 
Union, because they can help the weaker 
countries with balance of payment 
deficits. Although the separate balance of 
payment situation for individual European 
countries are not visible in a monetary 
union, they still exist and would cause 
financial flows between central banks. It 
remains be necessary for the European 
Union gradually to move closer to 
balancing internal European payments. 
(1) "Delta Plan" has already been used for 
the past. It is better to use a new label. If you 
want to do something w.r.t. global warming, 
then it is proper to explicity say so. See my 
book on the Tinbergen & Hueting approach to 
Ecological Survival. 197 
(2) If Holland is allowed to do so, why not 
Southern Europe ? Will they not suffer from 
global warming, e.g. more heat in Summer ? 
[These comments were from 2014 and might 
be a bit different in 2020.] 
(3) For the creation of Bretton Woods, 
Keynes already explained that the surplus 
countries had a higher responsibility to work 
towards a solution than the deficit countries 
(who were forced to import). 
P 
                                                                
197 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63904/ 
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17.2.7 8 [Capital scarcity] 
A very different limitation for Keynesian 
budgetary policies follows from the 
fundamental international shift in the 
relative scarcity of different factors of 
production. It was Professor Bertil Ohlin 
(Swedish economist, 23rd April 1899 – 
3rd August 1979), who analysed how the 
structure of international trade depends 
on the relative scarcity of the main 
factors of production, labour, capital, and 
entre-preneurial capacity. As a 
consequence of the increasing efficiency 
and therefore lower costs of international 
transportation and communication, some 
low-income countries have now been 
able to fully engage in international trade, 
becoming “emerging economies”. This 
means that the great abundance of 
labour for example in China, where more 
than one billion people still live in 
absolute poverty [? / TC], makes it 
possible to produce labour-intensive 
products very cheaply. This has a great 
impact on the industrial countries that 
could not compete with these cheap 
products, so that they imported them. 
This made labour in their countries 
relatively more abundant. In relation to 
this, capital became scarcer because 
many capital installations need to be 
replaced or adjusted to the new scarcity 
and price relationships in world markets. 
In the United States this resulted in a 
relative lowering of real wages that did 
not increase in the last ten years while 
productivity continued to grow. Against 
this, profits increased and especially 
entrepreneurial income went up in sky-
high bonuses. In Europe, similar 
tendencies can be seen. With respect to 
Keynesian policies this scarcity of capital 
means that the industrial countries need 
to increase savings. That can be an 
argument to aim for low budgetary 
deficits. Germany’s policies then fit into 
 
(1) Agreed about Bertil Ohlin. 
(2) Trade and technology improve welfare, 
and are not a cause for unemployment. 
(3) Unemployment is caused by a wrong 
implementation of the Welfare State.  
(4) The neoclassical analysis must be 
amended with ESC and NIBs to close holes.  
(5) The problem is not lack of savings. The 
problem is the lack of investments.  
In the classical economy of J.B. Say the 
idea was that S drives I. But Keynes 
discovered 198 that the economy had 
changed, and that I drives S. Putting money 
in the bank doesn't do much, except losing 
value if there are no investments. 
(6) Again, for Germany, the supplied graph 
is inadequate. 
Q 
                                                                
198 Addendum 2020: See the discussion about Steven Kates on Harlan McCracken, 
https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2014/10/26/thomas-robert-malthus-visiting-maastricht/ 
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this fundamental situation. For the 
Netherlands however, with its large 
saving surplus, the problem is rather to 
bring business investments to a higher 
level. 
17.2.8 9 [Emerging markets] 
This brings me back to the beginning of 
our large structural saving surplus. There 
are two aspects to this. We have seen 
that we now have a savings surplus of 
approximately 8% of GDP in the non-
financial business sector: high retained 
profits and low investment. The other 
element is formed by the savings from 
pension funds and life insurance 
companies of 6% of GDP. How can this 
be explained? 
As Schotten and Leering [3] point out, 
elements in this situation can be that we 
have a relatively large number of 
multinational companies that have their 
head office in the Netherlands and that 
then receive dividends from daughter 
companies in other countries. Dividend 
payments in our country are relatively 
low and the sharp decrease of the rate of 
interest has also helped. 
But a more fundamental factor seems 
to me that international capital 
movements in recent years have 
increased strongly. Limiting government 
regulations have been mostly abolished 
and financial communications have been 
improved. In this way, the emerging 
economies like China, Brazil and others 
can grow very strongly and therefore, 
they attract large capital imports. 
Multinational companies can then see 
more attractive investment possibilities in 
these countries than here. This is of 
course an aspect of the change in 
relative scarcity of the factors of 
production – labour and capital – that I 
mentioned earlier. The resulting scarcity 
of capital shows itself here by large 
outflows of capital in the form of direct 
investments or participation in shared 
capital of foreign companies. Dr. J. van 
Duijn, who wrote a very penetrating 
 
(1) Holland has been mentioned as a tax 
haven. However, if profits are redirected to 
flow over Holland, they come in but also go 
out, and there should be no big saldo effect.  
(2) The fundamental distinction would be 
the distinction between the internal and 
external market. (CPB: Van Schaaijk, 
Bakhoven, Colignatus, see point K.)  
The multinationals only feature strongly 
because they operate more on the external 
market. They are not relevant because of 
being "multinationals" (big) but they feature 
because of being external. 
R 
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article about our economic 
disequilibrium, [4] sees here also a shift 
in power from labour to capital with lower 
real wages and higher profits as a result, 
a tendency strengthened by the general 
lowering of profit taxes. An interesting 
aspect of this development is also that 
large companies are more easily taken 
over by competitors and have to defend 
themselves against this or prepare a 
take-over other companies themselves. 
This leads to accumulation of large cash-
holdings. Schotten and Leering 
mentioned these also and see this as a 
precaution against greater economic 
volatility. 
Ftnt 3: Schotten en Leering, De puzzel 
van het Nederlandse spaarover-schot, 
Me Judice, 2 February 2012 
Ftnt 4: Dr. J. van Duijn, De 
economische crisis en de aanpak ervan, 
Tijdschrift voor Openbare Financiën, 
jaargang 45, 2013, nummer 4, blz. 180. 
Both references suffer because of lacking 
the material that is under censorship. 
  
17.2.9 10 [Fiscal arrangements] 
This raises the question how 
governments should look at all this. The 
present paradigm includes complete 
freedom of international capital 
movements. The idea is that efficient 
markets know best. But apart from the 
question whether it is always best for 
shareholders, large take-overs can 
sometimes clearly damage the national 
interest with respect to employment and 
growth. It is clear that governments of the 
larger European countries sometimes 
interfere, visibly or invisibly. It seems to 
me that in our small country – although 
still medium-sized with respect to 
economics – the government should 
have the power, as in the United 
Kingdom, to veto large take-overs when 
they consider them not in the national 
interest. With such a power our 
government could have prevented the 
very unfortunate and destructive take-
 
The ABN AMRO bank case is a minor 
issue.  
Interestingly though, the director of the CPB 
who started the censorship of science is 
Gerrit Zalm, now CEO of ABN AMRO. 199 
My position w.r.t. Zalm is strictly business. 
Perhaps he was disinformed himself. I have 
not been witness to all what happened, and 
my advice is a parliamentary enquiry to find 
out. 
Zalm was member of the PvdA but 
switched to VVD in 1984, i.e. during the 
period of Reagan and Thatcher as well. 
He worked within the bureaucracy of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and had no real 
background in scientific research when he 
was catapulted into the directorate of the 
CPB in 1988. We see this same happening 
with the new director appointed last year. 200 
If the censorship had been investigated and 
ended by parliament in 1991, then Zalm likely 
couldn't have become minister of Finance in 
S 
                                                                
199 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrit_Zalm 
200 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2013/08/20/new-director-new-blinds/ 
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over of ABN AMRO by Fortis, the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander. 
Our central bank – de Nederlandsche 
Bank – foresaw great difficulties from this 
take-over but the government saw no 
possibilities to act. The result was finally 
that we lost a large network of foreign 
bank offices that had been built up over 
centuries and that had been very helpful 
for our exporters. Banking services were 
also an export category where we had a 
comparative advantage. So, this was a 
loss for the national economy. Apart from 
this, the relatively low level of our 
investments is an argument for a fiscal 
regime that is more favourable for 
investment and innovation. Research 
spending should be stimulated and we 
should have ample opportunities for 
accelerated depreciation of investment 
expenditures that can be a very effective 
stimulus to investments. This could also 
be variable as an instrument for anti-
cyclical policy. 
1994 (even if he was disinformed but then 
jumped to conclusions, and of course it 
remains politics).  
The report on his functioning as CFO of 
DSB Bank 201 in 2007-2008 is politically 
motivated and lacks decency. See point G 
above on the ease to neglect 
mismanagement. [In 2020, see this book 
Chapter 34.] 
17.2.10 11 [Domestic capital] 
Then there is also the question of a 
lack of financing. This plays a role for 
medium and small-scaled businesses 
and that brings us to the other element in 
our saving surplus: pension funds and 
life insurance companies. Our 
government has seen the great potential 
in these enormous savings that now flow 
for 85% out of the country. It has 
engaged these institutions in discussions 
to induce them to increase their financing 
in Dutch business. This discussion 
seems to be deadlocked however, 
because these institutions fear that the 
return on such credits would be relatively 
lower. Therefore, they ask at least for 
government guarantees, which the 
Minister of Finance naturally is not 
prepared to give. 
Is there a way out of this deadlock? 
 
The regulation of the pension funds is a 
minor issue.  
Relevant are the ESC and NIB, and my 
general solution approach to unemployment. 
When the economy comes properly regulated 
with those measures, what to do with the 
pension funds then is basically an issue of 
equality. It shouldn't be that workers who with 
a high degree of likelihood die before age 65 
actually pay for the pensions of government 
officials who with a high degree of likelihood 
live much longer. A pension proposal in 
Dutch is here. 202 
(Incidently, it so happens that this fits the 
case for professor Witteveen and hopefully 
myself, but it is not intended to be personal, 
and I surmise that he will agree with me.)  
T 
                                                                
201 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DSB_Bank 
202 http://thomascool.eu/Thomas/Nederlands/Wetenschap/Artikelen/2005-11-01-
MicroMacroConditiesPensioenen.pdf 
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Then we have to recognise that the 
present supervisory rules that force these 
institutions to aim for the highest possible 
returns, are completely unreasonable. 
They are unreasonable because they 
require the funds to build up a capital 
from which all future obligations for the 
next 30 to 40 years can be financed at 
the present exceptionally low rate of 
interest. If we would moderate this 
accounting rule by taking the moving 
average over the last ten years of this 
rate of interest, their financing problems 
would be alleviated and these institutions 
would have more room for credit to 
medium and small-scaled businesses 
with lower returns. Against this, the 
government should then re-introduce a 
maximum for investment in shares and 
participations in large corporations, which 
is the largest share of the total 
investments of pension funds: 323 billion 
euro of a total of 959.6 billion euro. [5] 
Ftnt 5: DNBulletin: Vermogen 
pensioenfondsen voor 14 procent in 
Nederland 
Unless Southern Europe defaults ... U 
17.2.11 12 Conclusion 
When we overlook the condition of our 
economy in its different aspects -- over-
saving, lack of investment, super 
cautious rules for pension funds and 
insurance companies and large liquidity 
holdings by businesses for precautionary 
reasons – we can see one basic spiritual 
weakness behind this. Clearly, a saving 
surplus reflects a lack of confidence, of 
trust. The results of investments depend 
on developments in the future and the 
future is uncertain. There are risks, but 
there are also basic opportunities. Some 
basic confidence, some optimism is 
needed. Keynes wrote about the “long-
term state of expectations” and the need 
for “animal spirits”. [6] 
 
 
 
(1) Agreed on "lack of confidence, of trust". 
But this can be quite realistic in the current 
economic conditions.  
(2) This analysis by Keynes is key to 
understanding the modern economy. The 
solution approach has these elements: 
(2a) Economic planning, for which a CPB 
fails, and we need an Economic Supreme 
Court (that respects science). This also holds 
for the Council of Economic Advisors in the 
USA, because of lack of independence within 
the constitutional framework.  
(2b) National Investment Banks that work 
countercyclically.  
(2c) Overall commitment to low cyclical 
unemployment of some 2%, with a properly 
implemented Welfare State.  
Politicians may disagree, but then they 
should clearly state that they want to wreck 
the system, and not hide behide false science 
based upon censorship and abuse of power. 
V 
Ftnt 6: John Maynard Keynes “The Just to be sure: Aristotle distinguished   
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general theory of employment interest 
and money”, pages161-162, published 
by MacMillan and Co., Ltd, London, 
1946. Keynes writes there: “But 
individual initiative will only be adequate 
when reasonable calculation is 
supplemented and supported by animal 
spirits, so that the thought of ultimate 
loss which often overtakes pioneers, as 
experience undoubtedly tells us and 
them, is put aside as a healthy man puts 
aside the expectation of death.” 
between dead matter, living plants and 
animal life. In Latin the latter was indicated by 
the "spiritus animalis". This is quite different 
from behaving like an animal, though pupils 
at English boarding schools tend to make that 
joke. 
I would add that human beings, faced 
with all the changes and dangers of the 
future in the material world, can always 
find astounding strength and insight in 
their inner life. But we have to discover 
these turning our attention from the outer 
material world to the inner spiritual world 
so that the One Source of Energy, Life 
and Light can be found. 
What we need is the power of 
confidence: Faith! 
With all respect: I apparently don't need to 
tap into some inner source that apparently 
still would be somewhat external since it 
would be shared with all others. On my 
automatic pilot I wake up each morning with 
joy in what the day will bring, and I hope that 
this transpires in my work. Still, this is a Vale-
dictory Lecture and we can only respect 
professor Witteveen for closing it with a 
statement from his heart. When we meet a 
troubled person why not indeed suggest that 
they look into universal sufism ? 
Overall, this economics discussion is of key 
relevance for the understanding of the 
economic crisis, both in Europe and the 
United State, and, indeed, the world.  
I am much impressed by professor 
Witteveen's grasp of economic theory and 
understanding of the present situation. It also 
shows that Keynes already lay the foundation 
in his General Theory and his work on 
Bretton Woods. Those essentials haven't 
changed. Progress since then has been on 
detail and technical issues (compared to this). 
Our economies have been suffering from the 
arrogance of policy makers who did not 
respect the essentials. The solution lies in 
curbing the political powers and prevent them 
from transgressing into science. 
Tongue in cheek: faith may be rewarded: at 
least, you may start considering my 
summary, dating back to 1990 and hit by 
censorship of economic science: "Cause and 
cure of the crisis" 203 (also on YouTube 204). 
W 
                                                                
203 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2013/02/24/cause-and-cure-of-the-crisis/ 
204 http://boycottholland.wordpress.com/video/ 
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Figure 7 
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18. Macro-economic context of the Greek crisis 
 
18.1 Chronology of the Greek debt crisis 
For a chronology of the Greek debt crisis there are the ESM, 205 the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA), 206 wikipedia, 207 and a useful overview is here. 208 
18.2 Unemployment and rate of interest in Greece 
To indicate the seriousness of the context, and the necessity of reliable data, 
Figure 8 gives the Greek long term rate of interest, and Figure 9 shows the 
unemployment in the Eurozone and some selected countries; 209 and remember 
that a recovery of employment in Greece likely means lower wages. 
We might also refer to a review by the IMF, 210 and I take the liberty to quote 
their graph, Figure 10, comparing the situation of the Greek collapse to the US 
Depression of the 1930s, with the US taking some 9 years to recover, and Greece 
requiring 24 years of which 11 have passed, slowly leaving the deepest point now. 
Figure 8. Greek long term rate of interest 211 
 
While this is the basic context, the present discussion about the accounting of 
Greek debt and deficits is an epi-phenomenon, like the itch on an elephant – 
though the elephant might be highly annoyed because he cannot reach the spot. 
Let us look more closely at that itch. 
 
                                                                
205 https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/greece 
206 https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/greek-crisis-17-2017/en/#chapter0 
207 Portal and no source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_government-debt_crisis 
208 https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-greece-debt-crisis-3305525 
209 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/estat-navtree-portlet-
prod/NodeInfoServices?lang=en&code=une_rt_a 
210 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/10/01/sp093019-The-IMF-and-the-Greek-Crisis-
Myths-and-Realities 
211 https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=229. 
IRS.M.GR.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z &periodSortOrder=ASC 
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Figure 9 
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18.3 Banking crisis: nationalisation in Sweden and Iceland versus bailing out the 
bankers in Ireland and Greece 
18.3.1 Regulation of banks 
Europe at the time did not have proper regulations for the mix of ECB with euro 
and national governments and banks. There still is a lot of work to be done. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) banks could account 
for government debt as risk-free, whence the Greek state in theory could borrow 
without boundary even while the debt kept rising, though eventually out of control. 
The rules for the euro with deficits less than 3% and debt less than 60% of GDP 
were intended to keep government debt risk-free indeed. France and Germany 
broke the agreement in 2003, creating the precedent for others. In the banking 
crisis, Ireland and Greece nationalised bank debts, but Ireland had a starting 
position with a national debt less than 60% and Greece was much above it. Part of 
the crisis was that Greek debt suddenly attained the risk of default, with a risk 
spreading to the whole of Southern Europe.  
The finances of the Greek state suffer when its rate of interest gets this stigma. 
Assume a debt of EUR 200 bn, with annual refinancing of EUR 20 bn with a 
maturity of 10 years. Let us assume a rate of interest of 3% or EUR 6 bn per 
annum. A rise of the rate of interest to 18% causes an unexpected additional 
burden of EUR 20 * 15% = EUR 3 bn in the next year. Eventually you still have a 
debt of EUR 200 bn but with an annual interest burden of EUR 36 bn. If you 
cannot pay the interest, then you would have to borrow to pay for the interest, and 
this is the road to bankruptcy. See Colignatus (2011b) on stigma and haircuts. 
18.3.2 IMF and its IEO 2016 
IMF is criticised for allowing a bailout of the bankers in Greece. This is also 
stated by the IMF IEO (2016) report. 212 Another researcher who thinks that bank 
owners cannot be simply bailed out is Andreas Georgiou (2009), “Excessive 
Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations“, IMF 
WP/09/233, October 1 2009. 213 
18.3.3 The Truth Commission 2015 
The scientific coordinator of the Greek “Truth Commission on Public Debt” from 
April 2015 to November 2015 Eric Toussaint 214 215 216 in 2017 reviews a book by 
Yanis Varoufakis. I did not check the Truth Commission claim on “falsification”, but 
Toussaint’s criticism about how George Papandreou handled the banking sector in 
2010 is advised reading: 217 218 
                                                                
212 https://ieo.imf.org/en/our-work/Evaluations/Completed/2016-0728-the-imf-and-the-crises-in-
greece-ireland-and-portugal 
213 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Excessive-Lending-Leverage-and-
Risk-Taking-in-the-Presence-of-Bailout-Expectations-23366 
214 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89ric_Toussaint 
215 https://www.cadtm.org/Varoufakis-s-questionable-account 
216 https://newpol.org/theoretical-lies-of-the-world-bank/ 
217 https://www.cadtm.org/Yanis-Varoufakis-s-Account-of-the (Part 2) 
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“In my first article on the subject of this book, I analysed critically the 
proposals made by Yanis Varoufakis before he became a member of the 
Tsipras government in January 2015, demonstrating that those proposals 
were doomed to fail. This second article covers the ties Yanis Varoufakis 
maintained with Greece’s ruling political class (both the PASOK, 
historically linked to social-democracy, and the conservative New 
Democracy) for several years. (...) 
What Varoufakis does not say is that Papandreou dramatised the public 
debt and the public deficit instead of making those who were responsible, 
both in Greece and abroad (that is, the private shareholders, the board 
members of the banks, and the foreign banks and other financial entities 
who contributed to generating the speculative bubble), bear the cost of 
the banking crisis. The Papandreou government falsified [big claim !] the 
statistics on Greece’s debt — not in the period before the crisis, in order 
to reduce it (as the prevailing narrative claims), but in fact in 2009, to 
increase it. That is demonstrated very clearly by the Truth Committee on 
Greece’s Public Debt in its June 2015 report (see chapter II, p. 17). 219 
Instead of blowing the whistle on the falsification, Varoufakis takes the 
statements made by Papandreou and his Finance Minister on the 
dramatic state of public finances at face value. (...) 
Following their win in the 2009 elections thanks to a campaign during 
which they denounced the neoliberal policies of New Democracy, the 
Papandreou government, had it wanted to make good on its campaign 
promises, would have had to socialize the banking sector by organizing 
an orderly failure of the banks and protecting depositors. Several 
historical examples demonstrate that organizing such a failure and then 
starting up financial services again to operate in the interests of the 
population would have been quite possible. They should have taken the 
example of what had been done in Iceland since 2008 [ftnt] and in 
Sweden and Norway in the 1990s. [ftnt] Instead, Papandreou chose to 
follow the scandalous and catastrophic example of the Irish government, 
which bailed out the bankers in 2008 and in September 2010 agreed to a 
European aid plan that had dramatic consequences for Ireland’s people. 
When in fact what was needed was to go even farther than Iceland and 
Sweden and completely and permanently socialize the financial sector. 
The foreign banks and big private Greek shareholders should have been 
made to bear the losses stemming from resolving the banking crisis and 
those responsible for the banking disaster should have been prosecuted. 
That would have allowed Greece to avoid the successive Memoranda 
that have subjected the Greek people to a dramatic humanitarian crisis 
and to humiliation, without any of it resulting in truly cleaning up the 
Greek banking system. (....)" 
                                                                                                                                      
218 https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3391-yanis-varoufakis-s-account-of-the-greek-crisis-a-
self-condemnation-part-two-surprising-relations-with-the-political-class 
219 http://www.cadtm.org/Preliminary-Report-of-the-Truth 
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18.3.4 Three outsiders 2015 and 2018 
Davidsdottir & Matthiasson in 2015 still propose such an Icelandic reconstruction 
though in 2015, while it already could have been used in 2009-2010. 220 
James Galbraith in 2018 “The Greece Bailout’s Legacy of Immiseration” does 
not take account of the Toussaint criticism about 2009-2010: 221 
“2010 to 2018 will go down in Greek history as an epic period of 
colonization; of asset stripping and privatization; of unfunded health and 
education; of bankruptcies, foreclosures, homelessness, and 
impoverishment; of unemployment, emigration, and suicide. These were 
the years of the three memoranda, or “financial-assistance programs” 
accompanied by “structural reforms,” enacted supposedly to promote 
Greek “recovery” from the slump and credit crunch of 2010. They were, in 
fact, a fraud perpetrated on Greece and Europe, a jumble of bad policies 
based on crude morality tales that catered to right-wing politics to cover 
up unpayable debts. 
This was a bailout? The word reeks of indulgence and implied 
disapproval. As it was often said, “The Greeks had their party and now 
they must pay.” Yes, there was a party—for oligarchs with ships and 
London homes and Swiss bank accounts, for the military, for engineering 
and construction and armaments companies from Germany and France 
and the United States. And yes, there was a bailout. It came from 
Europe’s taxpayers, and went to the troubled banks of France and 
Germany. Greece was merely the pass-through, and the Greeks who 
paid dearly with their livelihoods were just the patsies in the deal.” 
The policies came from the IMF— its standard repertory of austerity and 
“reform.” But its staff and directors knew from the beginning that these 
measures would not suffice. IMF executive directors from Australia, 
Switzerland, Brazil, and China voiced objections. Channels were 
therefore bypassed, objections ignored. The Fund was nearly out of work 
and money because of the failures of its programs — and the relative 
success of countries that ignored them — all over the world. And its 
managing director at the time wished to be the next president of France. 
So Greece, which is to say its creditors—especially French and German 
banks — received the largest loan in IMF history (relative to its ownership 
share). And that 289-billion-euro loan came largely from U.S. taxpayers.” 
18.3.5 Some haircuts in 2011 
It is useful to remember though that there were haircuts in 2011, 222 while ABN 
AMRO in 2008-2020 still is owned by the Dutch government (majority shares). 
                                                                
220 http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/the-good-the-bad-and-the-foreign-icelandic-lesson-for-stabilising-
the-greek-banks/ 
221 http://www.defenddemocracy.press/the-greece-bailouts-legacy-of-immiseration-by-james-k-
galbraith/ 
222 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203699404577045471766969222 
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“The Dutch [ABN AMRO] bank is the latest European lender to book a 
hefty loss on its exposure to the troubled Mediterranean country. The 
banking industry last month agreed to write down 50% of the value on 
their holdings of Greek sovereign debt, as part of an EU package to quell 
the debt-crisis in the euro zone. Most big European banks have already 
written down on the value of their investments, often by more than 50%. 
They are also seeking to exit other troubled euro-zone countries like Italy 
and Spain.” 
18.4 An insider and two commentators 
18.4.1 George Papakonstantinou 
George Papakonstantinou 223 as minister of Finance in the Fall of 2009 
announced that the Karamanlis deficit was not the claimed 6% but closer to 
12.5%, perhaps out of sincerity but likely also because he did not want to be held 
accountable for the deficit and debt by his predecessor. Perhaps the debt situation was 
still viable in 2009, with the rate of interest at that time, but once the eggs were 
scrambled, and speculation on the financial markets unleashed, there was no going 
back to the idea that the rising debt was viable. Given the protests around the world, 
he created El.Stat as an independent body, with the law of March 9 2010. A 2016 
review by Marcus Walker of Papakonstantinou’s book summarises the 
consequences of the financial and Greek crises: 224 
“Seven years on, the effects linger. Greece is stuck in the deepest 
depression in a developed economy since the 1930s. Southern Europe is 
suffering a lost decade. The European Union has become a byword for 
economic pain, making it an easy target for both the anti-capitalist left 
and the nationalist right.” 
I wonder why not more is said about that Papakonstantinou mislaid the Lagarde 
USB-stick, 225 and removed the names of some contacts from the list. 226 
18.4.2 Nikos Tsafos 
Nikos Tsafos about his book: 227 
“How did Greece, with less than 3% of the population of the European 
Union, become the epicenter of Europe’s “existential crisis?” Why did 
Greece opt for an obligation-laden bailout rather default or leave the 
Eurozone, as many said it should? Could it have avoided the 
disappointments that followed, including needing a second bailout, 
holding repeat elections, and swearing in its fourth prime minister in a 
year?  
                                                                
223 Portal and no source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giorgos_Papakonstantinou 
224 Marcus Walker (2016), “The Firefighter’s Lament. Game Over, by George Papaconstantinou”, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/game-over-george-papaconstantinou-1474565140 
225 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-minister-idUSKBN0MK24520150324 
226 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-minister/ex-greek-finance-minister-found-
guilty-of-tampering-with-tax-list-idUSKBN0MK24520150324 
227 http://www.greekdefaultwatch.com/p/my-book.html 
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 The conventional narrative answered these questions by viewing the 
Greek crisis as the result of a “flawed currency union.” Many economists, 
moreover, thought Greece was foolish to seek a bailout rather than 
renege on its debts or leave the Eurozone. And as the crisis deepened, 
economists again blamed the international community for pushing 
“austerity” onto Greece.  
 Beyond Debt offers a different account of this crisis. It sees it, first and 
foremost, as a Greek crisis, best understood through the lens of Greek 
history, politics and economics. The crisis was triggered by global events, 
but it was not caused by them. As the book shows, Greece’s chosen 
path—a bailout—made infinitely more sense than either a default or the 
abandonment of the common currency that many economists called for. 
And while others see “austerity” as the problem for Greece’s woes after 
the bailout, Beyond Debt blames instead an indecisive government that 
could not see reform through to the end.” 
18.4.3 Yannis Palaiologos 
Palaiologos has this report about the October 2009 events. 228 Another book 
review points to deeper causes: 229 
“Greece's worst flaw, it seems, is a culture of tax evasion as witnessed by 
tax reform expert Nikos Tatsos. (...) Besides corruption, Greece suffers 
from inertia, incompetence, even "boundless fecklessness", as 
Palaiologos calls it. (...). In line with the thinking propounded by 
evolutionary theorist Nicholas Wade, it is tempting to conclude the 
Greeks are inherently hopeless – congenital losers. Not so, says 
Palaiologos who predictably but persuasively pins much blame for the 
nation's plight on its mighty trading neighbour: Germany. "Self-serving 
speeches by German politicians decried the Greeks' innate penchant for 
corruption and sloth while skipping over the recklessness of their own 
financial institutions and the crooked practices of their big exporters in 
fuelling the crisis."” 
For some readers, the latter might seem evasive, but it is a sound economic 
point, see the discussion on the view by former IMF Managing Director Johan 
Witteveen in Section 16.2 and Chapter 17. The trade deficits of Greece, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal relate to the surplusses of Germany and Holland. 230 Greece 
can demand that these countries raise their wages. Creditor nations are always 
difficult partners in such discussions, but the EU exists for that very purpose. 
18.5 Accusations versus the true challenge for the future 
There are lots of accusations of frauds all-over. We ought to be able to trust 
science and learning though. Forum Theory “ought to work” for the Greek case as 
                                                                
228 http://www.ekathimerini.com/224837/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/the-story-behind-greeces-
unprecedented-fiscal-derailment-in-2009 
229 David Wilson (2016), “Book review: The 13th Labour of Hercules, by Yannis Palaiologos”, 
https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/books/article/1585824/book-review-13th-labour-hercules-yannis-
palaiologos 
230 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/CSBH/Index.html 
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well. Southern Europe has a different culture than Northern Europe, and the 
historical divide between the Eastern and the Western Roman Empire can also be 
seen. Such differences make solutions more complicated but we can always try to 
be creative without sacrificing scientific integrity. 
18.6 Law and economics 
The Greek justice system seems a world apart and might perhaps be much 
improved, but I have no background in law. I tend to think now that the Greek legal 
system seems to deserve more credit that foreigners seem to allow for it. It might 
still be a suggestion for the Greek government – not because of the Georgiou 
case but for entirely other reasons and purely upon economic considerations as 
discussed by Colignatus (2012b) – to let selected areas fall under international 
law, say for a lease of 50 years, to attract international business (and also 
increase competition for its own legal system, or at least provide a challenge for 
how it is perceived nationally or internationally). 
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Part 5. National accounting and statistics 
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19. Summary 
 
In 2020 the European Union and Eurostat assign statistical authority to single 
directors of the National Statistical Offices (NSO), thus NSO = director. This is 
unfortunate since a single person is more vulnerable to error and political or 
commercial pressure. Within national accounting and statistics there may be 
diversity of views and it can be unfortunate to elevate only one view to executive 
position. In 1899-2016, Holland had a Central Commission for Statistics (CCS) 
and a Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS Statistics Netherlands). CCS decided 
upon the programme for both CBS and non-CBS. CBS executed the programme 
assigned to it, and determined its figures and manner of publication. In 2003-2016 
CBS itself was being run by a multi-person board. Per January 1 2017 CCS was 
abolished and replaced by an advisory council. All statistical authority in Holland 
has been assigned to the director-general of CBS, so that CCS = CBS = DG = 
board, in conformity with the European Code of Practice 2011.  
The EU view on governance of statistics has been much influenced by the 
Eurozone crisis in 2010 with Statistics Greece (El.Stat). A Greek law of March 9 
2010 moved the statistical bureau NSSG out of the Ministry of Finance and 
created the independent El.Stat, and stated that a seven-person board had the 
authority with the director as member of the board. Director Andreas Georgiou 
however claimed all authority and in November 9 2010 sent “official figures” on 
deficit and debt for 2009 to Eurostat without first seeking approval by the board. In 
2018 the Greek Supreme Court found Georgiou guilty of a breach of duty for not 
seeking this approval, as he had been required by law. There need be no doubt 
about this Greek law of March 9 2010. The EU, Eurostat and the IMF wanted this 
Greek law changed. In a memorandum of 2012 to the IMF, the Greek government 
promised to change the law and assign all authority to the director. Statistical 
organisations ISI, RSS, ASA, IAOS, FENStatS and SFdS now protest against 
Georgiou’s conviction as a miscarriage of justice. They neglect the Greek law of 
March 9 2010 and they do not respect the separation of powers between the 
Executive (themselves) and the Judiciary branches of the Trias Politica. They also 
neglect the fellow statisticians on the board of El.Stat. To better appreciate the 
issue of governance of national accounting and statistics, it remains useful to 
deconstruct the Greek ordeal and uproar in the world of statistics. This will be 
done in Part 6.  
This present Part 5 will set the stage for the scientific governance of the EU 
National Statistical Offices in general. This governance has been seriously 
damaged because of the Eurozone crisis in 2010 and the Eurostat reaction to the 
Greek situation. The EU and official statistics are advised to return to the status 
quo ante. 
 
PM. See also El Serafy (2014), “Shouldn’t economists get involved in the making 
of the national accounts?”, RES Newsletter (October), included in THAENAES. 
Georganta (2012b) criticises the European Commission decision 2012/504/EU 
(September 17 2012), and she compares with 97/98/EC (April 21 1997). 
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20. Accounting, statistics and stewardship 
 
20.1 Distinction between accountancy and statistics  
In a letter of September 1 2017 by the American Statistical Association (ASA) to 
the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, 231 the ASA president Barry Nussbaum, 
executive director Ron Wasserstein and (Acting) Chair of the ASA Committee on 
Scientific Freedom and Human Rights Robin Mejia state:  
“The goal of a statistical agency is to describe reality, not create it.” 
However, a National Statistical Office can also have the task to draw up the 
National Accounts, and then also has the duty to apply particular accountancy 
rules, and it does not just have the goal to describe reality.  
Walter Radermacher, DG of Eurostat 2008-2016, gives a correct view about his 
job, though bungling the words, see Section 29.8 below, and also p228: 
“Walter Radermacher, Eurostat’s boss, told The New York Times that 
“the truth is not my business . . . statistics [this should be: national 
accounting] is about measuring against convention”.” 
ASA apparently is confused about the distinction between accountancy and 
statistics about reality. ASA can be advised to drop the case (and perhaps ask the 
American Accounting Association to look into this matter) – unless I myself would 
be confused about the mission of ASA.  
ASA must retract the letter to the Greek prime minister. 
National accountants – and statisticians in that role – indeed have a tendency to 
claim that “they collect data that reflect reality”, but the accountants also apply 
rules that are quite arbitrary. Ground material would be facts, but aggregates are 
constructs. It would be accurate for national accountants to say that they (also) 
apply rules, instead of (only) claiming the collection of data that reflect reality.  
A practical example is how to establish when a state enterprise is counted as 
falling under the (non-market) general government, see Section 30.6. This is not 
statistics to determine reality but application of rules of accounting established by 
convention (though with links to economic theory and practical concerns). 
With this foundation in arbitrariness, the figures for “national debt” and “budget 
deficit” are rather figments of some accounting universe, and to be used with 
caution. Macro-economists are trained on such awareness and are quite used to 
this, quite likely in contrast to other professions (likely at ASA) where statistical 
figures are much more meaningful and accurate, like perhaps, ironically, in 
demographics the “causes of death”, or in astrophysics the “distance between 
Earth and the Moon” (on average at Greenwich for average trajectories, or right at 
this moment from your position ?).  
It is important to say this, because in this discussion there appears to be a 
confusion between on the one hand statiticians who indeed aspire at estimating 
reality and on the other hand national accountants who (must) apply such arbitrary 
                                                                
231 http://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-20170901GeorgiouSeptember.pdf 
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rules. Discussions about “what the deficit really was” pertain to this accounting 
universe, and to what economists consider acceptable policy conclusions in the 
context of the Maastricht rules, and not to what scientists deem to be reality.  
Subsequently, when (major) “truly market companies” would fail, like indeed 
happened with “commercial banks”, then often governments have to step in, since 
governments exist to protect their citizens against disasters. In such cases a 
supposedly “commercial” debt still shows up as a national debt, notwithstanding 
the diligence of the national accountants of the previous years. It is too simple to 
hold that “the debt was first commercial and now it is national”, because such 
simplicity neglects the fundamental role of government. Even, there can be cases 
that keen observers – like Dr. Doom – saw such “commercial” deconfitures in the 
making, and if keen observers could do so, then why not statisticians who look at 
reality ? 
It seems useful to make these remarks at the outset, to allow us to take some 
distance from ambiguities and confusions and overtones that have played some 
role in the discussions about the Georgiou case.  
And the question is serious: Will ASA retract that statement ? Will ASA send an 
apology to the Greek prime minister for its own hysteria and malconduct ? 
20.2 Two key examples on the distinction between accounting and statistics 
It is useful to mention two key examples on the distinction between accounting 
and statistics. 
(1) National accounting has the notion of “gross domestic product” (GDP) that 
often is portrayed as (conventional) “national income” (NI), and used for the 
calculation of the figure of “economic growth”. However, this construction depends 
upon assumptions on preferences for environmental sustainability, and if such 
assumptions are not clarified than the presentation is rather misleading. There is 
also the notion of “environmental sustainable national income” (eSNI) (eGDP). DG 
Eurostat Walter Radermacher started as an environmental accountant, and 
apparently he did not quite understand the issue, see Colignatus (2020a) 
(THAENAES) and Chapter 33. 
(2) Colignatus (2017ab) (2018) are contributions to the Newsletter of the Royal 
Economic Society. 232 In an email to the leadership of the Royal Statistical Society, 
I asked for some assistance: 
“This article of mine in the Newsletter of the Royal Economic Society 
(RES) argues that the Brexit referendum question is scientifically 
unwarranted: 
(...)  
As an econometrician I have some awareness of statistics, and I think that 
the referendum question also fails for a statistical survey of what people 
actually think. But I am not a specialist on statistical surveys and my own 
diagnosis like carries little weight for others who would tend to rely on 
those specialists. 
I am wondering whether you or others in the RSS would agree with me. I 
would like to be able to quote some statistician(s) on this (pro or con, and 
why) and am wondering whether you or the RSS could help me finding 
                                                                
232 https://www.res.org.uk/site-search.html?q=Colignatus 
 131 
some. An option would be to republish the memo in a statistical medium 
and record some responses. I am wondering whether you would be able 
to help out.” 
My request for some assistance was rejected rather cursorily by RSS chairman 
David Spiegelhalter and RSS executive director Hetan Shah, see Section 39.11. It 
subsequently turned out that Shah has no background in statistics. He now 
propounds on the Georgiou case without proper check, while a scientist has been 
trained to check. For the relation to Brexit, see Chapter 11. 
20.3 Mark to Market 
See Pozen (2009) 233 on the problem that “mark to market” can be procyclical. 
For US banks he states a solution approach: 
“Could the interests of bankers and investors be reconciled with regard to 
the bank’s income statement? Yes, if the bank published two versions of 
its earnings per share (EPS) each quarter—one calculated with fair value 
accounting and the other without. Suppose the bank reported EPS of 54 
cents for the quarter, comprising net operating income of 62 cents per 
share and a loss of 8 cents per share due to unrealized losses in the 
market value of its bond portfolio. The bank would also publish a second 
EPS of 62 cents per share, with an explanation that this second EPS 
excluded those unrealized losses. 
The publication of two EPS numbers each quarter along these lines was 
recommended in 2008 by the SEC’s Advisory Committee on 
Improvements to Financial Reporting (which I chaired). The table taken 
from this report (see “Is a New Financial Statement the Solution?”) shows 
a partial reconciliation of a hypothetical company’s net income under fair 
value accounting (YYY in the table) with its net cash flow, which excludes 
fair market adjustments (XXX). Stripping out a company’s cash flow from 
its income statement is the type of exercise undertaken by many 
securities analysts to better understand a company’s financial situation.” 
At El.Stat Statistics Greece, director Georgiou had worked at the financial 
statistics department of the IMF and should know that “mark to market” 
accountancy rules may sound wise (“take the current market value”) but actually 
tend to be counterproductive from a policy point of view (namely procyclical) and 
are not really required for a government anyhow (that has more options for 
finance). 
20.4 Stewardship in general 
A producer of some product retains some stewardship. It involves a (limited) 
duty of care that the product is not used outside of its specifications and intentions. 
Often a manual is provided. There can be advice on how to dispose of the 
product. At some point one tends to assume that users are independent and have 
their own responsibilities (like with knives and axes) but there are always surprises 
about the complexity of such relationships. Some people are considering that 
                                                                
233 https://hbr.org/2009/11/is-it-fair-to-blame-fair-value-accounting-for-the-financial-crisis 
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tabacco companies 50 years ago already knew what they were doing, e.g. in 
making their products more addictive, and would still be accountable even today. 
Software uses the “as is” clause, and might be an exception to the rule, but likely 
is not. 
20.5 Official statistics versus academia 
There are some crucial distinctions, see Table 2 op page 137: 
• Official statistics does applied science within a developed legal setting, 
basically with the intention to refresh data and figures within a known 
analytical framework.  
• Academia and research statistics are free to adapt to the occasion, with the 
purpose to work on theory and empirical science and generate new analyses. 
Many scientists will tend to hold that data are not decided upon by voting, but in 
applied science the use of expert panels is not uncommon, and a National 
Statistical Office operates within a legal context that is quite different from 
academia. 
Academia still have some stewardship, since it is not enough to just publish a 
result in a journal and leave it at that. When Paul Krugman had presented a new 
theory on trade, and noticed that policymakers claimed to use his theory for 
purposes where it did not apply, he protested. Some might think that Krugman 
could have chosen not to protest, but it fits the notion of stewardship that he did 
protest. Some people might argue that it is rather the role of parliament in the 
legislative branch to check upon the statements and decisions by policymakers in 
the executive branch, but there remains a role for scientists too, also at the 
academia, for example since parliament might only understand the issue when 
there is a protest about what the problem is. 
Official statistics tends to have a structural stewardship. Goals, principles, duties 
and procedures are specified in laws and documents. The practice of official 
statistics also involves the management of the flow of information. When data are 
presented, it can be explained again what they are. On occasion it might happen 
that an alert is published when it is observed that some data are used improperly. 
This might happen rarely though, since users of data may tend to know what they 
are doing, or when they don’t know what they are doing then it still might be that 
the national office doesn’t notice it.  
For example, somewhat mundane, CBS Statistics Netherlands in 2015 issued a 
warning about fake-interviewers.  
A recent interview with DG CBS 2014-2020 dr Tjark Tjin-A-Tsoi indicates his 
perception on stewardship. 234 In my translation:  
“Q. The attention for the work by CBS has increased considerably in 
recent years. Yet it is also easy to "lie with statistics". Is this increase 
visible in the figures and are you satisfied with the way how your research 
is presented in the media and politics?” 
                                                                
234 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/corporate/2019/50/interview-directeur-generaal-over-strategie-en-rol-
cbs 
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“A. The increase can indeed be seen clearly in the figures. The number of 
times that Statistics Netherlands has been quoted has doubled in some 5 
years and the quality of the reporting has also increased. By the latter I 
mean that larger and richer articles are written by journalists based on 
publications from CBS. This is partly because we started to provide more 
information per message, with more indicators per topic. We also indicate 
better in messages what the used indicators say exactly, i.e. what their 
definition is, and also what they do not say. Lack of clarity about this is 
often the cause of "lying with statistics". Finally, we offer a fairly large 
number of messages for preview to journalists, so that they have more 
time to prepare for their own messages and possibly to do some research 
of their own. All this has led to a sharp increase in attention for our work, 
but it has also contributed to the quality and factual accuracy of the 
messages that appear in the media.” 
A dry observation is that when you partly prepare the work of a journalist then 
there is more chance that they adopt your press-release (without the convention 
that it would be plagiarism). 
20.6 Example: Publication of the figure for GDP in the USA 
The publication of the figure for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the USA 
might be an example. Consider the letter by the director of the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) to All Employees of July 13 2016 concerning the 
“Updated Security and Release Procedures”. 235 Excerpts are: 
 “In order to continue to guarantee that the hard work in generating our 
sensitive economic statistics is not compromised by unauthorized pre-
release of any statistics, this memorandum organizes, updates, and 
clarifies the longstanding security procedures at the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.” (...) 
 “As the review process moves to higher levels within the Bureau, only 
those individuals with a need to know will have access to the more 
comprehensive aggregates. (Comprehensive aggregates are estimates 
that provide a comprehensive view of the overall set of estimates.) The 
estimates are not finalized until they have undergone final review and 
approval by a designated group of top management officials. For the 
principal economic indicators, this review is conducted under “lock-up” 
conditions (see Attachment B).” (...) 
 “As soon as the estimates for principal economic indicators have been 
approved and finalized and copies of materials for public release have 
been prepared, the estimates are transmitted to the President, through 
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.” (...) 
 “Within one hour before the scheduled time of a news/public release, the 
information to be released may be provided to the Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs and other Department policy officials in a “lock-up” 
environment. There shall be no external communication of information 
received in the lock-up until the time of public release, and there will be 
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no public comment by policy officials until at least one hour after the 
official release time” (...) 
 “2. All participants in the lock-up will sign in on a sheet located at the 
entrance to the restricted area (room 8K403B). After the initial sign-in, all 
procedures for the lock-up will be enforced, and participants will not leave 
the lock-up area until officially dismissed.” (...) 
 “7. All worksheets, notes, rough drafts, unused copies, removable 
computer media, etc. (except those to be used in the briefings the next 
morning) will be locked up as the lock-up ends and held until after release 
of the estimates. "Shredder bins" for trash and envelopes for materials to 
be retained will be available for this purpose. Materials needed for next-
morning briefings will be locked up or otherwise secured either on site at 
the Suitland Federal Center or in the BEA safe at the Herbert Hoover 
building.” (...) 
 “10. After signing out of the lock-up, all discussions of the estimates (the 
actual numbers, ranges, difficulty at arriving at the estimates, etc.) with 
non-designated persons prior to their release are strictly prohibited” 
20.7 Example: Other fields than official statistics 
It may be useful to look at other fields than official statistics.  
On February 17 2009, Dutch prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende and CPB 
director Coen Teulings gave a joint press conference, announcing the impact of 
the financial crisis upon the Dutch economy. Production contracted with 3.5%. In 
December, the forecast of the budget deficit for 2009 had been 1.2% but was now 
revised to 3%, with a rise to 5.5% in 2010. 236 237 Obviously, the “independent 
CPB” could have published its revised forecast and let the policy makers deal with 
the bombshell. It is stewardship to give some time to the cabinet to come to terms 
with the new information, and to present the finding with some sense of control 
and direction instead of causing widespread chaos. 
In Holland in September 2018, Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte managed a 
delay of two weeks of a report by two planning agencies (CPB and PBL), because 
he wanted public attention for the annual presentation of the budget and the King’s 
Speech, and no “distraction” about climate change, even though the discussion 
about the budget obviously is affected by such discussion on the climate. 238 
20.8 Stewardship in national accounting and official statistics: publication 
20.8.1 Reasons for stewardship 
Remarkably, also, the tendency in these protests in official statistics and the 
academia w.r.t. the Georgiou case is that a National Statistical Office has a duty to 
publish data coûte que coûte whatever the consequences. This overlooks the 
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237 https://www.parool.nl/nieuws/economie-klapt-in-
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stewardship or duty of care that always exists in science or actually in any 
professional function anyhow.  
It is proper indeed to calculate the statistical figure according to its definition (a 
temperature is a temperature, and we would like to know it as a fact) (with some 
discretion, also in accounting, when definitions are not mathematically precise), 
but it is another decision when and how to publish it.  
• When there is a fire in a theatre then the yelling of “fire” might cause a 
stampede and make matters worse. 
• Instead of publising “x = 10” one might also publish “x is in the range of 8 to 
11” (dodging symmetry) and then wait a while till emotions are settled before 
resolving the stated uncertainty.  
• Performing act X has benefits for groups A and costs for groups B, and not-
performing X has benefits for groups C and costs for groups D. It is too simple 
to hold “let the truth be out”, especially when this “truth” concerns statistical 
constructs within a particular setting. Potentially there is the option to publish 
two figures, see the suggesion by Pozen (2009), see Section 20.3. 
20.8.2 Legal residue 
Official statistics exists for more than a hundred years, and thus there are some 
hundred years of legal struggle with the vagarities of official statistical publications 
and the tough conditions in reality. Even while one might wish to serve users and 
“publish and be damned”, there might always be a glitch, such that postponement 
or whatever is preferable. Thus, in the legal codes of ESS and CBS we find 
exceptions that provide for leeway if needed. The codes sound tough but with 
these exceptions they are like butter. 
One method is to “regularly publish a publication series” but omit a particular 
table within that series, for unstated reasons. One method is to publish a 
preliminary figure and revise it later, and provide statistical reasons for doing so. 
At CBS there is a case from 1990 about emissions in agriculture, of which CBS 
since 1973 could not find agreement with “agricultural experts”, and thus decided 
not to publish. 239 It required a report by the Court of Audit to publish about it, and 
then the environmental problem could be discussed based upon data.  
The ESS Code of Practice 2017 rule 6.7 allows the exception of priviliged 
access, and if the country’s President were to call and ask to freeze publication in 
the national interest, the agency may - still independently – decide to concur or 
not. Since the statistical agency does not decide about what would be a “national 
interest”, they may well give the President the benefit of the doubt. 
“6.7 Statistical authorities independently decide on the time and content 
of statistical releases, while taking into account the goal of providing 
complete and timely statistical information. All users have equal access to 
statistical releases at the same time. Any privileged pre-release access to 
any outside user is limited, well-justified, controlled and publicised.” 
                                                                
239 https://www.cbs.nl/-/media/imported/documents/1999/52/cbs-wel-geteld-een-eeuw.pdf p177 
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For figures that are published on schedule, the COP rule 13 has an exception, 
and observe that you may wait till 1 second before a scheduled publication to 
announce “in advance” that you will not do the publication: 
“13.4 Divergence from the dissemination time schedule is publicised in 
advance, explained and a new release date set.” 
“13.5. Preliminary results of acceptable aggregate accuracy and reliability 
can be released when considered useful.” 
The CBS Statistics Netherlands 2017 publication policy states: 
“If the situation so requires, it is possible to depart from the policy in 
individual cases. This is at the discretion of the Director General.” (p1) 
“The purpose of CBS’ publication policy is to promote the (correct) use of 
relevant figures.” (p3) 
Thus, rather than publish a figure “whatever the consequences”, and then 
having to mop up an outburst of incorrect use, CBS will choose a publication time 
and format, so that correct users are served, and that incorrect use is at some 
unavoidable level. 
Remarkably, historian Kuijlaars (1999) uses the word “delay” (Dutch “uitstel”) 
only twice. Apparently, CBS had learned already many ways to prevent an 
announcement that a publication is being delayed.  
It is also remarkable that the publication policy does not extend upon the 
exceptions such as delay. Potentially statistical publications at CBS are less 
sensitive than the planning publications at CPB. Rather, though, it is more likely 
that CBS in its publication strategy does not wish to state or confess what 
methods there are to not publish. 
The stewardship of a National Statistical Office is more complex than often 
portrayed. If it were as simple as often portrayed then there would be no need for 
larger boards (or “council of directors”) at the national statistical agencies (e.g. 
some 9 persons at CBS Statistics Netherlands 240 241 or some 10 persons at 
Statistisches Bundesamt 242).  
There is ample reason for a role of a board rather than put all decisions in the 
hand of a single person who might forget about this stewardship more easily than 
a board (and who might reject advice in unscientific manner as well). It is tempting 
to point to the case of Georgiou as an example of a rogue DG but this might be N 
= 1 statistics. It suffices to appeal to the 1899-2016 experience at CBS Statistics 
Netherlands that it is better to keep more people involved, even in the high trust 
society in Holland, see Chapter 21. 
Chapter 27 below will look a bit closer at stewardship at El.Stat. 
20.9 Summary table 
Table 2 summarizes our comparison of statistics at the academia and the 
national accounting and statistics at official statistics.  
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The academic statistical associations like ASA would want to reconsider their 
involvement with the Greek statistics issue. 243 RSS though has a section on 
official statistics. 244 
Table 2. Different emphasis at Academia and Official Statistics 
 
 Academia Official Statistics 
Area Statistics National accounts and statistics 
Purpose Empirical research Provide information for policy making 
Direction Shift the frontier Reproduction of known analyses 
Publication Peer review and weblogs Protocols for politically and socially 
sensitive information 
Governance Ideology of the individual 
scientist (but for the dean) 
Laws and regulations, hierarchical 
Stewardship Ideology of the individual 
scientist (but for the dean) 
Maintain trust and the reliability of 
official statistics 
 
 
                                                                
243 https://www.amstat.org/ASA/News/Statisticians-in-the-News-Andreas-Georgiou.aspx 
244 https://www.rss.org.uk/RSS/Get_involved/Sections_and_study_groups/ 
Official_Statistics/RSS/Get_involved/Sections/Official_Statistics.aspx 
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21. Governance and integrity of a national statistical office 
 
21.1 The governance of a National Statistical Office 
The European Statistical System (ESS) Code of Practice 2005, allowed a 
National Statistical Office (NSO) in the European Union to have a board as a 
collective body. After the ordeal with Andreas Georgiou at El.Stat 2010, Eurostat 
and the ESS developed the policy that each National Statistical Office (NSO) is 
headed by a single Director-General (DG) and that the board has a single 
member, the DG. The term “chief” can best be use to identify the single head. 
Thus the legal construction in 2020 is that NSO = DG = chief = single head = head 
= board. I have not checked for all 28 Member States though. 
This development in the governance of the National Statistical Offices is 
unfortunate. It is advisable that a NSO is headed by a board with more members. 
The Georgiou ordeal at El.Stat caused a wrong reflex in European statistics. The 
fact that Georgiou was guilty as charged – see below – however is not the prime 
argument to return to the status quo ante. 
21.2 From Greece to Holland 
The El.Stat case highlights the general importance of the governance of a 
national statistical institute. Let us now consider whether a multiperson board is 
better than a chief (single head). For the present purposes it suffices to discuss 
the Dutch example, while the main issue clearly is of a general nature. 
This discussion exists for longer than a century, compare the establishment of 
the Dutch Central Commission for Statistics (CCS) in 1892 and CBS Statistics 
Netherlands (SN) itself in 1899, see the history in Appendix 38, also for the first 
articles of the original law of 1899. 
When the CCS was created in 1892, there appeared to exist a great demand for 
statistical data, so subsequently in 1899 the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
(CBS Statistics Netherlands) was created with a Director (-General) (DG) and 
department within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The CCS determined the 
programme (also non-CBS) and the Director established the actual figures and 
form of publication. The institutional history of these bodies in 1899-1996 is 
discussed in the thesis by Kuijlaars (1999). 245  
The laws on CSS and CBS Statistics Netherlands of 1996, when it resided under 
the Ministery of Economic Affairs, provided for the CCS, and stated 246 247 rather 
simply that “there is a CBS”, and that it was “headed by a DG”. 248 
                                                                
245 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/over-ons/-/media/a5fc9d932ac840cb91eb83999df8bbe2.ashx 
246 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0008005/2001-09-01 
247 https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/ 
j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vjzymvqfyux9/f=/kst23576n3k2 
248 Dutch: “Artikel 2. Er is een Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, dat ressorteert onder Onze 
Minister. (...) Artikel 4.1. Aan het hoofd van het CBS staat een directeur-generaal met de titel van 
directeur-generaal van de statistiek.” 
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21.3 CCS and CBS in Holland in 2003 
The Dutch law of 2003 turned CCS and CBS into each a Quasi-Autonomous-
Non-Governmental-Organisation (Quango), while the construction with the dual 
governance was maintained. The law states in articles 6 and 8 that there are two 
governing bodies (“bestuursorganen”, or board bodies):  
(a) the CCS, 249 250  
(b) the CBS Director-General (DG).  
A rule clearly stated that the CCS partook in governing CBS. 251 Article 10.2 
states that the CCS can do a recommendation for a new DG. 252 
The DG decided for CBS itself to have a board of three persons (“Raad van 
Bestuur”) and it was rather the deputy DG who looked at matters of content. 253 In 
2009, this board had two members. 254 
21.4 An Eurostat peer review 2015 
An Eurostat peer review by O’Hanlon et al. (2015:10) was quite positive about 
this structure: 255  
“Under the SN [Statistics Netherlands] Act the production of official 
statistics in the Netherlands is almost entirely under the control of SN and 
it accounts in practice for around 95% of the statistics produced. SN is a 
well resourced professional organisation with 1,777 highly qualified and 
experienced staff (in full-time equivalent) and has a well earned 
reputation for developing and using innovative and cost-effective 
methodologies in the implementation of its statistical programme. Indeed, 
SN is recognised as one of the leading NS if not only in the EU but 
worldwide. On the basis of its review, the Peer Review team concluded 
that SN, and by extension the production of European statistics in the 
Netherlands, is very highly and uniformly compliant with all CoP [Code of 
Practices] principles.” 
This 2015 peer review was particularly impressed by the distinction between 
CCS (a commission of 7 to 11 persons) and SN (a Director-General (DG) and 
personel). The working programme required approval by the CCS and the DG 
determined the methods of execution and publication. However, Dutch lawmakers 
intended the abolition of the CCS, and thus O’Hanlon et al. (2015:4) advised:  
“4. The relevant national authorities should ensure that, in the context of 
the Central Commission for Statistics ceasing to exist (as envisaged as 
                                                                
249 https://www.allewetten.nl/content/sb/03/516.pdf 
250 https://www.allewetten.nl/content/sb/03/551.pdf 
251 Dutch: “Artikel 20. Het bestuur van het CBS wordt mede gevormd door een Centrale 
commissie voor de statistiek.” 
252 Dutch: “10. 2. Bij het openvallen van de functie van directeur-generaal doet de CCS een 
aanbeveling voor de vervulling van deze functie aan Onze Minister.” 
253 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0033309/2004-09-24 
254 https://download.cbs.nl/jaarverslag/2009/web-content/downloads/P5-Organogram.pdf 
255 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/64157/4372828/2015-NL-Report/05d4a3fd-8013-
4fa5-bd0e-b38c3f54702b 
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part of the wider Civil Service Reform Agenda), appropriate replacement 
statistical governance and advisory structures are put in place so that the 
needs of the statistical system can continue to be met in an effective 
manner. (European statistics Code of Practice, Principles 1 to 6 and 
Coordination)” 
21.5 Abolition of the CCS in 2016 
In 2016 the Dutch law has been changed, effective per 2017, to the structure 
CBS = DG = chief = single head = board, and the CCS has been replaced by an 
advisory council. 256 The DG is no longer appointed for life but for seven years with 
a possible extension of 3 years. 257 The change was presented to Parliament as 
being caused by the general objective “to reduce the number of quango’s” but the 
change is so fundamental for governance of official statistics that the general 
number-argument cannot be relevant. One cannot avoid the impression that the 
European ordeal with Greece must have played a key role, and that this merely 
wasn’t said to avoid the reaction that Holland need not adapt because of Greece. 
21.6 After the abolition of CCS in 2016 
The law effective since January 1 2017 258 has reduced CCS to an advisory 
body, and states rather simply again that “there is a CBS”, while now, remarkably,:  
“Article 2a.1 CBS consists of one member, the director-general, with the 
title of director-general of statistics” (my translation). 259  
CBS Statistics Netherlands thus is one person. Subsequently we can also infer 
that the DG forms the board of CBS. Thus in 2020 we have CBS = DG = chief = 
single head = head = board. 
In the 2017 law on CBS, article 2b.1, the DG establishes a “bestuursreglement” 
(“board regulation”). When we check what the current DG has presented as his 
regulation 260 then it states that the “directieberaad” (“council of directors”) consists 
of the DG and various department directors. In Dutch, and likely also in English 
translation, there is a distinction between a “bestuur” (board) (board of directors) 
and a “directieberaad” (council of directors). A board takes decisions as a 
collective body, while a council basically convenes to hear what the DG has to say 
(with the option to give advice when you disagree). Thus while the Dutch law 
stipulates the need of a board regulation, CBS = DG only provides for a council 
regulation.  
The DG CBS can simply resolve this deficiency by stating more clearly that he or 
she forms the board, and that the CBS directors only form an advisory body who 
convene to hear what directives he or she has, and offer their advice. This would 
also solve a potential inconsistency in the law between the rule that CBS = DG 
                                                                
256 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/over-ons/organisatie/raad-van-advies 
257 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0015926/2019-01-01 
258 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0015926/2019-01-01 
259 Dutch: “Artikel 2a.1. Het CBS bestaat uit één lid, de directeur-generaal, met de titel van 
directeur-generaal van de statistiek.” 
260 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0039055/2017-01-01 
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and the stipulation that there must be a “board regulation” which allows for the 
idea that there might be more people in a board.  
Overall clarity thus would be attained by stating CBS = DG = chief = board. 
However, such clarity might put this structure in the open while the lawyers 
apparently took pains to somewhat hide it, perhaps also to get this accepted by 
Dutch parliament.  
21.7 Law phantasy versus trust in Dutch society and science and learning 
In practice, Dutch culture allows for a high degree of collective decision making 
anyway (Geert Hofstede), 261 and Dutch lawmakers have a relatively easy life, with 
stating articles like “there is a CBS”. Given a high degree of trust in Dutch society, 
one can leave matters to scientists and scholars, and a law is only required to 
justify an expenditure in the national budget.  
It would be unfortunate when this Dutch legal approach would be exported to 
Europe, where such underlying trust is not self-evident, and where one really 
requires a board regulation, for more persons. (A board larger than 7 persons is 
rather unwieldly.) 
The Greek case brings this issue of governance to the fore. Obviously it is better 
to enhance trust instead of trying to use the law to force people to perform, but it 
still is possible to state by law that a board takes decisions collectively.  
At this point, though, it may still be remarked that once the person, who accepts 
the position CBS = DG = chief = board, observes that he or she cannot do 
everything alone, and starts hiring other scientists, then this chief (single head) 
meets with the scientific integrity of such others, who cannot be just minions but 
who have a professional ethic: whence the chief, if intellectually honest, accepts 
that he or she cannot empiricaly be the single member that the law stipulates, 
whence it is shown that the Dutch legal phraseology is a phantasy that doesn’t 
cover Dutch practice. This reminds of the even older question whether laws can 
reflect reality anyhow, while many lawyers might hold that such empirical reflection 
isn’t required, at least not for their professional activities of making laws and 
sueing and defending people in courts of law. 
21.8 How was the CSS abolished ? 
It must be observed that the CBS DG 2014-2020 dr. Tjark Tjin-A-Tsoi has no 
real background in statistics, see Appendix 39.13. However, he had been 
appointed in 2014 with recommendation by the old-style CCS in 2014 (when the 
law of 2003 was at force, stating hat the CCS makes a recommentation 262), so 
that there seems to be no reason to make his background an issue, except that it 
appears that the (last) chairperson of the CCS, at that time in 2014, was a lawyer, 
Inge Brakman, with a CV that does not impress for a background in science and 
statistics, see Appendix 39.14. It is remarkable in the first place that she had 
been appointed as chairperson at CCS.  
Thus, effectively, lawyer Inge Brakman recommended the appointment of a non-
statistician as DG of CBS in 2014, and both allowed the abolition of CCS in 2016.  
                                                                
261 https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-
culture/ 
262 https://www.allewetten.nl/content/sb/03/516.pdf 
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There are texts in parliament. 263 There are the annual reports by CCS in 2015 
264 and 2016. 265 There is the CBS annual report of 2016, of the last year under 
CCS, with on p36 a statement about the transformation. 266  
The annual report 2015 of CCS states on page 7 that CCS accepts its abolition, 
267 with my comments: 
“At the end of 2014, the CCS communicated its position on repositioning 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs by letter. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the system works well (as is also apparent from the government's 
response to the CBS evaluation in 2012), the CCS expresses 
understanding that two Quango's for one institute [error that CCS and 
CBS form only one institute] will be reduced to one and that, as a 
result, it is proposed that the Quango status of the CCS is canceled. The 
CBS is led by the DG: this person is the ultimate responsible for the 
functioning of the institute. [CCS does not understand the function of 
itself as a board] The CCS believes it is important that the DG of 
Statistics Netherlands remains a Quango. [error: a quango is rather an 
organisation and not a person] This is in line with European 
developments where the importance of properly and independently 
organizing the provision of statistics is on the agenda. [influence by the 
Georgiou case] The CCS is of the opinion that for the proper functioning 
of CBS an external view would be desirable in three areas. [A view 
means advice and no decision power anymore] Firstly, it concerns the 
adoption of the statistical program. The majority of the statistics that 
                                                                
263 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/34248 
264 https://www.cbs.nl/-/media/_pdf/2016/17/jaarverslag%20ccs%202015%20-%20def.pdf 
265 https://www.cbs.nl/-/media/_pdf/2017/45/ccs-jaarverslag-2016-def.pdf 
266 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-822787.pdf 
267 DutchL “Eind 2014 heeft de CCS heeft haar standpunt over de herpositionering per brief aan 
EZ kenbaar gemaakt. Ondanks het feit dat het systeem goed functioneert (zoals ook blijkt uit de 
kabinetsreactie op de evaluatie van het CBS in 2012), heeft de CCS er begrip voor dat twee 
zbo’s voor één instituut worden teruggebracht tot één en dat als gevolg daarvan wordt 
voorgesteld dat de zbo status van de CCS komt te vervallen. Het CBS wordt geleid door de DG: 
deze is de eindverantwoordelijke voor het functioneren van het instituut. De CCS vindt het 
belangrijk dat de DG van het CBS een ZBO blijft. Dit is in lijn met Europese ontwikkelingen waar 
het belang van het goed en onafhankelijk inrichten van de statistiekvoorziening op de agenda 
staat. De CCS is van mening dat voor het goed functioneren van het CBS op een drietal 
terreinen een externe blik wenselijk zou zijn. Ten eerste betreft dat de vaststelling van het 
statistisch programma. Het grootste deel van de statistieken die het CBS produceert, is verplicht 
via het Europese recht. De invloed van de CCS betreft daarom vooral de instemming met de niet 
verplichte statistieken, waarbij de CCS in haar overwegingen uitdrukkelijk de maatschappelijke 
context betrekt. Voorts zou het dienstig zijn de CCS te betrekken bij het beleid in de combinatie 
van gegevensverzameling, privacy en ICT. En als derde onderwerp zou voor een goede interne 
governance meegekeken moeten worden met de bedrijfsvoering en de efficiënte besteding van 
de middelen. De CCS vindt een wettelijke grondslag van de hierboven beschreven gewenste 
governance passend voor het CBS, juist vanwege de brede taak die het CBS voor alle 
geledingen van de samenleving heeft. Daar komt bij dat in de huidige regelgeving ook een 
voordrachtsrecht van de CCS voor de benoeming van de DG door de Minister is opgenomen, 
hetgeen de CCS eveneens passend vindt bij de gewenste onafhankelijke status van de DG. Eind 
2015 is deze brief op verzoek aan de vaste kamercommissie voor Economische zaken verstrekt. 
In 2016 wordt het wetgevingstraject vervolgd.” 
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Statistics Netherlands produces is mandatory under European law. The 
influence of the CCS therefore mainly concerns the agreement with the 
non-compulsory statistics, whereby the CCS explicitly considers the 
social context. Furthermore, it would be useful to involve the CCS in 
policy concerning the combination of data collection, privacy and ICT. 
And as a third topic, good internal governance requires a role in looking 
at business operations and the efficient use of resources. The CCS holds 
that a legal basis for the desired governance described above would be 
appropriate for Statistics Netherlands, precisely because of the broad role 
that Statistics Netherlands has for all sections of society. [Thus a legal 
base for giving advice] In addition, the current legislation also includes 
a right of nomination [false: a right of recommendation, 268 see 
footnote 252] of the CCS for the appointment of the DG by the Minister, 
which the CCS also considers appropriate to the desired independent 
status of the DG. At the end of 2015, this letter was provided to the 
Permanent Chamber Committee for Economic Affairs [of the House of 
Parliament] on request. The legislative process will be continued in 
2016.” 
It is remarkable that lawyer Inge Brakman makes so many legal errors, but it is 
not remarkable that she, with no background in statistics, see Appendix 39.14, 
makes these fundamental errors in understanding the governance issue of CCS 
and CBS, including their history since 1892. 
21.9 Protests in 2016 by retired CBS DG and retired deputy DG  
There are letters 269 of 2016 by former CBS DG 1999-2004 Ruud van Noort and 
deputy DG 2001-2003 Henk van Tuinen, addressed to the Dutch Senate, to reject 
the legal changes of 2016, and to maintain the governance structure as it was. 
They pointed out that the CCS had authority also over (some) non-CBS-statistics, 
and not only CBS, and that the new arrangement puts the DG in the awkward 
position to survey both. They argue in favour of maintaining the old structure, with 
CCS deciding about the programme and the DG deciding about the execution and 
the data. They call the formal reason given by the government into question, as if 
it would really be relevant to reduce the number of Quangos. They raise the 
question: 270 
“For who else can, after abolition of the CCS, correct a fallible DG CBS? 
And if the Minister does so anyway, why should the independence of 
statistics not be at stake?”  
                                                                
268 Dutch “voordragen” is nominating, and “aanbevelen” is recommending. Conventionally, the 
minister appoints from the list of nominated candidates. If the minister thinks that no candidate is 
acceptable, then the nominating board may be requested for another list. With a 
recommendation, the minister can directly appoint quite another candidate. 
269 http://thomascool.eu/Others/2016-oudCBS-VanNoort-VanTuinen-aan-EersteKamer-over-
CCS-en-CBS.pdf 
270 Dutch: “Want wie anders kan, na opheffing van de CCS, nog een feilbare DG CBS bijsturen? 
En als de Minister dat dan toch maar doet, waarom zou dan de onafhankelijkheid van de 
statistiek niet in het geding zijn?” 
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They also refer to the Greek case, 271 and might imply that Greece might not 
have entered the Eurozone when accounting had been more independent (from 
the Greek Ministery of Finance), but it may also be that they did not sufficiently 
study the situation at the newly created El.Stat of 2010: 
“We live in a time where the independence of statistics in the EU should 
be strengthened. After all, the inadequate quality and independence of 
the then Greek statistics was at the root of the euro crisis and it is not 
much more than 10 years ago that Eurostat (the 'European CBS') 
encountered serious problems due to insufficient independence and 
excessive project financing at too small a structural budget. There is 
every reason not to jeopardize the good Dutch regulation.” 
In the Dutch discussion about the abolition of the CCS, some political parties in 
the Dutch Senate asked critically: 272 273 
“The government has indicated that the governance relationship between 
the Minister and the Director-General (hereinafter: DG) of the Central 
Bureau for Statistics (hereinafter: CBS) forms the basis for this law. 
However, this "unclear governance relationship" has existed since 1899. 
What exactly was unclear about this arrangement that has functioned 
properly for more than a century, so that a new legal basis must now be 
created? ”274 
“CBS is highly praised precisely for its independent supervision. Why 
does the government choose not to guarantee this supervision better?” 
275 
It is rather likely that the Dutch change has been influenced by the Greek ordeal 
with Georgiou. The Dutch government point of view seems to have been – but 
there is no proof of this – that the European regulations did not ask for a separate 
role of some CCS, and that Holland would step out of line, and needlessly 
complicate issues for other countries, if Holland did not adopt the same structure 
as advised by Eurostat.  
                                                                
271 Dutch: “We leven in een tijd waarin de onafhankelijkheid van de statistiek in de EU versterkt 
zou moeten worden. Immers, de onvoldoende kwaliteit en onafhankelijkheid van de toenmalige 
Griekse statistieken lagen ten grondslag aan de eurocrisis en het is nog niet veel meer dan 10 
jaar geleden dat Eurostat (het ‘Europese CBS’) in ernstige problemen kwam wegens 
onvoldoende onafhankelijkheid en te omvangrijke projectfinanciering bij een te klein structureel 
budget. Er is alle reden om de goede Nederlandse regeling niet in gevaar te brengen.” 
272 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34248_herpositionering 
273 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20160223/voorlopig_verslag_2/document3/ 
f=/vk1uet8p5jzw.pdf 
274 Dutch: “[PVV] De regering heeft aangegeven dat de sturingsrelatie tussen de Minister en de 
directeur-generaal (hierna: DG) van het Centraal bureau voor de statistiek (hierna: CBS) de 
grondslag is voor deze wet. Deze «niet heldere sturingsrelatie» heeft echter bestaan sinds 1899. 
Wat was nu exact onduidelijk aan deze regeling die meer dan een eeuw naar behoren heeft 
gefunctioneerd, waardoor er nu een nieuwe wettelijke basis dient te worden gecreëerd?” 
275 Dutch: “[SP] Het CBS wordt Europees geprezen juist vanwege het onafhankelijke toezicht. 
Waarom kiest de regering ervoor dit toezicht niet beter te borgen?” 
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22. The European statistics Code of Practice 
 
22.1 Versions 2005, 2011, 2017 
The European Statistical System (ESS) Code of Practice has versions of 2005, 
2011 and 2017. 276 The 2005 version prevailed in 2010, when Andreas Georgiou 
made the error that he has been convicted for. 
22.2 The purpose of the code 
The Code of 2005 clarifies that its purpose is to provide for institutional 
independence from external influences. 
“PRINCIPLE 1: PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
The professional independence of statistical authorities from other policy, 
regulatory or administrative departments and bodies, as well as from 
private-sector operators, ensures the credibility of European statistics.” 
Hopefully statisticians do not claim that a law court investigation would mean 
external pressure. Subsequently, when the board itself forms the statistical 
authority, then it cannot be external pressure (or an attack on its independence) 
when the director-general has to seek approval by the board. 
22.3 A head may be a board; a single head is a chief 
The notion of a “head” may well apply to a board and not just a single person 
(chief), as many organisations have discovered the limitations of single managers.  
Merriam-Webster 277 has quite a long article on the term “head”, and most 
relevant for us are those instances 8a, 12a and 14 where the term shows the 
interpretation as a location where more persons can be present: 
“6: director, leader” 
“8a: the leading element of a military column or a procession” 
“12a: the bow and adjacent parts of a ship” 
“14: the place of leadership, honor, or command” 
While the above concerns the noun, the verb itself already allows the plural 
membership, e.g. in “the board heads the organisation”. 
Because of the ambiguity of the term “head” it is advisable to use the term 
“chief” if one really intends the single head. 
22.4 European statistics Code of Practice 2005 
This Code allows for a role of “heads of its bodies”: 278 
“[no number 1.4] The head of the statistical authority and, where 
appropriate, the heads of its statistical bodies have the sole 
responsibility for deciding on statistical methods, standards and 
procedures, and on the content and timing of statistical releases.”  
                                                                
276 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_12_249 
277 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/head 
278 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/EconStatKB/KnowledgebaseArticle10174.aspx 
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Points are: 
• “Head” can be read as “board” depending upon the further stipulations of the 
regulation. See O’Hanlon, Szép, Smrekar (2015) for appreciation within ESS 
for the construction in Holland originally with the Central Statistical 
Commission and CBS Statistics Netherlands. (O’Hanlon also chaired the good 
practice advisory committee (GPAC) at El.Stat in 2013-14, and worked with 
Snorrason to set up crowd-funding for Georgiou’s legal bill. 279) 
• The “heads of its bodies” may refer to external agencies that contribute to the 
collection of statistics, e.g. the Central Bank, or the Ministry of Labour for 
labour statistics, or the aviation authority for aviation data. These external 
heads may also be boards.  
• Subsequently, the “heads of its bodies” may also be interpreted as the internal 
directorates within the National Statistical Office. (“Director-General” tends to 
imply that there are also other directors.) 
The notion that “head may mean board” is immaterial for the 2005 Code, since 
“heads of its bodies” itself is a description of a board (and “when appropriate” 
applies when there is a board).  
This comment on “head may mean board” only pertains to the interpretation of 
the Code of Practice. Chapter 21 discusses the issue on content: whether a 
multiperson board is better than a chief. 
22.5 European Statistics Code of Practice 2011 
The European Statistics Code of Practice of 2011 states (also changing 
“statistical authority” into “National Statistical Institutes and Eurostat”) 280 
“1.4: The heads of the National Statistical Institutes and of Eurostat and, 
where appropriate, the heads of other statistical authorities have the 
sole responsibility for deciding on statistical methods, standards and 
procedures, and on the content and timing of statistical releases.”  
The 2011 Code seems to be a significant change w.r.t. 2005: 
• It still holds that “head” may mean “board”, as it would be curious to argue that 
a single person would bear full responsibility for a National Statistical Office, 
especially when such office has a board. Such argument is a bit more complex 
in legal manner however since the clause of “heads of its bodies” has 
disappeared.  
• A directorate within the National Statistical Office would not be recognised as 
an “authority” itself.  
• Other bodies like the Central Bank are now also recognised as statistical 
authorities. 
Perhaps the 2011 change was already in the pipeline during 2010, but It is not 
inconceivable that the change from the 2005 Code to the 2011 Code was made in 
support of the Georgiou case (too). In his legal defense, Georgiou referred to the 
                                                                
279 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-statistics-crowdfunding/embattled-greek-statistics-
chief-gets-crowdfunding-help-from-colleagues-idUSKCN0X41QM 
280 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/quality/european-statistics-code-of-practice 
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later Code, claiming that he as head was solely responsible, while the 2005 Code 
that appied for him clearly points to the responsibility of the board – which got him 
convicted (that is, there was no conflict with the March 9 2010 Greek law). 
It would be advisable for the world of official statistics to revise the code, so that 
it would be clearer that “head” may also mean “board”, as was obviously the case 
in 2005. 
22.6 European Statistics Code of Practice 2017 
The current European Statistics Code of Practice of 2017 states: 281 
“1.4 The heads of the National Statistical Institutes and of Eurostat and, 
where appropriate, the heads of other statistical authorities have the 
sole responsibility for deciding on statistical methods, standards and 
procedures, and on the content and timing of statistical releases.” 
The 2017 code is the same as 2011 but both would seem to be a significant 
change w.r.t. 2005. It is still possible to argue that “head” may also mean “board”. 
It is better to state this explicitly like in 2005. See the discussion of the 2011 Code. 
22.7 Governance of Eurostat itself 
Georganta (2012b) criticises the European Commission decision 2012/504/EU 
(September 17 2012), to change the governance of Eurostat itself, and she 
compares with 97/98/EC (April 21 1997) and the Vatican. 
                                                                
281 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/quality/european-statistics-code-of-practice 
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23. Dutch statistics and national accounting 
 
23.1 Dutch official statistics and national accounting 
The construction with CCS and CBS has not precluded that Dutch official 
statistics and national accounting has a mixed history of ups and downs: 
• One cannot imagine Dutch society without the ever use of the data and 
information from CBS Statistics Netherlands.  
• Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994) received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1969 for 
work done at CBS and the League of Nations before 1945. He is one of the 
founding creators of the current UN system of national accounts (SNA). His 
work also led to the creation of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) in 
1945, see “Dutch economics” and the censorship of science since 1990 by the 
directorate of CPB, as discussed in Part 4. 
• Alongside Dutch economics and Greek statistics as key examples for the 
relevance of Assemblies of Science and Learning, there actually is also Dutch 
national accounting, namely on the Tinbergen & Hueting approach. The latter 
case is served by the separate book Colignatus (2020a) (THAENAES), still in 
draft at this time of writing. See next section. It must be mentioned that this 
present book is a spin-off of THAENAES, since the discussion in THAENAES 
about Walter Radermacher caused one question after another. 
• The CCS and the CBS DG accepted the 2016 changes in the law about the 
governance, and they should not have, see the discussion above. 
• There are also some considerations to be critical of the role of CCS in the 
past. For example, a past chairperson of CCS (Frans Rutten) 282 was a former 
secretary-general of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and one cannot avoid 
the impression that he maintained some form of control as if he still was a 
secretary-general. The current advisory council chair 283 Gerrit Zalm 284 was 
government servant and Minister of Finance, and when he, without a 
background in science, was appointed as director of the Central Planning 
Bureau, he committed censorship of science and abuse of power to dismis a 
proper scientist. Disclaimer: the latter scientist was me. 285 See Chapter 34. 
23.2 The problematic case of “Dutch national accounting” 
CBS Statistics Netherlands initially supported the work by Hueting on eSNI, and 
more wider the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, see Hueting & De Boer (2019), but 
eventually placed it outside of CBS, using misrepresentations and fallacies, see 
THAENAES. See the CBS official position of 1997. 286 After the publication of 
Hueting & De Boer (2019), CBS has been asked for a review of its position, but 
none has been forthcoming yet. A particular misconception by deputy DG Henk 
                                                                
282 https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frans_Rutten_(econoom) 
283 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/over-ons/organisatie/raad-van-advies 
284 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrit_Zalm 
285 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
286 http://www.sni-hueting.info/NL/Documentatie/1997-03-11-CBS-Standpunt.pdf 
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van Tuinen in 1997 has been on “undisputed statistics”. The same label is used in 
the CBS document of 2017 about its publication policy, p1: 287  
“The statistics must have an authoritative and undisputed reputation.”  
Van Tuinen judged that the figure of eSNI came with much uncertainty, which is 
correct, and that discussion about such uncertainty would be tantamount to a 
dispute, which is incorrect. Van Tuinen confused on the one hand proper scientific 
discussion about the uncertainties and on the other hand criticism about the 
quality of the work done to arrive at the estimate of eSNI. The latter would be a 
dispute, but the work on eSNI is of excellent quality, 288 and Van Tuinen was much 
mistaken by calling this into question by fear-mongering about disputes, instead of 
expressing a willingness and determination to answer on content to criticism on 
content, and to defend the scientific integrity of national accounting. Van Tuinen 
also misjudged the issue of uncertainty and invalidity. eSNI was developed 
because GDP is an invalid indicator for national income when considering the 
environment, even though CBS presents GDP as an indicator of national income. 
In this sense, GDP itself is disputed. While eSNI is uncertain, at least it is a valid 
measure of national income when including the notion of environmental 
sustainability.  
See THAENAES also about other mishaps w.r.t. eSNI also after Van Tuinen’s 
retirement. Though I presently focus on Van Tuinen’s argument on disputes, it 
would be incorrect to attribute the handling of eSNI at CBS only to him, and there 
are issues that hold for the SNA in general. 
23.3 Statistics at academia and research institutes 
The academia have their departments in mathematical and applied statistics, 
and there are the research institutes.  
The Dutch statistics research association is VVS+OR, 289 with the journals 
Statistica Neerlandica and Dutch STAtOR, the latter with a special & double issue 
on ethics in 2012 that also mentions the Georgiou case. 290 Regrettably, its articles 
by Willem de Vries (p16) and Kees Zeelenberg (p37) misstate the Greek case. It 
might not surprise that they signed support for biased declarations in favour of 
Georgiou, see Appendices 40.2 and 41.4. The chairman of VVS+OR, Fred van 
Eeuwijk, signed the biased FENStatS declaration of October 20 201 291 (with main 
signiture by FENStatS president Maurizio Vichi, thesis supervisor for Walter 
Radermacher, former DG Eurostat and participant in this ordeal). 
 
 
  
                                                                
287 https://www.cbs.nl/-/media/_pdf/2017/36/publication%20policy%20of%20statistics%20 
netherlands-def%202017-0515.pdf?la=en-gb 
288 http://www.sni-hueting.info/ 
289 https://www.vvsor.nl/ 
290 https://www.vvsor.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/STAtOR_2012-3en4_totaal.pdf 
291 https://www.sfds.asso.fr/sdoc-2898-14a43749ef83ca96e84aeb66450e15c1-letter_fenstats.pdf 
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Part 6. Greek statistics 
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24. Investigate instead of jumping to conclusions 
 
24.1 Disclaimer, and properly calling for an investigation 
I do not speak Greek and do not know the fine details of the Georgiou case. 
The issue seems like a snake pit. There have been false accusations and 
convictions for libel, see Section 30.8.2. As much as anyone else, I would rather 
not look into this further, but would appreciate a brief summary by Interpol. 
The academia and the world of official statistics, that didn’t do the fact-check and 
uttered their protests, should have been wiser, and should merely have called for 
an investigation, like I did in a letter to ISI in 2012. 292 It still is advisable that the 
scientific world has this investigation about the Georgiou case and its context. The 
issue is important and there is too much noise now, with apparently also 
unexpected impacts like on Eurostat regulations for the whole of Europe.  
In said 2012 letter to ISI, I called attention also to the situation that other 
econometric or statistical colleagues had been dismissed, in a potential abuse of 
power. My suggestion was a full investigation. I haven’t seen such investigation 
yet, though the Greek courts have been busy. Currently I notice that there are 
statements from the world of official statistics in support of Georgiou but I do not 
know upon what evidence such support is based, since as far as I can see there 
has been no full investigation (other than the Greek courts), and it is unclear why 
the world of official statistics doesn’t provide support for the other statistical 
officers, potentially dismissed with abuse. 
My disclaimer is also that part of my interest in Greek Statistics is that I also 
want to call attention to Dutch Economics, that requires a similar investigation. 293 
An Assembly of Science and Learning in a nation would monitor the quality of 
science and learning in a nation, with a Floor elected by national scientists and 
scholars and with a Senate consisting of the national Academia of Science and 
Learning. The role of information becomes ever more crucial for society, and some 
organised quality control by the world of science and learning thus becomes 
crucial too. The governance of statistics is only one of many other cases that 
require attention too. Such assemblies provide for an environment in which such 
investigations can be organised and monitored. 
24.2 European integration versus improved national structure 
The EU is an association of Member States. Its foundation are national 
governments who run their countries. The European Statistical System (ESS) 294 
(not necessarily a legal entity) depends upon agreements between these 
governments and the national statistical institutes. Some authors do not seem to 
take this into account with the proper perspective. 
Véron (2018) observes that the EU is remarkably reticent compared to the 
protests by the International Statistical Institute (ISI) and other statistical 
organisations.  
                                                                
292 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/06/10/letter-to-the-isi-on-greek-statistics/ 
293 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
294 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/european-statistical-system 
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“Eurostat, in particular, must break out of its deafening silence of the past 
few years.” 295 
It might also be that Eurostat knows that it replaced the 2005 Code by the 2011 
Code, so that Eurostat knows that Georgiou is basically guilty as charged.  
Undoubtedly, the EU and Eurostat must maintain working relations with the 
Greek government. El.Stat has obligations to the Eurozone too, that Greece 
belongs to. Georgiou had been hired by El.Stat for purposes of El.Stat. Too much 
meddling by EU or Eurostat might put him into the position of a foreign agent, 
which would merely prove some of the accusations made in this case that he was 
a foreign agent indeed and did not work for El.Stat properly. Walter Radermacher 
as DG of Eurostat neglected the Greek March 9 2010 law for whatever reason, 
and Georgiou, perhaps in his view “for the benefit of Greece in the long run”, 
rather followed Radermacher than the law for the benefit of Greece in the long run.  
Véron (2018) likely is right that the ESS can be improved, but it seems unwise 
that he refers to the Georgiou case as evidence, as this basically shows that 
Greece has some competence (i) to maintain a separation between the Executive 
and Judiciary branches, and (ii) to convict Georgiou where he was guilty as 
charged.  
It would be a tragic mistake to use the Georgiou case as a lever to enforce more 
European integration, as Véron (2018) pleads (my emphasis): 
“Sixth, the EU should open a far-ranging debate on whether and what 
additional structural changes to the ESS may be needed in order to 
ensure the immunity of official statistics to manipulation and pressure 
from national governments and political interests. Even with the additional 
protections suggested above, a more integrated structure may be 
required for at least some critical statistical functions.” 
Colignatus (2000, 2011) diagnoses that the core problems lies within the Trias 
Politica systems of the nations themselves. The balance between science and 
policy making is already a problem at the national level, as argued in this book. 
24.3 Sources 
The discussion about the Georgiou case is mostly on the internet, and those 
references are in footnotes. Over the years I have benefitted from journalist 
Malkoutzis and economist Mouzakis, now both at MacroPolis. 296 The important 
Malkoutzis & Mouzakis (2013) report, though at a newspaper, deserves to be 
included in the list of references. Over the years I also benefitted from retired 
banker Klaus Kastner. 297 I used a discussion by engineer and journalist Basil 
Coronakis 298 299 300 to guide me to these weblinks too; the issue is complex and I 
did not check Coronakis’s statements themselves however. 
                                                                
295 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/22/eurogroup-statement-
on-greece-22-june-2018/# 
296 http://www.macropolis.gr/ 
297 http://klauskastner.blogspot.com/ 
298 https://www.iene.eu/eurostat-needs-to-put-greek-failure-behind-it-p2576.html 
299 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basil_Coronakis 
300 https://www.coronakis.com/about-the-book/ 
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25. What the Greek case is about, how it started, where we are 
 
25.1 The 2009 EU Economic Recovery Plan 
In April 2009 there was the G20 London Summit with a EU Economic Recovery 
Plan of EUR 200 bn, comparable to the USA TARP of $ 700 bn, to prevent that 
the financial crisis turned into a Depression. UK prime minister Gordon Brown 
declared that the “Washington consensus” was dead. Sciso (ed) (2017:81-82) 
clarifies the context. 
25.2 Greece turns the financial crisis into an euro crisis 
Marcus Walker in the WSJ 2017-02-06: 301  
“Data fraud played a part in Greece’s downfall, a European Parliament 
report has noted. In October 2009, the Karamanlis government told the 
EU its deficit that year would be 6% of GDP. Two days later, it lost 
elections. Greece then said the deficit would be 12.5%. EU officials were 
furious; investors began dumping Greek bonds.” 
When new PM George Papandreou 302 – actually his minister of Finance George 
Papakonstantinou, see Section 18.4.1 – in October 2009 stated that the Greek 
deficit was much larger than had been said by former PM Kostas Karamanlis, 303 
the “Washington consensus” returned from the dead, with new austerity and 
control of deficits and debts.  
Greek statistics had been produced by a bureau NSSG residing under the 
Ministry of Finance. In January 2010 the EU issued a report about Greek statistics, 
observed “deliberate misreporting”, and requested an improvement. 304  
“In both cases, in the aftermath of political elections, substantial revisions 
took place revealing a practice of widespread misreporting, in an 
environment in which checks and balances appear absent, information 
opaque and distorted, and institutions weak and poorly coordinated. The 
frequent missions conducted by Eurostat in the interval between these 
episodes, the high number of methodological visits, the numerous 
reservations to the notifications of the Greek authorities, on top of the 
non-compliance with Eurostat recommendations despite assurances to 
the contrary, provide additional evidence that the problems are only partly 
of a methodological nature and would largely lie beyond the statistical 
sphere. “ (p20) 
In April 2010, the deficit of 2009 was revised to 13.6%. The first Greek bailout 
with EU and IMF was signed in May 2010. 305  
                                                                
301 https://www.wsj.com/articles/greeces-response-to-its-resurgent-debt-crisis-prosecute-the-
statistician-1486396434 
302 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Papandreou 
303 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kostas_Karamanlis 
304 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_ 
report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a. 
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25.3 The new El.Stat law of March 9 2010, the new director, the new error 
Greece created the newly independent bureau El.Stat, via a new law of March 9 
2010. El.Stat was governed by a board of seven persons, including the director. 
Only the director had a full time job. The other members of the board were without 
remuneration, had their own work elsewhere and only convened for meetings. 
Andreas Georgiou, 306 formerly working at the IMF, was appointed as director of 
El.Stat, starting August 2 2010. The first board meeting was on August 3, 2010. 
In November 9 2010 Georgiou sent revised 2009 deficit and debt figures to 
Eurostat 307 without first seeking approval by the (equally new) board of El.Stat.  
25.4 The conviction in early June 2018 
Ioanna Mandrou (eKathimerini / International Herald Tribune 2018-06-09): 308 
“The criminal section of the Supreme Court upheld a conviction against 
the country's former statistics chief to two years in prison for breach of 
duty, dismissing an appeal to revert the sentence. A lower court had 
handed down a suspended sentence to Andreas Georgiou in August 
2017, finding him guilty of not getting approval by the then board of 
El.Stat before transmitting the 2009 deficit figures to Eurostat.” 
There are ample rumours to be wary of courts, 309 but lawyers from other 
countries can check that the Greek ruling fits not only the Greek law but also the 
European statistics Code of Practice 2005, see Chapter 26. 
Hopefully statisticians do not claim that a court investigation would mean 
external pressure, and that official statistical agencies are above the law. 
Obviously the EU and Eurostat use the law for their regulations, and thus 
statistical agencies are subject to legal procedure. 
25.5 Person versus position 
Unnamed “EU officials” assign Georgiou a “decisive role” for getting better 
figures. 310 They forget the change in governance. The “deliberate misreporting” 
happened when Statistics Greece resided under the Ministery of Finance. An 
improvement in quality need not be attributed to personal capacity but would 
rather concern the new independent position, which also applied to the board. 
“Contrary to prosecution claims against Mr Georgiou, EU officials have 
repeatedly argued that he played a decisive role in improving the reputation 
of Greek statistics that had been shattered by Athens’ repeated understating 
of the deficit in the years before the crisis erupted in the country in 2009.”  
                                                                                                                                      
305 See also the IEO (2016) report about the weak reaction by the IMF at the end of 2009. 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/internal-auditor-hits-imf-handling-of-greece-
bailout/ 
306 https://bruegel.org/author/andreas-georgiou/ 
307 https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/983839/Fiscal+data+(Provisional+Data)/cf84d5b7-
535e-49b1-a0dc-6ab27237b026?version=1.0 
308 http://www.ekathimerini.com/229460/article/ekathimerini/news/top-court-upholds-suspended-
prison-sentence-for-former-statistician 
309 http://uti.is/2016/09/the-El.Stat-case-takes-a-new-turn-imf-and-eurostat-staff-prosecuted/ 
310 https://www.ft.com/content/3d213384-77b1-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691 
 159 
25.6 The economic impact in November 2010 
How did financial markets react to the announcement on November 15 2010 of 
the Georgiou deficit figure for 2009 ? It is difficult to assign a particular effect. 
Events in 2010 itself, for example GDP in 2010 shrinking by 5.5%, were obviously 
important. The Guardian of that day: 311 
“Eurostat revealed that Greece's budget deficit reached 15.4% of GDP 
last year, substantially higher than its previous estimate of 13.6%. In 
April, Eurostat had estimated the debt-to-GDP ratio would reach 115.1%. 
The revised data meant that Greece's debt ratio has eclipsed those of 
every other EU state, officials said. By the end of 2009, its debt is 
projected to account for 126.8% of GDP.” 
The difference between 13.6% and 15.4% is important but the word “substantial” 
is overdone. William Watts at MarketWatch observed that day: 312  
“Meanwhile, the cost of protecting Greece’s debt against the threat of 
default through credit default swaps rose on Monday. The spread on five-
year Greek CDS widened 20 basis points to 8.8 percentage points, 
according to data provider Markit. That means it would cost $880,000 
annually to insure $10 million of Greek debt against default for five years, 
up from $860,000 on Friday.”  
Baldwin & Giavazzi (2015) figure 8, quoted here as Figure 11, has the spreads 
for “periphery” government loans. The Irish bailout was in November 21-28 2010.  
Figure 11. “Prelude and phase one of the crisis in Eurozone periphery” 
 
 
The Greek national bank stated in a press release of 2010-12-27: 313 
                                                                
311 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/15/greek-deficit-bigger-than-thought 
312 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/greeces-revised-2009-deficit-tops-15-of-gdp-2010-11-15 
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“The spread between the Greek and the German 10-year bond yields 
widened, in line with the performance seen in the rest of the peripheral 
Euro-zone markets, reaching 930 bps at the end of November from 820 
bps at the end of October.” 
Financial markets likely expected a result like this. See Figure 8 in Section 16.2 
on the rate of interest: the rate did not go down, but the large upward effect only 
came from policy decisions around March 2011. We can also see this in the 
spreads in Figure 11. See Colignatus (2011b) 314 on stigma in rates of interest.  
In hindsight, for us, at this point in the discussion, the November 15 2010 
accouncement was only a modest event for the financial markets. However, the 
El.Stat board, with stewardship, might have anticipated a stronger reaction. 
25.7 Formal base and material meaning 
The conviction for breach of duty has a formal base, but its material meaning is 
that the director sabotaged the stewardship of the board, see Chapter 27. 
It is such a pity that Georgiou did not respect the March 2010 law and the ESS 
2005 Code of Practice and did not allow the El.Stat board to give a ruling on the 
figures for deficit and debt. Perhaps they might have done a good job. While 
figures could be calculated, for internal purposes for (international) policy makers, 
publication is another issue – compare statements by Mario Draghi about the 
euro. See the discussion in Chapters 20.8 and 27 about the stewardship of a 
national statistical office. The “publish a.s.a.p. whatever the consequences” 
attitude (which might perhaps be Georgiou’s attitude), might perhaps hold for an 
academic sending in a paper, but one might allow for the discretion of a board to 
when and how to publish what figures, also taking into account how a world in 
crisis might react to such figures. 
25.8 Focus on what is clearly known; a word about falsification 
A main topic in this book is governance and integrity of national statistical 
offices, with the advice for the European Statistical System (ESS) to return to the 
status quo ante of 2005.  
For the Greek case, this book verifies and takes as a clear fact: Georgiou was 
guilty as charged for not seeking approval by the board. Below, we deconstruct 
the mass hysteria in the world of official statistics.  
Director Georgiou has also been charged with falsifying the figure of the deficit.  
• Xafa (2019a): “Nevertheless, a criminal investigation of the same issue of the 
falsification of the 2009 deficit (...) appears to still be proceeding.”  
• On December 18 2019, ISI’s president John Bailer and president-elect 
Stephen Penneck gave a statement: “(...) the other, from 2016, about the 
same issue of alleged manipulation of public finance statistics for which he 
has been acquitted in a different case! There have been no charges pressed 
yet, but there is also no indication that the cases have been closed.”  
                                                                                                                                      
313 https://www.bankofgreece.gr/en/news-and-media/press-office/news-
list/news?announcement=58d66f84-9ac7-4be8-a076-c916beaa157f 
314 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2011-11-18-Haircut.html 
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It is necessary to be precise about what would be falsified. Newspaper reports 
tend to speak about “falsified data” but it does not seem that Georgiou is accused 
of falsifying low-level data. The deficit figure is a high-level construct requiring the 
application of accounting rules, and also depends upon decisions that fall under 
the discretion of the board, in discussion with Eurostat. Chapter 27 will make some 
comments on this.  
Basically, my only comment on the falsification issue is that the issues of 
“breach of duty” and “falsification” cannot quite be separated. One cannot argue 
that “Georgiou’s figure was correct because it was accepted by Eurostat”: because 
Eurostat might also have agreed with a figure produced by the board, if the board 
had been able to convene and look at the issue, and perhaps come up with a 
(slightly) different figure that Eurostat might have found acceptable too. 
The April 2010 figure of 13.6% for the deficit actually doesn’t differ so much from 
the November 2010 Georgiou figure of 15.4%, and a board might have its own 
discretion on this. Eurostat in April 2010 allowed a margin of error of 0.5%, and the 
difference between (13.6 + 0.5 =) 14.1% and 14.9% (= 15.4 – 0.5) is only 0.8% 
points, and it unclear whether GDP in the denominator changed too (see p203).  
The impact on the financial market is a different issue. Given stewardship, the 
board might still have been cautious because of the earlier strong reaction by the 
financial markets in 2009, when the financial crises became an euro crisis. 
It is a much more involved issue to argue that the deficit figure was more like 
6%, as the Karamanlis government had claimed in 2009. This would be a case for 
accounting specialists on the Greek economy. Such specialists can be found 
primarily within the European Statistical System. It seems also a case for spin-
doctors, for it appears to be important to be aware of a House of Mirrors. 
25.9 A House of Mirrors 
The breach of duty is the crucial error. There is also the accusation that 
Georgiou would have “falsified data”. The latter is a more complicated issue, see 
“my only comment” above and Chapter 27. 
The remarkable phenomenon is that the accusation of falsification appears to be 
used, both by Georgiou himself and by some political actors, to distract attention 
from the true crucial error (namely the breach of duty).  
Thus, when reading sources on the internet about Greek statistics then keep in 
mind that we actually are in a House of Mirrors, in which the truly critical error of 
the breach of duty is hardly mentioned (or downplayed as a small technical issue). 
25.9.1 Presenting conviction as a “resounding victory” 
In August 2017 Georgiou was convicted for breach of duty and cleared of 
“falsification”. eKathimerini 2017-08-01 reports (my emphasis): 315 
“He was not present at the hearing in Athens, remaining at his home in 
the United States, according to lawyer Giorgos Stefanakis, who led his 
defense and described the ruling as a victory for his client. 
                                                                
315 http://www.ekathimerini.com/220561/article/ekathimerini/news/ex-statistics-chief-convicted-
for-breach-of-duty-in-resounding-victory 
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“It's like being charged for a deadly traffic accident and being convicted 
for failing to renew your driver's license ... It is a resounding victory for 
Mr Georgiou,” he told the AP, adding that he advised his client to appeal 
the conviction at Greece's Supreme Court. 
“We are very pleased with today's result because he was cleared on the 
serious charges,” Stefanakis said.” 
Obviously, breaching your duty cannot be compared to failing to renew your 
driver’s licence. Lawyer Stefanakis is selling apples for oranges. Stefanakis knows 
this. Presuming that Stefanakis is appealing to an internatinal audience: the fine 
for failing to renew your driver’s licence ranges from $250 or impoundment of the 
vehicle. 316 This is not the suspended two years in jail for Georgiou in Greece. 
Potentially the Greek system has awkward penal measures, but it ought to be 
clear from Section 25.7 that the breach of duty is most important in terms of 
economics and governance. 
25.9.2 Xafa (2019b) indicates that the Karamanlis (ND) – Papandreou (PASOK) 
case of 2009 still is politically sensitive in Greece in 2019 
Xafa (2019b), in a publication in Greek, that I could only partly understand by 
Google Translate, would seem to indicate, that the Karamanlis (ND) – Papandreou 
(PASOK) clash of 2009 still is a sensitive political matter in Greek society in 2019. 
For the ND, the “falsification” by Georgiou is more interesting for scapegoating 
than the breach of duty. I quote the Google Translate result of January 2 2020, 
and add my comment in brackets: 
“All accusations come from former members of the El.Stat board and 
some members of the El.Stat staff, who represent the "old guard" and 
were offended by Mr Georgiou's technocratic and non-partisan approach. 
[this is an unnecessary ad hominem put down] However, it is 
noteworthy that this criticism found strong and active support among 
Greek politicians who were willing to throw the blame for the crisis on a 
technocrat. Mr Georgiou was a convenient scapegoat, loaded with the 
inevitable austerity imposed by creditors after years of financial waste. 
His stubborn persecution appears to have been a "flushing" effort by 
Kostas Karamanlis' center-right government, during which term Greek 
government debt rose from 101.5% of GDP to 126.7% of GDP. When the 
radical left-wing government of SYRIZA came to power in 2015, the 
condemnation of Mr Georgiou and his associates at El.Stat became a key 
element of the government's strategy of renegotiating debt and lifting 
austerity measures.” 
“In January 2017, supporters of former Prime Minister K. Karamanlis, a 
figure still influential within the ND party, presented a study entitled "The 
Greek Political Economy: 2000-2015" to "dispel the myth of fiscal 
defection" during his reign.” [footnote 36 317] The event featured many 
New Democrats and party members, including Mr Karamanlis himself.” 
                                                                
316 https://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-is-the-penalty-for-driving-with-an-expired-license/ 
317 Her footnote to Roukanas & Sklias (2016), see https://www.amazon.com/Greek-Political-
Economy-2000-2015-ebook/dp/B01N1H8OTH 
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Apparently the ND-strategy of scapegoating “statistics” for policy seems to be 
working, as Yiannis Mouzakis in “Learning the lessons of Greece’s toxic decade”, 
MacroPolis on 2019-12-31, 318 reports that 26% of the respondents in a pole 
preferred Kostas Karamanlis as their new Greek President. 
PM 1. One supposes that a judgement of the 2000-2015 period would require 
expertise on national accounting, and that said Roukanas & Sklias (eds) (2016) 
book would require close inspection on the content of the argumentation – more 
information for the required investigation. 
PM 2. Xafa (2019b) repeats the error of wrongly quoting the European Code of 
Practice, not using the relevant year 2005 that applied in 2010 but a later year, 
see Section 26.7. 
PM 3. The article Xafa (2019b) has been signed by “Ms. Miranda Xafa is a 
senior fellow at the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI).” It 
would have been better if she / the editors had stated her Greek official and 
political involvement. The 2019 prime minister of Greece is Kyriakos Mitsotakis 
(ND), 319 son of Konstantinos Mitsotakis (ND), 320 who again was a prime minister 
in 1990-1993, while her cv states: “Miranda served as chief economic adviser to 
Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, from 1991 to 1993”, see Appendix 
39.7. However, readers of Liberal.gr might know this already. The ND party might 
have factions, and the current prime minister might think that Kostas Karamanlis 
indeed had an irresponsible policy in 2004-2009.  
25.10 Official statistics and statistics at academia are in uproar 
Currently there are protests in official statistics and the academia that Georgiou 
is maltreated 321 322 323 – even with a petition in 2018 signed by perhaps a thousand 
signatures including nine Nobel laureates in economics. 324 325 There is also a 
group calling itself “the friends of Greece”, with Michel Camdessus (managing 
director of IMF 1987-2000). 326 There is the International Statistical Institute (ISI) 
statements on statistical ethics, 327 while a statement of February 28 2013, 
reproduced in Appendix 40, received 339 endorsements, 328 also by e.g. Kees 
Zeelenberg of CBS Statistics Netherlands, whom I tend to regard as a respectable 
methodologist and statistician. Sobering observations are: 
                                                                
318 Learning the lessons of Greece's toxic decade 
319 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyriakos_Mitsotakis 
320 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konstantinos_Mitsotakis 
321 https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/221-80-former-chief-statisticians-condemn-
prosecution-of-andreas-georgiou 
322 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/735541/6942269/Statement+on+developments 
+in+the+Greek+statistical+system+12_10b.pdf/4c589f69-ea0e-4af7-98b8-7e5b72a6d6f8 
323 https://community.amstat.org/blogs/steve-pierson/2017/03/29/asa-writes-to-greek-prime-
minister-regarding-charges-against-its-former-chief-statistician-dr-andreas-georgiou 
324 https://voxeu.org/content/european-union-must-defend-andreas-georgiou 
325 https://www.amstat.org//asa/files/pdfs/GeorgiouStatement.pdf 
326 https://thefriendsofgreece.wordpress.com/about/ 
327 https://isi-web.org/index.php/about-isi/policies/isi-statements-letters 
328 https://web.archive.org/web/20170711001907/https://isi-web.org/index.php/news-from-isi/695-
supportgreece 
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• These protesters apparently did not check above elementary fact about the 
Greek law of March 2010. The protesters tend to denounce the Greek 
Supreme Court as biased. But what about the actual law and the IMF ? 
• Within the House of Mirrors, these statistical organisations focus upon the 
accusations of “falsification” and downplay the conviction for breach of duty, 
thus following the misrepresentation by Georgiou and his lawyer. They play 
into the storyline that “statistics is about figures” and neglect the importance 
of governance especially for national accounting. (See Table 2 on p137.) 
25.11 The IMF agreed that El.Stat in 2010 had a multiperson board 
The Greek law of March 2010 was that the El.Stat board worked as a collective 
decision body, without singular authority for director Andreas Georgiou. It is 
somewhat strange that the IMF does not clearly say this to all the protesters, who 
hold that Georgiou in 2010 already was the single head (chief) while he wasn’t. In 
the Memorandum of Understanding with the IMF, the Greek government declared 
in March 2012 (page 114), 329 and this emphasizes that the IMF has been knowing 
about the March 2010 law: 
“14. We will further strengthen the Greek statistical agency, El.Stat. We 
will revise the statistics law to reform El.Stat’s governance arrangements. 
The law will establish the El.Stat Board as advisory, and clarify the 
professional authority of El.Stat’s president as the institution’s chief officer 
and coordinator of the national statistical system.” 
25.12 An advice by the ECB on a draft law in 2010 
I did not find an English translation of the El.Stat law of March 2010. Let us 
consider an advice by the ECB on a draft. This suggests that Jean-Claude Trichet 
in 2010 accepted a board of seven persons in collective responsibility, see p4: 330 
“3.3.2 HSTAT will be governed by its President and Board. Under Article 
12 of the draft law, the composition of HSTAT’s Board comprises seven 
members, each appointed by the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament for a 
four-year term of office, renewable once. The Board will comprise: (i) the 
HSTAT president as its chairman to be selected by the Conference of 
Presidents of the Hellenic Parliament; (ii) four members, including the 
vice-chairman, also to be selected by the Conference of Presidents of the 
Hellenic Parliament; (iii) one representative from the Ministry of Finance, 
to be nominated by the Minister of Finance; and (iv) one member to be 
nominated by the HSTAT’s staff union. To further enhance HSTAT’s 
independence, the ECB recommends that the chairman and members of 
HSTAT’s Board should be appointed for longer terms of office and that 
the terms of office for different Board members should be staggered, with 
a view to ensuring continuity in policymaking. Furthermore, the use of the 
                                                                
329 IMF Country Report No. 12/57, March 2012, “Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement 
Under the Extended Fund Facility”, ATTACHMENT II. GREECE: MEMORANDUM OF 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1257.pdf 
330 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_17_f_sign.pdf 
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term ‘representative’ in relation to the Board member nominated by the 
Minister of Finance seems to be incompatible with Article 15(1) of the 
draft law, on the safeguards of HSTAT’s independence, according to 
which the chairman and members of HSTAT’s Board enjoy personal 
independence in the performance of their duties and are bound only by 
the law and their consciences. Moreover, under the same Article, 
HSTAT’s President must be employed by HSTAT on a full-time basis, 
while the other Board members may not hold any remunerated or non-
remunerated public office or engage in any other professional activities of 
a business or other nature, which are incompatible with their status and 
duties as members of HSTAT’s Board. While the ECB welcomes the 
independence safeguards in Article 15, it is of the view that the draft law 
leaves broad discretion as to which types of activities may be considered 
incompatible with such persons’ status and duties and recommends that 
also the vice-chairman of HSTAT should be employed by HSTAT on a 
full-time basis. Furthermore, under Article 15(2) of the draft law, the 
chairman and members of the Board may be dismissed by a decision of 
the body appointing them on serious grounds relating to the performance 
of their duties or for failure to perform their duties due to illness or 
disability. The ECB recommends that these serious grounds should be 
further specified in the draft law.” 
25.13 Georgiou knew that he was wrong: he started to change the regulation 
In his defence, former IMF employee Georgiou has referred to the European 
Code of Practice that would assign such singular authority to him as DG of El.Stat 
in 2010. However, he also worked in 2010 to have a change in the Greek law (to 
the effect of such IMF induced change). The next section shows that the March 9 
2010 law was already changed in December 2010. 
Thus Georgiou knew in 2010 that there was a tension, see Georganta 
(2012b:22-23), 331 and he basically lied to the board, and later to the courts, that 
there would not be such tension.  
Thus it is not convincing that he could act alone in 2010, or that he really 
believed that he could. He is guilty as charged, i.e. that he breached his duty to 
seek approval by the board. If he has been under oath at the Greek courts then he 
also committed perjury. 
See Appendix 39 on the Backgrounds of Georgiou and Georganta.  
PM. The emails in Georganta (2012b) above have been gotten by her lawyer, 
she states, and not via the computer hack that we will discuss below. 
25.14 The actual Greek law  
After revision, article 14 of the Greek law now states (in English) (El.Stat = DG): 
“The President of EL.STAT. is the supreme officer of EL.STAT., and shall 
exercise all its powers and shall be responsible for ensuring that the 
authority operates without problems in order to discharge its objectives in 
                                                                
331 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/European-Commission-Decision-
prejudice1.pdf 
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line with the provisions of national and European law, the European 
Statistics Code of Practice and best international statistical practices.” 
I have not been able to find an English translation of the original “Law 3832/2010 
("Greek Statistical System (GSS) - Establishment of the Hellenic Statistical 
Authority (EL.STAT.) as an Independent Authority", Gov. Gazette 38, Issue A, 
March 9 2010. It is remarkable that the members of the Greek board of 2010, who 
protest against the situation and who appeal to the international community, have 
not put such translation online. This is as remarkable as that they did not fire 
Georgiou on the spot (though Georgiou refused at that time to call a meeting). 
The English translation of the current Greek law includes amendments, already 
starting in December 2010. 332 333  
I have used Google Translate to recover the following. Translation of above 
phrase generated the websites (i) https://www.kodiko.gr without clarification in 
English who runs this, 334 (ii) a competitor company “Legal Engineering 
Publications - Internet Services”. 335 The latter company requires subscription to 
find earlier texts. Since we only look once we are not in need of a substription, we 
take some risk and look at the freely available law text changes as recorded by 
kodico.gr.  
Running through this law is somewhat tricky, especially when one doesn’t know 
Greek, as holds for the present author. 
• We must click on the current article 13 to find a former article 12, that existed 
in 2010. Clicking on “Δες την εξέλιξη του άρθρου” generates this page. 336  
• If we mark the box “Εμφάνιση διαφορών με την προηγούμενη κωδικοποίηση” 
then we get a mixture of old and new phrases, which reads awkward, 
especially when you do not know Greek anyway.  
• Subsequently clicking on the box for the original text, we find the article as it 
existed in 2010. 337 This can be exported as a PDF and submitted to Google 
Translate.  
Thus we find article 12.1, that states:  
“EL.STAT. It is composed of seven members, as follows:” 338 
Thus, El.Stat = board. Apparently the Greek legislator created the new statistical 
institution by declaring that it existed out of its seven members. Subsequently, the 
president is indicated as one of the members. Then article 14 of 2010 describes 
the role of the president, though subject to other provisions: 
“The President of EL.STAT. is responsible for any issues related to its 
proper functioning. Particularly (...)” 339 
                                                                
332 https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/300673/Stat_Law3832_EN.pdf/de31bfc8-c4d4-
4d39-aa5f-d4592d1c8330 
333 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ess/greece/management-issues 
334 https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/document_navigation/53799/nomos-3832-2010 
335 https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-nomothesia-genikou-endiapherontos/n-3832-2010.html 
336 https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/document?id=239072 
337 https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/document?id=239077 
338 Greek: “Η ΕΛ.ΣΤΑΤ. συγκροτείται από επτά μέλη, ως εξής:” 
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Observe the distinction between being (made) responsible and having the power 
to execute that responsibility. It is a recipe for stress to be assigned (or adopt) a 
responsibility without the means to do something about it. 
Another tricky point is that kodico.gr does not list a change that was affected on 
December 17 2010, as part of another law 3899/2010, officially on tax changes, 
but that contains article 10 on statistical governance nevertheless. 340 In itself, this 
law in December 2010 usefully indicates where the term “El.Stat” (the collective 
decision making body of the board of seven persons) is replaced by “the president 
of El.Stat”. We can again export it as a PDF and call Google Translate. 
25.15 Mass hysteria fueled by falsehoods in the world of official statistics 
The mass hysteria in the world of official statistics and at the academia is even 
more unfounded than already appears from the above. In 2010, Georgiou worked 
under the European Statistics Code of Practice (COP) of 2005, that made 
approval by his board mandatory, 341 see the text of the code and discussion in 
Chapter 22. The European Code was changed in 2011 to a more ambiguous 
formulation, 342 very likely done by Eurostat to better suit Georgiou. This change 
was retained in the 2017 Code, 343 see Chapter 22. 
The International Statistical Institute (ISI) and others tend to refer to the Code of 
a later and thus wrong year, namely 2011 or 2017 instead of 2005. 
25.16 Role by Hallgrímur Snorrason 
Hallgrímur Snorrason, former DG of Statistics Iceland till 2008, and vice-
president at ISI, plays the double role of both “independent outsider” and 
representative of Eurostat at El.Stat in 2010, as “High Level Expert (HLE, see 
Section 33.1) for the joint Eurostat/Greece statistical action plan”. In fact he was a 
participant in this ordeal, assisted Georgiou to change the law (and likely the 
Eurostat Code of Practice). He appears to be partial, does not inform his fellow 
statisticians that he himself has a role in the case, 344 and acts as activist instead 
of scientist. See Appendix 39 on the Backgrounds. 
Check that ISI relies upon Snorrason. Check that the American Statistical 
Association (ASA) uncritically refers to ISI, Georgiou and Snorrason. 345 
25.17 eKathimerini (2013), Wikipedia, Xafa (2019ab) and Toussaint (2020) 
An excellent, compact and timely overview had already been given by journalist 
Malkoutzis and economist Mouzakis (2013) 346 in eKathimerini / International 
                                                                                                                                      
339 Greek: “Ο Πρόεδρος της ΕΛ.ΣΤΑΤ. είναι αρμόδιος για κάθε ζήτημα το οποίο σχετίζεται με την 
εύρυθμη λειτουργία της. Ειδικότερα” 
340 https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/document_navigation/58197/nomos-3899-2010 
341 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/EconStatKB/KnowledgebaseArticle10174.aspx 
342 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5921861/KS-32-11-955-EN.PDF/5fa1ebc6-
90bb-43fa-888f-dde032471e15 
343 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/quality/european-statistics-code-of-practice 
344 https://isi-web.org/images/news/2018-07_Court-proceedings-against-Andreas-Georgiou.pdf 
345 https://community.amstat.org/blogs/steve-pierson/2017/06/15/statistician-prosecuted-latest-
developments-in-andreas-georgiou-case?CommunityKey=634529e2-a7c9-4921-ac16-
7fde170e677a&tab= 
346 http://www.ekathimerini.com/148007/article/ekathimerini/comment/an-issue-of-statistical-
significance-in-greece 
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Herald Tribune. They argued that the accusations against Georgiou were 
exaggerated, but they did not look at the aspect for which Georgiou now has been 
convicted, and thus missed the implications that we consider now. Mouzakis 
(2019) gives a very useful overview of the last decade.  
Unfortunately, Wikipedia (a portal and no source) doesn’t have the full story yet: 
it can only present it when someone else has presented it first. 347 
An overview of the Andreas Georgiou case is given by Miranda Xafa (2019a). 348 
At first the article makes for compelling reading. However, Xafa (2019a) does not 
explain the breach of duty as clearly as required. In her exposition, it seems as if 
the Greek Supreme Court made an error of judgement and that Georgiou is a 
victim of a miscarriage of (supreme) justice. The truth is different.  
It is problematic that Xafa also signed the mentioned petition, taking a side. 349 
We can spot similar errors in the petition as in Xafa (2019a), which causes the 
question whether her paper was simply biased or whether such bias was the result 
of inadequate research in the first place.  
Xafa (2019b) seems more opinionated (Google Translate) but is in a newspaper. 
See Appendix 39.7 on her background: Greek by origin, a PhD from the 
University of Pennsylvania, and also at the IMF executive board when Andreas 
Georgiou worked there.  
Xafa (2019a) calls the vice-president of the El.Stat board a “political appointee” 
while president Georgiou was appointed by Greek politics too. She refers to police 
findings on the computer hacking but does not specify sources, so how can we 
check ? (I asked her for the police report but she stated that she did not have it, 
and at first was inclined to look for it, but then declined – asking me why I would 
not simply trust newspaper reports about the police report.) 
However, some errors do not disqualify a person, who can correct mistakes. 
Xafa has experience with Greece. Interviewed by the BBC in 2012, 350 when Xafa 
worked for Salomon Brothers, she provided this example: 
“The [railway] company would issue shares that the government would 
buy. So it was counted not as expenditure, but as a financial transaction. 
And it did not appear on the budget balance sheet. So Greece fulfilled the 
Maastricht criteria and was admitted to the eurozone on January 1, 2001 
– but by 2004 the deception was becoming transparent.”  
The BBC report also reminds us: “However, France and Germany broke the very 
rules that they had insisted on for everyone else.” There are errors on all sides. 
Toussaint (2020) reports about the “Truth Commission” of the Greek Parliament, 
of which he was the “scientific co-ordinator”: 
                                                                
347 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_government-
debt_crisis#2010_revelations_and_IMF_bailout 
348 Miranda Xafa (2019a), “A Statistician’s Ordeal: The Case of Andreas Georgiou”, World 
Economics, Volume 20, Issue 3, 
https://www.worldeconomics.com/Papers/A%20Statistician%E2%80%99s%20Ordeal%20The%2
0Case%20of%20Andreas%20Georgiou_6fc3ac6d-6ce2-4a90-8337-4987d8058ba7.paper 
349 https://www.amstat.org//asa/files/pdfs/GeorgiouStatement.pdf 
350 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16834815 
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“Meanwhile, the Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, set up by the 
president of the Hellenic Parliament, was working hard to produce its Report 
and recommendations before the end of the second Memorandum, which had 
been extended until 30 June 2015. The plan was to present the Report in an 
open session of Parliament on 17 and 18 June 2015 as a contribution to 
discussions on the Memorandum and negotiations. The Committee’s mandate 
was to identify the proportion of debt that could be defined as illegitimate, 
illegal, odious or unsustainable. The Truth Committee was composed of 30 
members, 15 from Greece and 15 from abroad, including several professors of 
law from universities in Great Britain, Belgium, Spain and Zambia, a former 
United Nations independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and respect 
of human rights, experts on international finance, auditors of public accounts, 
people who had previous experience of public debt audits, a former president 
of a central bank and former minister of the economy, bank specialists having 
acquired profound knowledge of the banking sector in the course of their 
careers. Of the 15 people from Greece, several had experience of the world of 
banking, in the domains of international finance, law, journalism and health. 
(....) The Report concludes that the entire debt claimed by the Troika is 
illegitimate, odious, illegal and unsustainable.” 
The latter refers to the issue that Sweden and Iceland nationalised banks while 
not bailing out bank creditors, while Ireland and Greece nationalised debts while 
bailing out creditors, see Section 18.3. If this Truth Committee had done its job of 
convincing the entire world then these current chapters might be superfluous.  
Greek voters had the 2015 referendum on the Trojka approach: 
“On 5 July, the results were unmistakeable: a high rate of participation (62.5 
per cent) and 61.31 per cent of ‘no’ votes. In the working-class areas, the ‘no’ 
vote reached 70 per cent. A poll indicated that 85 per cent of young people 
between 18 and 24 years old voted ‘no’ (Kouvelakis 2015: 148). [23].” 
A quick calculation is that 61.31% of 62.5% is only 38.3% of voters supporting a 
“no”, and it can only be populism to claim that the referendum rejected the trojka 
approach. Unfortunately Toussaint takes that position, even when the Greek 
Parliament later supported the U-turn by Tsipras: “Out of 300 MPs, 251 voted in 
favour of the capitulation plan proposed by Tsipras. It was a full-blown crisis for 
Syriza.” After new elections, won by Tsipras:  
“Three days later, on 26 September [2015], Tsipras had Nikos Voutsis 
elected as president of Parliament. They decided to dissolve ipso facto 
the Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt and to remove all documents 
relating to its work from the parliamentary website.” 
25.18 Statistical colleagues and whistleblowers 
What is dearly lacking in the protests by official statistics and the academia is 
attention for statisticians who were fired by Georgiou in 2010, the vice-president 
who resigned under pressure, and for the five members of the board of El.Stat 
who were dismissed by the Greek government in 2011 upon instigation by its 
creditors.  
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It is not clear how the world of official statistics and the academia can draw the 
line, and why they support director Georgiou and why they do not support the 
other fellow statisticians.  
Apparently three statisticians in the dismissed board keep very silent and two 
statisticians have a protest online. While Georgiou would be like a whistleblower 
against the forces who want to see different figures, the other two, i.e. El.Stat 
board vice-president Nikos Logothetis and member professor in econometrics Zoe 
Georganta, are whistleblowers against Georgiou. We are reminded of the classic 
Hirschman (1972) “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” but now rather in a more brutal world. 
It is well-known that whistleblowers can be subject to severe stress, 351 and that 
stress may affect judgement. Society must find ways to create clarity whether 
whistleblowers are right or wrong in the original case even when they later 
succomb to such stress.  
• Georgiou has had support from the start by Eurostat, EU and IMF, his 
reference group, and it seems that his kind of stress has been muted.  
• The dismissed El.Stat board members seem to have received little support, 
though the Greek court system took a critical look at their witness statements 
and evidence, and decided on prosecution. Logothetis and Georganta 
apparently are succombing to stress. In interviews in 2017, see Appendices 
43 and 44, Logothetis argues that the case in 2010 was a conspiracy (but 
doesn’t provide proof by whom, e.g. from financial records about shorts), and 
Georganta claims that Germany tries to conquer Europe again (even though 
Germany lost its currency and has only a single seat in the ECB). With such 
derailment today it is tempting to think that the El.Stat board in 2010 was 
dysfunctional from the beginning, but, for a diagnosis of 2010 we must 
obviously look at 2010 and 2010 only. In a way, given their derailment, to 
some extent, these two statisticians are more authentically blowing the whistle 
against an apparently quite powerful director with support by Eurostat (and 
subsequently EU, ECB and IMF who seem not to doubt Eurostat).  
25.19 Investigate and do not take sides; return to the status quo ante 
These events highlight that these matters have been studied by the EU, ECB, 
and IMF, by the Greek Parliament and Courts, and by various academic scholars, 
and by numerous journalists. But their conclusion is still mostly wanting, except 
when the House of Mirrors shows the effort of hiding. The mass hysteria in the 
world of official statistics is quite troubling. This present discussion indicates some 
loose ends, and indicates that it would be useful to have an investigation to really 
get us somewhere on a practical conclusion. 
Thus, I do not take sides and propose an investigation, and suggest that others 
do so too. The real issue is to find an international authority that can set up such 
investigation with co-operation by the different countries and agencies. 
All in all, it remains advisable that the ambiguity in the ESS Code of Practice 
since 2011 is removed, and that the earlier clarity of the 2005 Code is restored, 
meaning that the authority of a National Statistical Office resides within the 
collective body of its board. 
                                                                
351 https://whistleblower.org/our-story-2/ 
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26. Step by step through the maze (European Code of Practice) 
 
As said, the above already established that the Greek law was that the director 
had to seek approval by the board of directors. This chapter only concerns the 
(additional) confusion about the European Statistical System (ESS) Code of 
Practice. See Chapter 22 for the texts of the versions of 2005, 2011 and 2017. 
My comments will be in brackets, and emphasis in bold. 
26.1 Dependence upon the Code in 2010, and the Code is changed in 2011 
The law for El.Stat of 2010 appearently states that the ESS Code of Practice 
also applies to El.Stat. This El.Stat law and the 2005 Code are not in conflict. 
However, the change of the Code in 2011 might be read as such a conflict. It is 
somewhat dubious to agree with particular terms, when later in the process the 
terms are changed. The Greek law was also changed in December 2010. 
26.2 Reference by Georgiou himself 
In the Georgiou court case it has been argued by Georgiou and his witnesses 
that the “other statistical authorities” might be other bodies than the national 
statistical institute, which makes sense for the 2011 Code but not necessarily for 
the 2005 Code, when it may apply to the board (while the 2005 Code was relevant 
for the period then Georgiou breached his duty). 
And as said in Section 25.13, there is evidence that Georgiou wasn’t sure about 
his claim in 2010, as he tried to revise the regulation. 352 (Has an accused person 
the right to try to mislead a court ? If under oath it would have been perjury.) 
26.3 The problem, and key confusion in official statistics 
Xafa (2019a) unfortunately refers to the 2017 Code of Practice (that also 
specifies a number), and not the 2005 Code (that doesn’t specify a number) 
prevailing in 2010: 
“In a separate case, Mr. Georgiou was found guilty of ‘breach of duty’ for 
not asking the (subsequently abolished) board of the statistical agency to 
approve the revised fiscal data before notifying them to Eurostat, and was 
sentenced to two years in prison (suspended, unless he gets another 
conviction). Yet according to EU rules [though Greek law applies], 
decisions regarding statistics are not subject to vote by a board and are 
explicitly the ‘sole responsibility’ of the head of the statistical agency. [her 
footnote 1: See principle 1.4 in the European Statistics Code of Practice 
(Eurostat 2017).]”  
26.4 Misrepresentation by official statistics of the 2005 Code  
Below we will see that there is a misrepresentation of the 2005 Code in the 
world of official statistics, notably by ISI and (likely uncritically copied by) RSS, 
ASA, IAOS, FENStatS, SFdS. 353 See Section 22.4 for the Code of 2005. 
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prejudice1.pdf 
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The misrepresentation consists of:  
(i) leaving out the 2005 clause on “heads of its bodies”, partly by referring to a 
later version of the Code 
(ii) focusing on the single head and leaving vague what the role of a board of a 
statistical authority would be (except perhaps being a nuisance for a chief) 
(iii) taking the rule, which is intended to protect against external pressure, and 
misapply it to the case when the chief clashes internally with the board.  
26.5 ISI doesn’t include the relevant clause of the 2005 Code 
ISI changes “authority” (2005) into “institute” (2011) and removes the “heads of 
its bodies” clause, and argues in 2017: 354 
“Mr Georgiou acted at all times in complete compliance with the 
European Statistics Code of Practice, which he was required to do under 
the provisions of the Greek Statistical Law applying at the time. 
Specifically, Principle 1 of the Code, relating to Professional 
Independence, requires that "the Head of the National Statistical Institute 
(in this case the President of El.Stat) [missing clause] has the sole 
responsibility for deciding on statistical methods, standards and 
procedures, and on the content and timing of releases". Thus, informing 
the Board of El.Stat and seeking its approval prior to the release of the 
Debt and Deficit figures would have been completely [false] at variance 
with the Principle of Professional Independence and the Code of 
Practice. 
Official statistics should be produced according to scientific principles and 
methodologies determined by professional statisticians, not according to 
the votes of members of the Board [as if voting isn’t used in applied 
science]. Nonetheless, the Greek courts have convicted, with a two year 
suspended prison sentence, Andreas Georgiou of not obtaining the 
Board’s approval for release of data, even though doing so would have 
been contrary [false] not only to the European Statistics Code of Practice 
but also to the ISI Declaration on Professional Ethics and the United 
Nations Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics.” 
ISI’s statement in 2017 is clearer than the more verbose statement in 2016 355 
but to the same effect, namely that ISI gives a wrong quote of the code, and 
misrepresents the situation. ISI’s application of the Code to the internal distinction 
between a single head (chief) and the board is a misapplication of the Code that 
has a purpose for external pressure. 
Apparently ISI allows itself to be advised by Hallgrímur Snorrason, former DG of 
Statistics Iceland for 23 years, 356 who retired in 2008 (at the beginning of the 
international financial crisis, with the curious role by Iceland). Snorrason 
                                                                                                                                      
353 International Statistical Institute (ISI), Royal Statistical Society (RSS), Americal Statistical 
Association (ASA), International Association of Official Statistics (IAOS), Federation of European 
National Statistical Societies (FENStatS), Société Française de Statistique (SFdS). 
354 https://www.isi-web.org/images/news/2017-08ISI%20Statement%20on%20Greece.pdf 
355 https://www.isi-web.org/images/news/2016-09ISI%20Statement%20on%20Greece.pdf 
356 http://snorrasonstatistics.net/ 
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apparently was an “Eurostat-appointed expert at El.Stat during 2010-2012”. 357 We 
can only conclude that Snorrason hasn’t taken the critical distance and view that 
the case requires. 
26.6 European Parliament’s selective cut of the Code 
A document at the European Parliament gives an even more creative selective 
cut of the Code compared to the ISI misrepresentation: 358 
“The Court, however, convicted him on the third count of not putting up 
the 2009 EDP [Excessive Debt Procedure] figures for approval by the 
former El.Stat Board and imposed a two-year suspended prison 
sentence. The court sentence did not take into account that Indicator 1.4 
[number not in 2005 version] of the European Statistics Code of 
Practice stipulates that the Head of the National Statistical Institute (in 
this case the President of El.Stat) should have [missing clause, or 
actually a quote of a part outside of that clause] “sole responsibility 
for deciding on statistical methods, standards and procedures, and on the 
content and timing of statistical releases”.” 
26.7 Xafa (2019a) gives a wrong quote of the 2005 Code 
Xafa (2019a:28) has a wrong quote of the 2005 Code: 
“Mr. Georgiou’s defense was based on the European Statistics Code of 
Practice (COP), adopted in 2005 and explicitly referred to in both the 
European statistical law (Regulation 223/2009) and the Greek statistical 
law (3832/2010). The COP states that ‘[t]he heads of the National 
Statistical Institutes and of Eurostat and, where appropriate, the heads 
of other statistical authorities [which should be “its statistical bodies”] 
have the sole responsibility for deciding on statistical methods, standards 
and procedures, and on the content and timing of statistical releases’ 
(Principle 1.4). [no number in 2005] European statistics are produced 
not only by national statistical institutes such as El.Stat, but also by other 
agencies—typically the central bank and ministries. These are the ‘other 
statistical authorities’ referred to in the COP; Greece has nine of these. 
[ftnt] 359 The interpretation of the COP was clarified in the court 
proceedings by the oral testimonies of defense witnesses, who were 
experts on account of the positions they had held as heads of national 
statistical institutes in the European Statistical System (Ireland and 
Iceland), as well as by written testimonies from the head of Eurostat and 
the EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs that had been 
submitted to the 2012 Parliamentary Investigative Committee.” 
                                                                
357 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-statistics-crowdfunding/embattled-greek-statistics-
chief-gets-crowdfunding-help-from-colleagues-idUSKCN0X41QM 
358 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614481/ 
IPOL_BRI(2017)614481_EN.pdf 
359 Xafa’s footnote is: “As noted on El.Stat’s website: 
www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/1196143/National_Authorities_HSS_23102018_EN.pdf/f33e
0ed9-3822-416e-82b7-447a1674d830, accessed September 6, 2019” 
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26.8 Xafa (2019a): the court refers to the board as a collective body 
Xafa (2019a) gives her interpretation of what the Greek court actually did, but 
her reference to the “principle 1.4” is confusing since the 2005 Code has no such 
number. The court agreed with the reading of the 2005 Code that there is a role 
for a board. It is useful to emphasize the court ruling within Xafa’s interpretation: 
“The way the Court of Appeals was able to reach a guilty verdict is 
remarkable. It seems to have disregarded both exculpatory evidence and 
the plain language of the COP. It relied on its own Greek translation of 
the relevant paragraph instead of the official Greek translation published 
on the Eurostat website, to reach the conclusion that sole responsibility 
essentially means the responsibility of the heads of statistical divisions 
within El.Stat (instead of the other statistical authorities outside El.Stat). 
Based on this misinterpretation, the court decision concluded that COP 
principle 1.4 ‘does not prevent the legislator of the member state 
from approving… the delegation of the relevant decision-making to 
a collective body as in this case the seven-member board’ of El.Stat. 
(...) (Wall Street Journal 2017b).” 
26.9 Europe’s Statistics DGs do not mind single-headed authority 
Xafa (2019a) reports that Georgiou referred to “principle 1.4” (not in 2005):  
“To support his annulment request, Mr. Georgiou both explained how the 
European and Greek legal framework had been evidently misinterpreted, 
and submitted to the Supreme Court letters from the sitting presidents of 
the Austrian, Finnish, French, Italian, and Irish national statistical offices 
stating that on account of Principle 1.4 of the European Statistics Code of 
Practice they had sole responsibility and independence to decide (a) the 
statistical methodology and professional statistical standards used in their 
offices, (b) the content of statistical releases and publications issued, and 
(c) the timing of and methods by which statistics compiled by their 
respective offices would be disseminated. These letters were neither 
taken into account by the Supreme Court, nor acknowledged in its 
decision.” 
Comments: 
(i) It is troubling that the DGs apparently have not been aware that the 2005 
Code was in force in 2010, that clearly assigns such role to boards (when 
appropriate, i.e. when they exist). (But Georgiou and Radermacher knew.) 
(ii) It is troubling that the DGs did not check upon the Greek law of March 2010 
that applied to El.Stat. (But Georgiou and Radermacher knew.) 
(iii) It is fully understandable that the Greek Supreme Court did not take these 
testimonies of these DGs into account, as Xafa reports, and it is curious that 
she doesn’t say so.  
Overall, it is troubling that the DGs of these national institutes indeed claim sole 
responsibility for themselves, instead of for (their) boards. Even if they refer to the 
Code of a later year, they interprete “head” as applying to themselves, and not as 
“board”. When DGs are lacking in modesty about their capacities, and do not 
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recognise that it is only a legal arrangement, then it may well be advisable that the 
principle explicitly refers to boards, and that also boards should be protected from 
external pressure.  
Another troubling issue are the perceptions on stewardship. This requires a 
separate discussion. 
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27. Aspects of stewardship for the El.Stat case 
 
27.1 Different, false or falsification, and their legal aspects 
The European Commission (2010) report of January identifies “deliberate 
misreporting”. 360 With the March 9 2010 law and creation of El.Stat, and all 
authority given to the board, there is a fresh start to do it right. Greece in the 
Eurozone must use the Eurostat definitions of ESA95. It is useful to distinguish: 
(1) When a board is in meeting and there are various estimates for a statistic, say 
the national deficit according to the ESA95 definition without such deliberate 
misreporting, but then either (i) closer to the former report, or (ii) with more 
distance to the former report, then these are just “differences in views”. 
(2) The board would need to come to agreement with Eurostat, and Eurostat 
might publish, like in the past, a Greek figure with a margin of error, or, there is 
the Pozen (2009) approach to publish two figures with their definitions, see 
Section 20.3.  
(3) Once it has been decided what figure will be the official one, and published, 
the other differing figures become “false figures” in the sense that they are not 
the official one. 
(4) It is an interesting question when such a “false figure” would become a 
“falsificated” one. The Georgiou case presents an example of this enigma. If a 
board decides to a figure A and the chief sends figure B to Eurostat, then the 
board might hold that B is not only false but also falsificated. 
(5) The situation however becomes tricky when the chief doesn’t call for a 
meeting so that the board did not have a chance to determine its choice. 
(6) Though the 2010 board did not convene and did not determine its own 
assessment of the figure of the deficit of the Greek budget, some board 
members however judged in person that the likely board figures would have 
differed from the figures that Georgiou sent to Eurostat. Thus, in terms of 
content, apart from the legal situation, these board members have good 
reason to posit that, in their view, Georgiou falsificated the figure of the Greek 
deficit. One cannot hold that this would be an improper accusation, as it is only 
a personal evaluation of the situation.  
(7) Such accusation is quite impossible to prove, since the board did not convene.  
(8) In sum, as stated in Section 25.8: the issues of “breach of duty” and 
“falsification” cannot quite be separated. One cannot argue that “Georgiou’s 
figure was correct because it was accepted by Eurostat”: because Eurostat 
might also have agreed with a figure produced by the board, if the board had 
been able to convene and look at the issue, and perhaps come up with a 
(slightly) different figure that Eurostat might have found acceptable too. 
(9) It would still be a relevant exercise to try to determine what margin of 
discretion the board would have had for different applications of the Eurostat 
rules, not only in calculation but also for the moment of publication. 
                                                                
360 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/ 
c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a 
 178 
The Greek courts also considered the accusation that Georgiou falsificated 
figures. This particular accusation was rejected in a lower court. Xafa (2019a):  
“Nevertheless, a criminal investigation of the same issue of the 
falsification of the 2009 deficit, initiated by Ms. Dimitriou in 2016, appears 
to still be proceeding.”  
A court rejection is not necessarily a conclusion that would be the same as a 
decision by a board based upon their own statistical considerations. A court looks 
at legal regulations around the board decision, while a board would mainly look at 
the content of the matter. A court would likely uphold a board decision, but now 
the board was not convened, and later dismissed.  
It would be too simple to (i) denounce the Greek Supreme Court for convicting 
Georgiou for sending a figure to Eurostat without approval by the board, and (ii) at 
the same time praise the Greek Supreme Court that Georgiou has been cleared 
from charges of falsification (and that he was innocent “even by the courts”). If 
official statistics refers to the courts as evidence that Georgiou did not falsificate 
figures, then one invokes respect for the courts, and this would tend to imply also 
a respect that the courts convicted Georgiou for violation of duty. (If one still 
wishes to pick and choose, then this requires elaboration.) 
The devil lies in the details, and an investigation from the world of science and 
learning is advisable. Once a report has been written, with an indication about 
what the figure of the Greek deficit would have been had the El.Stat board been 
given a chance to determine it, then the Greek court might reconsider the case, 
given that there would be an estimate of the figure. A court would likely not decide 
in such manner though, since this depends upon (too many) counterfactuals. The 
question for the world of statistics is anyway how to establish such a 
counterfactual. Where might we find a suitable authority to conduct such an 
investigation ? The world of statistics itself appears to be tainted. 
27.2 Eighty former chief statisticians 
At the International Association for Official Statistics (IAOS), there is a 2018-06-
18 declaration by 80 former chief statisticians, 361 and their argument is: 
“Indeed, the methodology and figures are also accepted by the Greek 
Authorities and have been consistently used by successive Greek 
Governments since 2011 in requesting international financial assistance. 
Actually, the same methodology and figures are being used these days 
for requesting the final disbursement of about 12 billion euro to Greece 
under the final stage of a bailout that since 2010 has amounted to over 
270 billion euro. The same methodology and figures are also currently 
being used by Greece to ask for significant debt relief for the debt 
incurred under this largest bailout in history.  
The EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF, as funding partners, have 
also fully accepted the figures as the basis for providing assistance since 
the end of 2010, for considering debt relief to Greece, and for monitoring 
the performance of the Greek economy.” 
                                                                
361 https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/221-80-former-chief-statisticians-condemn-
prosecution-of-andreas-georgiou 
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There are however some considerations to doubt this reasoning. These 
statisticians show self-congratulary behaviour and they are advised to reconsider. 
27.2.1 Misrepresenting the true case 
We are back in the House of Mirrors. This declaration misrepresents the true 
case, by not mentioning that Georgiou under the 2005 Code breached his duty 
and by-passed his responsibility w.r.t. the board of El.Stat. Instead the declaration 
focuses on the other charge of falsifying statistical information, holding that 
Georgiou’s figures were accepted by Eurostat and “thus good”. However, their 
declaration should also have checked the fact about the 2005 Code. The 
declaration creates the impression now as if Georgiou is the victim of a witch hunt, 
while he in fact was in breach of his duty in statistics, and this is the crucial issue, 
and Eurostat in collaboration with the board might have accepted a different figure. 
27.2.2 Recovering from a malfeasance 
Compare the analogy that some person X wants to sell you a wheelchair. You 
reply that you can walk fine and do not need a wheelchair. X shoots you in your 
kneecaps and says: “Now you need it.” Then the 80 statisticians come along and 
proclaim that X has been right all the time because you indeed are using a 
wheelchair now.  
Alternatively, consider that Y wants you to lose weight because it is better for 
your health. You reply that you are fine as it is. Y kicks you so hard that you land 
in the hospital. Slowly you recover while losing weight. Then the 80 statisticians 
come along and proclaim that Y has been right all the time because you indeed 
have lost weight and are healthier now than you were before.  
The point is not that you are healthier now but that Y should not have kicked you 
into the hospital in the first place. The declaration by the 80 former chief 
statisticians skips this perspective.  
27.2.3 Do not deny discretion 
The former chief statisticians must know that figures in national accounting have 
a range of “error” or rather discretion. The novelty of an independent position from 
the Greek Ministry of Finance holds not quite for Georgiou but rather for the board. 
Focusing on Georgiou’s role instead puts him in the spot for violation of duty and 
the subsequent issue that other figures might have been conceivable too. We can 
only presume that the El.Stat board would have needed an agreement with 
Eurostat too. If there had been an unresolved conflict then this could have been 
discussed in the European Council of Ministers, and might have resulted in 
abolition of the board anyhow, or not, depending upon the quality of the argument. 
27.2.4 80 Statisticians on calculation and publication 
The 80 former chief statisticians do not say so but implicitly suggest that 
calculating a statistical figure is tantamount to its publication. They suggest that a 
statistician would not be responsible for the effect of such publication as long as 
the figure is correct. Thus they skip discretion and stewardship in national 
accounting and its publication. We mentioned stewardship w.r.t. environmental 
statistics, see also Chapter 33 below, and we can now repeat it w.r.t. the Greek 
nation. Andreas Georgiou and his supporting world of official statistics did not 
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show adequate stewardship w.r.t. the publication of the revised data on the deficit 
and debt of 2009.  
27.3 Contemplating the effect of publication 
Chapter 20 already discussed that calculation and publication are different 
issues. Let us consider counterfactually how the El.Stat board in 2010 might have 
looked at publishing revised figures for deficit and debt, even though the board did 
not convene.  
Section 25.6 indicated the direct impact of the November 15 2010 press-release 
when the figure for the deficit of 2009 was raised from 13.6% to 15.4%. While the 
long rate of interest had dropped below 10% in October, it remained above 11% 
from November onwards, but only months later in the beginning of 2011 the 
financial markets reacted strongly, but it were policy actions that caused the steep 
rise in 2011-2012, see Figure 8 on page 117. With rising rates of interests and 
risks of default, banks were legally forced to write-off assets, spreading the 
problem across the EU. In November 2010, the financial markets hardly reacted to 
the Georgiou figures. (In itself, this is an important point.) This was quite different 
from Autumn 2009 that unleashed speculation on further economic collapse with a 
debt that could not be serviced. In Autumn 2009 the notion of “Greek statistics” 
became a symbol in the public’s mind that Greece was problematic indeed, with a 
fear for even more hidden debts. It is unlikely that Georgiou and his board had no 
idea in November 2010 about the potential impact of the upcoming publication. 
Georgiou (2009) had written about the kind of subject, and it is not convincing that 
he would have been fully unaware of the consequences.  
On the other hand, Georgiou had hardly tried to convince his board about his 
discussions with Eurostat, and some El.Stat board members were inclined to think 
that the 2009 Karamanlis figure of 6% for the deficit was the correct one. The 
(internet) discussion about “Greek statistics” gives a lot of noise about the impact 
of the actually published figures. There is the suggestion that if the deficit of 2009 
could be calculated as around 6% indeed, then the austerity of the Memorandum 
of May 2010 could be lifted. However, given the return of austerity in early 2010, it 
is unlikely that expansive policies were possible at the end of 2010 anyway, see 
Table 3. The point remains that the El.Stat board was not responsible for 
government policy, and was only responsible for getting correct figures, with 
stewardship on when and how to publish the findings. 
Table 3. Policies and underlying figures (given a Washington consensus) 
Washington consensus Expansive policies Austerity 
Georgiou – Eurostat figures Impossible  Logical response 
Board – Eurostat figures 
(counterfactual) 
Fata morgana Perhaps less austere 
 
Even though the El.Stat board obviously was not responsible for policy, it was 
their job to be aware of the economic circumstances in which they would present 
their publication. Thus, for us, it remains important to be aware of the economic 
conditions as those could be perceived by the El.Stat board at the time. Chapter 
18 discussed the macro-economic conditions.  
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27.4 Precedent and regime change 
Though we determined that the immediate effect of the announcement in 
November 2010 was modest, and that markets mainly reacted strongly to policy 
making in March 2011, the meaning of the November accouncement may also be 
seen as an announcement of a precedent and regime change. While Greek 
economic policy making had had much freedom it now was subjected to a stricter 
regime. For example, many state enterprises and their debts had been excluded in 
the 2009 Karamanlis figure and now were included in the 2009 Georgiou figure. 
Debts that had not been included in the financial position of the Greek state, now 
were shifted from the “market sector” to the “general government”, and created the 
policy issue how Greece could satisfy the Maastricht rules on deficit and debt. 
Chapter 30 discusses some of the accounting rules. 
27.5 A counterfactual tale 
Before Autumn 2009 and the Papandreou criticism of Karamanlis, EU officials 
and financial markets took Greek statistics with a grain of salt, and merely used 
the official figures for legal justifcation of their own bookkeeping, with rating 
agencies indicating the risks. The main policy objective on statistics was to make 
sure that the figures at least improved in quality. 
The Papandreou criticism of the 2009 Karamanlis deficit figure unleashed 
financial speculation in 2009, turning the financial crisis into the euro crisis. As part 
of the response, the EU and ECB wanted a regime change and new start in 2010 
with the creation of El.Stat and appointment of its board and director. 
Obviously, it could have been a headache for the board of El.Stat in November 
2010: (i) to determine the statistical figures of deficit and debt, either (i-a) still 
acceptable to Eurostat but closer to the earlier methods or (i-b) with the method 
used by Georgiou (and approved by Eurostat in close collaboration), and (ii) to 
communicate to the public what the figures represented. There again is the 
distinction between calculation and publication.  
We must presume that the El.Stat board would have taken account of the 
existing legislation and would have used scientific considerations. Within these 
assumptions, there is still room for discretion and for a counterfactual to what 
actually happened.  
Considerations for the board in 2010 might have been: 
• The El.Stat board would have been aware of the January 2010 EU report 362 
about Greek statistics and the reasons for the creation of El.Stat and their and 
Georgiou’s appointment.  
• The El.Stat board would have been aware of the regime change, and the 
potential impact on the financial markets. Perhaps they might have perceived 
that the announcement in November 2010 might not have much direct impact 
but they would have been aware of possible restrictions for policy making. 
• It may also be recalled that the rules of the EU, ECB and IMF are not 
sacrosanct. Education is accounted as an expenditure only, while many 
elements in education have aspects of investment in human capital. For 
                                                                
362 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_ 
report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a 
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persons it is accepted that they borrow for their education (and banks accept 
this too) but somehow this is not allowed for national budgets. Damages to the 
environment can cause forseeable costs in the future but are not included in 
the EU rules on debts.  
• There are more considerations for discretion, like the Pozen (2008) suggestion 
for US companies, cited above, to publish two figures, calculated on the two 
methodologies. 
• Overall, the board of El.Stat had more options to discuss the newly 
independent findings with the Greek government – and then provide options 
for the Greek government for discussion with the EU – and try to avoid the 
autocratic Georgiou shock therapy. 
What the board of El.Stat would have done is unknown of course. Georgiou 
might also have resigned as a whistleblower. It is also unknown whether Eurostat 
would have accepted figures for Greek deficits and debts that were clearly 
improving in quality but not the ones made by Georgiou and published now.  
Potentially Georgiou was too rigid and Eurostat merely doesn’t mind such rigidity 
and felt the need to support him as their man in Athens. But it seems that Eurostat 
did not really try to communicate with the board, and relied upon the director, also 
chairman of the board. The current annual acceptance by Eurostat of the Greek 
statistics need not be the most convincing argument per se, assuming some 
statistical error and discretion on convention. 
The point is and remains that the world of official statistics better acknowledges 
that there was a role for the El.Stat board, and that this role was sabotaged by 
Georgiou, in conflict with good statistical practice, also formulated by Eurostat 
itself, that in 2005 accepted a role for a board.  
Next to calculation there is publication. The supplementary point is that there is 
also stewardship in presenting statistics. Statisticians mainly have the attitude that 
“stewardship is to present the best quality data possible”, but in the 2010 situation, 
in the wake of the financial crisis and given the 2009 Papandreou / Karamanlis 
shock, the change from one regime to another apparently became a highly 
sensitive matter, and it appears to be too simple to think that one merely needs to 
make that regime switch overnight. While a government in 2010 must present a 
budget for 2011 without delay to gain approval by parliament to proceed with 
spending, perhaps there might be more leeway for delay by a statistical office in 
presenting the national accounts. 
• The board might have decided not to publish new figures compared to the 
13.6% deficit figure of the Spring and wait for a less sensitive moment. 
• If the board of El.Stat had not been convinced by Georgiou’s figures, rightly or 
wrongly, they still would have been in the position to document their 
judgement, and face criticism and defend them.  
• Georgiou and his board might have published two figures, see the Pozen 
(2009) suggestion mentioned above. 
• Georgiou and his board could have published provisional figures for deficit and 
debt with ranges of error. Eurostat had already indicated an error range of 
0.5% on the Spring figure of 13.6%, and the board might have opted to only 
ajdust that range. The financial markets might be shocked by the range of 
error like “at most 2%” but the message as such could fit with expectations. 
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Greek and EU policy makers could be informed behind closed doors about the 
meaning of the figures, and would get the message that more was needed for 
a reduction of deficit and debt. 363 
• Communication is sensitive. If El.Stat would say in 2010 that it was finally 
implementing the Eurostat accounting rules, with the objective of 
harmonisation within the next years, then it would imply that the former El.Stat 
director had not done so. This could only be implied if the 2010 board actually 
investigated what had happened in the years before. If Georgiou had 
convened the board more often, as required, the board could have discussed 
such aspects better, and potentially have decided that a calculation for 2009 
only made sense if there was more clarity on the years before.  
I am not saying what I would have done, for I wasn’t in their position. This is just 
a counterfactual tale. Just to be sure: I am not suggesting that the board of El.Stat 
should have cooked the books, 364 in order to avoid the Georgiou shock therapy. 
Perhaps national accountants can indicate the ranges for discretion, and perhaps 
simulation games can be played to discover the ranges of outcomes of what 
others would do. The responsibility remains with the board of El.Stat at that time 
(which Georgiou, Eurostat (Radermacher) and ISI (Snorrason) falsely deny, see 
Chapter 26).  
The counterfactual tale indicates stewardship which is wider, while the ISI 
support for Georgiou reduces it too easily into “just publish the figures according to 
the Eurostat rules”, without facing up to the issues of discretion w.r.t. those rules, 
the distinction between calculation and publication, and the issue of stewardship 
w.r.t. a publication. When there is a fire in a movie theatre then it may be unwise 
to just yell it. In a theatre it is relatively clear what to do: alert the staff, and the 
staff would have procedures. This case of a Greek regime change apparently is 
less clear-cut but this doesn’t eliminate stewardship. 
There should be an investigation by the world of science and learning. 
                                                                
363 As said, action would also be required by the creditor nations on their export surplusses, and 
the problem could be explained on content rather than by flagging an arbitrary number as if it 
exposed Greek irresponsibility and not German and Dutch export surplusses. 
364 For example, state enterprises that were included in the General Government because of the 
50% rule, might be asked by the Greek government to adjust their prices so that they became 
more profitable in 2011, and so that perhaps they might not have to be included for the whole 
period, when the deficits would be calculated for 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
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28. Fact checking within official statistics and at academia 
 
28.1 Introduction 
This chapter diagnoses inadequate fact checking within official statistics and at 
academia. The next chapter continues with their inferences that are based upon 
this inadequate fact checking.  
In quotations, my comments are within brackets, and my emphasis is in bold. 
28.2 A united world of official statistics 
Remarkable, Georgiou now receives support from: the International Statistical 
Institute (ISI), the Royal Statistical Society (RSS), the American Statistical 
Association (ASA), the International Association for Official Statistics (IAOS), the 
Federation of European National Statistical Societies (FENStatS), the Société 
Française de Statistique (SFdS), 365 all for this: 
“This Commendation was given to acknowledge Andreas Georgiou‘s 
upholding of the highest professional standards in his public service in 
the pursuit of integrity of statistical systems.” 
All this, while ISI has misquoted and misrepresented the 2005 code, and the 
other associations must not have checked ISI, because they would have found the 
2005 code. They all disregard other statisticians who were dismissed, some by 
Georgiou, potentially with an abuse of power, or the dismissal of the board itself.  
(There is another disappointment with the RSS, on Brexit, see Appendix 39.11.) 
28.3 Eighty former chief statisticians, revisited 2018 
This is discussed in Section 27.2 and Appendix 41.4. To summarise: At the 
International Association for Official Statistics (IAOS), there is a 2018 declaration 
by 80 (I did not check) former chief statisticians. 366 This declaration looks at 
falsification of the figures and not at the governance and the relation between the 
director and the board. The 80 statisticians should have checked the situation 
nevertheless and should not have neglected the most important aspect.  
28.4 A Peer Review glosses over a letter by an union of employees  
The 2015 Eurostat Peer Review of El.Stat has this statement on page 15: 367 
“A written submission to the Peer Review team by the Panhellenic 
Association of National Statistical Service of Greece Employees. Among 
other statements, the letter accuses the Troika of interference in the legal 
framework in contradiction of the principle of professional independence, 
                                                                
365 https://isi-
web.org/images/2018/Press%20release%20Commendation%20for%20Andreas%20Georgiou%2
0Aug%202018.pdf 
366 https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/221-80-former-chief-statisticians-condemn-
prosecution-of-andreas-georgiou 
367 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/64157/4372828/2015-EL-Report/488eadf4-da69-
40db-b48b-884c6ac4937c 
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and the President of El.Stat of being unable to inspire a ‘sense of 
independence and credibility’ due to his former role at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It also questions the integrity of Greek statistics, 
partly on the ground that the President is not subject to clear 
accountability. The Peer Review team was grateful for the written 
submission but does not find the main arguments persuasive. The tone 
and content of the submission point to tensions within El.Stat as a result 
of changes to the legal and administrative framework, and the severe 
pressures on resources, that have been evident in recent years. The 
Peer Review team noted these concerns.” 
Thus, you receive such a statement by El.Stat employees, and you decide that 
you do not find it “persuasive” and then drop it ? There isn’t any awareness that 
you, as Peer Review, should at least investigate what is happening, and reply on 
content ? Are you really an accountant, who merely records the figures given to 
him or her, and who hasn’t heard about forensic accountancy ? Are you really no 
statistical scientist, who checks what the reports are about ?  
PM. Likely the website of this association of El.Stat employees. 368 
28.5 Also academics fail to check upon the facts 
It is not only the world of official statistics and national accounting that fails to 
check upon the facts, but there are also RSS, ASA and IARIW and academics 
who sign the declarations. Appendix 40.2 looks at Dutch signatures, and it is 
fortunate that in 2020 Richard Gill, now emeritus professor of mathematical 
statistics in Leiden, and former president of the Dutch association VVS+OR, has 
changed his opinion.  
28.6 Other protests without the 2005 clause in the year 2017 
Other 2017 protests (copies) without the clause of the 2005 Code are at IARIW 
369 and GPAC El.Stat 2017. 370  
For the latter GPAC: Gerry O’Hanlon is the former director of the Irish statistics 
service CSO. O’Hanlon chaired the good practice advisory committee (GPAC) at 
El.Stat in 2013-14, and partook in the ISI misrepresentation of the 2005 Code, 371 
and in the crowdfunding action in support for Georgiou’s legal bill. 372 At some 
point a “disinterested outsider” becomes an “involved participant”. 
28.7 American Statistical Association 2017 
The American Statistical Association (ASA) uses the House of Mirrors on 
Georgiou’s error of 2010. They refer to ISI’s “documentation” but ISI has no 
investigation but only the tabulation by Snorrason and O’Hanlon, opinions and 
                                                                
368 https://syllogos1.wordpress.com/ 
369 http://iariw.org/Court_Andreas.pdf 
370 https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/1195539/GPAC_4th_Report_2017.pdf/63133c54-
37f4-478b-baab-116ce53239e4 
371 https://www.isi-
web.org/images/news/Court%20proceedings%20against%20Andreas%20%20Georgiou.pdf 
372 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-statistics-crowdfunding/embattled-greek-statistics-
chief-gets-crowdfunding-help-from-colleagues-idUSKCN0X41QM 
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photographs. 373 In an ASA press release of March 29 2017, Acting Chair of the 
ASA Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights Robin Mejia and ASA 
Executive Director Ron Wasserstein state: 374 375 376 
“Georgiou was appointed by the Greek parliament in 2010 to head El.Stat 
and bring about the production of reliable Greek statistics. After many 
years of understated deficit and debt figures reported by Greece, 
Georgiou recalculated official economic statistics according to European 
Union (EU) law. Statistics produced under his leadership were 
validated and published by Eurostat (the official statistics body of the 
EU in which Greece is a member) for five consecutive years. (...) Yet, in 
2013, Georgiou was accused of “undermining the national interest” and 
slapped with criminal charges for “false statements and complicity against 
the State” for allegedly inflating the Greek deficit and causing damages of 
171 billion euro to the Greek state. Although various judicial procedures 
have several times concluded the charges against Georgiou are 
baseless, the charges keep being revived. In addition, in December, he 
was acquitted of related misdemeanor charges for violation of duty, but 
that acquittal was reversed just 10 days later. He is now to be retried for 
the same alleged crimes and thus subjected to double jeopardy. 
(...) Other professional statistics organizations, including the International 
Statistical Institute, have documented that, since 2010, Greek statistics 
have passed all European quality checks. Georgiou is widely credited 
with producing the first round of reliable financial statistics in accordance 
with EU standards, breaking a tradition of many years of fraud. Key 
stakeholders have found these prosecutions to be “political in nature,” 
[prove this] particularly evident upon the repeated reopening of cases 
shortly after investigating prosecutors or judges recommended the 
charges be dropped.” 
Thus ASA in 2017:  
(i) downplays the by-passing of the El.Stat board (reason of the 2018 conviction) 
(ii) accuses Greece of fraud before 2010 (there is the EU report of January 2010 
but then statistics was at NSSG at the Ministry of Finance) and ambiguously 
suggests as if El.Stat did the fraud and Georgiou changed this, while the crux 
was the new independence of El.Stat, which rather applied to the board 
(iii) uses the argument “it is good for you when I kick you into a hospital”, see 
Section 27.2.2 
(iv) refers to documentation on quality checks at ISI that doesn’t exist (though 
Eurostat would have documentation, the point is that ISI doesn’t provide it) 
                                                                
373 https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/230-commendation-of-andreas-georgiou-at-
iaos-special-meeting 
374 https://www.amstat.org/asa/News/ASA-Expresses-Support-for-Ousted-Statistics-
Officials.aspx 
375 https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/pressreleases/2017-
ASAExpressesSupportforOustedStatisticsOfficials.pdf 
376 https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-ASALetterRegardingAndreasGeorgiou2017-03-
27.pdf 
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(v) refers to anonymous stakeholders who have (unproven) superior knowledge.  
This is unconvincing, and ASA better retracts. 
ASA supports the legal defense fund for Georgiou. 377 
28.8 Letter by Georganta and Logothetis to ASA 2017 
Members of ASA might think that such activities by the ASA leadership are the 
responsibility of the leadership itself, not pertaining to the member’s own horizons. 
However, bodies like the EU Parliament would tend to attach value to statements 
by the ASA leadership. Such statements by the ASA leadership are really done in 
their elected capacities as representatives of the membership body. Members are 
advised to keep their leadership accountable. 
Members of ASA are also advised to read the letter to them, dated October 27 
2017, by Zoe Georganta and Nikos Logothetis, in protest against the partiality by 
the ASA leadership. 378 Hopefully it was as widely circulated as the ASA 
accusation. The letter reached the ASA executive and their answer is short 
enough to reproduce here, 379 380 to show that ASA does not reply on content and 
that ASA slanders the messengers: 
 
From: Wasserstein, Ronald L., Sent: Sunday, December 3, 2017  
To: Zoe Georganta , Subject: your letter of October 27, 2017 
Dr. Georganta and Dr. Logothetis, 
Your letter of October 27, 2017, has been carefully reviewed by many people, 
including the members of the ASA Board of Directors. No evidence that you have 
presented or that we can find confirms your basic premise that "the Greek public 
debt and deficit burdens have been unjustifiably exaggerated, that they have 
actually been created, instead of describing the 2009 reality." Rather, the 
evidence confirms exactly the opposite. This and the many other troubling 
statements in your letter raise significant questions about the ethics and integrity 
of your allegations. 
Sincerely, 
Ronald L. Wasserstein 
Executive Director 
American Statistical Association 
Promoting the Practice and Profession of Statistics® 
 
(PM. ASA has turned its slogan into a registered phrase so that other people can 
no longer say that they promote the practice and profession of statistics without 
asking ASA for permission.) 
 
 
                                                                
377 https://community.amstat.org/communities/community-
home/digestviewer/viewthread?GroupId=2653&MessageKey=8da26535-5d12-4274-bacb-
2fe495effbc9 
378 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/About-ASAs-partiality.pdf 
379 https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-Email-Wasserstein-Georganta-120317.pdf 
380 http://klauskastner.blogspot.com/2017/12/El.Stat-andreas-georgiou-and-slap-in-face.html 
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29. An uproar in the world of statistics that not only neglects 
facts but also colleagues, whistleblowers and the 
separation of powers 
 
29.1 Introduction 
While the former chapter established that the world of official and academic 
statistics and national accounting did not adequately check the facts (importantly 
on the issue of governance and the 2005 Code of Practice, and on which 
Georgiou was guilty as charged), this chapter continues with the inferences made 
upon that inadequate fact-checking. This highlights the disregard of the colleagues 
and whistleblowers, and the disrespect of the separation of powers.  
29.2 The Trias Politica, and ASA’s disrespect of checks and balances 
The Trias Politica model of democracy has the checks and balances of the 
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches of government. They are 
independent but still in mutual interaction. Subsequently there is the independent 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the independent National Statistical Office, for 
Greece: El.Stat. 
There are at least two competing perspectives: 
• The ASA argument holds that the independence of El.Stat is breached upon, 
though ASA does not quite specify who is responsible for what, and only 
vaguely indicates that there would be “political” influence. ASA could present 
evidence to the Greek Jurdiciary but instead the letter is directed to the 
Executive, president Tsipras, and thus suggests that the Executive might 
infringe upon the Judiciary (and also El.Stat’s independence). 
• The Greek Executive and Judiciary actually can be observed to treat El.Stat 
as an independent office, though subject to the law. In this perspective it is the 
ASA letter that disrespects the independence of both Judiciary and El.Stat (by 
the request by ASA that the Greek Executive breaches the independence of 
the Greek Judiciary). 
The second perspective is the appropriate one. The first perspective, that ASA 
adopts, requires strong proof, and we indicated that this is lacking (wrong year of 
the Code, no check on the Greek law itself (Memorandum for IMF, advice ECB), 
confusion of statistics and national accounting, no check upon the malconduct of 
Snorrason, disregard of the colleagues and whistleblowers). 
29.3 Two sets of whistleblowers, and ASA’s disregard of one 2017 
The ASA letter performs the grand disappearing act of other whistleblowers 
apart from Andreas Georgiou. The case has actually two sets of whistleblowers: 
(i) Andreas Georgiou, director of El.Stat, who wanted to publish the “true deficit 
according to the Eurostat rules”, and who by-passed his board.  
(ii) Zoe Georganta and Nikos Logothetis, the most vocal members of the 2010 
El.Stat board, who protest against proceedings, who suggest that the deficit 
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would be different, who were neutralised by Georgiou (e.g. by not convening 
board meetings), and moved with political force out of El.Stat. Logothetis 
resigned early 2011 under pressure by minister of Finance Papakonstantinou, 
and Kerin Hope in 2011-09-30: 381 
“Under pressure from the European Commission, however, Evangelos 
Venizelos, finance minister, last week sacked the five remaining 
members of El.Stat’s board, leaving Mr Georgiou with full responsibility 
for running the agency on his own.” 
The two whistleblowers (and others) have provided evidence to the Greek 
Judiciary branch. The prosecutor in that branch decided independently that 
prosecution was in order. Claims as if this prosecution was motivated politically, 
have not been substantiated, and ASA only weakly refers to anonymous others 
who suggest such. 
Apparently other members of the 2010 El.Stat board keep silent. There is also, 
and I quote from the letter of October 27 2017 by Georganta and Logothetis: 
“Dr. Stroblos, the Director of the National Accounts Division in El.Stat up 
to the 10th of September 2010 and the most technically authentic senior 
National Accounts officer for years in El.Stat (see his CV 382), was 
immediately moved from his position by Mr. Georgiou as soon as in a 
closed meeting of the statistical Board he expressed his concerns about 
the fallibility of Mr. Georgiou’s debt and deficit numbers.” 
29.4 Econometrician Georganta (2011) appeals to scientific integrity 
National accountants and statisticians are also invited to read Georganta (2011), 
a paper in the academic record. Readers may be warned about a “Greek version 
of English” (e.g. “perpendicular axis” instead of “vertical axis”). Other weak points 
are an axis that has only 0 and no scale, and a wrong paragraph-cut at the end. 
Her paper appears to be a heroic attempt (i) to teach non-economists about 
national accounting, using arrow diagrams (“concept mapping”), and (ii) to capture 
the problem at El.Stat at the same time, and (iii) to present this in a European 
perspective. Somewhere along the way she loses too many of her readers (as we 
can observe given the lack of international acclaim). I myself am in no position to 
check its data. Still, the abstract fits the attitude of a professor in econometrics: 
“Statistical data plays such a vital role in policy-making in all fields of 
human activity that its quality and reliability is a matter of human well-
being. Within today’s severe and unprecedented recession into which 
Greece seems steadily sinking, accuracy of national statistics has 
become as decisive for her survival as ever before. Our country’s 
potential to rise above the present situation for the good of Greece’s and 
eurozone citizens depends heavily on truthfully putting our statistics „in 
order‟, something which is not currently happening. Fiscal and financial 
statistics may in general offer the greatest example of the principle 
„garbage in, garbage out‟. The issue is that users cannot usually assess 
                                                                
381 https://www.ft.com/content/deeaea88-eb81-11e0-a576-00144feab49a 
382 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CV-Nicholas-Stroblos.pdf 
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the presence of garbage simply by reading the press releases, while at 
the same time they are suffering from the deleterious effects of the 
wrong-data. This paper uses extensively the concept-mapping approach 
to investigate basic reliability issues of Greece’s fiscal and financial 
statistics. The statistical location of the deficit and debt items is sketched 
out within the European System of Accounts and five data reliability 
issues are identified. The paper is concluded with proposals on two 
fundamental reforms required to enable Greek statistics to serve the 
public good.” 
29.5 Disrespect of the separation of powers 2015 
In the 2015 Eurostat Peer-Review of El.Stat, the reviewers state (p14), 383 and 
thereby suggest as if statistics would be above the law, and as if the Executive 
and Legislative branches of government should meddle with the Judiciary: 
“El.Stat management has identified the court proceedings as a major 
area of weakness with regard to managers maintaining professional 
independence over the long term. The prolonged nature of the 
proceedings will inevitably distract El.Stat managers from the 
implementation of the CoP. Moreover, as long as the court proceeding 
continue, El.Stat’s professional reputation remains at risk. GPAC 
noted the ‘virtual silence’ of the Government and Parliamentary leaders 
on the proceedings despite the frequent political comments on the matter 
and observed that this ‘appears to be at variance with’ the commitment 
in the CoC [Commitment on Confidence on statistics] to guarantee and 
defend the professional independence of the ELSS [Hellenic Statistical 
System], and to promote it to the public through appropriate 
communication actions.” 
29.6 No impartiality at the Royal Statistical Society 2017 
Journalist Robert Langkjær-Bain (2017) in “Trials of a statistician”, RSS 
Significance magazine, interviews Georgiou but completely forgets that there are 
other statisticians, some dismissed by Georgiou. On page 19, he nobly quotes: 
“Georgiou’s advice is to “stick to your principles and to the rules at all 
times. Never compromise. If you compromise in anything, you will not feel 
well with yourself, and it will create a liability that will come back to haunt 
you. ”Finally, Bevacqua says statisticians must “report any abnormalities 
that you notice as soon as possible, both within and outside country 
borders. Silence is the worst enemy.”” 
Well, members of the El.Stat board Logothetis and Georganta have reported 
such irregularities in this manner, and suddently the world of official statistics sees 
this as persecution. Something is quite unbalanced if not hypocritical here. 
The RSS also had a related problem on its (now former) executive director 
Hetan Shah who did not have a background in statistics but still acted as if, see 
Section 39.11 w.r.t. the 2016 Brexit Referendum Question. 
                                                                
383 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/64157/4372828/2015-EL-Report/488eadf4-da69-
40db-b48b-884c6ac4937c 
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29.7 Dutch statisticians who signed the Georgiou petitions 2013 2018 
Since this book obviously takes the Dutch context as a wetting stone for 
international issues – referring to the 1892-1899 genesis of CCS and CBS 
Statistics Netherlands, Dutch economics and the CBS treatment of the Tinbergen 
& Hueting approach – it may also be useful to check who in Holland signed the 
Georgiou petitions, and thus failed (i) to check upon the Greek law, or take note 
that EU and IMF wanted this law changed, (ii) to check upon the proper year of the 
ESS Code of Practice, (iii) to pay attention to the statistical colleagues and board 
members who were dismissed. See Appendices 40.2 and 41.4 
29.8 Tim Harford in the Financial Times 2013 
Tim Harford may have deeply studied the case and have fine sources, but the 
article that he writes as the “undercover economist” in the Financial Times, “Lies, 
damned lies, and Greek statistics”, 2013-01-25, comes across as an uncritical, 
fact-free and guess-gossip discussion that expresses a view on statistics, but that 
does not quite distinguish between national accounting and statistics, even though 
Walter Radermacher takes issue with the ASA point of view that statistics reflect 
“reality”, while an accountant only applies accounting rules: 384 
“[Georgiou] seems to have been embroiled in full-contact office politics. 
One of the people accusing him, Zoe Georganta, was an El.Stat board 
member who was sacked (along with most of the board) in 2011. 
Another, Nikos Logothetis, was accused by Mr Georgiou of hacking his 
email and has been criminally investigated. El.Stat’s union has weighed 
in against Mr Georgiou, too. As to the merits of these accusations, 
your guess is as good as mine.”  
“Statistical judgments are just that: judgments. There is right and wrong in 
statistical practice, but typically there are also shades of grey. Walter 
Radermacher, Eurostat’s boss, told The New York Times that “the truth 
is not my business . . . statistics [this should be: national accounting] is 
about measuring against convention”. He has a point. (...) But the truth 
is that governments will often prefer statistical obfuscation as a way of 
achieving their goals indirectly, and statisticians will find themselves in 
political debates with no unambiguous, correct answer.” 
29.9 EU Commissioner holds statistics to be above the law 2017 
In the Financial Times August 3 2017: 385 
QUOTE 
“In remarks on Twitter that reflect deep unease in Brussels at Mr 
Georgiou’s conviction, Valdis Dombrovskis, European Commission vice-
president, said he was following developments with concern. It was 
“important that independence of Elstat and people who do their jobs are 
protected in line with the law”, said Mr Dombrovskis, who has 
responsibility for euro affairs. 
                                                                
384 https://www.ft.com/content/fc5e295a-663b-11e2-b967-00144feab49a 
385 https://www.ft.com/content/3d213384-77b1-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691 
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Speaking to the Financial Times, Mr Dombrovskis said the independence 
of national statistics offices was a “key pillar of the proper functioning” of 
the euro and “one of the main elements forming the trust amongst euro 
area member states”. 
“This is why it is protected in EU law. This is why it cannot be 
challenged.” 
UNQUOTE 
The FT also denigrates a prosecutor as “junior” and two board members as 
“sacked” persons: 
“The affair dates back to 2011 when a junior financial prosecutor ordered 
an inquiry into whether Mr Georgiou had been working against Greek 
interests. Separate cases were later filed by two sacked Elstat board 
members and a senior Elstat employee.” 
29.10 Nicolas Véron 2018 
Nicolas Véron (2018) 386 has a link to the 2017 Code, thus not the relevant 2005 
Code. Based upon this wrong footing, he suggests that Greek politicians can 
violate the separation of powers or that statisticians would be above the law:  
“This is not about any ambiguous grey area but entirely and simply about 
the integrity of statistics and the independence of statistical authorities. 
The EU system is failing the most basic test of its ability to withstand 
political pressure.” 
Based upon this lack of fact checking, Véron wants to violate the 2017 Code, 
and put pressure upon the Greek government to break down the separation of 
powers between Executive and Judiciary branches, and neglect the rule of law 
w.r.t. statistics and the proper execution of the 2005 Code:  
“The European Parliament could also do more, for example, by calling Mr 
Georgiou’s Greek tormentors to testify and possibly by blocking EU 
financing to Greece as long as the case is not resolved satisfactorily.” 
29.11 Collective paranoia or collection of paranoids (advice to retract) 
Though apparently with a relevant background in national accounting and 
statistics, both Logothetis and Georganta unfortunately in 2020 do not present an 
ideal argument that convinces by itself, because (today) they make erroneous or 
dubious statements about other issues and their personal views on the context 
that do not directly pertain to the case.  
In interviews, Georganta 387 (Appendix 43 below) and Logothetis 388 (Appendix 
44 below) make various errors about context though not necessarily in their field of 
expertise, see my deconstruction there.  
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387 https://www.mintpressnews.com/whistleblower-greek-debt-crisis-manufactured-unscrupulous-
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388 https://dialogosmedia.org/transcript-interview-with-whistleblower-nikos-logothetis-on-El.Stat-
scandal/ 
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I advise these whistleblowers to retract these interviews. They are participants / 
witnesses in the El.Stat case, and their credibility on that particular issue is tainted 
when they make errors on other issues.  
It is also known that whistleblowers can be subject to severe stress, 389 that may 
affect judgement, and, as said, society must find ways to create clarity whether 
whistleblowers are right or wrong in the original case also when they later 
succomb or not to such stress. 
Logothetis (nowadays) appears to think that there was a conspiracy against 
Greece, and Georganta (nowadays) protests against German companies bribing 
Greek politicians, and she accuses Germany to seek dominance over Europe, 
while Germany in fact has surrendered its currency to a weaker position in the 
ECB. While this taints their position as witnesses and whistleblowers, it must be 
kept in mind that it does not necessarily affect their professional positions in their 
field of expertise, in particular in 2010. In that respect, it is more troubling that 
Georganta (2011) presents an axis with only a 0 and no scale, but one might also 
suppose that the article was written under some duress and that the peer-
reviewers should have checked this.  
Overall, there is the House of Mirrors identified in Section 25.9. There appears to 
be quite some paranoia in the Greek media about maltreatment by major 
European countries and financial agencies, though of course I cannot present 
evidence that there is no conspiracy and I cannot say “what Germany really is up 
to”. This toxic situation in the Greek mind or media (that sells newspapers) of 
course doesn’t help these two whistleblowers to maintain a more sober check 
upon what they think or say in such interviews. It is a sorry state of affairs, 
compare the sorry state in the UK media about Brexit, or the notion about 
democracy in the USA, UK or France, or, in the world about population growth. 
Nevertheless, it would be too simple to hold that the El.Stat board in 2010 has 
been dysfunctional, and that issues of professional competence and integrity 
would not apply to these two whistleblowers too. Thus, please check their errors 
on context but keep this caveat in mind too. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
389 https://whistleblower.org/our-story-2/ 
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30. More on what actually happened on the deficit figures 
 
30.1 Tentative 
The following is quite tentative. I only know national debt and defict concepts 
from economic modeling using rather simple equations. I am no national 
accountant with experience of determination of the figures using government 
records. Still, it remains useful to apply our critical faculties at what transpires from 
the discussion in papers and reports. 390 
30.2 Eurostat’s report November 2010 
Though this report is not dated, it must come from the second part of November 
2010: 391 
“On 15 November 2010, following extensive work carried out by EL.STAT 
staff in cooperation with other Greek public authorities to implement the 
results of the EDP methodological visits in 2010, Eurostat published 
Greek fiscal data for 2006-2009 without reservation. [392] This publication 
was accompanied by an information note [...] on the activities and 
sources of revision of data between April 2010 and October 2010. This 
report is intended to provide a more complete background to the work 
undertaken.” 
30.3 Entry in the Eurozone 
It was the EU who accepted that Greece joined the Eurozone in 2000, based 
upon a convergence report by the ECB under its president Wim Duisenberg, that 
Greece’s deficit in 1999 was below 3%.393 EC president Prodi, who later 
expressed doubt about the usefulness of the Eurozone criteria, gave a resounding 
welcome. 394 One can still imagine that policy makers in 2000 had the idea that it 
would be more important to give Greece the benefit of the doubt, and secure a 
position of the euro within this NATO country, than focus on reasons for doubt. At 
least, that seemed to be the implication of his position of the Dutch minister of 
Finance, Gerrit Zalm, in a criticial discussion in Dutch parliament, see Chapter 34. 
It seems that there was no role for Eurostat here. In 2004 Eurostat determined 
that the 1999 deficit actually would be 3.4%. 
The Kostas Simitis government used a swap in 2001, 395 396 thus after entry into 
the Eurozone, and not to enter it. Jointly with Yannis Stournaras, Simitis in 2012 
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defends himself also against such an accusation. 397 There still might have been a 
political consideration to have the deficit look well, so shortly after entering the 
Eurozone, and with the new circulation of banknotes and coins in 2002. 
The NY Times in 2010 pointed to bankers offering financial deals. 398 399 400 
““Politicians want to pass the ball forward, and if a banker can show them 
a way to pass a problem to the future, they will fall for it,” said Gikas A. 
Hardouvelis, an economist and former government official who helped 
write a recent report on Greece’s accounting policies.” 
30.4 Issues of accounting and discretion 
PM 1. It might also be relevant to remark here that ESA95 distinguishes (i) 
“normal” government debt at “market prices” 401 (assuming that there is a market) 
and (ii) the debt according to the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP) at nominal 
value (face value). 402 See marking to market in Section 20.3. 
PM 2. ESA95 has different editions. The above edition was of 2002, that also 
states: “The stock of government debt under ESA95 (at marketvalue)”. The 
ESA95 edition 2010 states on p305: “The stock of government debt under ESA95 
(at marketvalue, where applicable)”. 403 The latter causes Georganta (2011:213) 
404 to infer: 
“As explained, also in subsection 2.2, there is no specific definition of GG 
[General Government] debt in ESA95. The only definition provided in 
ESA95 is that the stock of government debt equals the sum of all 
liabilities of the GG sector at market values with the additional note 
“where applicable” (ESA95, 2010 edition). Consequently, the accurate 
delineation of GG, which is a condition sine qua non for a reliable 
calculation of debt, is considerably left with the National Statistics 
Authority to decide.” 
30.5 The crucial year 2009 when the financial crisis became an euro-crisis 
For our introduction, Xafa (2019a): 
“[Eurostat] noted that the deficit estimates reported by the Greek 
authorities had been subject to unusually large revisions: on October 2, 
2009, the outgoing New Democracy government had revised its estimate 
of the 2009 deficit from 3.7% of GDP (the figure notified in April 2009) to 
6.0% of GDP. The incoming PASOK government further revised this 
estimate to 12.5% of GDP on October 21, 2009, based on Bank of 
                                                                
397 https://www.theguardian.com/global/2012/apr/26/greece-europe-north-south-divide 
398 https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business/global/14debt.html 
399 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gikas_Hardouvelis 
400 http://hardouvelis.gr/ 
401 p197: “the stock of government liabilities should be recorded in the national accounts at their 
market value at the end of the accounting period, in the closing balance sheet of the general 
government sector” 
402 “p198: “Debt means total gross debt at nominal valueoutstanding at the end of the year and 
consolidated between and within the sectors of general government.” 
403 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-RA-09-017 
404 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Greek-fiscal-and-financial-data.pdf 
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Greece estimates that the cash deficit amounted to 10% of GDP in the 
first nine months of the year and would reach 12–13% by year-end. The 
actual 2009 deficit figure, estimated at 13.6% of GDP, was first published 
by the statistics office in April 2010 and transmitted to Eurostat in the 
context of the semi-annual Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
notification.” 
“The European Parliament subsequently concluded that Greece’s deep 
crisis ‘was also due to statistical fraud in the years preceding the setting-
up of the program’ and welcomed ‘the decisive action by the Greek 
government to urgently and effectively address these problems, including 
by establishing the independent Hellenic Statistical Authority in March 
2010’ (European Parliament 2014).” 
This particular report by the European Parliament is here. 405 
It indeed expresses the opinion by the two committees that there was “statistical 
fraud”. A substantiation would be found in the European Commission (2010) 
report, and the relevant phrase is “deliberate misreporting”. 406 As far as I can see, 
it seems that there have been no legal actions against actual fraud. Potentially 
there is a distinction between “fraud” and “statistical fraud” ?  
Note, though, that Statistics Greece was subordinate to the Ministry of Finance 
before, and that El.Stat was created in March 2010. Earlier “statistical fraud” might 
rather be “political fraud”. 
Obviously there has been a history of irregularities, see this Eurostat (2004) 
report too 407 and some wikipedia pages (no source but a portal). 408 409 Rauch et 
al. (2011, 2019) 410 use the Newcomb – Benford law to discern irregularities. 
With the Greek deficit reported as 13.6%, Eurostat stated itself in April 2010: 411 
“Greece: Eurostat is expressing a reservation on the quality of the data 
reported by Greece, due to uncertainties on the surplus of social security 
funds for 2009, on the classification of some public entities and on the 
recording of off-market swaps. Following completion of the investigations 
that Eurostat is undertaking on these issues in cooperation with the 
Greek Statistical Authorities, this could lead to a revision for the year 
2009 of the order of 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points of GDP for the deficit 
and 5 to 7 percentage points of GDP for the debt.” 
Xafa (2019a) (my comment): 
                                                                
405 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-
0149+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
406 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/ 
c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a 
407 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/GREECE 
408 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_Financial_Audit,_2004 
409 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_financial_audits,_2009%E2%80%9310 
410 https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ger.2011.12.issue-3/j.1468-0475.2011.00542.x/j.1468-
0475.2011.00542.x.xml 
411 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5046142/2-22042010-BP-
EN.PDF/0ff48307-d545-4fd6-8281-a621cbda385d?version=1.0 
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“After considerable work to ensure data quality and to allow Eurostat to 
carry out a further methodological visit to check and validate Greece’s 
statistics, on November 9, 2010 Mr. Georgiou transmitted to Eurostat 
annual public finance statistics for 2006–9 [to be published]. The 2009 
deficit, which had been estimated at 13.6% of GDP in the April 2010 EDP 
notification, was further revised to 15.4% of GDP. The 2006–9 figures 
were published by Eurostat without reservations in contrast to what had 
usually occurred in previous years, [ftnt] as were all nine subsequent 
notifications by Mr. Georgiou during his five-year tenure.” 
“One of the adjustments Mr. Georgiou made to bring the deficit and debt 
figures into compliance with Eurostat’s methodology was to include 17 
public enterprises and entities within the definition of the general 
government. Under EU rules, state enterprises are classified as 
government entities if revenues from sales cover less than half their 
costs. In Greece 17 such entities failed the 50% rule and were included in 
the deficit. Correction of inappropriate recording decisions in a number of 
other areas also contributed to revising the deficit upwards by 1.8% of 
GDP, from 13.6% to 15.4% of GDP.” 
30.6 Classification of “state enterprises” as “general government” 
The above refers to the ESA95, page 9, rule 1.3. 412 Eurostat reports are here. 
413 The General Government = Central Government + States / Provinces + 
Municipalities + Social Security. We can also account General Government = 
Administration + State Enterprises. The “methodology” of 2010 has the Greek list 
of state enterprises a.k.a. public corporations. 414 State Enterprises are exempt 
from the euro rule that Debt ≤ 60% GDP (not to be used as an escape route). 
30.6.1 Various editions of ESA95 
ESA95 edition 2002 415 p9 point 1.3 has this arbitrary rule about accounting for 
state enterprises: 
“In other cases, it is necessary in deciding the sector to which the public 
institutional unit should be allocated to check if this unit is market or non-
market: in other words, are more than 50% of production costs covered 
by sales, or not?” 
Thus we can distinguish: 
• Potentially the only statistical fact (reality) for a particular unit concerns the 
ground material on the actual proportion of covered costs.  
• The classification of the unit as market or non-market is not statistics but a 
matter of accountancy (convention). 
                                                                
412 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5860213/KS-42-02-585-
EN.PDF/34346b49-bc38-4063-a423-74590fdaf8bd 
413 https://www.statistics.gr/en/eurostat-reports 
414 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/3991231/Greece-2010-methodological-
visits-report.pdf 
415 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-42-02-585 (edition 
2002) 
 199 
One cannot seriously argue that the market or non-market position of a unit is 
really determined by such covering of costs. Many people might hold that a unit 
that covers costs by 60% sales and 40% state subsidies could hardly be called a 
(viable) market enterprise, as ESA95 would catalogue it.  
Also, subsidies for public transport might be used to reduce congestion and 
improve the environment, and such subsidies might also be seen as sales, in 
which the government pays part for each customer.  
However, even while the accounting rule is arbitrary, it still can be applied. We 
may accept as a statement of fact (and not as something desirable in itself) that 
national accountants at a National Statistical Office must apply such arbitrary 
rules, but we – and they themselves too – should rather not think (as ASA does) 
that the outcome of all such calculations reflects some (statistical) “reality”.  
Personally, I find the 2002 EU rule rather peculiar, and the 50% criterion quite 
arbitrary, and perhaps Eurostat thought so too, when it introduced modifications.  
PM. ESA95 edition 2010 416 p14 has a more complicated discussion of public 
enterprises, and is not relevant for the present example. ESA 2010 was published 
in 2013. 417 418 
The relevant ESA95 manual for 2010 is here, 419 and the discussion of public 
enterprises starts quite early at page 25.  
Potentially El.Stat in the years since joining the euro in 2000 might have some 
considerations that the Eurostat rule did not make sense in the Greek situation, 
and that the problem was with Eurostat and not with El.Stat. When Greece joined 
the euro, it had to implement such rules though. A new El.Stat board in 2010 that 
was subject to a regime change in accounting might have considered that the 
government should be informed about the accountancy regime switch, and of the 
conquences of Eurostat’s accounting, so that the Greek government might change 
aspects of the public enterprises (e.g. the governance) and avoid 
misunderstandings in the financial markets. This is just conjectural. 
30.6.2 Malkoutzis & Mouzakis 2013 – macro-economic considerations 
Zoe Georganta, El.Stat board member in 2010 and professor in econometrics at 
the university of Macedonia, sees a larger adjustment. Malkoutzis & Mouzakis 
(2013) state 420 (referring to the later adjustment of 15.4% to 15.6% 421):  
“Georganta argues that Georgiou's main offense was to incorporate 17 
public enterprises (known as DEKOs in Greece) into the general 
government budget, thereby inflating the 2009 deficit by 18.2 billion 
euros. She claims that Greece’s deficit for that year should have been 
just under 4 percent of GDP, rather than the final figure of 15.6 percent, 
which came about after several revisions.” 
                                                                
416 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-RA-09-017 (2010) 
417 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/esa-2010 
418 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-GQ-14-002 
419 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-42-02-585 
420 http://www.ekathimerini.com/148007/article/ekathimerini/comment/an-issue-of-statistical-
significance-in-greece 
421 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5171846/2-22042013-AP-
EN.PDF/bb7ad61c-6f17-4a86-8f13-4747a2b6c2ed 
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These authors do not look at the particular calculations but provide a more 
general review of the macro-economic conditions that allow them to infer, quite 
reasonably, that the deficit indeed was closer to 15% rather than to 4%. 
30.6.3 Marcus Walker 2017 – Georganta’s mistaken assumption 
Marcus Walker in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) of February 6 2017 indicates 
that the inclusion of the state enterprises need not quite increase the deficit. 422  
It will be useful to discuss this with the basic accounting formula also used by 
Georganta (2012a). 423 For data, she uses the notification table of April 18 2012. 
424 425 Unfortunately, these data do not specify the debts of the state enterprises, 
so that Georganta and we cannot check how those have been accounted for.  
In reconstruction, Georganta apparently assumes that the debt figure for 2008 of 
EUR 263.284 bn excludes the state enterprises (as had been usual in Greece) 
and that the debt figure for 2009 of EUR 299.685 includes the debt of the state 
enterprises (the change by Georgiou). Subsequently, she corrects the debt of 
2009 by subtracting the 2009 debt of the state enterprises. However, Walker alerts 
her and us that El.Stat / Georgiou had adjusted the whole series (up to some year 
in the past). Thus the elimination of the debt of the state enterprises should apply 
to the whole series, and in particular also 2008, which Georganta did not do.  
 Let D[t] be the deficit in year t, and let SFA[t] be a stock-flow adjustment, 
Eurostat: “conceptually, the stock-flow adjustment can be distinguished into the 
following constituent elements: net acquisition of financial assets, debt adjustment 
effects and statistical discrepancies”.  
Let General Government (G) = Administration (A) + State Enterprises (SE). The 
accounting relations are: 
  DebtI[t] = DebtI[t – 1] + SFAI[t] + DI[t]  for sectors I = A, SE and sum G 
  xG = xA + xSE       for variables x = Debt, SFA, D 
Georganta presents the first formula and then continues working with figures. 
She finds the debt of the administration (A) in 2009 by taking the General 
Goverment debt and subtracting the debt of the state enterprises: 
  DebtA[2009] = DebtG[2009] – DebtSE[2009] correct 
Subsequently, assuming that Administration SFA is zero, she intends to do the 
following, which requires the correct figure for the Administration debt of 2008. 
  DA[2009] = DebtA[2009] – DebtA[2008]  correct, using SFA = 0 
Apparently she assumes that Georgiou only corrected 2009, so that the figure 
listed as DebtG[2008] = EUR 263.284 bn would be this DebtA[2008]. This gives:  
                                                                
422 https://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2017/02/06/was-greeces-deficit-inflated/ 
423 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Greek-Deficit-Revisited.pdf 
424 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2031189/EL-2012-04.pdf 
425 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/excessive-deficit-
procedure/edp-notification-tables/edp-
archives?p_p_id=2_WAR_kaleodesignerportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0 
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  “D”A[2009] = DebtA[2009] – DebtG[2008]  giving an outcome like 4% 
In the earlier Greek notification tables, 426 at the latest in April 2010, the General 
Goverment debt indeed excluded these state enterprises, and thus indeed gave 
the G = A debt, at EUR 237.252 bn.  
However, El.Stat revised this figure for 2008 too, adding some EUR 24.144 bn in 
November 2010, updated to EUR 26.032 bn in April 2012. 
Walker correctly states that Georganta now compares apples and oranges. 
Since the whole series has been revised, the correction for state enterprises must 
also be done for 2008. Perhaps Walker was aware of Georganta’s assumption 
and then might have noticed this himself. Perhaps he had been alerted by national 
accountants that El.Stat had adjusted the whole series. Perhaps Walker simply 
took the 2012 notication at face value, and saw that Georganta made a wrong 
assumption. Thus we get: 
  DA[2009] = DebtA[2009] – DebtA[2008]  correct, using SFA = 0 
     = (DebtG[2009] – DebtSE[2009]) – (DebtG[2008] – DebtSE[2008]) 
In his calculation, Walker assumes that the debts of the state enterprises would 
be similar, i.e. DebtSE[2009] = 18.214 bn EUR ≈ DebtSE[2008], and then they 
cancel. The Administration deficit subsequently appears to the accumulation of 
debt in the General Government, still at 15.4%.  
Georganta assumes that we can do the same for swaps and hospital bills, 
except that those have no specific “sector”, see “other” in Table 4. The 
counterfactual El.Stat board might now consider the outcome of 14.9%, though 
see the actual correction for swaps and hospital bills below: 
  DA[2009] = (299.685 – 28) – (263.284 – 26.032) ≈  34.4 or 14.9% 
 
Table 4. If 2008 was treated as 2009, via method MW / ZG 
bn EUR Debt  Deficit % GDP 
 2008 2009 2009 2009 
SE + other 26.032 28.000     
A – other  237.252 271.685 34.433 14.9% 
G 263.284 299.685   
 
Walker: “Ms. Georganta didn’t reply to questions about her sums.”  
We can only imagine that Georganta must be very happy that finally someone 
looked critically at her calculation and discovered the mistaken assumption and 
resolved the enigma that has been so upsetting for her since the 2012 paper (and 
earlier). When she did not reply to Walker then something else might be at play. 
Some points to consider: 
                                                                
426 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/excessive-deficit-
procedure/edp-notification-tables/edp-
archives?p_p_id=2_WAR_kaleodesignerportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0 
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• It is remarkable that apparently no-one before Walker in 2017 reacted to 
Georganta (2012a) to point out that El.Stat had adjusted the whole series, 
even though this discussion abounds with national accountants and financial 
journalists. This should have been spotted shortly after she presented her 
paper, and then much needless discussion could have been prevented. PM. 
The Reinhart – Rogoff spreadsheet error seems more involved. 427 
• The presentation by Walker 2017 and Xafa (2019a) is rather unkind, 
because they write as if Georganta is a simpleton who doesn’t know that you 
must correct the whole series: but Georganta must have focused on the idea 
that it was Georgiou who had adapted only the figure of 2009. One is hard 
put to assume that Georganta knew that the whole series had been adapted 
and still did not reverse the adaptation for the full series.  
• In other words: Walker in 2017 does not fully explain the situation. He does 
not state clearly what mistaken assumption she actually made. As an effort 
at communication this still wasn’t complete.  
• There is a point that eludes not only Georganta but also Walker, and also 
Xafa (2019a) who copies Walker’s criticism without reference to him, see 
Section 31.2.1. Georganta knew that the swap loss of EUR 21 bn was 
distributed over four years in roughly equal proportions. The adustment 
cumulated over four years starting in 2006 and ending in 2009 with said total 
value. Thus, this part of her mind knew that the whole series was being 
adapted. Her focus on 2009 and fast result of 4% apparently stopped her 
from working through all equations. Walker and Xafa, with their awareness 
of the mistaken assumption, should not have stopped there, and should 
have used the whole set of equations for the whole series. The unkind 
criticism that they levied on Georganta now backfires on themselves. 
Walker has some small corrections but let us first use the methological report of 
footnote 391 on p195.  
(1) For the unpaid bills by suppliers to hospitals, the methodological report states 
on p20 that payables within the first 90 days are distinguished from arrears, 
and that the first affect the deficit, but are not included in the debt. Walker 
agrees: “Unpaid hospital bills are not counted in government debt”. But what 
about arrears ? At the IMF, Cristina Checherita-Westphal, Alexander Klemm, 
and Paul Viefers (2015) 428 clarify for our purposes: “Whether debt turns out to 
be lower, depends on whether trade credit and arrears are counted as 
government debt. Under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) definition, this 
is not the case”. See also their footnote 3 for the difference with the SNA. 
Thus, we would presume that the hospital arrears have not been included. 
However, the European Commission (2010), 429 that established the 
“deliberate misreporting”, states that it was the Ministry of Finance of Greece 
itself that included the arrears as debt.  
                                                                
427 https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22223190 
428 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/edce/46b7ab16757c966d0ed80791fcbf3010160c.pdf 
429 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/ 
c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a 
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The “Truth Commission” 430 and Coronakis 431 refer to a Greek Government 
“Technical Report on the Revision of hospital Liabilities (3/2/2010)” that 
apparently is not online, and they claim that Eurostat gave in to Greece and 
included these arrears in April 2010 (though it is unclear whether the 
commission bases this upon Georganta). Marcus Walker accepts the hospital 
figures of EUR 3.9 bn in 2008 and EUR 4.5 bn in 2009. Thus, we best correct 
all figures that were reported starting already in April 2010. 
(2) The values of the swaps are on page 19 of the methodological report. These 
must be deducted from values after April 2010. Note that the swaps cumulate 
(like the arrear bills to the hospitals), so that by 2009 the total of EUR 21 bn is 
included in the total debt. 
Table 5. Deduction of swaps per year and cumulative 
EUR bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum 
Per year 5.1255 5.1255 5.4000 5.2817 20.9327 
Cumulated 5.1255 10.2510 15.6510 20.9327  
 
These details give Table 6 with the relevant row j. Thus while Walker suggests 
that Georganta’s corrections still leave the same deficit at 15.4%, the proper 
accounting of her objections on content causes a 2009 deficit of 13%. 
Table 6. If 2008 was treated as 2009, proper accounting of claims 
EDP corr.  Debt Debt SFA Deficit % GDP GDP 
  2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 
a Hospital 3.900 4.500     
b Swap yr 5.400 5.282     
c Swp cum 15.651 20.933     
d G.Apr10 237.252 273.407 3.813 32.342 13.6% 237.494 
e = d – a  G.A10-cor 233.352 268.907 3.813 31.742 13.4%  
f G.Nov10 261.396 298.032 0.486 36.150 15.4% 235.035 
g G.Apr12 263.284 299.685 0.298 36.103 15.6% 231.642 
h SE 18.000 18.214     
i = g – h  A 245.284 281.471 0.298 35.889 15.5%  
j = i – a – c A corr. 225.733 256.038 0.298 30.007 13.0%  
k = f – d  Dif A-N10 24.144 24.625     
l = g – d  Dif 12-10 26.032 26.278     
m = g – j  Dif 12-cor 37.551 43.647     
 
In this accounting, the arrears in hospital bills and swaps still hang in limbo 
somewhere, to the amount of EUR 25.433 bn. One would require sound reasoning 
in accounting to prevent that this becomes creative accounting. 
                                                                
430 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IEDebt/impactassessments/ 
Preliminary_Report_Greek_Debt_EN.pdf 
431 https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eurostat%E2%80%99s-crafty-ways-collaboration-governmental-
officials-swell-greece%E2%80%99s-public-deficit/ 
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30.7 Criticism by Logothetis on treatment in 2010 of swaps of 2001  
In an interview in 2017, see Appendix 44, Nikos Logothetis, the vice-president 
of the El.Stat board in 2010, identifies his first clash with his president Georgiou, 
and wrongly states that the swap had been used to enter the Eurozone: 432 
“My first disagreement with him was when I realized he would add on the 
deficit figures and on the national debt of Greece the Simitis swaps, that 
is, the swaps that Simitis had made use of in 2001 in order for Greece to 
get accepted to the Eurozone.” 
The situation for us in January 2020 is complicated by curious statements in this 
2017 interview. Logothetis seems to have succombed under stress, and now, 
though perhaps even earlier, believes in a conspiracy. If I understand him 
correctly, European banks were in peril and organised that the Greek government 
adopted Greek private loans and included them in the national debt.  
In this 2017 interview, Logothetis claims that Eurostat invented a rule on the fly: 
“However, Mr. [Walter] Radermacher, the general director of Eurostat, the 
statistical authority of Europe at the time of Georgiou, decides only for 
Greece and only for that time and while the value of the yen had 
collapsed, that this swap value to be included in our total debt, thus 
raising our national debt by 21 billion euros because of the losses of the 
Yen. This was the loss incurred by the collapse of the Yen at that time. 
So we found ourselves with an additional fiscal debt of 21 billion euros. 
Now, Radermacher’s additional act was to instruct Georgiou to divide this 
amount by four and to include what came out of it in the deficits of the 
years 2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006. So eventually, for 2009 and all the 
three previous years, we found ourselves with an additional deficit of 
about 5.5 billion euros. But I’m pointing out again that swaps should not 
be used in any way before their maturity, in order to influence negatively 
or positively the fiscal debt, let alone the yearly deficit.” 
We find some information in a Greek paper by Georganta that has as appendix 
a letter in English by Eurostat / Radermacher on this issue. 433 The 2001 swap was 
restructured in 2005 and 2008, and Eurostat judges that they account as new. 
This sounds reasonable. Eurostat also states that the lack of a rule on swaps does 
not mean that they would not count as debt (likely contrary to the advice by 
Goldman Sachs). I am no expert on this and cannot judge whether Logothetis is 
right that there would be more room for discretion. It is a pity that Logothetis in 
2017 does not mention others who agree with him, but it might be difficult to find 
experts who are independent of the ESS network, since ESA95 rules are only 
applied within that network.  
Nevertheless, the swaps could be included in the SFA term. This allows their 
inclusion in the national debt without affecting the operating deficit of the current 
year. This gives Table 7. The method maintains the deficit at 13% and has the 
advantage that the swaps are not in limbo but included in the debt. 
                                                                
432 https://dialogosmedia.org/transcript-interview-with-whistleblower-nikos-logothetis-on-El.Stat-
scandal/ 
433 https://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Illegal-swelling-hospitals-SWAP.pdf 
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Table 7.  Including the swaps in the SFA term 
EDP corr. continued Debt Debt SFA Deficit % GDP GDP 
  2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 
g G.Apr12 263.284 299.685 0.298 36.103 15.6% 231.642 
h SE 18.000 18.214     
i = g – h  A 245.284 281.471 0.298 35.889 15.5%  
n = i – a  A - hosp 241.384 276.971 5.580 30.007 13.0%  (sfwap) 
o = g - n Dif 12-sfw 21.900 22.714     
 
(1) Marcus Walker remains right that the correction for state enterprises and 
arrears in bills for hospitals do not really affect the deficit, since the figures per 
year are not so different. 
(2) For the swaps, some might regard this as creative bookkeeping, but it follows 
the notions (a) that the deficit is intended to be used for monitoring of 
operations, income and expenditures,  (b) whence the logic of the SFA term to 
be used for financial corrections without obscuring said purpose. The idea of a 
swap is that it is a financial arrangement, and no income instrument, see p5 
here. 434 Financial speculation is for market agents and not for the Ministery of 
Finance. Though this swap is seen by Eurostat as having been used to adapt 
the perceived debt level, this principle would not seem to be affected.  
(3) With this explanation, I can only expect that national accountants would agree 
that the swaps would rather be recorded in the SFA term. 
(4) The logic of using the SFA is so strong that we better check whether the 
swaps already have been recorded in the SFA. The recorded figure for SFA is 
only an aggregate, and it may contain the swaps but also balancing 
components. The EDP document does not provide such details. The original 
SFA term of 0.298 however is close to the statistical discrepancies of 0.301 in 
table 3A of the EDP report, and thus we can expect that the swaps are not yet 
included in the SFA.  
(5) The example on (by coincidence the same page number) p19 of the document 
of 2008 has a cash receipt and a simultaneous rise of debt of 100, paid back in 
installments of 20 over 5 years, thus a reduction of the debt. In the 2010 
“methodological” document p19, already referred to, we find the distinction 
between the loan (debt) and interest (deficit) components. In the case of 
Greece, the Eurostat solution was not to increase the debt by the full amount 
of EUR 21 bn via the SFA of 2005 and 2008 of the years of restructuring the 
swaps, but do this in steps over 4 years, see the table heading “Increase in the 
debt (loan component)”. Remarkably, though, these components are still 
recorded in the deficits.  
(6) Eurostat and director Georgiou would then have to explain why they did so. 
One cannot avoid the impression that Eurostat and Georgiou were indeed so 
focused upon highlighting the Greek problem with debt and deficit so that they 
overlooked the proper use of the SFA and included the swaps in the deficit. 
                                                                
434 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2041357/FINANCIAL-DERIVATIVES-07-
03-2008.pdf/236f33d7-8660-4a28-9e64-ce83d820a210 
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This choice would be an accounting oversight, with the own purpose of 
highlighting debt and deficit. But it seems that this particular question – “Why 
did you not use the SFA ?” – has not been put to them yet, so they may have a 
different answer than agreeing that it was an accounting oversight. 
30.8 The Credit Default Swaps (CDS) of 2009 (TT) 
30.8.1 Basic information 
Ekathimerini 2010-03-22 reported: 
“TT bet against Greece 
State-controlled Hellenic Post Bank (TT) spent nearly 1 billion euros last 
year to secure its positions against the possible bankruptcy of the Greek 
government, according to documents seen by Kathimerini. In August, the 
bank bought credit default swaps (CDS) – a form of insurance on 
financial instruments – worth 950 million euros when the spread on the 
Greek five-year bond over the German Bund was at 135 basis points. 
CDS products allow investors to purchase protection against the default 
of debt issued by governments, hedging existing positions. TT's 
management, which changed after the Socialists took power in October, 
sold the CDS when the spread was at 235 basis points in December, 
earning a profit of some 35 million euros, the documents show. The 
bank's position in CDS protected the lender from its exposure in Greek 
bonds but also provided it with an opportunity to play a part in the global 
CDS market worth some 8 billion dollars last year. With a position 
totalling 950 million euros, or 1.2 billion dollars, TT had the ability to 
shape momentum in the speculative derivatives market which the Greek 
government wants to be controlled. Prime Minister George Papandreou is 
among the global leaders that have been pushing for increased financial 
market supervision of CDS and a crackdown on market manipulation. 
TT's previous CEO, Angelos Philippidis, had said in his last press 
conference as head of the bank last year that the swaps were part of the 
lender's «social role,» giving it the ability to tackle speculators targetting 
Greece.” 
30.8.2 Accusation of insider trading, convicted as slanderous 
The issue got a nasty edge when economist and Greek parliamentarian Panos 
Kammenos claimed – though without proof – that the CDS were sold to family and 
friends of George Papandreou who would have cashed the real billions. 435 A 
criminal investigation was launched. 436 It is easier to find reports about such 
announcement than to find reports about the outcome, and I haven’t found those. 
                                                                
435 https://web.archive.org/web/20120111064120/http://www.sovereignindependent.com/ 
?p=21184 
436 https://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/07/11/former-pms-brother-andreas-papandreou-cds-
trade-involvement-reinvestigated/ 
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We must refer to wikipedia, a portal and no source. Courts in 2013 and 2014 fined 
Kammenos for libel, for not providing the proof which all had been waiting for. 437 
“Kammenos accused the former Prime Minister of Greece George 
Papandreou of treason. He said that the Hellenic Postbank, a public 
banking arm of the Greek government, oddly purchased a $1.3 billion 
worth of credit default swap (CDS) to insure against a default of the 
Greek government in spring and summer of 2009 (so indirectly, the 
government bought protection against its own default), and those CDS 
was then subsequently sold in December 2009 to a private firm named IJ 
Partners for $40 million. Naturally, as the Greek debt crisis was getting 
progressively worse, the CDS in question was probably worth $27 billion 
in June 2011. [17] In 2013, a Greek court decided that he should pay 
30,000 euros for libel against the brother of George Papandreou [18] and 
in 2014, a court decided that Kammenos accusations were false and 
slanderous and he should pay 100,000 euros to the IJ PARTNERS. 
[19][20]” 
It so happens that our source Miranda Xafa has worked at IJ Partners, see 
Sections 39.6 and 39.7, and thus (indirectly) was cleared too. 
30.8.3 Andreas Papandreou jr 
It will be useful to refer now to the CV 438 of Andreas Papandreou jr, brother of 
George Papandreou. He wrote his thesis about externalities with Amartya Sen, 
and has an interest in the environment. The internet apparently has weblogs who 
recycle such information. This CV information can easily be found, but the 
weblogs bring aspects as news. Indeed it would be news for who hasn’t looked for 
it. But it is silly to bring it as news, since it is clearly available. One of those 
websites is HellasFrappe, apparently run by Marina Spanos, who presents herself 
as a journalist, but who also seems to enjoy getting attention by spinning 
conspiracy theories.  
Andreas’s CV states that he set up an NGO i4cense. This is a weblink of 2011, 
439 with founder Andreas Papandreou and advisory board with Jeffrey Sachs and 
José María Figueres, Managing Partner at IJ Partners, President of the Republic 
of Costa Rica (1994-1998). The EU reports that there was a conference in 
October 2010, in which partook the “Institute for Climate and Energy Security 
(i4cense) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) under the auspices of the 
Prime Minister of Greece”. 440 Nikos Nikolopoulos asked questions why this 
i4cense company would be listed in Switserland. 441 Perhaps an answer might be 
that father Andreas Papandreou sr almost was executed by the Greek military 
Junta of 1967-1974 (and was saved by John Kenneth Galbraith who contacted the 
US State Department – lost the reference). 
                                                                
437 Portal, no scource: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panos_Kammenos#Political_positions_and_controversies 
438 http://en.econ.uoa.gr/fileadmin/econ.uoa.gr/en/uploads/CV2014APapandreouOffice.pdf 
439 https://web.archive.org/web/20111108164941/http://www.i4cense.org/content/advisory-board 
440 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/BEI_10_180 
441 https://www.pronews.gr/koinonia/21583_erotisi-toy-voyleyti-n-nikolopoyloy-gia-tis-kratikes-
horigies-stin-etaireia-i4cense 
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HellasFrappe and Olympia.gr produce a lot of text, but factually they do no more 
than check that Switserland really is Switserland. 442 
Andreas’s CV states that he was “Member of the Strategy Committee of the 
Unigestion-Ethos Environmental Sustainability Fund 2008”. HellasFrappe 443 
recycles this information as if sufficient for suggesting potential malversation.  
We can imagine that HellasFrappe is much frustrated by the lack of real data 
and Interpol reports about real malversations (like we all may be as viewers of 
Hollywood films). HellasFrappe apparently resolves this frustration by inventing 
suggestions about those, but HellasFrappe then should stop presenting herself as 
a journalist too.  
30.9 Let there be an investigation 
The problem for Greece is that it has no control over its own currency (the euro). 
It it hadn’t wanted these Eurostat accountancy rules then it should rather not have 
joined the Eurozone. Considerations by the EU and Greece caused that Greece 
joined “too early”, and at least with the attitude that differences in accounting 
would have to be resolved at a later date. To some extent the EU apparently was 
aware of this, as we can notice that Eurostat did pay closer attention to Greece. 
Obviously, the governance in the Eurozone is so complex that it would be 
improper for Eurostat to decide upon such accountancy itself. One cannot avoid 
the impression that Eurostat did work closely with the European Commission. The 
world would be served by more clarity about what actually happened here (but 
perhaps someone may already have a reference). 
Our check on the debt and deficit figures and the criticism has only been 
tentative, since we lack the documentation and specialised expertise, but some 
general comments in econometrics can be made. The inclusion of state 
enterprises and arrear bills to hospitals affect the level of debt but not the deficit 
very much since the values of 2008 and 2009 do not differ so much. The basic 
analytical point is that the swaps allocated to 2009 should rather be included in the 
stock-flow adjustment (SFA), so that the 2009 deficit reduces from 15.6% to 13%. 
It tends to be a convention that such financial arrangements are recorded in the 
SFA, and thus it is a question for Eurostat and DG Radermacher and El.Stat and 
director Georgiou why they chose to increase the figure for the deficit which is 
meant to register the difference between income and expenditure. 
The baseline is that it is too simple to argue, as is often heard, that “Eurostat 
accepted the new figures”. The advice is to have an investigation, and in such 
investigation Eurostat cannot be treated as sacrosanct, and it may well be that 
there are curious rules and curious changes in them that make for a less clear-cut 
situation – which also establishes a role for a board rather than a chief (single 
head). 
 
 
 
                                                                
442 http://hellasfrappe.blogspot.com/2011/08/shocking-report-swiss-paper-justifies.html 
443 http://hellasfrappe.blogspot.com/2014/01/special-report-coincidences-that-tie.html 
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31. El.Stat board members 
 
All members of the El.Stat board in 2010 are: A. Georgiou, N. Logothetis, Z. 
Georgantas, A. Philippou, G. Simiyiannis, S. Balfousia and K. Skordas. Four 
members (of which chairman and vice-chairman) are appointed by parliament, on 
the recommendation by the Minister of Finance, and confirmed by 4/5 of 
parliament. One member is appointed by the Governor of the Bank of Greece. 
One member by the Minister of Finance. A final member by the Workers’ 
Association. 
There is also Nick Stroblos, director of the national accounts at El.Stat. 444 
31.1 A disappointing situation 
With so much statistical talent, one would expect that it would be fairly simple to 
write a joint statement, that clarifies to the world of national accounting and 
statistics what the problem was. Unfortunately, we do not see such a statement. It 
remains true that a reference to the data requires access to those (sometimes 
confidential) underlying data, and such access was blocked. A director can be too 
powerful when blocking critics from access to the evidence. And authors like me 
would not have the time to really look into it. It looks like re-inventing the wheel. 
31.2 Zoe Georganta 
31.2.1 Principle versus calculation 
Xafa (2019a) has two references to deficit calculations by El.Stat board member 
in 2010 and professor in econometrics Zoe Georganta, 445 one in English, 
Georganta (2012a), 446 and one in Greek with an attached letter in English by 
Eurostat about swaps (referred to in Section 30.7). It is important to distinguish: 
• If the El.Stat board had convened in 2010 to discuss the figures about national 
income, budget, deficit and debt, then Georganta could have submitted her 
views and listened to criticism. She has identified Nick Stroblos as the real 
expert on national accounting. Eventually she might well have accepted the 
final board view to which she had made a contribution. This is counterfactual 
since such board meeting didn’t occur. 
• The current texts by Georganta 2012 may emphasize how she thinks about 
the matter, but these texts cannot be misrepresented as a dictate to such a 
board meeting. Georganta (2012a) is short enough to read. She identifies the 
sizes of adjustment and the literature also at IMF about discretion and 
arbitrariness (explicit) and vagueness (not-explicit) in rules. Xafa (2019a), 
without reference to Marcus Walker (WSJ), mentions the issue identified by 
him in Section 30.6.3. Xafa may have discovered this herself too. Georganta 
can be alerted to a mistaken assumption and she would have the possibility to 
correct. It is too simple to hold that someone is disqualified by some mistakes. 
There may well be other points where a professor in econometrics is right. 
                                                                
444 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CV-Nicholas-Stroblos.pdf 
445 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/ 
446 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Greek-Deficit-Revisited.pdf 
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• Georganta has the strongest rhetorical position where we can diagnose that 
the board wasn’t treated properly. An investigation would still be required to 
reconstruct the figures for the 2009 deficit and debt. By presenting some 
calculations of her own, she weakens this position, since this shifts the 
discussion from the principle on governance to actual calculations, on which 
she is no expert like Stroblos. Her presentation of data and calculations is a 
kind gesture, since she wants to enlighten us about the issue on content. On 
the other hand it complicates the situation. We can be in sympathy with her 
situation, but there could be no suggestion that we would also be in support of 
such data and calculations. Overall, it suffices to say that an investigation is 
still required, in particular on the scope for discretion. 
It is best to call for an investigation, when we do not know more. The real issue 
is to find an authority that can do such investigation. 
31.2.2 Board meetings 
Georganta (2012b:5) (around age 62) has this report about the first meetings 
with Georgiou, with the rubber stamp appearing in the 2nd meeting: 447 
“The 4 Board members (chairman, vice-chairman, and two simple 
members) were ratified by the Conference of Presidents of the Greek 
Parliament on 29 June 2010. It is emphasized that in spite of the urgency 
of Greece’s statistical situation and the ensuing request to the newly 
ratified chairman and the Minister of Finance pressed by the three of us 
(the vice-chairman and the two simple members) in order to start working 
as soon as possible, at our astonishment we were forbidden even to 
approach the building of the Statistics Department. The legalization 
(publication in the Official Gazette) of the ratification process for the 4 
Board members was delayed to suit the chairman’s personal needs until 
August. Thus, the Board’s first meeting took place on the 3rd of August 
2010 when we met with the other three appointed members each 
representative of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Greece and the 
Staff Union, respectively. 
 There was a second surprise: the chairman, who as we later learnt was 
at the same time an employee of the IMF (Financial Institutions Division, 
Deputy Chief), insisted that our second meeting would be as late as the 
3rd of September 2010 in spite of continuing pressures by Eurostat, who 
was demanding to clear out data issues relating to the General 
Government deficit and debt for the year 2009. Thus, we, the 6 members 
of the Board, were sent on compulsory summer holidays! I note that even 
on the 8th of October (the day of the Board’s last meeting) there was no 
information on SWAPS, Public Hospital expenditures, Public Enterprises’ 
reclassification issue and Local Government balance sheets; all this 
continued as “open issues” as the chairman had announced us on the 3rd 
of September 2010 meeting (according to my hand notes of the day). 
                                                                
447 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/European-Commission-Decision-
prejudice1.pdf 
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 For the whole month of August the 6 members of the Board were kept in 
darkness, we were not given desks or chairs to sit, we were not even 
allowed to approach the building of the Statistics Department during 
August. Later, we learned that the chairman had extensive 
communication with Eurostat and meetings took place in the El.Stat 
building in Piraeus between the chairman, Mr. Georgiou, and Eurostat 
officials. I am wondering whether the Director-General asked about our 
contribution. May be he did, but we never had such information. What we 
learnt later was that both the El.Stat chairman and Mr. H. Snorrason, the 
Resident Representative of Eurostat in El.Stat, had defamed us by 
serious libel, as I will report further down in this Note. The crucial issue is 
that our opinion was never requested by either the Director General or 
the Press. 
 In the second meeting the chairman started by signaling to us that it had 
been decided (by whom, we could not understand) that the Board’s role 
was to be a rubber stamp.” 
A 2017 interview with Georganta (about 67 years of age then), reproduced in 
Appendix 43, has an encouraging start, but the rubber stamp statement now is 
“from the first meeting” and not “at the 2nd meeting”. It may be an issue of Greek-
English. 
“Zoe Georganta (ZG): As an econometrician and economic statistician 
appointed in August 2010 by the Greek Parliament to be a member of the 
seven-member Hellenic Statistical Authority, I had the responsibility by 
law to express my scientific opinion – first within the meetings of El.Stat, 
in which all seven members, the president (or chairman) included, were 
supposed to discuss the statistical issues of the agenda and make a 
decision by majority rule. 
 What actually happened from the first meeting of El.Stat on August 3, 
2010 was very strange and seemed extremely peculiar to all six of us, 
since the president, Andreas Georgiou, supposedly an ex-vice president 
of the Statistics Department of the IMF — this was declared as his 
position in the IMF — insisted that he had to be the only person who 
could speak and decide, while the remaining six of us had to agree and 
sign his proposals without questions. 
 According to him, we had the role of a rubber stamp. He said that openly 
to us. He also insisted that we should not keep minutes of the meetings, 
and when we all threatened to resign and publicize the issue, he agreed 
to keep minutes but he added that the minutes would report only his 
opinion and nobody else’s. So as you can imagine, there were minutes 
[of these meetings] but they were not signed by any of us.”  
It remains remarkable that Georgiou “from the first meeting” would declare a 
difference, a position of authority. This suggests some kind of preparation with 
Eurostat. What happened before August ? It would be useful to reconstruct the 
way how Georgiou was selected, what was said in the selection process, and what 
he discussed with the EU, Eurostat, ECB and IMF in de run-up to the first board 
meeting, at least on this topic. (See p223 for the Eurostat Steering Committee.) 
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Subsequently: 
“El.Stat, as a seven-member board, had only four meetings, because the 
president [maintained] extremely strange attitudes. As the main issue 
was the measurement of the final estimate of the public, or general 
government debt and deficit for 2009, Mr. Georgiou kept presenting to us 
ad hoc numbers and he refused to answer our questions about how he 
came to those numbers. 
 Consequently, all six of us then insisted that the director of the national 
accounts division of El.Stat, Nick Stroblos, come to our meeting and 
explain to us those numbers. Mr. Stroblos’ comments were a catapult. He 
said that those numbers were wrong and they were fixed by violating 
Eurostat regulations and methodology, which are described in the ESA 
manual. ESA [refers to the] European System of Accounts, and this is 
legally constituted under European Commission regulation 2223/1996. 
 By investigating the issue, we found out that Mr. Stroblos was right. I 
must report here the fact that Mr. Stroblos was sacked from his position 
the very next day after he expressed his reservations about the 2009 
debt and deficit numbers that were fixed by Mr. Georgiou and by the 
general director of Eurostat, as we found out later. 
 After he sacked Mr. Stroblos, Mr. Georgiou went on to neutralize all six 
members of the El.Stat board, with the help of the IMF representative in 
the troika Poul Thomsen, who, according to evidence, asked ECOFIN, 
the group of the finance ministers of the EU, to force the Greek 
government to change the statistical law so that El.Stat would [fall under] 
Mr. Georgiou’s rule without a board of directors. This was finally done in 
2011 and all six of us were sacked without explanation, just [as a result 
of] a clause within a law of economic austerity measures.” 
31.2.3 Analysis on context 
One tends to feel sympathy for a board member who is reduced to a rubber 
stamp. However, some of Georganta’s statements are troubling. (Brackets not by 
me but the interviewer or transcriber of the interview.) 
“ZG: There is evidence that the German and French banks were bankrupt 
in 2008, because they had a lot of toxic American debt. Also, they owned 
a sizable quantity of Greek state bonds. Falsely augmenting the Greek 
deficit [was done] in order to load us with unnecessary loans which go 
back to their banks, so that Greece buys back [its] bonds, so that the 
German and French banks can refinance their debts. This was a very 
appetizing idea [for the banks]. This has been actually said by people like 
[Paul] Krugman 448 and a lot of other researchers and scientists, 
American and European.” 
The phrasing is awkward, perhaps it is an issue of language (Georganta’s 
Greek-English). 
                                                                
448 January 2011, http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=133112932 
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(i) Banks that “refinance their debt” is a wrong expression for a creditor. The 
creditors of Greece did not have to write off their loans, or take a haircut, 
when the Greek government took over the debts made by Greek banks. 
(ii) “Unnecessary loans” would still leave you with loads of cash, that you can use 
to pay off debt, after which you would no longer have those loans.  
(iii) Very likely, the interviewer has located the wrong link for Krugman. In the link 
that is provided here, Krugman discusses something else, e.g. the lack of 
automatic stabilizers from surplus to deficit countries. Krugman: “One of the 
really destructive things about this – if you want the European idea to succeed 
– is that if you look at what's happening in Ireland right now, on the one hand, 
the Germans are feeling that they are put upon, they're being forced to bail 
out those irresponsible Irish. And the other hand, the Irish are feeling that the 
Germans have turned into these cruel, heartless money collectors who are 
turning Ireland into a subservient colony. It's an ugly scene. It's not what you 
want to see happening.” 
It remains true though that German and French banks had big exposures in 
Greek debt. 449 It was the choice of the Greek government to adopt such debt, see 
Section 18.3. Ireland did so but had a debt of less than 60% and Greece had a 
debt that was already too high. This moved the hot potato towards the risk of a 
default by the Greek government. The EU chose to prevent a banking problem by 
insisting that the Greek government did not default. Such default would have 
caused a collapse of the Greek economy too. 
While much of what Georganta states about 2010 may still be correct, much of 
what she states in 2017 about the context is derailed, or suffers from Greek-
English. I put my comments in Appendix 43. 
31.3 Nikolaos Logothetis  
In his interview in 2017 with Michael Nevradakis (MN), 450 see Appendix 44, 
Logothetis (approximately 67 years of age) states (my comments):  
“NL. As a result of all the above, Greece ended up with a huge deficit for 
the year 2009, of 36 billion euros, or equivalently, 15.4 percent of gross 
domestic product. This legitimated the first memorandum, paved the way 
for the second and worse memorandum, and justified the imposition of 
these cumbersome austerity measures, such as the pension cuts and the 
tax increases, huge tax increases, measures that we are still suffering 
today. 
 MN: Dominique Strauss-Kahn himself, the former president of the 
International Monetary Fund, has gone on the record [451] as saying that 
he met with George Papandreou to discuss an IMF so-called “bailout” of 
Greece in April 2009 [that page does not mention April. It mentions 
Papandreou’s discovery of the larger deficit, so the encounter must have 
                                                                
449 https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/german-banks-have-big-investment-in-
greece/?_r=0 
450 https://dialogosmedia.org/transcript-interview-with-whistleblower-nikos-logothetis-on-El.Stat-
scandal/ 
451 http://en.protothema.gr/strauss-kahn-i-had-spoken-with-papandreou-in-2009-about-a-
memorandum/ 
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been after the elections in October 452 453]. This was several months 
before Papandreou was elected as prime minister and at a time when 
Papandreou was saying, while campaigning, that plenty of money existed 
to fund the social programs he was promising to Greek voters. Do you 
believe that the economic “crisis” in Greece was pre-ordained or pre-
planned? 
 NL: Yes, I do. In my opinion, joining these medieval memoranda that 
have brought about this economic crisis that Greece is still experiencing, 
was beyond any doubt pre-planned and pre-determined. This arises not 
only from Strauss-Kahn’s own admission, I think in a TV interview, that 
the IMF has been preparing every detail for this with Papandreou, [this is 
not supported by above weblink] it also arises for many reasons that 
subsequently became known, that Greece was chosen by the designers 
of the European Union to become the guinea pig, an example to be 
avoided, in the context of a new economic policy for handling the member 
countries with fiscal problems. 
 Indeed, the policy of the memoranda gave the opportunity not only to the 
IMF to put a foot in Europe — until then its activities always were, with 
devastating consequences, limited to developing countries in Africa and 
Latin America — they took that opportunity, but also gave the opportunity 
to the French and German banks to get rid of their so-called toxic bonds, 
that were loaded onto the Greek people by turning a private debt into a 
state debt.”  
It is not quite clear how this conspiracy would work, and when it actually 
happened. Section 18.3 on page 119 above mentions ways to handle a national 
banking and debt crisis. Some creditors obviously would have an interest to avoid 
a haircut. If such creditors would have good connections with the Greek Ministry of 
Finance then they might cause a shift from nationalising banks (writing off debts) 
to nationalising debts. There is always the rule “follow the money”, and some 
researchers might be interested in debunking such conspiracy theory anyhow. For 
us, an investigation would rather focus on what happened at El.Stat, in interaction 
with Eurostat. 
31.4 What needs to be said 
Someone interested in the El.Stat case might think that the mentioned interviews 
would be a good starting point, but after reading would rather be perplexed by the 
derailed accusations. One would be inclined to diagnose that the interviewees 
have succumbed to stress, after which it becomes tempting to dismiss the case. 
However, there is also the fact that Georgiou is guilty as charged on the violation 
of duty. This conundrum is easily resolved though by further forgetting about the 
case. My inclination was the same. However, my position is that colleagues with a 
protest deserve a hearing. Thus, I deconstructed the interviews paragraph by 
paragraph. Removing the nonsense, I came to the conclusion that they have a 
point. There are still too many loose ends that call for an investigation. 
                                                                
452 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Papandreou 
453 https://www.greeknewsonline.com/george-papandreou-offers-explanations-on-meeting-with-
strauss-kahn/ 
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32. The computer hack 
 
32.1 An alternative explanation for the availability of documents and emails 
In a Dutch book, Eva Wiessing (economic reporting) and Conny Keessen (radio 
correspondent in Greece) 454 have an interview with Georganta, and she mentions 
that she has all Georgiou’s emails “requested via my lawyer”. Thus, when emails 
are available, it does not need to mean that they would have been hacked.  
The change of the law in December 2010 indicates that Georgiou in 2010 was 
aware that he was in error in the way how he treated the board, see Section 
25.13. Georganta has this explanation 455 about how she found out that Georgiou 
was trying to change the law on the governance of El.Stat, which provides an 
alternative explanation for Georgiou’s story that he was hacked (on this issue).  
“Perry Samuelson was another law consultant, who was appointed 
secretly by Mr. Georgiou to contribute to the change of the statistical law 
3832 along the lines desired by Mr. Georgiou’s appetite for power. 
Accidentally, Mr. Samuelson came to me to help him with the essence of 
Greek-English expressions in the law 3832. This was the day I found out 
that Mr. Snorrason and Mr. Georgiou were busy changing the law, 
instead of looking at the debt-deficit data and the statistical requirements 
of the Population-Housing Census and the Agricultural Census, both 
inadequately completed.” 
In an interview of 2017, see Appendix 43, Zoe Georganta states: 456 
“This correspondence exists because Logothetis pressed charges 
against Georgiou for wrongly accusing [Logothetis] of “hacking” 
[Georgiou’s] personal email. I want to say here that all charges against 
Logothetis have been dropped, although the Wall Street Journal had a 
recent article by Marcus Walker which completely distorts the facts, 
showing his outrageous bias in favor of Georgiou. It is a pity, but it has 
happened. I am saying that to be clear, because Logothetis was not 
hacking anybody. His [proficiency with] computers is not at that level. 
How could he break passwords and all this that Georgiou accused him 
of?” 
32.2 Still unclear whether Logothetis really did it 
Georgiou refers to a police report that his computer was hacked. I have not been 
able to retrieve this report or an English translation. 
                                                                
454 “Worstelen aan de rand van Europa: Verhalen achter de Griekse crisis”, Lebowski 2016 
https://books.google.nl/books?id=xc_-
CgAAQBAJ&q=Georganta#v=snippet&q=Georganta&f=false 
455 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/European-Commission-Decision-
prejudice1.pdf 
456 https://www.mintpressnews.com/whistleblower-greek-debt-crisis-manufactured-unscrupulous-
accounting/228076/ 
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Hacking would be regarded as a crime. It is not clear whether Georgiou 
immediately jumped to the conclusion of a hack or did some investigation about 
alternative explanations. Georgiou filed a lawsuit, after which he became “the 
plaintiff” in this particular case of the asserted hack.  
Xafa (2019a) reports that the prosecutor pressed charges against Logothetis in 
January 2011, and that he resigned from the board. In personal communication, 
Logothetis states that he was forced by Finance minister Papakonstantinou to 
resign or face various measures. The resignation is no admission that he did it. 
The Economist in 2011: 457  
“Mr Logothetis is also facing criminal charges for hacking into Mr 
Georgiou's email account; he denies all accusations.” 
Xafa (2019a) has more on the hacking of Georgiou’s computer though she does 
not provide a link to a source and we cannot check on police statements. When 
asked, she cannot provide the police report. She thus relies upon reports by 
journalists or hearsay. According to Xafa, Logothetis’s denial still is a lie. 
“In October 2010, two months after Mr. Georgiou’s appointment at 
El.Stat, it transpired that his personal email account had been hacked. A 
police investigation revealed that the hacker was the vice-chair of 
El.Stat’s board Mr. Logothetis, and that the hacking had been done 
continuously since Mr. Georgiou’s first day [August 2, 2010] on the job.” 
This doesn’t quite add up. The board members were not daily at El.Stat but daily 
at their own work, and only convened at El.Stat when board meetings were called. 
Georgiou started at El.Stat on August 2 and the board had the first meeting on 
August 3. If Georgiou’s computer had been hacked from August 2, then one might 
suspect that there is someone else, who then later passed on information. One 
would want to see more information on this. 
Xafa (2019a) clarifies (with my comment in brackets), but does not provide a 
source: 
“Both criminal and misdemeanor charges were pressed by the prosecutor 
against Mr. Logothetis in January 2011. After years of inactivity in the 
case, in July 2016 the Appeals Court Council decided not to refer Mr. 
Logothetis to trial as the statute of limitations had been passed. The court 
decision clearly stated that Mr. Logothetis had indeed hacked Mr. 
Georgiou’s emails [if those were found on his computer then still 
someone else might have done the hack], but considered that he was 
defending the interests of the Greek state. Mr. Georgiou was never 
notified of the decision (although he was the plaintiff [what about the 
role of the prosecutor ?]), and thus missed the opportunity to request 
the Supreme Court to annul the decision of the Appeals Court Council 
within the set deadline.” 
This ending of the hacking case is unfortunate.  
                                                                
457 https://www.economist.com/newsbook/2011/11/29/numbers-in-action 
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• When Logothetis denies the charges, he hasn’t been offered a chance to be 
cleared by a court.  
• Given Xafa’s report, it is strange that the court in words convicts Logothetis 
(affects his reputation by stating that he did it) but at the same time does not 
grant him the opportunity to question this supposed evidence, and then acts 
as if they do not convict him. Again we wish that Xafa had provided sources.  
• Perhaps Logothetis makes a distinction between himself and an actual hack 
by someone else. Perhaps the police found documents by Georgiou on his 
computer, some with the date of August 2, but when someone else had 
given those documents to Logothetis after a later date, then this would be 
consistent with him not doing the actual hack himself. Perhaps. 
• Perhaps he has been given login codes, and perhaps after being confronted 
with troubling documents: so that he might have a whistleblower argument, 
comparable to people condemning Snowden but journalists still using the 
documents. Was Logothetis merely using login codes or were there more 
hacking tools on his computer ? One would want to see the police report, 
translated into English. 
• Georganta’s statement of “charges dropped” is in conflict with Xafa’s report 
of merely the statute of limitations. Is Georganta fully informed on this ? Why 
does Georganta not consider that Logothetis might have had some help? 
Perhaps Logothetis makes a distinction between “reading someone else’s 
account” (with a password given by a third person) and “hacking to find the 
password” (by that third person) ? Why doesn’t Georganta state the full 
reason why the “charges were dropped”, with the explanation provided by 
Xafa (2019a) of the statute of limitations ? These questions do not 
incriminate Georganta, but indicate at least a lack in persistence in clarifying 
what has been happening here. But she might be focused on other 
concerns. A degree in econometrics as an academic subject differs from 
general effectiveness w.r.t. such events like here at El.Stat. 
32.3 Reconstruction by Sigrun Davidsdottir 
Sigrun Davidsdottir, “Lies, Damned Lies, and Greek Statistics”, 458 2015-07-30, 
has this additional information, though it is not clear what her sources are, and 
whether she knows Greek, while she writes “Georganda”. See the Backgrounds in 
Appendix 39.8. Let me insert some comments in brackets.  
“The adoption of the new statistics law in March 2010 made El.Stat 
independent of the MoF [Ministry of Finance], although its board was 
politically [?] appointed [just like Georgiou] in addition to a 
representative from the employees’ union. This might not have been a 
problem if the board had understood the European Statistics Code of 
Practice in the same way as Georgiou. [But Georgiou understood it 
sufficiently to want to change it, and say to others that it already 
stated what he wanted to see.] 
 Georgiou emphasised the independence and accountability of El.Stat, 
and thought the board should be involved only with the broader issues, 
                                                                
458 https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/07/lies-damned-lies-and-greek-statistics.html 
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not the statistical production process. But the board felt, among other 
things, that it should vote on and approve the statistics and saw Georgiou 
as being manipulative, wanting to rule over the statistics. Three of the 
members of the new board, set up in August 2010 – El.Stat’s vice 
president Nikos Logothetis, Zoe Georganda and Andreas Philippou – 
had applied for the position of president of El.Stat, which possibly did not 
make things easier. [It is slander that these persons would not have 
the professional integrity and competence to deal with the situation 
that they did not get the job. They might infer that they would have 
done the job better, but it is an altogether other thing to suggest 
that they had a motive here.] 
 The breakdown of trust happened at a meeting with the presidium of the 
employees’ union on 21st October 2010, after Georgiou had been in 
office less than three months. At this meeting, the presidium showed 
Georgiou a document – a legal opinion from Georgiou’s lawyer, with 
whom Georgiou had been in touch via his private email account, on 
issues related to the law on El.Stat that was in the process of being 
changed. [Georganta explains elsewhere, see the quote above, that 
this lawyer directly consulted her, looking for a Greek translation.] 
Georgiou realised that someone had unauthorised access to his account. 
He later discovered that another member of the board, Zoe Georganda, 
possessed an email Georgiou had exchanged with Poul Thomsen, head 
of the Greek IMF mission. [Potentially also from Samuelson] 
 Georgiou brought the case to the police, who discovered that Nikos 
Logothetis had been entering Georgiou’s account from the first day 
Georgiou took up his position at El.Stat. When the police did a house 
search, Logothetis was actually at his computer, logged into Georgiou’s 
account. [You are not the first to say so, and it might be hearsay. 
Please give the police report.] After less than six months in office 
Logothetis resigned from the El.Stat board in February 2011 as criminal 
charges, based on his hacking into Georgiou’s account, were brought 
against him. [Clarify why he resigned.] 
Logothetis has denied accessing the account and claims instead  
[Source ?] that various leading [Argument of authority] European 
statisticians framed him. His case is pending in court. But in spite [Why 
the “in spite” ?] of being charged with unauthorised access to 
Georgiou’s account, Logothetis has repeatedly been called in as an 
expert witness in parliament in the cases against Georgiou and his two 
colleagues.” 
32.4 Comparison Georganta and Logothetis  
It is remarkable that Logothetis does not provide the same explanation as 
Georganta. Perhaps Georganta gave him copies of the documents she got from 
Perry Samuelson, but did not quite say how she got them, or perhaps he forgot ? 
Perhaps Logothetis gave the same explanation as Georganta, but Davidsdottir 
finds it interesting to present him as someone who uses conspiracy theories ? 
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32.5 Crime and whistleblowing 
Unless when you work for the police and have a court order that grants that you 
are hacking a suspect, computer hacking clearly is condemnable. At the same 
time, if Nikos Logothetis is a decent person, then one can image what pressure 
must have been on him to do this condemnable act if he has indeed done so 
(assuming that the reports about the Greek police can be trusted or that the Greek 
police can be trusted in this particular case). If Georgiou referred to the 2005 Code 
to basically disquality the board, and rule autocratically, while the 2005 Code and 
all other rules and regulations established the importance of the board, then one 
might start to comprehend a little bit about the circumstances. However, 
Logothetis still denies the charges. 
The situation in January 2020 is complicated by that Logothetis seems to have 
succombed under the pressures, if he did not before, and expresses to believe in 
a conspiracy, 459 see Appendix 44.  
                                                                
459 https://dialogosmedia.org/transcript-interview-with-whistleblower-nikos-logothetis-on-El.Stat-
scandal/ 
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Part 7. Two directors and two ministers 
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33. Walter Radermacher, DG of Eurostat 2008-2016 
 
33.1 Three points of criticism 
Points of criticism w.r.t. Radermacher are:  
(1) As environmental statistician he misrepresented the Tinbergen & Hueting 
(1991) approach as politics while it is science proper.  
(2) As DG of Eurostat 2008-2016 he knew that the El.Stat board in 2010 had the 
authority to decide about the figures but he still collaborated with Georgiou in 
ignoring the board, and he misrepresented the situation to others by assigning 
this authority to the director only. He assisted Georgiou in violating the law of 
an EU Member State. (In his letters of support for Georgiou he emphasizes 
that the figures would be acceptable to Eurostat but the essential issue of 
governance is bypassed. 460 461) 
This book suggests that the world of science and learning investigates the case, 
and that the EU parliament investigates the case, and that the EU also considers: 
“In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, 
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the 
performance of their duties. “ 462 
(3) Radermacher originated the NSO = chief = single head structure in European 
statistics, which is unwise, seems to have served mainly the Greek situation, 
and seems to have been forwarded with false arguments. The EU Commission 
in 2012 answered to the EU Parliament: 463 
“1. A Joint Overall Statistical Greek Action Plan has been in place since 
early 2010 with the aim of providing the necessary assistance to El.Stat 
to restore confidence in Greek statistics. It was established in response to 
an invitation by the Ecofin Council of January 2010 and is subject to 
regular reporting. Its implementation requires close cooperation, 
transparency and sharing of information between El.Stat and the 
Commission (Eurostat). The implementation of the Hellenic Statistical 
Law is one action included in the plan and has, as such, been discussed 
by the Steering Committee which coordinates all the actions. In this 
context, the Commission (Eurostat) has, inter alia, been informed of an 
amendment to the Hellenic Statistical law in 2010 concerning the 
allocation of executive and non-executive powers within El.Stat, which is 
in line with the European statistics Code of Practice and Regulation (EC) 
                                                                
460 https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/1245979/ELSTAT_legal+case_Jan_2013.pdf/ 
d5919576-71ef-47ae-8108-ad831bc85bc9 
461 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2012-
003488&language=EN (OJ C 130 E, 07/05/2013) 
462 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E340 
463 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-
002801&language=EN (OJ C 117 E, 24/04/2013) 
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No 223/2009 on European statistics. However, the Commission 
(Eurostat) has not received a letter similar to that referred by the 
Honourable Member asking to significantly increase the remit and powers 
of El.Stat's President. 
The High Level Expert appointed by the Commission [in 2010 Snorrason] 
provides independent advice to El.Stat and acts as a contact point for the 
Commission (Eurostat).” 
Apparently all European NSOs concurred with Radermachter that the NSO = 
chief = single head structure was a good idea. It might be less convincing to direct 
this criticism to him alone (though Eurostat = Radermacher in 2012-2016). This 
book invites the world of official statistics to search their souls. (See Section 25.16 
on Snorrason.) 
33.2 Background and overview 
Walter Radermacher (b. 1952) was DG of Eurostat in 2008-2016, 464 and the EU 
still has a page with his CV of 2013 in a table quoted below. 465  
In 2019 he defended his PhD thesis 466 at Sapienza Univ. di Roma. 467  
Radermacher, in a few pages 52-54 in his thesis, looks back at the 2008-2016 
episode as DG of Eurostat when he was involved with the Statistics Greece case. 
We will reproduce and deconstruct these three pages below. 
A complication is that the Radermacher thesis was written under the co-
ordinator / supervisor professor Maurizio Vichi, 468 who also appears to be 
President of the Federation of European National Statistical Societies (FENStatS), 
who was the first to sign a letter 469 by FENStatS of October 20 2017, directed at 
Mr. Alexis Tsipras, Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic, concerning the court 
trials concerning Statistics Greece and in particular director Andreas Georgiou. 
Apparently both Vichi and Radermacher are united in bias, and the thesis does not 
satisfy scientific criteria here. 
There appears to exist also another issue. Radermacher originally graduated as 
a business economist and proceeded at the German Statistisches Bundesamt in 
1978, becoming responsible in 1991 for setting up the System of Environmental – 
Economic Accounting. Colignatus (2020a) (THAENAES) 470 (earlier version 2009 
update 2015 471) discusses the Tinbergen & Hueting (1991) approach to national 
accounting and the environment. Radermacher, working on that subject at 
Statistisches Bundesamt, should have studied that approach too. However, 
THAENAES shows that Radermacher, when working on environmental statistics, 
apparently did not grasp the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, and confused politics 
and science since at least 1994. Within circles of national accounting it is rather 
conventional to be against the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, but it can also be 
                                                                
464 https://ec.europa.eu/info/persons/director-general-walter-radermacher_en 
465 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/radermacher_en.pdf 
466 https://iris.uniroma1.it/handle/11573/1237923 
467 https://phd.uniroma1.it/web/WALTER-JOSEF-RADERMACHER_nP1695225_EN.aspx 
468 http://fenstats.eu/data/CV_vichi.pdf 
469 http://fenstats.eu/data/news/Letter_FENStatS.pdf 
470 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Environment/2020-01-31-THAENAES.pdf (refresh cache) 
471 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63904/ 
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shown that almost every national accountant or environmental economist who has 
stated a rejection of this approach also makes errors in referencing and 
presentation. Radermacher is no exception, and might actually have stimulated 
this general confusion. It is also likely that his promotions to director of 
Statistisches Bundesamt and DG of Eurostat was influenced favourably by his 
(popular) rejection of the Tinbergen & Hueting approach. We are safe to conclude 
that his career was partly based upon such errors in referencing and presentation.  
Radermacher would not be the scientist and the keen person that people have 
thought him to be, who promoted him to higher position. Errors on his part with 
respect ot Statistics Greece then should not be surprising. 
Below we first restate Radermacher’s CV and then consider his discussion of 
Statistics Greece in his thesis. Then we proceed with his work on national 
accounting and environmental economics, that is also discussed in his thesis. 
Radermacher fails in science on the issues of (i) national accounting and 
environmental economics, and (ii) Statistics Greece. The thesis doesn’t do science 
but presents opinions, and actually also opinions that are contrary to empirics. The 
thesis should be retracted. 
33.3 Curriculum vitae 2013 and 2015 
QUOTE 2013 
Nationality: 
 
German 
Academic 
qualifications: 
➢ 1970 – 1975: Studies in business economics in 
Aachen and Münster 
Professional 
experience in the 
European 
Institutions: 
➢ August 2008 to date [published in 2013, in effect 
to 2016]: Director-General of Eurostat and Chief 
Statistician of the European Union 
Professional 
experience before 
joining the European 
Institutions: 
➢ 2006 – 2008: President of the German Federal 
Statistical Office and Federal Returning Officer 
➢ 2003 – 2006: Vice-President of the German 
Federal Statistical Office 
➢ 1978 – 2003: Various positions in the German 
Federal Statistical Office 
Other professional 
activities: 
➢ 1982 – 1998: Teaching assignments in statistics 
and environmental economics at 
Fachhochschule (specialised college of higher 
education) of Wiesbaden and University of 
Lüneburg 
➢ 1975 – 1977: Member of academic staff at 
University of Münster (economic mathematics, 
operations research) 
Language Skills: ➢ German (mother tongue) 
➢ English 
➢ French 
UNQUOTE 
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There is this information dated 2015: 472 
“Walter Radermacher, studied business economics in Aachen and 
Münster. From 1975, he was member of the academic staff in economic 
mathematics and operations research at the University of Münster. He 
started his career at the Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland) in 1978. During the nineties, he 
set up the environmental economic accounting (Umwelt-ökonomischen 
Gesamtrechnungen - UGR) which brought him wide international 
acknowledgement. In 2003, Walter Radermacher is named Vice-
president of the Federal Statistical Office and in 2006, he passed 
President. During the German Presidency of the Council of the EU (first 
six months in 2007), Walter Radermacher was in charge of the Working 
Group for Statistics. He was the first chair of the UN Committee of 
Experts on Environmental-Economic Accounting (UNCEEA) from 2005 to 
2008. Since August 2008, Walter Radermacher is Director General of 
Eurostat and Chief Statistician of the European Union.” 
33.4 Radermacher’s thesis and Statistics Greece 
The issue of Statistics Greece forms only a small section on p52-54 in the 
Radermacher (2019a) thesis. Let us first quote it in the next subsection, and then 
discuss it in the following subsection. It will be useful to insert my comments in 
square brackets in the quote itself too. 
33.4.1 [Quote of Radermacher (2019a:52-54):] Third case: Are Greek statistics 
on GDP and public finances correct?  
Greek public deficit figures for 2009 (and all preceding years) were problematic, 
with the forecasts of the deficit to GDP ratio (which were prepared by the Ministry 
of Finance in 2009) having to be increased from an initial 3.7% to a final 12.5%. In 
April 2010, the first statistical estimate of the actual outcome increased the ratio to 
13.6% but still Eurostat had concerns with the methodology used and published 
the statistics with reservations. Ultimately, and following a rigorous examination, a 
revised estimate of 15.4% was submitted [without approval by the El.Stat 
board] to and published by Eurostat in November 2010.  
In 2009, it was already the second time that Greece caused an earthquake in 
European statistics. Already in 2005 (one election of the Hellenic Parliament and a 
change of government earlier), misreporting and subsequent major/implausible 
revisions of macro-economic indicators had caused a crisis, which asked for a 
profound revision of the making of official statistics in Europe. 473 Unfortunately, all 
these new safeguards of quality did not prevent the misreporting from continuing 
until 2009, when (again after an election) the (next) Greek government revised the 
previously notified figures. What happened then 474 is summarised in the 
                                                                
472 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/content/walter-radermacher_en 
473 The famous Goodhart’s law (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law) was proven in 
a dramatic reality check in Greece, after European macro-financial indicators were directly 
related to the Euro currency, the Stability and Growth Pact and even the Treaties themselves. 
474 See also ‘A Greek Tragedy: Hubris, Ate, and Nemesis’ (Coyle 2015: 77). 
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corresponding report of the European Commission of 8 January 2010 (European 
Commission 2010).  
What is of interest here is the response from different parts of the public and the 
participating and interested actors. The international feedback on the revision of 
the numbers and the institutional changes was very positive; capital markets 
calmed down [See Figure 8: interest rates at first remained high. The policy 
reaction, also based upon the deficit figures, later caused a sharp rise in the 
rate of interest on Greek debt. Relevant though is the precedent of the 
calculation of 2009 also for policy making, see Section 27.4] and international 
confidence in the credibility of Greek statistics could be slowly rebuilt. In this 
process of recovery of trust, it was crucial not only to inform users about the 
revised results, but also to give them a realistic understanding of the remaining 
uncertainty margins. Not surprisingly, the question that was asked regularly was 
when we could finally expect ‘correct’ results. To answer this professionally, it was 
pointed out that the benchmark for the quality of Greek numbers should be the 
average of the results of the other EU member states, which are also subject to 
minor inaccuracies within a tolerance interval (European Commission 2018). [The 
question whether x is accurate cannot really be answered by that the margin 
of error of x should be like other figures. When the value of x is not trusted 
then also the stated margin of error of x likely is not trusted.] 
The reactions within Greece were and still are in stark contrast. The statistics 
computed according to international standards [reported without approval by 
the El.Stat board] are held liable for the fiscal programmes and austerity 
obligations since 2010. [See the House of Mirrors, Section 25.9] Paradoxically, 
‘falsification’ 475 is alleged where the statistics administration acted for the first time 
neutrally and impartially. [Established how ? The director did not seek 
approval by the board] As a dramatic consequence of this intra-Greek 
conspiracy allegation, [no, after consideration within the independent judiciary 
and national presecutor and Supreme Court] the responsible professional and 
administrator for these statistics at the top of El.Stat, the statistical agency of 
Greece, Andreas Georgiou (as well as two other El.Stat managers), was 
confronted with trials and sentenced. That this led to an overwhelming protest of 
all international statistical organisations 476 and national statistical societies has, so 
far, changed nothing. [Radermacher doesn’t tell that these statistical 
organisations and societies did not check the facts. He knows that Georgiou 
was guilty as charged, and thus knows that the world of statistics is misled.] 
Nothing can better illustrate where the exaggerated expectations and pitfalls are, 
when statistics and truth are mixed in a confused manner, like this dreadful case. 
[Thus the former DG of Eurostat advises all of us to investigate this case.] 
Also, this case shows how much confidence in state authority or the absence of it 
leads one to trust official statistics to perform their task neutrally, impartially and 
                                                                
475 Significantly, this allegation was made by a so-called ‘Truth Committee’ (TruthCommittee 
2015: 18). 
476 See for example the letters of AMStat (http://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-
20170901GeorgiouSeptember.pdf), FENStatS (http://fenstats.eu/data/news/Letter_FENStatS.pdf 
) or ISI (https://isi-web.org/index.php/activities/professional-ethics/isi-statements-letters). 
[2020 relocated to: https://isi-web.org/index.php/about-isi/policies/isi-statements-letters] 
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purely technically-scientifically (or not). If the entire administration is politicised, a 
citizen simply cannot imagine that unpolitical official statistics could possibly exist. 
[This citizen will also be abhorred when noticing the malconduct by the DG 
of Eurostat in 2008-2016.]  
The more that value-loaded and normative terms such as ‘truth’ appear in a 
debate, the more statisticians should be mindful of following the rules of Deming’s 
[477] profound knowledge and communicating on their basis. [This should also be 
a warning for statistical societies who have a mission on empirical reality 
that they should be wary of accountants and statistical process control, plus 
that Radermacher doesn’t mind getting their support even while there are 
different objectives.] 
The lessons learned from this third case are – contrary to the two other ones – 
oriented towards the production process. In other words, the design of the 
statistics in question, namely the calculation of public sector debt/deficit and 
national accounts, is not up for disposition at national level. One has to 
acknowledge that official statistics in the EU is a rules-based system that ensures 
comparability and consistency in the application of statistical methodology 
throughout all EU Member States. There is no such thing as scientific ‘freedom of 
choice’ to apply whatever kind of methodology in the core of European statistics, 
which is based on standard methods and classifications that are manifested in 
European legislation, as adopted by European Council and European Parliament. 
[Except that a board had discretion for particular applications and manner of 
publication. Radermacher makes it sound as 1 + 1 = 2 but thus he violates 
the very code of professionalism that he is sworn to uphold.] All Member 
States (and consequently all public statistical institutes) have to stick to these rules 
(that Member States as the main legislators in the EU have decided themselves). 
In this governance framework, Eurostat is the final statistical authority and 
guardian of the Treaties, thus ensuring that the rule of law is applied equally 
throughout the whole EU. [With professional discretion in each nation without 
interference from others.] 
However, if the design is already regulated by default, it is all about producing 
statistics exactly to that standard. [Misrepresentation as if it always is 1+ 1 = 2.] 
However, this has not happened in Greece, at least not until the year 2010. 
[Misrepresentation as if the board in 2010 might not have been able to arrive 
at figures acceptable to Eurostat at some point in time.] If one talks about 
false or fake Greek statistics, then what is meant is negligent errors from the 
statutory rules, weak statistical systems or even deliberate misreporting: 
[Radermacher now refers to the situation before March 2010, when NSSG 
was subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, while the relevant discussion of 
                                                                
477 My footnote: Radermachter (2019a:24) states: “In European statistics, the first systematic 
steps in the area of statistical quality were made at the end of the 1990s through cooperation in 
the ESS Leadership Group (LEG) on Quality Initially, the LEG was struggling with difficulties 
inherent in the convergence of two schools of thought: classical approaches from statistical 
methodology and approaches from industrial quality management. It was very much in the spirit 
of W.E. Deming’s view on ‘profound knowledge’, quality management and learning organisations, 
which the LEG had finally elaborated in a synthesis report, including 21 recommendations for 
European statistics (Lyberg et al. 2001).” 
 229 
the “falsification” by director Georgiou relate to his lack of approval by the 
board, see Section 27.1.] 
‘Two different but in some instances linked sets of problems: problems 
related to statistical weaknesses and problems related to failures of the 
relevant Greek institutions in a broad sense. The first set of problems 
concerns methodological weaknesses and unsatisfactory technical 
procedures in the Greek statistical institute (NSSG) and in the several 
other services that provide data and information to the NSSG, in 
particular the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). The second set of problems results from inappropriate 
governance, with poor cooperation and lack of clear responsibilities 
between several Greek institutions and services responsible for the EDP 
[Excessive Debt Procedure] notifications, diffuse personal 
responsibilities, ambiguous empowerment of officials, absence of written 
instruction and documentation, which leave the quality of fiscal statistics 
subject to political pressures and electoral cycle’ (European Commission 
2010: p 4).  
Again, it becomes clear how tight the interlocking of official statistics and political 
action is. It is therefore all the more important to ensure with sound governance 
the independence and strength of the statistical institutions. [Radermacher, 
presenting this in 2019, does not discuss the verdict by the Greek Supreme 
Court in 2018. He does not report that El.Stat in 2010 had an independent 
board of statisticians and econometricians, and that director Georgiou acted 
against the law by not seeking their approval. He does not discuss that he 
assisted Georgiou in violating the law of an EU Member State.] 
Official statistics must be policy-relevant but must not be politically-driven.  
33.4.2 Evaluation 
As DG of Eurostat 2008-2016, Radermacher has been a participant in the 
events concerning Statistics Greece. A normal person might be excused perhaps 
for not taking some distance from such involvement. A scientist, presenting a 
thesis, would be required to take some distance, and also report about conflicting 
evidence. 
• Radermacher must have known in 2010 that the new Greek law of March 
2010 was changed in December 2010, to enhance the position of the director 
and to reduce the position of the board. (See also p223.) His text hides the 
director’s error in 2010 (which was evident at the time, and for which he was 
convicted in 2018). Radermacher displays the situation as if there is a clear-
cut case of a director acting properly and maltreated by others, but since 2010 
he must have known that the situation was different. 
• A fortioiri: Radermacher’s 2019 thesis should have mentioned and discussed 
the Greek Supreme Court decision of 2018. Radermacher cannot convincingly 
argue that he would not have known about the existence of that decision, as 
he refers to the various protests in statistical circles. He would know that the 
Greek Supreme Court decision was correct. (PM. One reference by 
Radermacher is to the ASA letter of September 2017 but this refers to the 
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conviction of Andreas Georgiou in August 2017 by the Appeals Court for not 
putting the disputed deficit figures to the then Board of El.Stat for approval 
prior to public release. Radermacher also refers to the ISI website, that has a 
“recommendation” of Georgiou after his June 2018 conviction by the Greek 
Supreme Court. 478) 
Since Radermacher knew better in 2010, his treatment of the case can only be 
diagnosed as a deliberately false description of the actual events. 
With respect to the EU rule on non-contractual liability and of compensating 
Member States for damages done by its servants, cited above, it is incriminating 
evidence that Eurostat in 2010 knew that the director had to seek approval by the 
board, but accepted figures form the director that had not received such approval. Still, 
potentially, Eurostat might say: “When we received the figures in 2010, then we 
assumed that the director had taken all relevant steps for approval, and we were not 
aware of any illegal act (as has now been established, irrevocably, by the Greek 
Supreme Court in 2018).” However, Eurostat never expressed surprise about the 
accusation of bypassing the board, and it only contested the legal base for doing so, 
whence we can infer that Radermacher knew about the bypassing. The argument that 
Eurostat thought that Georgiou had the legal authority cannot convince, since Eurostat 
assisted in changing the law. The damage must be related to Section 27.4 in this book. 
However, the Greek law was changed in December 2010, so one might argue that the 
damage was limited. The argument then becomes that Eurostat with false arguments 
persued the dogma of the single head (chief) of a National Statistical Office. As 
clarified in this book, this puts each NSO in the EU at risk. 
33.5 National accounts and environmental economics 
33.5.1 National accounts and eSNI  
Hueting & De Boer (2019) discuss national accounts and environmentally 
Sustainable National Income (eSNI). Hueting’s thesis in 1974 (English translation 
1980) established that the environment because of scarcity had become part of 
the subject matter of economics. National accounting thus also had to include the 
environment. Alongside standard national income (NI = GDP) there is 
environmentally sustainable national income (eSNI = eGDP), and of interest is the 
gap eΔ = NI – eSNI = GDP – eGDP, see also Tinbergen & Hueting (1991). For 
this measurement, it is crucial to understand that social preferences cannot be 
properly expressed or observed. Market prices do not include all environmental 
costs, and consumers are disinformed. A way to get rich is to exploit natural 
resources without regards for future generations. Since measurement is 
impossible because of distorted prices, Hueting’s solution was to make conditional 
assumptions on preferences on environmental sustainability. The NI figure derives 
from the “what if market prices are alright” and the eSNI figure derives from the 
“what if humanity would prefer conservation of the environment”. By these 
assumptions, eΔ gives a statistical measurement of the distance to environmental 
sustainability. This is the only theoretically satisfying manner to measure 
                                                                
478 https://isi-
web.org/images/2018/Citation%20for%20Andreas%20Georgiou%20Sep%202018.pdf 
 231 
environmental sustainability. Once the idea has been formulated, the approach is 
a no-brainer for econometricians. 
Colignatus (2020a) concludes: 
“With his background in business economics and venture into 
environmental accounting, Radermacher apparently lacked the 
theoretical framework of welfare economics and national accounting to 
grasp the Tinbergen & Hueting approach.” 
When Radermacher read the work by Hueting, he apparently was not keen 
enough to observe his deficiency in background and need to repair this. The 
reader is referred to Colignatus (2020a) for a deconstruction of Radermacher 
(1994), Brouwer, O’Connor & Radermacher (1999), and Radermacher (2019a). 
For the present purposes it suffices to restate the deconstruction of the 1994 
paper. 
33.5.2 Colignatus (2020a) about Radermacher (1994) 
QUOTE 
Radermacher (1994) has this abstract: 
“A standard demand made in connection with structural economic reform, 
ecological tax reforms and the like is that national product computation be 
corrected in order to obtain a ‘Green GDP’. Prices ought no longer to ‘tell 
the truth’ only in individual cases but also at the macroeconomic level, 
and take into account the scarcity of natural resources. This contribution 
analyses the chances of meeting this demand in practice. It is shown that 
the opportunities of obtaining information and the knowledge available 
are so limited that the statistical implementation of theoretical models has 
not been successful. This means that the informational problem is no 
longer a marginal issue but of a central nature and must influence the 
way theoretical models are set up.” 
While, Hueting et al. (1991, 1992d) presented a practical approach to an 
unsolvable problem, Radermacher (1994:35) looks at their paper and answers: “so 
far, there have not been any feasible models or practicable [sic] approaches to this 
complex of novel problems.” 
Radermacher (1994:48) section 4.2 discusses and rejects eSNI: 
“Hueting considers ‘sustainable standards’ as values that can be 
determined in an objective and scientific way. This opinion must be 
rejected here. In the case of CO2, for instance, Hueting takes the natural 
receptivity as a basis. Closer examination shows, however, that this 
uptake capacity can be estimated on a global scale only – if estimation is 
possible at all – while the Dutch, German or Brazilian share can be 
ascertained only by solving a problem of distribution [35]. (...) In other 
words, setting national standards for individual types of pressures cannot 
be the task of statistics. After all the standards have definitely been fixed, 
it is of course possible to calculate also an a posteriori Green National 
Product.” 
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Thus, while these standards can be derived from the scientific literature, 
Radermacher confuses this with politics. Hueting doesn’t recall that Radermacher 
sent him a copy of this publication. Quite likely, if Radermacher had done so, then 
Hueting would have responded, in this Statistical Journal of the United Nations 
ECE. Journal editors should take notice when a third researcher’s analysis is 
misrepresented. Researchers mentioned in the list of references should rather be 
alerted about the existence of such discussion. It is worrysome when authors are 
not keen enough to do this themselves. 
The argument in the latter quote does not get a sound proof in the article. 
Scientists can provide for measures for distribution. When you haven’t studied 
distribution then it might seem a daunting issue, like each subject is daunting if 
you haven’t studied it. The criterion that standards must be definitively fixed also 
falls from the sky. Radermacher only expresses opinions, perhaps popular 
opinions, but it is worrying that he isn’t aware that it are merely opinions, and that 
he doesn’t try to figure out why he has arrived at such opinions, and that he 
doesn’t mind presenting Hueting as someone who is confused about science and 
opinions. 
There can be an issue of “fairness” e.g. on the weights attached to P A T 
(population, affluence or GDP, technology) 479 but also land and livestock and 
footprint. One can also imagine that “pollution rights” generate trades about those 
rights. However, “fairness” is not at issue here.  
The purpose of the eSNI measure is to indicate the distance eΔ = NI – eSNI, 
and it suffices to make an adequate distribution that generates environmental 
sustainability when eΔ = 0. Hueting & De Boer (2019:103) apply proportional 
reduction. If CO2 emissions must be reduced by 80% for the whole world for the 
return to pre-industrial levels, then it must be 80% in each country. This would 
seem to allow larger polluters to maintain a higher standard of living, but, again, 
eSNI is not intended for the policy issue of distribution of pollution rights, but only 
to provide an adquate measure for the distance to environmental sustainability. 
They also mention the usefulness of sensitivity analses. 480 
Radermacher (1994) puts eSNI in a cupboard and throws away the key, while it 
would be more sensible to develop it and perform sensitivity analysis indeed. He 
also should have alerted Hueting to his article for the option to respond. 
UNQUOTE 
33.5.3 Evaluation 
At the time of writing this, THAENAES still is a draft. Some points have been 
stated here, but the reader is advised to check for updates of THAENAES. The 
major conclusion about Radermacher’s position and role is unlikely to change 
much though.  
From 1994 to his 2019 thesis, Radermacher consistently misrepresents or 
burkes the Tinbergen & Hueting approach. The environment was his original 
subject in statistics and he failed in grasping the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, 
                                                                
479 Wikipedia is no source but a portal: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_%3D_PAT 
480 If one country has achieved eΔ = 0 and the world would still require 80% reduction, then this 
country should not be affected. Hueting & De Boer (2019) do not state this. All countries are so 
far from environmental sustainability that this aspect is not relevant yet. 
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and misrepresented science as politics. Radermacher (2019a) does not refer to 
the Tinbergen and Hueting approach. This is burking. The thesis must be retracted 
for omitting this approach. He should at least have mentioned it, including his 
argument why Tinbergen & Hueting would confuse statistics and politics, so that 
others could see that Radermacher was confused on this himself (and so that the 
thesis would not be acceptable on that count as well). 
Radermacher is duly motivated to keep politics out of statistics. There is a 
distinction between politics and statistics and what he perceives as “politics” and 
“statistics”. This is a somewhat difficult issue. Either you trust other scientists (your 
doctor) or you don’t, but in the latter case you have to create your own idea what 
this other science would be, and soon you are both incompetent and opinionated 
about areas that you haven’t studied.  
Radermacher’s “international acknowledgement” (as mentioned in some other 
CVs of his) perhaps derived from his blocking of the Tinbergen & Hueting 
approach when it was unpopular in many circles. Radermacher’s confusion on 
politics and statistics has been a major stumbling block for adoption of green 
accouting in both Europe in general and at Eurostat in particular. With Walter 
Radermacher as DG and single authority for European statistics, scientists would 
have a hard time to show him that he was confused and wrong since at least 1994 
about national accounting and the measurement of environmental sustainability. It 
is better to have a board with more options and diversity. 
33.6 Conclusion 
As already stated: Radermacher fails in science on the issues of (i) national 
accounting and environmental economics, and (ii) Statistics Greece. The 
Radermacher (2019a) thesis doesn’t do science but presents opinions, and 
actually also opinions that are contrary to empirics. The thesis should be retracted. 
Our current topic of discussion concerns the governance and integrity of national 
statistical offices. Potentially Radermacher still has performed well as DG of 
Eurostat, but we have not aspired at such an evaluation in general.  
33.7 PM. Radermacher (2019b) 
In the IAOS journal (see Appendix 41.3) Volume 35 Issue 4, December 2019 
issue, we find Radermacher (2019b) about the governance of official statistics. 481 
It is labeled as a research article but it is more a review of perspectives. Its title 
and abstract are: 
“Governing-by-the-numbers/Statistical governance: Reflections on the 
future of official statistics in a digital and globalised society  
Abstract: The growing importance of statistical evidence, data and 
information for political decisions is reflected in the handy and popular 
formulation ’Data for Policy’ (D4P). Under this cover, well-known guiding 
themes, such as the modernisation of the public sector, or evidence-
informed policy-making, are led to new solutions with new technologies 
and infinitely rich data sources. Data for Policy means more to official 
statistics than just new data, techniques and methods. It is not least a 
                                                                
481 https://content.iospress.com/journals/statistical-journal-of-the-iaos/35/4 
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matter of securing an important function and position for official statistics 
in the Policy for Data of the future. In order to justify this position, it is 
necessary to have a clear understanding of the tasks of official statistics 
for the functioning of (democratic) societies, with a view to how these 
tasks have to be reinterpreted under changing conditions (above all 
because of digitisation and globalisation).” 
He uses a peculiar terminology: “Data are given, facts are made.” (p534), which 
suits Latin (datum = given, factum = made, done 482) but not current conventions 
and dictionaries. 483 Like any business cannot do without information 
(‘management without facts’), he explains that also governments require 
information. On p525-526 he reasons from Is to Ought (contrary to Hume 484): 
“It becomes clear that the production of statistics is closely linked to the 
making of the state and that statistics are an essential prerequisite for 
any form of government. On the other hand, the governance of a state 
has an enormous influence on official statistics, their mode of production, 
their quality, their independence and their proximity (or distance) to 
citizens. (...) Official statistics are part of the public administration that 
provides services that are of fundamental importance for a society. Which 
services are involved, where the border between the private and public 
sectors lies and how to ensure that these services are provided with the 
requested efficiency and effectiveness are questions and topics for which 
there is more than just one correct answer. Rather, different forms and 
solutions of governance have emerged over the course of history and for 
different political cultures. Contrary to the trend observed internationally 
in recent decades towards the privatisation of health and education 
sectors, transport and other network infrastructure, periodically recurring 
discussions about the possible privatisation of official statistics (at least 
so far) have quickly disappeared into nowhere. For this reason, it can be 
assumed that official statistics belong to the core of inalienable public 
services." 
There are many words about integrity but they sound shallow when we consider 
the points of criticism. 
 
                                                                
482 http://latindictionary.wikidot.com/verb:facere 
483 https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fact?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld 
484 A portal and no source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem 
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34. Gerrit Zalm, director of CPB 1989-1994, minister 1994~2007 
 
34.1 Curriculum vitae 2017 
Dutch economist Gerrit Zalm is the current chairman of the CBS Advisory Board 
till 2022 (and re-appointable), 485 formerly known as the Central Commission for 
Statistics (CCS) before the change of the law in 2016, see Chapter 21. 
Though Zalm is Dutch, a cv of Zalm can be found at Danske Bank, 486 where he 
joined the board in 2019. After graduating as an economist at VU Amsterdam in 
1975, his employment was: 
 
2010-2017 CEO and chairman, ABN AMRO Group & ABN AMRO Bank 
2009-2010 CEO and chairman, ABN AMRO Bank 
2008-2009 Chief Financial Officer, DSB Bank NV 
2007-2008 Chief Economist, DSB Bank NV 
2003-2007 Finance Minister [Balkenende II Cabinet] and Deputy Prime Minister 
2002-2003 Parliamentary Leader of the People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy 
1994-2002 Finance Minister [Paars I and II Cabinets] 
1989-1994 Director, Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis [Central Planning 
Bureau (CPB)] 
1989-1994 Professor Economic Policy, Vrije Universiteit [VU] Amsterdam 
1988-1989 Deputy Director, Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
1985-1988 Director, General Economic Policy, Ministry of Economic Affairs 
1983-1985 Deputy Director, General Economic Policy, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 
1981-1983 Deputy Director, Budgetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance 
1975-1981 Various positions in the Ministry of Finance 
 
34.2 Switch from Ministry to scientific CPB 
Zalm originally worked at the Dutch Ministry of Finance and subsequently the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, i.e. positions within the government bureaucracy. 
Subsequently, he was given a position at CPB, which is considered a position in 
science, first as deputy director in 1988 and then as director in 1989-1994.  
• The move from bureaucracy to science met with (neglected) protests.  
• One would also regard it as a sign of bureaucratic incompetence when a 
bureaucrat thinks that he or she can do science. 
                                                                
485 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/over-ons/organisatie/raad-van-advies 
486 https://danskebank.com/-/media/danske-bank-com/file-cloud/2019/3/gerrit-zalm---english-
cv.pdf?rev=ad9fbd47f2264a1e8310e1e5314f3374&hash=036618D4A12EE7D657BD37B603AD
B0FE 
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• As director of CPB Zalm made errors against science, see Sections 2.1 and 
34.3. These are not studied in Holland but merely because they aren’t studied.  
I have not been able to locate a list of scientific publications by Zalm. It seems 
that only his period at CPB can be called “scientific”, parallel to the professorship 
in economics at his alma mater VU Amsterdam. VU in 2008 gave Zalm a honorary 
PhD for the formal reason of a trend rule for government expenditure. 487 
Remarkably, Zalm did not quite stick to that rule himself. My suggestion is that we 
drop the illusion that Zalm would know what science is and accept that his mindset 
has always been of a policy maker or politician, thus also while at CPB. 
34.3 Problem since 1990, and disclaimer 
The present author worked as an econometrician in the position of scientific co-
worker at CPB in 1982-1991. 488 In 1990 Zalm blocked my work from internal 
discussion and the process for external publication, which is censorship of 
science. The Dutch civil servants court allowed this to happen, but the court did 
not apply scientific criteria (focusing on the “civil servant” and not the “science” 
element in the job description), and only observed that the directorate had the 
legal position to do as it wished. Zalm abused his power to change my 
employment position, blocking my access to the mainframe computer so that I 
could not run a model exercise on my analysis on unemployment, and was 
corrected by the court for an abuse of power (“detournement de pouvoir”). 489 
Subsequently, I was dismissed in 1991, with untruths and based upon that abuse 
of power in 1990, but the civil servant court let this happen. The directorate still 
had to give a reason why my position had been changed in 1990, but declined to 
do so, whence I was officially re-instated in my old position. The CPB lawyers and 
court overlooked that the change in position, now undone, had still been used for 
the dismissal. In sum, the Dutch system doesn’t provide adequate protection for 
science against censorship of science and abuse of power.  
Observe that censorship since 1990 is not a one-time affair but continues to this 
day. Outsiders don’t know what it is about, till the censorship is lifted. Also the 
CPB directorate may not know what it is about, since they blocked internal 
discussion and computer modeling on my analysis. Apparently the directorate did 
not appreciate my advice of a parliamentarian enquiry into unemployment 
including the role of advice by CPB, but one cannot just look at a summary 
conclusion without considering the underlying reasoning.  
Statements since 1990 by the CPB directorate about economics and economic 
planning are based upon such censorship and abuse of power, and are 
misleading to fellow economists, parliament and the general public. Dutch 
economists fail in their critical function. My suggestion to the world is to boycott 
Holland till the censorship of science by the directorate of CPB is lifted. 490 
Compared to “Greek statistics”, the situation can be labeled “Dutch economics”. 
                                                                
487 https://www.rijksbegroting.nl/binaries/pdfs/this-site-in-english/public-finance.pdf 
488 Function informationform: 
http://thomascool.eu/Thomas/Nederlands/TPnCPB/Record/1987/05/28/FIF.html 
489 http://thomascool.eu/Thomas/Nederlands/TPnCPB/Pers/DeDraad3.html 
490 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
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34.4 Maintaining a neutral distance 
I maintain a neutral distance to CPB and (former) colleagues and regard them 
as witnesses to be heard in a potential parliamentarian enquiry. 
Obviously I have much better things to do than monitor what former CPB 
director Gerrit Zalm is doing. Occasionally there are moments when I think that 
people might wisen up, and that they might see that he is not the competent 
economist that many think he is. 
It must also be observed that Zalm has been a key actor in Dutch society since 
his appointment as director of CPB in 1989. It would be strange if I would not 
discuss some of his deeds too.  
In 2015 I made this overview (in Dutch) of my sporadic comments, 491 at the 
occasion of the decision by ABN AMRO to raise the salaries of its board by EUR 
100,000 each (excluding Zalm), while the bank had been saved by public funds 
and was still in public property (after the Fortis debacle).  
34.5 Reasons for discussion 
Zalm became the Dutch minister of Finance in 1994-2002 and 2003-2007. There 
are some reasons to discuss aspects, and those reasons themselves differ from 
the aspects themselves: 
• His policy record as minister of Finance seemed succesful for the Dutch 
economy, but was based upon the low wage policy that exports 
unemployment, and that causes problems for other countries (like Southern 
Europe), see Section 16.2. Originally the low wage policy caused a rising 
exchange rate for the Dutch guilder, but that was resolved by the euro. See 
Colignatus (2009b), here Chapter 15, while Colignatus (2014b), here Chapter 
17, evaluates what former IMF managing director Johannes Witteveen (1921-
2019) thought about this. 492 See a curious confusion at Delft Technical 
University also concerning German export surplusses. 493 
• In the first cabinet, Zalm helped create the euro (with its strict rules) and 
allowed the entry of Greece in the Eurozone, and dismissed critical questions 
by professor of international economics and member of parliament Henk de 
Haan, instead of answering in detail, and setting up closer monitoring. 494 
Google translate: “De Haan was told by Greek fellow professors that the 
budget submitted to the EU by the Greek government was wrong, but he had 
no hard evidence that the country came up with flattering figures.” 
• In 2003, when Germany and France broke the Stability and Growth Pact, Zalm 
lost the vote for maintaining it, but did not draw the conclusion that something 
was wrong about the rules. 495 
• When Zalm was CEO of ABN AMRO, the WSJ reported: “While ABN Amro 
doesn't hold any Greek sovereign debt, the bank is indirectly exposed to the 
                                                                
491 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2015-04-03-Wetenschappelijk-protest-
tav-Gerrit-Zalm-1988-2015.pdf 
492 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2014-05-21-Comments-on-Valedictory-
Lecture-by-Witteveen.html 
493 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2017/05/13/disinformation-and-trauma-at-tu-delft/ 
494 Portal no source: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henk_de_Haan_(econoom) 
495 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2870055/France-and-Germany-smash-Euro-pact.html 
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country's debt through €1.4 billion in loans to public transport and utility 
companies. If these firms fail to meet their obligations, the Greek government 
will have to step in. ABN Amro hasn't experienced any payment problems yet, 
but it said that it is highly doubtful that it will get all its money back.” 496 Also: 
“ABN Amro was nationalized during the financial crisis in 2008 as a part of a 
rescue program for the former Benelux financial services giant Fortis. (...) The 
Dutch state, which spent around €27 billion to prop up the bank, aims to return 
ABN Amro to the market after 2013, preferably through a stock-market listing.” 
This also helps to indicate that the Dutch government after 2009 had more 
interest as a creditor to Greece than merely the first Memorandum of 2010. 
34.6 CPB and eSNI since 1993 
Hueting reports that Zalm (CPB-directorate) in 1993 tried to get the Dutch ESB 
journal to retract Hueting’s article on environmentally sustainable national income 
(eSNI). The editor rejected the CPB false arguments and abusive language. 497 
34.7 Srebrenica 1995 
The 1994-2002 cabinets allowed the genocide at Srebrenica in 1995 498 and 
waited till 2002 to resign to take their responsibility, 499 requiring an “investigation” 
to see it. A Dutch court ruled that the cabinet was partly responsible for the death 
of about 350 men located at the Dutch compound and surrendered to the Serbian 
army. 500 All the while Zalm presented him as merely the minister of Finance and 
“bookkeeper” but this attitude means that he dodged the collective responsibility of 
a cabinet and the essential questions that were clear to see. 
34.8 Tax plan of 1998 for the 21st century 
A tax plan of 1998 was based upon a lie, 501 see also Colignatus (2013b). 502 
34.9 The murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 
In 2002, Zalm contributed to the climate of hate that eventually resulted into the 
murder of Pim Fortuyn, 503 see Colignatus (2004). 504 
Zalm turned out to be an unreliable coalition partner, and steered towards a 
frustration of Fortuyn’s voters, 505 which frustration still is an open wound in Dutch 
society, with e.g. the rise of politicians like Geert Wilders. After the death of 
Fortuyn his party LPF was in chaos, but Zalm might have worked with its official 
leader and vice-premier and fellow-economist Eduard Bomhoff, but Zalm ended 
the coalition (“pulling the plug”) when Bomhoff questioned the position of CPB. 506 
                                                                
496 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203699404577045471766969222 
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498 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre 
499 https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/17/world/dutch-cabinet-resigns-over-failure-to-halt-bosnian-
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500 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/europe/srebrenica-bosnia-dutch-netherlands.html 
501 https://thomascool.eu/Thomas/Nederlands/Wetenschap/Artikelen/Heffingskorting.html 
502 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47071/ 
503 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ksj0ArI5QM 
504 https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpgt/0405001.html 
505 https://www.groene.nl/artikel/bij-het-aftreden-van-gerrit-zalm 
506 https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2002/10/26/ik-ben-er-bijna-dacht-ik-7611615-a131209 
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34.10 In banking and the DSB bankruptcy in 2009 
My knowledge of the (“Dirk Scheringa Bank”) DSB case is, obviously, very 
limited. There are huge dossiers at the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the 
financial markets authority (AFM) of which I am oblivious. I can make some 
remarks on consistency and common sense.  
To my surprise, Scheringa on January 27 2020 annouced court proceedings 
concerning the bankruptcy in 2009, to recover part of his losses. 507 
34.10.1 Prime events 
In 2007 Zalm became Chief Economist at DSB, for two days per week. He 
became its Chief Financial Officer (CFO) from December 3 2007 till February 1 
2009 (recorded in his CV as 2008-2009). 
In October 2008, there was the debacle with Fortis, and the Dutch government 
nationalised parts, creating a renewed ABN AMRO. In November 2008, Zalm was 
asked by minister of Finance Wouter Bos to become its CEO per March 1 2009.  
In October 2009 DSB collapsed. 508 509 510 A consumer group claimed that the 
bank had sold 250,000 mortgages combined with life insurances, in ways that are 
illegal in Holland (“koppelverkoop”). 511 Apparently, the bankruptcy is handled 
without cases in the penal court, though there have been “management fines”, and 
the accountant of bookyear 2008 was disciplined. 
34.10.2 A string of investigations 
The Dutch law on financial oversight (WFT) stipulated that a bankruptcy is 
investigated by the supervisers (who might have failed themselves), who also 
must re-check the bankrupt company officers for their competence (for their future 
life in business).  
There were two supervising agencies for DSB: 
• The Dutch Central Bank (DNB, president Nout Wellink, former chair of BIS), 512 
part of the EuroSystem, was the supervising authority for both DSB, as a 
bank, and the appointment of bank board officers at DSB. 
• The authority on financial markets (AFM), 513 member of the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), looked at the effect of DSB policies 
for customers.  
• Thus, AFM wants to protect customers (perhaps at the cost of profits) and 
DNB wants to protect the regulatory framework and financial stability (perhaps 
maintaining profits even at the cost of customers). 
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512 https://www.dnb.nl/en/consumers/supervision/depositogarantiestelsel/dossier-
dsb/dnb223286.jsp# 
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Dutch parliament requested that an independent investigation was required to 
also evaluate the performance of the supervising agencies. Supervision might 
have prevented a bankruptcy in the first place. What went wrong ? It would not be 
acceptable that DNB would investigate its own performance and be a judge about 
itself. Similarly for AFM. 
Thus the minister of Finance set up a double investigation. 514  
(i) A DSB-commission 515 was formed to investigate the cause of the bankruptcy, 
which produced their report on June 23 2010. 516 A way to understand this 
report is to look at a report about a symposium on it. 517 Members of the 
commission were (1) Michiel Scheltema, chair (see below), (2) Edgar du 
Perron, 518 professor in private law, who also looked at IceSave, now member 
of the Dutch Supreme Court, (3) Kees Koedijk, 519 professor in financial 
management, and (4) Leo Graafsma RA , (KPMG) banking accountant. 
(ii) There came an independent check on the re-check by DNB and AFM on the 
personal performance of the DSB officers (and especially Zalm), and their 
expertise and reliability. This job was given to Scheltema in person. Thus 
there is also a letter by Scheltema to the minister of Finance of February 26 
2010. 520 521 The discussion in parliament was on March 17 & April 7 2010. 522 
34.10.3 What was Scheltema requested to do ? 
The government letter (no. 31371-271) asked Scheltema to judge Zalm’s 
performance and the performance of the supervisors: 523 524  
(p1) "This concerns an investigation into the course of affairs at DSB Bank, the 
conduct of (former) directors and DSB supervisory board members (...)"  
(p2) "2. How did the management board and supervisory board of DSB Bank 
function during the investigation period?" 
(p3) “On the basis of this, the third party will assess whether DNB and AFM have 
carried out their work with due care and whether they have been reasonably 
able to arrive at their judgments with regard to the tested persons.” 
                                                                
514 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31371-271.html 
515 https://maxius.nl/instellingsbesluit-commissie-van-onderzoek-dsb-bank/artikel1 
516 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2010/06/29/rapport-van-de-commissie-
van-onderzoek-dsb-bank 
517 https://www.keijservandervelden.nl/nl/publicaties/13-publicaties-nl/publicaties-peter-
laaper/127-lessen-uit-het-rapport-scheltema 
518 https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-
Nederlanden/Over-de-Hoge-Raad/Raad/Paginas/Mr.-C.E.-(Edgar)-du-Perron.aspx 
519 https://www.mejudice.nl/ 
520 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-56063 
521 http://media.rtl.nl/media/financien/rtlz/2010/toets.pdf 
522 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31371-325.html 
523 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31371-271.html 
524 Dutch: (p1) “Het betreft een onderzoek naar de gang van zaken bij DSB Bank, de handelwijze 
van (voormalige) bestuurders en commissarissen (...)” and (p2) “2. Hoe hebben het bestuur en 
de raad van commissarissen van DSB Bank gefunctioneerd tijdens de te onderzoeken periode?” 
and (p3) “De derde zal aan de hand hiervan toetsen of DNB en AFM hun werkzaamheden 
zorgvuldig hebben uitgevoerd en of zij in redelijkheid tot hun oordelen ten aanzien van de 
getoetste personen hebben kunnen komen.” 
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34.10.4 Why Scheltema ? 
It is not clear why minister of Finance Wouter Bos asked Scheltema 525 526 527 to 
chair the committee and also do the check on the recheck. Scheltema had a 
background in administrative law, and not in banking and bankruptcies. 
(Scheltema actually introduced the Dutch legal thinking about Quangos (ZBO).) 
It is not clear why Scheltema accepted the task instead of pointing out that he 
was clearly incompetent for such a task.  
Remarkably, I have not found discussions about his competence. It seems that I 
am the only person now to wonder why Scheltema with his background was asked 
to chair this commission and do this special check,  
In this kind of investigation, a Ministry of Finance already tends to know what 
could be possible and desirable outcomes of such investigation, and selects 
committee members of the relevant backgrounds who are likely to produce the 
most desired outcome. The incongruous background of Scheltema in 
administrative law suggests that the Ministery of Finance wanted an administrative 
law answer to a material question. 
34.10.5 Scheltema’s legal approach, and not material approach 
When discussing Zalm’s performance, Scheltema 2010-02-26 has a legal and 
not material approach. This is not different in the final June report. 
• Scheltema observes that DNB is the relevant authority and that their judgment 
is the only one that is interesting. DNB sanctioned the appointment of Zalm as 
CFO at DSB in 2007, and judged his performance as good in 2008 for the 
appointment at ABN AMRO. Only this is relevant for a legal view. Scheltema 
2010-02-26 p17 states that DNB took the AFM objections serious but merely 
arrived at a different judgement, while DNB is the final authority. 
• AFM judged that Zalm had no background as CFO, and thought that he also 
should be dismissed as CEO of ABN AMRO (June report p53, Newspaper 
reports 528 529 530). It can also be observed that Zalm himself should have 
observed that he did not have the qualifications of a CFO. However, 
Scheltema judged that AFM had no authority w.r.t. the appointment of chief 
officers, which authority resided with DNB.  
• Hence Scheltema judged that DNB was the relevant authority, and he restated 
the DNB judgement that Zalm had performed well and could continue as CEO 
of ABN AMRO. For Scheltema’s legal mind: case closed. 
Remarkably, this entirely legal approach was reported in the Dutch media as a 
material confirmation of Zalm’s competence and professional integrity.  
While the task given to Scheltema was that he would perform an independent 
check, to prevent DNB and AFM judging their own performances, Scheltema only 
restated that DNB was the legally relevant authority. 
                                                                
525 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lln9o3zq/m_michiel_scheltema 
526 https://www.knaw.nl/nl/leden/leden/4746 
527 Portal and no source: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michiel_Scheltema 
528 https://www.nu.nl/nuzakelijk-overig/2195893/afm-wilde-vertrek-zalm.html 
529 https://www.volkskrant.nl/economie/afm-houdt-vast-aan-ontslag-van-zalm~b12a5542/ 
530 https://www.parool.nl/nieuws/zalm-blijft-aan-ondanks-harde-kritiek-afm~baf3de36/ 
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With this legal position taken, Scheltema follows the legal manner of applying 
arguments selectively to support an already taken point of view, and he is not 
trying to use the evidence to reject a desired hypothesis. 
Apart from this strict legal backbone, the Scheltema letter also contains other 
statements, more on content, that distract from the backbone. It is always a nice 
legal trick to make it seem as if you also have material considerations. Apparently 
the Dutch media were distracted indeed. For example, Scheltema’s main 
argument “on content” would seem to be in his letter of 2010-02-26 p19. 531 
“When Mr Zalm left [DSB] because of his appointment to AAB [ABN 
AMRO Bank], DNB was concerned about the situation that this would 
create. Mr Zalm, too, was of the opinion that he left too early because his 
work was not yet finished. It was difficult for DNB to imagine a suitable 
successor and considered measures. Deploring Mr Zalm's departure is 
difficult to reconcile with the idea that he would be insufficiently skilled. It 
should be noted that DNB was well aware of the situation at DSB.” 
This one-sided presentation must be compared with the view by AFM. In the 
Scheltema report of June 23 2010, AFM is critical about the credit policy, p145, in 
which Zalm supported the profitability of DSB by allowing high loan-to-income 
ratios. Professor of banking Arnoud Boot advises since 1995 that such loans be 
regulated, 532 533 but Zalm as minister of Finance had continued allowing them. 
Recall what Scheltema had been asked to do, Section 34.10.3. Scheltema 
however answered a different question: he namely answered as if the question 
was “who is the proper supervising authority ?”, and then replied that DNB was the 
supervising authority on the appointment of officers. 
Remarkably, I cannot find critical discussions that highlight this strict legality of 
the Scheltema report, and which discussions expose the report as fundamentally 
deficient for a check on actual performance. 
34.10.6 Reliability, professional and personal integrity 
The letter by minister of Finance Wouter Bos about the investigations spoke 
about expertise and reliability. (Dutch: “deskundigheid en betrouwbaarheid”.) In his 
letter Scheltema repeatedly refers to these words but on p12 suddenly switches to 
personal integrity. Scheltema 2010-02-26 p12 (my emphasis): 534 
                                                                
531 Dutch: “Bij het vertrek van de heer Zalm wegens zijn benoeming bij AAB was DNB bezorgd 
over de situatie die daardoor zou ontstaan. Ook de heer Zalm was van mening dat hij te vroeg 
vertrok omdat zijn werk nog niet af was. DNB kon zich moeilijk een geschikte opvolger indenken, 
en overwoog maatregelen. Het betreuren van het vertrek van de heer Zalm laat zich moeilijk 
rijmen met de gedachte dat hij onvoldoende deskundig zou zijn. Daarbij verdient opmerking dat 
DNB goed op de hoogte was van de situatie bij DSB.” 
532 https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/artikel/162911/twintig-jaar-woekerpolis-en-we-zijn-er-nog-
lang-niet-vanaf 
533 https://www.groene.nl/artikel/verzekeringsmaffia 
534 Dutch: “De herbeoordeling leidt tot de conclusie dat de heer Zalm voldoet aan de eisen van 
deskundigheid om het dagelijks beleid van AAB te bepalen en dat zijn betrouwbaarheid buiten 
twijfel staat. Het stuk van DNB waarin dit oordeel is neergelegd bevat een uitvoerige weergave 
van de feitelijke grondslag en van de overwegingen waarop deze conclusie is gebaseerd. Het 
accent ligt daarbij op de toetsing van de deskundigheid; op het punt van de betrouwbaarheid 
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“The reassessment leads to the conclusion that Mr. Zalm meets the 
requirements of expertise to determine the daily policy of AAB [ABN 
AMRO Bank] and that his reliability is beyond doubt. The DNB 
document in which this opinion is stated contains a detailed account of 
the factual basis and the considerations on which this conclusion is 
based. The emphasis is on the assessment of expertise; with regard to 
reliability, it is stated that there are no antecedents that affect Mr Zalm's 
personal integrity. When assessing expertise, the period of Mr. Zalm at 
DSB is central, but also at AAB.” 
Observe: 
• Scheltema changes reliability (professional integrity) into personal integrity. An 
example of the difference: When X dies, and you ask “Did X just die or was X 
murdered ?”, then the answer “X died” would tend to show personal integrity 
because the answer is not a straight lie (though dropping the word “just”), but 
the answers “X was murdered” or “X died but wasn’t murdered” would show 
reliability or professional integrity, because such provide a proper answer to 
the question (and one would give the right answer). 
• Scheltema basically restates that DNB is responsible for the banks, and that 
DNB judged about DSB and the first year at ANB AMRO, and that DNB was 
satisfied. Scheltema still allows DNB to judge its own performance, contrary to 
his task. 
• Scheltema later focuses on Zalm’s role for ABN AMRO, contrary to his 
statement now that the period at DSB would be central (too). 
34.10.7 A flexible period for evaluation 
A newspaper report of March 15 2010: 535 536 
“The opinion by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets on 
ABN CEO Gerrit Zalm was only based on his work at DSB Bank. His 
performance as a minister and his initial period at ABN Amro were hardly 
considered in the judgment. Professor Michiel Scheltema said this 
Monday for the Permanent Committee of the Second Chamber. (...) 
Scheltema examined the opinions by AFM and De Nederlandsche Bank 
                                                                                                                                      
wordt gesteld dat er geen sprake is van antecedenten die de persoonlijke integriteit van de heer 
Zalm raken. Bij de beoordeling van de deskundigheid staat de periode van de heer Zalm bij DSB 
centraal, maar wordt tevens ingegaan op die bij AAB.” 
535 https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/artikel/3514911/scheltema-kijk-afm-op-functioneren-zalm-
was-beperkt 
536 Dutch: “Het oordeel dat de Autoriteit Financiële Markten gaf over ABN-topman Gerrit Zalm 
was alleen gebaseerd op zijn werk bij DSB Bank. Zijn functioneren als minister en zijn 
beginperiode bij ABN Amro werden bijna niet betrokken bij het oordeel. Dat zei professor Michiel 
Scheltema maandag voor de Vaste Kamercommissie van de Tweede Kamer. (...) Scheltema 
bekeek op verzoek van de Kamer de oordelen van AFM en De Nederlandsche Bank over Zalm. 
Volgens Scheltema moet een toezichthouder bij het beoordelen van de deskundigheid van een 
bestuurder ook kijken naar algemene leidinggevende capaciteiten, bekeken in de afgelopen vijf 
jaar. ,,Dan is het toch opmerkelijk wanneer je alleen kijkt naar de tijd bij DSB en andere periodes 
er niet bij betrekt'', aldus Scheltema over de negatieve aanbeveling die AFM uiteindelijk aan DNB 
gaf.” 
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about Zalm at the request of the Chamber. According to Scheltema, 
when assessing the expertise of a director, a supervisor must also look at 
general managerial capacities, viewed in the past five years. "Then it is 
remarkable when you only look at the time at DSB and do not involve 
other periods," Scheltema said about the negative recommendation that 
AFM ultimately gave to DNB. " 
Scheltema allows that the evaluation period is taken selectively:  
• When DNB accepts Zalm by only looking at the DSB period, while DNB is the 
dominant supervisor, then the DSB period would suffice for Scheltema. Might 
DNB not have hesitations about Zalm’s acceptance of Greece into the 
Eurozone ? Might DNB not think that Zalm wasn’t quite effective against the 
powerful positions of Germany and France (like with Scheringa at DSB) ? 
What about that Finance minister Zalm didn’t put a stop to “koppelverkoop” ? 
• When AFM criticises Zalm because of the DSB period, then Scheltema 
suggests that a longer period is required, including Zalm’s supposedly 
succesful period as minister of Finance.  
• Scheltema did not look at the period including Zalm’s period as director CPB. 
Scheltema stated on national television that Zalm had a clean reputation before 
he arrived at DSB. If Scheltema had shown professional integrity instead of 
personal integrity, he had listed Zalm’s errors before DSB, and clarified that he 
intentionally ignored them. In 2010, Google already existed 12 years, and 
Scheltema could easily have Googled Zalm’s name to find criticism, and have 
supported an advice to have a parliamentarian enquiry into the censorship of 
science at CPB since 1990. 
34.10.8 My email to the Scheltema commission 2010 
 My email of March 17 2010 537 came after the Scheltema 2010-02-26 letter 
about the competence and reliability of Zalm, and was sent to the Scheltema 
commission. I cannot discern an effect on the June 23 report. 
• Scheltema perhaps did not know about the censorship of science and abuse 
of power by Zalm as director of CPB. Or he did, saying “the last five years”. 
• My public comment of March 2010 is here 538 and another comment of 2012 / 
2015 is here. 539 
34.10.9 Importance of the period of evaluation in the Scheltema setup 
The period for evaluation is rather relevant in Scheltema’s setup. He assigns 
less value to diploma’s and training for a CFO but assigns more value to whether 
you have “made a mistake” in the past – apparenly measured in such manner that 
the outside world has taken notice: 540 
                                                                
537 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2015-04-14-Een-leugen-niet-op-leugens-
nl.html#_Toc416806791 
538 https://www.frontaalnaakt.nl/archives/wil-de-echte-gerrit-zalm-opstaan.html 
539 http://www.thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2015-04-14-Een-leugen-niet-op-
leugens-nl.html 
540 Dutch: “De deskundigheid die aan de beoordeling ten grondslag moet liggen, is een begrip 
dat door beide toezichthouders heel ruim is uitgelegd en wel zo ruim dat die deskundigheid min 
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“The expertise that must form the basis for the assessment is a term that 
has been very broadly interpreted by both supervisors, and that it is so 
broad that this expertise is more or less equated with the question of 
whether good action has been taken in the past. The expertise is in fact 
derived from the way how performance has been in recent times. That is 
a fairly broad explanation. The bottom line is that an expert cannot make 
mistakes, because if he makes a mistake, he is by definition no longer 
expert because he has made a mistake. That is a very broad 
interpretation, but it is used by both supervisors. Perhaps there is not so 
much against this, except that the legal concept could lead to some 
restriction. But if you say that the experiences of recent times are 
decisive for the question whether there is expertise, then it is obvious that 
you will take a certain period of time for that. DNB's guidelines state that it 
concerns the past five years. The AFM's recommendations are almost 
exclusively about the period at DSB, almost not about the period at ABN 
AMRO and not about the period when he was a minister. Since the issue 
is whether he is an expert in his position at ABN AMRO and since 
expertise such as general managerial capacities also play an important 
role and whether you can lead a large organization and whether you can 
maintain your position sufficiently when others contradict you, it is 
remarkable when you only consider the period at the DSB and do not 
include other periods in it. That is one point I have doubts about. I regard 
this as a deficiency in how AFM has looked at the case.” 
Comment: 
• When DNB allowed the appointment of Zalm as CFO at DSB in December 
2007, Zalm had no experience in banking, except a short period as chief 
economist at DSB. It is curious not to require diploma’s and training.  
• Quite likely DNB regarded the period as minister as indication of 
competence but this actually enhances the lack of competence, see below. 
                                                                                                                                      
of meer gelijk wordt gesteld met de vraag of er in het verleden goed is gehandeld. De 
deskundigheid wordt eigenlijk afgeleid uit de manier waarop in de afgelopen tijd is opgetreden. 
Dat is een vrij ruime uitleg. Het komt er haast op neer dat een deskundige geen fouten kan 
maken, want als hij een fout maakt, dan is hij per definitie niet meer deskundig omdat hij een fout 
heeft gemaakt. Dat is wel een heel ruime uitleg, maar die wordt door beide toezichthouders 
gehanteerd. Misschien is daar ook niet zo veel op tegen, behalve dat het wettelijke begrip 
enigszins tot een beperking zou kunnen leiden. Maar als je zegt dat de ervaringen van de 
afgelopen tijd maatgevend zijn voor de vraag of er deskundigheid is, dan ligt het ook voor de 
hand dat je daar een bepaalde periode voor neemt. In de richtlijnen van DNB staat dat het over 
de afgelopen vijf jaar gaat. Bij de aanbevelingen van de AFM gaat het bijna uitsluitend over de 
tijd bij DSB, bijna niet over de tijd bij ABN AMRO en niet over de tijd dat hij minister was. 
Aangezien het gaat over de vraag of hij deskundig is in zijn functie bij ABN AMRO en aangezien 
bij deskundigheid ook dingen als algemene leidinggevende capaciteiten een belangrijke rol 
spelen en de vragen of je een grote organisatie kunt leiden en of je je voldoende staande kunt 
houden als anderen je tegenspreken, is het toch opmerkelijk als je alleen maar kijkt naar de 
periode bij de DSB en die andere periodes daar niet bij betrekt. Dat is één punt waarover ik 
twijfels heb. Dat vind ik een beperking van de manier waarop de AFM naar de zaak heeft 
gekeken.” 
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34.10.10 Scheltema’s smokescreen of mushiness 
While the backbone of Scheltema’s report consists of the mere fact that DNB is 
the legal superviser of the appointment of bank officers (which legal truth for many 
readers might provide the impression of convincing judgement, since such truth 
cannot be denied), Scheltema, when questioned in the House of Parliament, 
presents his requested task (see Sections 34.10.2 and 34.10.3) rather mushily, 
perhaps knowing that when his task is presented as a soup then his performance 
becomes difficult to measure: 541 
“Regarding reliability, it is really about personal integrity. That is a kind of 
general concept. You are reliable or you are not reliable. This applies 
regardless of the position that it concerns. Expertise involves a number of 
general aspects. This includes the question whether the person 
concerned can properly lead a large organization. This also includes 
aspects that apply more specifically to the position in question. This 
means that if you are expert for one position, you do not always have to 
be expert for the other position. This was all about expertise. Reliability 
was not an issue. It concerned the expertise with regard to managing 
ABN AMRO. That question had to be answered.” 
Comments: 
(1) Reliability is not the same as personal integrity. 
(2) Reliability was an issue. This was his task to investigate. Which he thus didn’t. 
(3) The question was not whether Zalm would be suitable as CEO of ABN AMRO 
regardless of his performance as CFO of DSB. The question was also 
specifically whether the latter had an impact. Zalm would not be a good 
appointment at ABN AMRO if his reputation was severely damaged because 
his incomptence at DSB now was highlighted because of the DSB bankruptcy. 
34.10.11 A key question by Kees Vendrik, March and April 2010 
In a debate in parliament in March 17 2010 542 and again April 7 2010, 543 
parlementarian Kees Vendrik asked a key question, in March this 544 and in April 
                                                                
541 Dutch: “Ten aanzien van de betrouwbaarheid gaat het eigenlijk om de persoonlijke integriteit. 
Dat is een soort algemeen begrip. Je bent betrouwbaar of je bent niet betrouwbaar. Dat geldt 
ongeacht de functie die het betreft. Bij deskundigheid is een aantal algemene aspecten aan de 
orde. Daartoe behoort de vraag of betrokkene goed leiding kan geven aan een grote organisatie. 
Hieronder vallen ook aspecten die meer specifiek gelden voor de betreffende functie. Dat 
betekent dat je, als je deskundig bent voor de ene functie, niet altijd ook deskundig hoeft te zijn 
voor de andere functie. Het ging hier uitsluitend om de deskundigheid. De betrouwbaarheid was 
niet aan de orde. Het ging om de deskundigheid ten aanzien van het geven van leiding aan ABN 
AMRO. Die vraag moest worden beantwoord.” 
542 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31371-325.html 
543 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31371-333.html 
544 Dutch: “Dit veronderstelt dat de toezichthouders veel van de heer Zalm verwachtten in het 
bestuur van DSB. Ik vraag de heer Scheltema of hij dit nader kan toelichten. Elders in zijn rapport 
is immers te lezen – met name in reactie op de aanbeveling van de Autoriteit Financiële Markten 
– dat de machtspositie van de heer Zalm binnen het DSB-bestuur niet overschat mag worden 
vanwege de bestuurder-eigenaarconstructie die de Nederlandsche Bank had toegelaten bij het 
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restated as first this 545 and then that. 546 Vendrik asks this question first about 
AFM but later the same question arises for DNB, and then it bites, because it 
shows that DNB is deficient as supervisor while DNB is the authority that 
Scheltema relies upon. In summary:  
(i) Scheltema finds an excuse for Zalm in the way how Scheringa managed DSB 
(ii) it was known that owner Scheringa managed the bank autocratically 
(iii) a “silent curator” might have contained him 
(iv) but the DNB allowed the appointment of Zalm, while knowing that he would 
run aground into Scheringa’s autocratic manner of management.  
Thus the question is: can Scheltema acknowledge that DNB should not have 
allowed the appointment of Zalm as CFO ? DNB cannot both disregard the 
governance at DSB when appointing Zalm and use the governance as an excuse 
to discount blame about Zalm’s performance. See Figure 12. A researcher with a 
basic training in logic would not ignore the inconsistency. DNB and Scheltema in 
its wake do so. And Dutch parliament appears to be incapable of dealing with this. 
Figure 12. DNB’s conundrum in supervision 
In March 2010, Scheltema first evades answering Vendrik’s question, even while 
Scheltema’s task had been to check whether DNB had properly executed its 
supervising role, also in relation to the reliability of Zalm as CFO: 547 (my comment) 
“Has it been sufficiently realised that the position in which Mr Zalm came 
was not the strongest? I do not know that exactly. [But below Scheltema 
                                                                                                                                      
verstrekken van de bankvergunning. Kan de heer Scheltema mij helpen om die twee oordelen – 
de inschattingen over de positie van de heer Zalm – met elkaar te verzoenen?” 
545 Dutch: “De heer Scheltema schrijft dat de heer Zalm waar het gaat om het bieden van 
tegenwicht per saldo niet zo heel veel te verwijten is vanwege de bestuursstructuur van de DSB 
Bank.” 
546 “Dutch: “De heer Scheltema zegt immers in de richting van de AFM – ik vat het even huiselijk 
samen – dat in de bestuursstructuur van DSB de heer Scheringa eigenlijk een soort 
alleenheerschappij had. Dat was dus bekend. Hoe kan zo'n besluit dan worden genomen om 
geen stille curator aan te stellen en eigenlijk de hoop te vestigen op de persoon en de positie van 
de heer Zalm, terwijl men wist dat de bestuursstructuur dat eigenlijk niet toeliet? Of was dat toen 
nog niet scherp in beeld? Hoe kan dat?” 
547 Dutch: “Heeft men zich voldoende gerealiseerd dat de positie waar de heer Zalm in kwam niet 
de sterkste was? Dat weet ik niet precies. Uiteindelijk heeft DNB de afweging gemaakt dat het 
prettig was dat de heer Zalm zou komen. Dus zou de curator niet worden benoemd. Veel meer 
kan ik er op dit ogenblik niet over zeggen. Natuurlijk zal de commissie verder kijken naar de 
manier waarop het toezicht is gelopen. Ook de vraag of dat een verstandige benadering van 
DNB was, zal in het rapport van de commissie aan de orde moeten komen. Ik verwijs daarvoor 
naar het eindoordeel van de commissie.” 
(Scheringa’s autocracy → Zalm cannot be blamed, 
& Scheringa’s autocracy → useless to appoint Zalm, 
& Allow the appointment of Zalm ↔ Neglect Scheringa’s autocracy, 
& Appointed → Accountable for blame)  
imply 
(neglect & not-neglect) & (appoint & not-appoint) & (blame & not-blame) 
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states that DNB was deficient here. Thus Scheltema actually knows, 
and contradicts himself.] In the end, DNB made the assessment that it 
was fortunate that Mr Zalm would come. So the curator would not be 
appointed. I cannot say much more about it at the moment. The 
committee will of course continue to look at the way in which supervision 
has been conducted. The question whether this was a sensible approach 
by DNB will also have to be addressed in the report by the committee. I 
refer to the committee's final assessment.” 
Vendrik at first does not accept the evasive answer, and asks: 548  
“However, it is quite vital, also for his [Scheltema’s] assessment of the 
AFM recommendation. (...) That is something I don't grasp. How can you 
accept a management structure in advance and welcome the arrival of 
the ex-minister of Finance, while afterwards you make the necessary 
reproaches, even such that they lead to a recommendation that Mr. Zalm 
should leave ABN AMRO? Has Mr Scheltema also discussed this with 
the authority? I don't understand this well. (...) You assess the authority's 
recommendation. An important point in your criticism about the authority's 
recommendation concerns the fact that the authority does not pay 
attention to Mr. Zalm's relatively weak internal position at DSB. In short, 
too much has been expected of him. Afterwards, you cannot blame him 
for not being able to realise everything that the authority would have liked 
in that position. That's how I read it. However, then the question becomes 
relevant what the position of the authority was at the time that Mr. Zalm 
joined DSB. I understand that not only DNB said: it is great that Mr Zalm 
is going to work at DSB. The AFM also said so, as I read from your 
report. That is strange. The question is how the authority responded to 
your criticism. I understand your reasoning, but it raises the question how 
the authority, despite the weak internal position that has been accepted – 
has apparently welcomed Mr Zalm's arrival – comes to such a harsh 
judgment. How does this work for AFM?” 
Scheltema again evades answering the question. He only comments: 549 
                                                                
548 Dutch: “Het is echter tamelijk vitaal, ook voor zijn beoordeling van de aanbeveling van de 
AFM. (...) Dat is iets wat ik niet snap. Hoe kun je op voorhand een bestuursstructuur aanvaarden 
en de komst van de ex-minister van Financiën verwelkomen, terwijl je hem achteraf de nodige 
verwijten maakt, zelfs zodanig dat die tot een aanbeveling leiden dat de heer Zalm bij ABN 
AMRO moet vertrekken? Heeft de heer Scheltema daar ook met de autoriteit over gesproken? Ik 
snap dit namelijk niet goed. (...)U beoordeelt de aanbeveling van de autoriteit. Een belangrijk 
punt in uw kritiek op de aanbeveling van de autoriteit betreft het feit dat de autoriteit geen 
aandacht besteedt aan de relatief zwakke interne positie van de heer Zalm bij DSB. Kortom, er 
wordt te veel van hem verwacht. Je mag hem achteraf ook niet verwijten dat hij in die positie niet 
alles heeft kunnen realiseren wat de autoriteit graag had willen zien. Zo lees ik het. Dan wordt 
echter de vraag relevant wat de positie was van de autoriteit op het moment dat de heer Zalm bij 
DSB kwam. Ik begrijp dat niet alleen DNB heeft gezegd: fijn dat de heer Zalm bij DSB gaat 
werken. Ook de AFM heeft dat gezegd, zo lees ik uit uw rapport. Dat is dan wel gek. De vraag is 
hoe de autoriteit op uw kritiek heeft geantwoord. Ik snap uw redenering, maar die roept de vraag 
op hoe de autoriteit ondanks de zwakke interne positie, die men heeft geaccepteerd – men heeft 
kennelijk de komst van de heer Zalm verwelkomd – toch tot zo’n hard oordeel komt. Waar zit ’m 
dat in?” 
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“The acceptance of the weak position actually happened when the 
banking licence was granted in 2005. Then the decision was made to 
grant the banking licence, of which the management structure formed a 
part. That has been done by De Nederlandsche Bank.” 
Scheltema again misrepresents his task: 550 
“At issue is the judgement according to the legal concepts «expertise» 
and «reliability». This has been finalised now with this reassessment of 
De Nederlandsche Bank and the contribution from the AFM. It is no 
longer possible to reconsider this. As a result of the committee's report, 
the Dutch Central Bank cannot, in my opinion, reconsider the judgement 
that was given. That is therefore fixed as such. There are various 
questions that the committee must answer. The questions that Mr 
Vendrik asked are related to this. I hope that the committee's answers will 
shed more light on how things went at DSB-Bank. However, that is 
slightly different from the present assessment. I would point out that this 
is an assessment concerning the expertise for ABN AMRO. This differs 
from what happened at DSB-Bank.” 
Comment:  
(1) As stated above: The task given to Scheltema was not to evaluate whether 
Zalm would be suitable as CEO of ABN AMRO regardless of his performance 
as CFO of DSB. The question was also specifically whether the latter had an 
impact. Thus Scheltema misrepresents his task. 
(2) Vendrik’s question pertained to the Scheltema report of 2010-02-26 and not 
the later report that Scheltema refers to. Thus Scheltema evades this question 
in parliament by pointing to a report that still must be written. Unfortunately, 
Vendrik and the other members of parliament let this happen. 
Eventually, Scheltema in March still partly accepts the implication for DNB: 551 
“In any case, you are right indeed that the phrase you read also refers to 
the judgement by DNB. In my opinion, both [DNB and AFM] had not 
                                                                                                                                      
549 Dutch: “Het accepteren van de zwakke positie is in wezen eigenlijk gebeurd bij het verlenen 
van de bankvergunning in 2005. Toen is de beslissing genomen om de bankvergunning te 
verlenen, waarvan de bestuursstructuur een onderdeel vormde. Dat is door de Nederlandsche 
Bank gedaan.” 
550 Dutch: “Het gaat hier om het oordeel volgens de wettelijke begrippen «deskundigheid» en 
«betrouwbaarheid». Met deze herbeoordeling van de Nederlandsche Bank en de inbreng van de 
AFM is dat afgerond. Daarop kan niet meer worden teruggekomen. Als gevolg van het rapport 
van de commissie kan de Nederlandsche Bank naar mijn oordeel niet meer terugkomen op het 
oordeel dat is gegeven. Dat ligt dus als zodanig vast. Er zijn diverse vragen die de commissie 
moet beantwoorden. De vragen die de heer Vendrik stelde, houden daarmee verband. Ik hoop 
dat de antwoorden van de commissie meer licht zullen werpen op de manier waarop het bij de 
DSB-Bank verlopen is. Dat is echter iets anders dan de voorliggende beoordeling. Ik wijs erop 
dat dit een beoordeling is in het kader van de deskundigheid van ABN AMRO. Dat is toch iets 
anders dan de vraag hoe het bij de DSB-Bank verlopen is.” 
551 Dutch: “In ieder geval is het zo dat u gelijk hebt dat de zinsnede die u opleest ook wel slaat op 
het oordeel van DNB. Beiden hadden naar mijn idee wat weinig rekening gehouden met de 
structureel zwakke positie van de heer Zalm.” 
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sufficiently considered Mr. Zalm's structurally weak position [within the 
DSB governance]. [This is in contradiction to Scheltema’s earlier “I 
do not know that exactly” because he apparently exactly knows that 
there is this deficiency.] ”  
Vendrik prods the point that DNB cannot both disregard the governance when 
appointing Zalm and use the governance as an excuse to discount blame about 
his performance.  
How can Scheltema defend the authority of DNB when DNB uses this kind of 
illogic and bad supervision: 552 
“It must be a fault on my part, but I still do not quite understand what the 
Dutch Central Bank's opinion is about the facts that the AFM uses to 
argue: we blame Mr Zalm so much that we think he should leave. What 
does De Nederlandsche Bank say about those facts? So far I understand 
that DNB is of the opinion that not everything can be blamed on Mr Zalm 
because the management structure was not good. You seem to confirm 
that too. Apparently this [the management structure] does not play such a 
major role in the considerations of De Nederlandsche Bank [because 
Zalm could be appointed at DSB]. What is the reason for saying that the 
AFM's recommendation is not being followed?” 
Scheltema: 553 
“De Nederlandsche Bank works partly with considerations. It has been 
observed that many things have improved, but also that things have not 
gone well. The bank comes to a judgement in a total assessment. For the 
rest, there are some differences in the views by DNB and the AFM about 
some points, such as over-lending. I gave an example of this in my report 
too. In this example, DNB says that there has been considerable 
improvement, while the AFM states that there may still be issues that are 
not good. This is the type of assessment that takes place.” 
Unfortunately, Vendrik did not insist upon an answer, and did not declare that 
Scheltema was evasive or possibly even a hostile witness, 554 as he had clearly 
contradicted himself. 
                                                                
552 Dutch: “Het zal wel aan mij liggen, maar ik snap nog niet helemaal wat nu het oordeel van de 
Nederlandsche Bank is over de feiten die de AFM aanvoert om te zeggen: dat verwijt ik de heer 
Zalm dermate dat ik vind dat hij weg moet. Wat zegt de Nederlandsche Bank daar dan over? Tot 
nu toe heb ik begrepen dat het oordeel van DNB is dat niet alles de heer Zalm is aan te rekenen 
omdat de bestuursstructuur niet goed was. U lijkt dat ook te bevestigen. Kennelijk speelt dit toch 
niet zo’n hoofdrol in de overwegingen van de Nederlandsche Bank. Wat is dan de reden om te 
zeggen dat de aanbeveling van de AFM niet gevolgd wordt?” 
553 Dutch: “De Nederlandsche Bank werkt gedeeltelijk met afwegingen. Er wordt geconstateerd 
dat veel dingen beter zijn gegaan, maar ook dat dingen niet goed zijn gegaan. In die totale 
afweging komt de bank tot een oordeel. Voor het overige lopen op sommige punten, zoals bij de 
overkreditering, de meningen van DNB en de AFM wat uiteen. Ik heb daar ook een voorbeeld 
van gegeven in mijn rapport. In dat geval zegt DNB dat het aanzienlijk is verbeterd, terwijl de 
AFM zegt dat er ook nog zaken kunnen zijn die niet goed zijn. Dat is het soort weging dat dan 
plaatsvindt.” 
554 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostile_witness 
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However, Vendrik had stated that he did not understand the situation. Perhaps 
he was not aware keenly enough that Scheltema presented Dutch parliament with 
an inconsistency and confuscation, and that Scheltema was unwilling to put the 
performance of DNB into doubt because he based his legal argument about the 
legal rock of DNB. 
On April 7 2010, President of DNB Nout Wellink evaded Vendrik’s question, by 
answering another question that Vendrik hadn’t asked, namely whether the public 
trust would be undermined if it became known that there was a silent curator. This 
is not much of a relevant issue. If a silent curator had been imposed upon DSB, 
then it would not be in the interest of Scheringa to let this be known, for it would 
hurt his bank. Thus why did Wellink pay so much attention to a less relevant point 
instead of answering Vendrik’s question ?  
Vendrik resigned on June 17 2010 from the House of Parliament with a 
statement about his health. Early in 2011 he was nominated by het House and 
subsequently appointed by the cabinet to the Court of Audit. 555  
In this book, we must also observe that Vendrik has a background as political 
scientist, and in the House for the Green Left in 1998-2010 did economic affairs. 
He must have had some dealings the Tinbergen & Hueting approach (not 
checked). He did not ask questions about the censorship of science by the 
directorate of CPB (starting with director Zalm in 1989/90). 
34.10.12 In sum 
Vendrik’s question clarifies that both DNB and AFM had been dreaming but that 
AFM eventually woke up: 
(1) DNB failed in its supervision, since DNB (i) had a rosy view of Zalm as a 
CFO and (ii) both disregarded the governance at DSB when appointing Zalm 
and used the governance as an excuse to discount blame about Zalm’s 
performance, see Figure 12. DNB had the legal authority to oversee the 
appointment of bank managers, but given its failure in supervision, this 
authority was not something to refer to usefully though Scheltema did. 
(2) AFM apparently gave the appointment of Zalm at DSB the benefit of the 
doubt, since they had no record of Zalm since he was new to banking. Likely 
they were also sleeping when Zalm was appointed as CEO at ABN AMRO. 
When DSB collapsed, and a new procedure was started, they however 
observed Zalm’s lack of background as CFO, his lack of awareness of his 
incompetence, and deficiency in performance at DSB (following the CEO 
rather than resigning). Then they rightly inferred and pointed out that such a 
manager lacks the credibility for another position in banking.  
This is our main conclusion from the DSB ordeal. It is remarkable how some 
people (Zalm) manage to invoke misplaced loyalty (Scheltema). The following 
subsections have some supplementary observations. 
                                                                
555 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llk9rzrq/c_c_m_kees_vendrik 
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34.10.13 Marginal check on AFM objections  
Scheltema also performed a “marginal check” on the AFM objections. We find 
that the Scheltema letter of 2010-02-26 already provides some summary of the 
later report. However, the rejection of Scheltema’s reasoning is more effective 
when we include the 2010-06-23 report. I rely upon what Scheltema reports about 
those AFM objections, for I haven’t located the AFM report yet. The following are 
some such issues. 
34.10.14 No background as CFO 
Scheltema cs in June 2010 p92 recognise that Zalm had “limited experience in 
banking” (basically his period as Chief Economist at DSB itself), and mention on 
p236 the need of the supporting officer Buwalda. Scheltema is incoherent in 
remarking that another CFO might not have done better than Zalm, p255-256: for 
one might have selected a qualified CFO (strong enough to stand up against the 
CEO and COO). 
The June report does not say anything about the DNB check on Zalm’s 
antecedents when he was accepted as CFO in December 2007. It is not unlikely 
that Wellink simply assumed that Zalm would work wonders. When Zalm was 
minister of Finance, he had weekly lunches with the President of DNB, Nout 
Wellink. 
Wellink in fact says in the meeting with the House, or Second Chamber, that he 
is overjoyed that Zalm becomes the CFO, but he does not explain why he 
accepted this on the spot in December 2007: 556 (my comment) 
“Thus we were overjoyed, and also surprised to be honest, [don’t use that 
way of expression] that just after we had decided to appoint a silent 
curator it was announced that Mr. Zalm would become CFO.” 
34.10.15 A background as a minister 
DNB and in its wake Scheltema cs in June 2010 use the argument that Zalm 
had a strong persuasive position as former minister of Finance, and thus was less 
in need of expertise as CFO. It is curious that DNB and Scheltema think that it 
works like this. If you hardly know what a CFO must do, or know what governance 
is required for a CFO to function properly, then you cannot take a stand on the 
issues that matter because you don’t know about it. Scheltema cs duly report that 
Zalm was rather co-operative, and this only confirms the diagnosis of an 
underlying uncertainty about his own competence. (Zalm even had stated that he 
had taken the job as Chief Economist at DSB since he respected Dirk Scheringa 
as a very succesful entrepeneur from his own region in West-Frisia. (Reference 
lost)) 
Scheltema 2010-02-26 suggests, but rather counterfactually: 
• (p15) That Zalm was capable of a confrontational style as minister of Finance, 
so that he could also adopt that style, even when he lacked a background for 
a CFO (and was in admiration of Scheringa). So that, if he didn’t adopt that 
                                                                
556 Dutch: “Wij waren dus dolblij, en ook verrast om eerlijk te zijn, dat net nadat wij hadden 
besloten om een stille curator te benoemen de mededeling kwam dat de heer Zalm CFO zou 
worden.” 
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style, he chose to be compliant because of supposed greater effectiveness, 
even when this didn’t really work (because he was compliant). 
• (p16 point 3) Apart from the asymmetry and flexibility of the choice of the 
period of evaluation, Scheltema does not consider that being a minister of 
Finance only might actually reduce your quality as a CFO. A minister can rely 
upon an entire ministry and a CFO at a rather small bank must do much more 
himself or herself. Subsequently, Scheltema mentions criteria that might be 
useful for a CFO but that do not touch upon the expertise of a CFO. 557  
“When it comes to the assessment of characteristics such as: managing 
a large organization, being able to work well together, offering sufficient 
opposition, decisiveness and other skills that are being assessed, that 
period cannot be entirely left out of consideration.” 
34.10.16 Comparison with Frank de Grave 
In the June 23 report: 
• The successor of Zalm as CFO became Frank de Grave. 558 De Grave was a 
fellow-party and -cabinet member of Zalm in 1996-2002. It is not clear to me 
whether CFO Zalm headhunted his successor CFO (one unqualified person 
headhunting another), for De Grave was officially proposed by the bank owner 
Dirk Scheringa. DNB (p87) had doubts about De Grave’s experience in 
banking, but allowed his appointment again. He was fired by Scheringa on 
May 14 2009 for being too confrontational (less aware of his incompetence).  
Scheltema in his letter of 2010-02-26 p15 argues: 
• that Zalm could not have been effective in a confrontational approach, since 
De Grave wasn’t succesful with such an approach. Scheltema effectively 
suggests that Zalm’s reputation as economist and minister of Finance would 
be equal to lawyer and minister of Defence De Grave’s. But De Grave has a 
much less prominent reputation. Clearly the reputations differ. Zalm could 
have been confrontational, if he had had a background of CFO.  
34.10.17 Other weak points in the letter of 2010-02-26 
• (p16 point 1) That it doesn’t matter whether Zalm was incompetent as a CFO, 
since he worked in a wrong governance structure (with all power for the sole 
shareholder). (See Vendrik’s question why DNB allowed the appointment of 
Zalm as CFO if he was going to fail anyway.) 
• (p16 point 2) That one must be realistic about what can be achieved in one 
year. Scheltema would imply that the sale of improper products must be 
reduced in gradual steps instead of simply stopped ? Does Scheltema know 
what is required of a CFO ? 
                                                                
557 Dutch: “Wanneer het gaat om de beoordeling van eigenschappen als: leiding geven aan een 
grote organisatie, het goed kunnen samenwerken, het bieden van voldoende tegenspel, 
besluitvaardigheid en nog andere vaardigheden die beoordeeld worden, kan die periode toch 
niet geheel buiten beschouwing blijven.” 
558 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_de_Grave (Not much attention for his role at DSB.) 
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• (p17 point 6) Scheltema correctly states that a rejection as CFO at DSB differs 
from a rejection as CEO of ABN AMRO. In early 2010, Zalm had been working 
at both places for almost a year each. Scheltema does not mention that when 
Zalm’s reputation is damaged by a clear rejection of his competence as a 
CFO, at DSB or anywhere, and his own lack of awareness of this 
incompetence, that he would become less effective as CEO of ABN AMRO 
(whatever the Dutch law on financial supervision (WFT) says on this). 
The reader is reminded that I have not looked at the full dossier, and e.g. haven’t 
read the AFM report and exchange with Zalm. Perhaps the AFM report is deficient 
as Scheltema suggests. However, Scheltema does not provide convincing 
arguments to think so. The arguments that Scheltema provides rather indicate that 
there is value in the common sense observation that Zalm did not have a 
background as CFO. Such CFO would be bound by the AFM rules to put an 
immediate stop to the sale of improper products. This would hurt the “business 
model” of DSB and affect its profitability, which seemed to be counter to the 
interest of DNB that seemed to want to save the bank potentially with the only 
motive that DNB had granted the banking licence. 
34.10.18 Pieter Lakeman 2010 
Econometrician Pieter Lakeman in 2010 rejected the Scheltema investigations 
from the start since the interviews with officials would be kept secret. Scheltema 
on his part suggested that it should be made illegal to advise to people to draw 
their money from a bank, as Lakeman had done – and many people associate this 
with the final bank run on DSB. With this suggestion Scheltema again showed his 
administrative law manner of thought. Lakeman wrote a book about weak banking 
oversight, in which Dutch regulations may be less strict than in other countries. 559 
34.10.19 Jesse Frederik and Eric Smit 2012 
When bankrupt, DSB was further managed by curators. Their report causes 
journalists Frederik and Smit to conclude that DSB under Zalm deteriorated. 560 
34.10.20 Harrie Verbon 2012 
Professor Harrie Verbon claims in 2012, 561 562 but this is Verbon’s personal 
opinion and judgment, and it is a pity that Verbon doesn’t try much to prove his 
view: 
                                                                
559 https://frieschdagblad.nl/2019/2/20/pieter-lakeman-veegt-de-vloer-aan-met-bank-wetgever-
en-toezichthouders?harvest_referrer=https:%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F 
560 https://www.vn.nl/de-bankier-die-faalde-2/ 
561 https://www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/waarom-was-michiel-scheltema-mild-voor-gerrit-
zalm-en-hard-voor-nurten-albayrak~b626654a/?referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F 
562 Dutch: “Zalm was door Scheringa alleen maar aangenomen om zijn DSB betrouwbaar te 
doen lijken. Zalm moet geweten hebben dat hij alleen maar als schaamlap diende, maar hij bleef 
gewoon zitten tot Wouter Bos hem uit zijn benarde positie bevrijdde en Zalm aanstelde om de 
ABN Amro te leiden. 
Het rapport van Scheltema over Zalm diende er voornamelijk toe de carrière van Zalm te redden. 
Waarom 'zwaargewicht' Scheltema zo vriendelijk was voor Zalm en zo streng voor Albayrak, 
zullen we waarschijnlijk nooit weten. Tenzij er ooit nog eens een echt onafhankelijk rapport komt, 
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“Zalm was only hired by Scheringa to make his DSB look reliable. Zalm 
must have known that he only served as a fig leaf, but he just 
collaborated till [minister of Finance] Wouter Bos saved him from his 
plight and appointed Zalm to lead ABN AMRO. The Scheltema report on 
Zalm mainly served to save Zalm's career. Why 'heavyweight' Scheltema 
was so friendly to Zalm (...) we will probably never know. Unless there will 
ever be a truly independent report once again, in which it becomes clear 
why Zalm was allowed to assist in the scamming of unsuspecting citizens 
(...)”. 
In 2019, Verbon restates the story and provides more reasoning. 563 
34.11 Legacy at ABN AMRO and other issues 
Obviously I do not intend to evaluate the whole of Zalm’s life on a golden scale. I 
only mention some main points. The reader is alerted that the above states what I 
know about the DSB case, and I know close to zero about ABN AMRO. The above 
criticism might strike one as unbalanced. ABN AMRO seems to be in operation 
and there is this (Dutch) report about claimed improvements in internal working 
relations. 564 This should not distract however from the observation that ABN 
AMRO might also have recovered with another CEO and that in 2020 there still 
are victims from Zalm’s period at DSB. Indeed, in the Dutch TV talkshow of 
January 27 2020 Scheringa first stated that he hadn’t read some particular reports 
about victims and later promised to use part of his recovered funds to compensate 
them – causing the question whether such compensation might also be a 
confession of past error (for why, otherwise, do so ?). 565 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
waarin duidelijk wordt waarom Zalm mocht meewerken aan het oplichten van argeloze burgers, 
terwijl Albayrak voor relatief geringe vergrijpen de goot in werd geduwd door Scheltema.” 
563 https://www.harrieverbon.nl/gerrit-zalm-de-maurice-papon-van-de-bankwereld/ 
564 https://www.mt.nl/management/de-erfenis-van-gerrit-zalm/534372 
565 https://www.rtl.nl/video/3fb07f1b-991a-4093-9987-cefa475e8650/ 
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35. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, minister 2012-2017 
 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem was Dutch minister of Finance in 2012-2017 and president 
of the Eurozone in 2013-2018. This present book has much attention for the year 
2010 but Dijsselbloem deserves attention for the whole history of our subject. 
35.1 Jeroen Dijsselbloem on money and math 
2013-03-27 566 
I wasn’t going to join the hype in the European media about eurogroup president 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem. The hype is only about money and that isn’t so interesting, 
contrary to what the nice people at the Financial Times tell you. However, it so 
happens that Jeroen Dijsselbloem also has been the chair of a Dutch 
Parliamentary Inquiry Commmittee on Innovations in Education in 2007-2008. 567 
Now we are talking. For this brings us to the issue of the education in 
mathematics. 
The European media hype is about whether Dijsselbloem knew what a 
‘template’ is. He says on Dutch television that he didn’t know the word. He did 
however reply to a question containing it, see the FT Reuters transcript. 568 
Apparently the political distinction is now being made between an ‘approach’ and a 
‘template’. We may figure that Dijsselbloem is a sensible and intelligent person 
who gets the drift of a question, so we can forgive him for not responding: “Can 
you explain what you mean by a template ?” It is actually not so nice of the 
reporters at FT Reuters to make such a fuss about this. They are just as guilty in 
this blame-game, for after Dijsselbloem’s reply they didn’t ask for confirmation: “So 
this will be the template, just to be sure that we will not quote you in a wrong 
manner ?” The real fuss is the command of English and the state of the Dutch 
system of education. 
The European media hype is also about whether Dijsselbloem over-
enthousiastically took the Dutch approach to SNS-Reaal-bank and Cyprus as the 
future approach for the Eurozone (if we allow for that word). It may be that he 
overplayed his position as president and that other members have different 
thoughts. This may indeed be the case. The other members may have shown 
polite interest in what Dijsselbloem has been explaining about his ideas, and it 
may be that Dijsselbloem mistook this for agreement. Deep in the hype, harsh 
words may have been spoken, but, as diplomats tend to do, internally, far 
removed from the spotlights. Well, every Dutch(wo)man has to learn that Europe 
isn’t just a ‘big Holland’. We all remember the difficulty that Wim Duisenberg had in 
2000 after the introduction of the euro and the questions about the exchange rate 
policy. 
Nevertheless, the EU is setting up a Banking Union with a European Banking 
Authority. 569 On that single webpage we see words like ‘supervision’, ‘regulation’, 
                                                                
566 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/jeroen-dijsselbloem-on-money-and-math/ 
567 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parlementair_onderzoek_onderwijsvernieuwingen 
568 http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2013/03/the-ftreuters-dijsselbloem-interview-transcript 
569 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/banking-union/index_en.htm 
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‘mechanism’, ‘vision’ and ‘roadmap’, but we do not see the word ‘approach’ yet. 
Downloading the Communication, we see that the Banking Union distinguishes 
‘the most significant European systemically important banks’ and the ‘others’. The 
first will have to be saved at all cost, the others will be allowed to implode. Thus 
Dijsselbloem quite accurately warns us to put our money in a system bank, unless 
we are risk-prone and like a little bit of higher interest plus the thrill of a possible 
collapse. The warning is also that each bank in trouble should quicky join a system 
bank so that it will be saved. 
I might sound a bit sarcastic but in reality I am referring to my earlier Economic 
Plan for Europe 570 and the suggestion for a new EMU treaty, 571 plus an additional 
analysis that I hope to be able to put on the web soon. [Addendum April 3: it is 
here now. 572] 
Now the interesting part. For Dutch education, we find a similar juggling of 
words. The Dijsselbloem Committee in 2008 distinguishes ‘what’ from ‘how’. 
Parliament decides what will be taught at school, and the teaching community 
decides how it will be taught. The Committee observes that this rule had been 
violated in the past, with various ‘innovations in education’, that Parliament loved 
but teachers abhorred, and that caused Dutch education to go down the drain. 
The Committee didn’t investigate how it came about, that Parliament loved 
‘innovations’ that the teachers abhorred. Apparently Dijsselbloem takes it for 
granted that Parliament doesn’t listen to teachers. Indeed, after the Committee 
report was declared a success, Parliament decided that highschool graduation 
should include a test on basic numerical skills, and a fail would even block 
graduation. Parliament thinks that this is a ‘what’ but actually it is a ‘how’. Learning 
to count is for young children and not for teenagers. Elementary schools should 
provide for those basic numerical skills, but they are failing to do so, both because 
of ‘innovations’ and because of elementary school teachers who have insufficient 
numerical skills themselves. Apparently Parliament wants to fix this by shifting the 
burden onto the higher level. Dutch readers with a strong heart and love for horror 
shows would want to read Jaap de Jonge “Opkomst en ondergang van de 
rekentoets” (Rise and Fall of the Numerical Test), March 2013, Euclides 88/5 
p224-225. 573 Unfortunately, that magazine of the Dutch Association of Teachers 
of Mathematics tends to keep important information behind a pay-wall. 
Now to the Grand Finale. My point is that Parliament has decided that schools 
must teach math, but the teachers do not deliver math, but something that they 
call ‘math’. Mathematicians are trained for abstraction, but in class they meet real 
live students, and they resolve their cognitive dissonance by clinging to a tradition 
that has grown over the ages, but that isn’t targetted at proper didactics. See my 
books Elegance with Substance (EWS) 2009 and Conquest of the Plane (COTP) 
2011. Thus the Dijsselbloem distinction at first seems to have some merit, but 
breaks down when Parliament refuses to check whether it really gets what it 
intends to get. The distinction between ‘what’ and ‘how’ is somewhat illusory, if the 
people responsible for the ‘how’ destroy the ‘what’. 
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The only solution is that Parliament starts paying attention to teachers rather 
than the bureaucrats and lobbyists. The only solution lies in an open atmosphere, 
where people can speak freely and frankly, where we treat people and ideas with 
respect, and where we judge issues on their merit. 
More on this in my paper What a mathematician might wish to know about my 
work, March 2013. 574 
35.2 The education of Jeroen Dijsselbloem 
2013-04-09 575 
The Dutch minister of finance and eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem 
became (in-) famous in Europe overnight, with the handling of the crisis in Cyprus. 
He is decent, he is smart, and he belongs to the younger generation that is set to 
take over from Angela Merkel and François Hollande over the next decade. 
Indeed, it is better to call him Jeroen rather than Mr. Dijsselbloem and keep him as 
a household name, as common as that of a soccer player, not only since he will 
stay on the stage for a longer time but also because it is easier to communicate up 
close rather than over a long distance. If one thing has become clear from the 
Cyprus event is that Europe has to communicate a lot. 
The Cyprus government had four years since 2008 to resolve its banking 
problem and had refused to do so. In September 2012 the EU presented plans for 
a European Banking Union. These plans distinguish between system banks that 
have to be saved at all costs and normal banks that may collapse. The Cyprus 
government could have read those plans, especially since Cyprus even was the 
EU-President in the second half of 2012. The Cyprus government still refused to 
resolve its problems and apparently hoped that the EU would provide ample 
funds. Alternatively said, the Cyprus banking elite didn’t mind to use its own 
population as hostages, hoping that the bluff poker would work. The key message 
from the EU to Cyprus is that the EU did actually help, for otherwise the chaos 
would be much bigger. It is up to Cyprus now to get rid of its brutal elite, and find 
similar decent and smart people like Jeroen to clean up the mess. 
It is good to know that Jeroen made an entrance on the political stage in Holland 
in about the same manner as now in Europe. He made his mark as the 
chairperson of a parliamentary enquiry into education. It is hard to believe, but the 
system of education in Holland had been spiralling downwards, and Jeroen 
suddenly was on national television, explaining what had gone wrong and what 
should be done to repair it. Overnight he was a national hero. A key thing to see is 
that this fame endured, and didn’t disappear as sudden as it had come, as we see 
with so many hypes nowadays. Jeroen is there to stay. 
Europe has had strange political leaders, like Helmut Kohl from Germany who 
got lost in an illegal party financing deal and Jacques Chirac from France who got 
convicted to two years of prison for diverting public funds. With leaders like that, 
you may question what they say or do. Think of Cyprus again, or of Berlusconi. 
The Greek who hate Angela Merkel should rather protest against Berlusconi and 
his lame promises. In any case, with Jeroen, we do not need to fear for this. 
Jeroen isn’t perfect and may make errors, but given that he is decent and smart, 
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an error still means that no mischief is intended, so that he can learn from 
mistakes, and he tends to be open to new information that can help to correct 
such errors. 
The key message of this article is that there is new information. Up to now, 
economic science has been explaining that a common currency like the euro also 
requires a political union. This is called the theory of the optimal currency area. In 
the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the political leaders created the euro but rejected 
the political union. The euro indeed was badly managed. Europe now goes from 
crisis to crisis, potentially making the minds of the population ripe to accept a 
United States of Europe, and give up national sovereignty, but also with the risk of 
rising nationalism and the break-up of what already exists. 
Now, however, there is a new economic theory, that would allow to maintain 
both the euro and national sovereignty, provided that each nation adopts its own 
national Economic Supreme Court (ESC), that supervises national economic 
policy. The national ESC would be staffed by national economic scientists, who 
know their nation better than distant Brussels, and who operate under the rules of 
science, rather than the hidden rules of a distant bureaucracy. The international 
co-ordination that is required for a common currency comes about by the 
international scientific co-operation of the various ESCs, that is transparent and 
open to science and the public. This new economic theory plus a scheme how to 
handle the euro is discussed in the paper “Money as gold versus money as water” 
available at the Munich archive for economic papers. 
Since I am Dutch and present this analysis from Holland, and since Jeroen is 
Dutch and is the minister of finance of Holland, readers may think that Jeroen and 
I have discussed this new theory, and that he is well-informed on this. 
Unfortunately, it doesn’t work like that. A huge unemployment and political chaos 
across Europe and complex communications and diplomacies over a few 
thousand kilometers apparently are required, to cross the few kilometers from my 
desk to his desk. There is also censorship of science in Holland since 1990. The 
Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) is not an Economic Supreme Court and 
does not apply the proper rules of science. Next to 'Greek statistics' there is 'Dutch 
economic science'. Thus Jeroen entertains a misperception about the quality of his 
economic advisors and he lacks information about the new economic theory. Thus 
Europe needs some education on Jeroen, and Jeroen needs some education on 
Europe. The best thing that Europe can do is help Jeroen gain more information 
indeed where this is lacking now. 
The article “Money as gold versus money as water” is available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45759/ 
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35.3 Dijsselbloem on Dutch exports 
2013-08-23 576 
Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem is not a macro-economist. By training 
he is an agricultural economist. 577 He will rely on macro-economists and judge 
their advice by economic common sense. That common sense may however also 
be influenced by traditional mercantilist ideas that exports will earn us gold and 
make us rich. There is also the success of Dutch agricultural exports that may 
cloud his judgement. 
His recent letter of June 19 to Dutch Parliament about the budget deliberations 
for 2014 contains this key statement (p3): 578 
“Holland is in a so-called debt-recession. (…) The usual pattern of economic 
recovery in Holland (rising exports, rising investments, rising consumption) is 
slowed down by the type of crisis.” (In Dutch gibberish: “Nederland bevindt zich in 
een zogenoemde balansrecessie. (…) Het gebruikelijke patroon van economisch 
herstel in Nederland (export trekt aan, investeringen groeien en particuliere 
consumptie neemt toe) komt door de aard van de crisis langzamer tot stand.”) 
But the export surplus in 2013 is about 10% of GDP, see the CPB Central 
Economic Plan. 579 
The Dutch surplus contributes to the deficits of Southern Europe. The 
huge Dutch surplus is part of the European problem. Christine Lagarde of IMF 
shouldn’t send a team only to Greece but also to Holland, to sternly explain that 
the situation is intolerable and that Holland should work towards a balance 
(notably by importing more). 
Yes, there is a debt crisis. If you insist on recovery via exports then recovery will 
be slow. But the debt crisis does not prevent you from tackling the export surplus. 
Full employment can be restored at home, by proper internal measures. 
Dijsselbloem gets his advice from macro-economists who have been 
emphasizing exports since 1970. The Dutch system of social security creates a 
huge unemployment on the home market. The Dutch solve this by lower wages 
and relying on exports. The Dutch have been exporting their unemployment since 
1970. 
See my 1996 paper on the exposed and sheltered sectors, at EconPapers 580 or 
a local file with graphs. 581 It is also a chapter in DRGTPE 582 and an update is in 
CSBH. 583 
The Eurozone group has a president who is one of the key creators of the 
problems that they discuss, though sadly enough they aren’t aware of this. (That 
is, they may think that he causes other problems.) 
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36. 9000 deaths, a pandemic, and Dutch parliament takes a two-
month vacation 
 
June 27 & July 5 2020 584 
The WHO calls the virus SARS-CoV-2 and the disease Covid-19. 585 The virus 
would be genetically very much like the original SARS-CoV from 2003, with many 
similar properties, see De Wit et al. (2016), like the effect on age and sex, also on 
superspreading events ("clusters"), which explains the success of source and 
contract tracing in Japan, see department director Saito (2020). 586 Molecular 
biologist Peter Borger (2020) 587 argues that we are basically dealing with the 
same virus but a bit less deadly (as happens over time), and he wonders why the 
world did not prepare for its remergence and why it was claimed that the virus 
would be "new" and "unknown" - though admittedly the outbreak of 2003 did not 
reach the West. Let us discuss: 
• Parliament goes into recess and takes a two-month vacation till August 31 
• European recovery funds 
• Where we are now 
• The exit strategy 
• How did we get into the emergency brake of the lockdown ? 
• The medical world and litigation 
• The failure of the Dutch source and contact tracing (SCT) 
• What are major unknowns ? 
• Repair of national trust 
36.1 Parliament goes into recess, but inadvisably so 
The government has asked the Dutch Safety Board, chaired by Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem, to evaluate 588 how Holland responded to the SARS-CoV-2 
pandemic. 
"With the investigation the Board will look at the preparations for a 
pandemic, crisis management, the measures taken and the phasing out 
of these measures. The Safety Board will also look at the effects of the 
corona crisis on the safety of vulnerable people in the society, for 
example due to discontinuation of regular care or social services. Medical 
treatments and economic support measures fall outside of the scope of 
the investigation. The goal of the investigation is to draw lessons for 
potential future epidemics." 
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Since this report may be expected somewhere in 2021, Dutch parliament 
arranged, though not without some struggle, that another report 589 will be 
available before September 1. Satisfied with the job done, Dutch parliament 
apparently intends to have the recess July 3 - August 31. 
This attitude by Dutch parliament is flabbergasting. 
The situation is not in control, national trust is corroding, the lack of information 
still is huge, the financial loss to families is large, and the risks of coming Fall and 
Winter are huge: with reduced buffers, while the economy is in recession and 
people fear bankruptcies and unemployment. 
For a sense of perspective, the Winter 2017-2018 flu took 9500 excess deaths, 
see my earlier discussion, 590 so that the figure of 9000 excess deaths in 2020 
should not be dramatised. However, the basic facts remain: (1) SARS-CoV-2 can 
be deadlier than the flu, (2) the virus can also be nasty for younger healthier 
persons, and thus might better be eradicated, (3) the risk of a 2nd wave has not 
been avoided yet, (4) the economy must somehow recover with these unknowns. 
Parliament should not rest till it has provided clarity about the following. 
• The government still hasn't formulated an exit strategy other than muddling 
through, and RIVM still leans on notions of herd immunity that conflict with the 
containment / suppression / eradication. There is need for a clear choice. 
• There is not only RIVM that looks at the infection dynamics but there is also 
Zorginstituut Nederland (ZiN) 591 (comparable to the US NIH), that advises on 
cost-effectiveness of health care, and that ought to advise on the (quality 
adjusted) "life years" (qaly). Are the infected adequately monitored (given the 
nastiness of the virus) ? The ZiN agenda on Covid-19 however is rather timid. 
592 The blogs by its advisory council are more informative. Advisable is the 
blog by Hugo Keuzenkamp, 593 former editor of economics journal ESB and 
former hospital director. There seem to be more questions than ZiN can 
answer, and how has it been arranged e.g. within Europe that this capacity to 
answer questions is best allocated ? 
• Without such clarity on strategy, the European discussion is vague too. You 
cannot bargain for a result when you do not know what you are bargaining for. 
The next EU council is planned for July 17. 594 
• The lack of information still is huge, not only because of lack of research 
funds, but also because key agents like RIVM and ZiN do not provide the 
information that they have. They might be overworked on what they are doing 
but what they are doing may also be misguided. When parliament thinks that 
such information will be available in that new report of September 1, then this 
is ostrich behaviour, and it may well be that parliament isn't even aware of 
what questions must be asked. RIVM indeed applied the emergency brake in 
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March so that the death toll was restricted to 9000 instead of 250,000 (see 
below), and it must be greatly appreciated that they eventually did so, but this 
does not imply that they know what they are doing overall, see below. To 
make sure that answers are given, parliament must ask questions itself, and 
provide a bridge for questions coming from science and society. 
• If there would be this new report by September 1 then this information can 
indeed be used for the discussion about the national budget for 2021, but this 
is too late for the Fall of 2020. Preparations must be made in July - August 
already. 
• For example, the scientific evidence on aerosol transmission is 
overwhelming, but OMT / RIVM seem to be mentally blocked by the 
linguistic distinction between "infectious" (the capacity to infect) and 
"having infected" (having performed the actual deed), see this 
deconstruction. 595 We are now on a path to lose the Summer months for 
adaptation of ventilation systems. (Admitting that "ventilation has a role" 
opens the can of worms that it is not clear for each ventilation system 
when and how. But it is better to specify this uncertainty than deny the 
causal influence.) 
• The theory of infections contains a notion of "herd immunity". If a 
population is not mixed - say the strong animals form a protective circle 
around the vulnerables - then predators may die from hunger before they 
can do any harm. If a population is mixed, then a predator may still die 
when the chance of meeting a strong animal is much larger than meeting 
a vulnerable one. In general, when you do not specify what model you are 
using then you are at risk of (spreading) confusion. This is a major 
problem in the current discussion about SARS-CoV-2. My paper on 
redesign of didactics, Colignatus (2020c), 596 section 1.5.5 on page 26, 
questions what RIVM (the Dutch CDC) has stated about the virus, and 
section 6.11 on page 105 has a longer discussion of the theory. For 
SARS-CoV-2, RIVM has stated that herd immunity would be at 60% of 
infected people in the population. As far as I know, and please correct me 
if I am wrong, RIVM hasn't explicitly stated how they arrived at this figure. 
RIVM stated that they intended to protect the vulnerables (eldery and 
younger with comorbidity) but many deaths actually occurred in homes for 
the elderly. And if you lock down the economy so that R0 becomes much 
lower, how do you intend to achieve that herd immunity ? RIVM has been 
so ambiguous and inconsistent on this issue that tough questioning is 
required to arrive at clarity about what the Dutch policy approach is. 
• What institutional structure would you want to have, such that there is 
adequate and transparant planning with not only "lives saved" (lives extended) 
but also (quality adjusted) "life years gained" - or the compromise of the "unit 
square root" - and with the distinction between statistical data collection for the 
past and planning for the future ? 
• Most of all: apparently there still is too little awareness that the pandemic has 
been caused by policies that are environmentally unsustainable. It is 
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scientifically obvious that current policies are inconsistent on economics and 
climate change, see Colignatus (2020a). 597 It is absurd that Dutch parliament 
hasn't made such statement yet. Europe is already moving into this direction 
but let this be a key cornerstone of the discussion of July 17 and let Holland 
support this. Impose a carbon tax. For investments, companies require as 
much certainty as can be provided. 
• The proposed support of about EUR 3.4 bn for Air France / KLM is a case 
in point. 598 The government argues that the company and Schiphol are 
important for some 100,000 jobs, but the government does not state that 
this employment is fundamentally at odds with the goal on environmental 
sustainability.  The government states that CO2 emissions per passenger 
must be reduced "by 50% in 2030 compared to 2005" - which causes the 
question why 2005 ? - but why not target a level of 5% of passengers for 
2021+ anyhow ? Why not acknowledge that tourism in distant countries is 
not environmentally sustainable with our present world population and 
technology ? 
• For the Fall and Winter on the Northern hemisphere, my suggestion is that 
unemployment, also for the transition to environmental sustainability, is 
avoided by allowing and encouraging people to get more education. One 
day per week education for the work force would mean a 20% reduction of 
the labour force, with time mostly spent studying at home. The scheme 
could be financed by a general tax also on wealth, replacing such capital 
by human capital. Pay for the educational day would be at 70% of normal 
pay, with a minimum of the net legal minimum wage and a maximum at 
half the prime minister's salary, with regular testing and check-up, and 
ending of participation if not studying. I take my inspiration for this scheme 
from the late Louis Emmerij (1934-2019). If one would agree with this kind 
of idea, then it obviously requires preparation for the educational system 
to make this possible. 
36.2 European recovery funds 
There is a disastrous economic imbalance between on one side Germany and 
Holland and on the other side Southern Europe. The world is advised to boycott 
Holland till the censorship of economic science in Holland since 1990 is resolved. 
599 It might seem as if every crisis is another excuse to ride one's hobby horses, 
but my hobby horses are fundamental issues that apparently must be emphasized 
again and again. 
The loss of lives and livelihoods because of SARS-CoV-2 causes sorrow all over 
Europe. There are expressions of compassion and solidarity all over. 
On SARS-CoV-2, the distinction between North and South was broken by 
Greece in the South (doing well) and Sweden in the North (doing worse). Diversity 
of nations gives a great reward in information. 
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While Greece responded immediately and adequately to the virus with source 
and contact tracing (SCT), with now 191 deaths (18 per million) (not counting 
"other excess mortality") apparently the systems of health in Italy and Spain suffer 
from similar problems as the Dutch system does, and these problems could be 
resolved nationally, without the need for European supervision. It is only in the 
areas of economies of scale and scope, of deliberate interdependence by trade 
and monetary union, and the overall impact on the environment, that the European 
Union has relevance. With the historical process towards closer co-operation, 
there is also the awareness for common justice and civil liberties and the defense 
of the borders of the larger region. (It must also be remarked that Brexit has 
basically been caused by a non-proportional electoral system, and scientific failure 
of "political science" still locked in the humanities, see my proposal of a buddy 
system of physicists and such "political scientists", Colignatus (2020b). 600) 
Italy and Spain have pointed to their problematic state finances and heavy death 
tolls: Italy 34.7 thousand (574 per million) and Spain 28.3 thousand (606 per 
million) (not counting other excess mortality) (compared to Holland 356 per 
million). 601 
Italy and Spain can raise taxes on their own rich, who are much better off than 
the average German or Dutch. 
Nations like Italy with 60 million people and Spain with 47 million people, with 
their proud histories and highly developed governments and often excellent 
universities, really do not need Europe to help out. When politicians in Southern 
Europe use the European Union and Northern Europe as scapegoats to distract 
attention from their own failure to properly manage their own economies and 
systems of health care, then this is better said clearly, so that voters in Southern 
Europe are advised not to vote for such politicians. (There is a distinction between 
scapegoating Holland and boycotting it for said specific reason.) 
By mid April, the Italian debt / GDP ratio was expected to rise by 20% to 156% 
(IMF table 1.2). 602 603 Italy and Spain were also earlier in the pandemic and the 
Dutch death toll hadn't fully materialised yet. The Italian proposal was to have 
Eurobonds, so that country-specific rates of interest would not be hit by stigma as 
happened during the financial crisis of 2007+. I myself had agreed, for that 
particular crisis in this period, that such bonds might be used temporarily indeed, 
obviously with conditions, see Colignatus (2012b). 604 
The Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte must have known that relaunching 
the proposal of eurobonds is a slap in the face of Northern Europe. He decided to 
slap anyway. This attitude is unhelpful and anti-European. 
The Dutch finance minister Wopke Hoekstra rejected the proposal of eurobonds 
and pointed to the national responsibility to adhere to the targets of the Maastricht 
Treaty, with a debt / GDP ratio of at most 60%. Southern Europe hadn't done 
enough in the years since the financial crisis and was accountable for its own 
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errors. This rejection caused anger in Southern Europe and Hoekstra apologised 
for not having been emphatic enough in this particular statement, and for not 
expressing enough his compassion for the plight in Southern Europe. 605 
As said, it is problematic to discuss European funds when there is no clarity on 
the common exit strategy and embedding within the discussion on climate change 
and the environment overall. I regard it as valid that the ECB and the EU stepped 
in with emergency plans to keep the economies afloat but it would also be a grave 
error when the structural imbalances are not tackled, when censorship of science 
is allowed, when there is no clarity on environmental sustainability, and when 
Southern Europe does not deal with its financial elites too. 
36.3 Where we are now 
Holland has 17.4 million inhabitants, of which 0.65 million showed antibodies for 
SARS-CoV-2, a prevalence of 3.7%. The total death score in Holland today is 
about 9000, of which some 6000 have been officially tested (356 per million) and 
some 3000 are "other excess mortality" including non-SARS-CoV-2 deaths in 
unknown proportion. A raw estimate, also given by RIVM (the Dutch CDC), is that 
the infection fatality factor (IFF) is 9000 / 650,000 = 1.38%. The IFF for 60+ is 
4.84% and for <60 it is 0.06%. 
• The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic landed in Holland in apparently some four genetic 
variants with people returning from ski holidays and from Northern Italy, 
around Valentine's day (February 14) or Carnival (February 23) (my guess at a 
super-spreader-event). 
• The Dutch lockdown started in steps on March 11 and can be taken as 
effective on March 18 (day 24 since Carnival). It may be mentioned that the 
virus likely came via Italy but also that scenes in Italian hospitals had an 
influence on the Dutch decision on a lockdown. 
• The Dutch death count per day reached its top around April 5, six weeks after 
Carnival. 
• Today we are some 17 weeks after Carnival with hardly any recorded deaths 
and excess mortality. 
• All-cause mortality is annually some 150,000 persons on average anyway. We 
may be speaking about 1% loss of life expectancy, but the risk of the virus of 
course is that it may still explode to the level of 250,000 (see below) additional 
deaths. 
• For climate change, the 2020-2030 decade still is crucial, and the world is in 
dire need of policies that work, see this book Chapter 13 (longer 606). 
NB. The figure of 250,000 deaths derives from a didactic scenario 607 with R0 = 4 
and an IFF of 1.5%. The figure assumes that Rt = R0 = 4 whatever happens. It is 
not claimed that this is a realistic scenario though I am inclined to think that it 
might be close to a worst case scenario. The point is that a realistic scenario has 
endogenous reactions, with people noticing the epidemic and reducing contacts 
themselves before the government steps in with additional measures. With 
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endogenous reactions, perhaps the death toll might be a factor 10 less, thus 
25,000, so that the effect of government measures is only the last 1/3 to 9000. The 
issue of what would be realistic scenario's forms part of the huge unknowns in this 
discussion. (See the comment on page 28.) 
In the former weblog entry, I discussed: (i) my change of viewpoint towards 
containment / suppression / eradication, and current rejection of the scenario of 
using the virus as its own vaccine while shielding the vulnerables, (ii) a redesign of 
didactics of some epidemiological models, (iii) the abuse of the notion of "herd 
immunity" in much discussion about the virus. (Recommended is Pueyo (2020).608) 
The new Dutch government "dashboard" gives a daily or weekly figure and 
doesn't allow you to trace the history or look at a forecast yet. RIVM has always 
declined to make projections about mortality and loss in (quality adjusted) life 
years. RIVM neither states the economic cost of the policy. The dashboard states 
that it is being developed, and perhaps we may hope for such crucial information 
in the future. Today the estimate is that there would be 1715 infected persons. It is 
remarkable that so few people can threaten the entire EUR 800 bn Dutch 
economy. (It is not clear to me how this number has been estimated, and if tests 
have been used how the false positives have been accounted for.) The key 
problem is the asymptomatic transmission, because most people with symptoms 
would tend to see their social duty of self-quarantine. This week, the 5-day Rt 
would be 1.05 which roughly means that over 5 days there could be 1715 * 1.05 
infected persons. The infection fatality factor (IFF) of 1.38% over February-June 
indicates that 24 of these people could die. Perhaps a point of reference are the 
661 / 52 = 12.7 weekly deaths in traffic accidents. However, many deaths occurred 
in care-homes, and perhaps the country has now learned to better protect the 
vulnerables. If those 1715 people would be only healthy <60 with an IFF of 0.06%  
then there would be 1 death. The dashboard doesn't give the age distribution of 
the estimated 1715 infected persons. Presumably these are like the population 
age distribution but this is dubious. This means that the "dashboard" doesn't give 
us the crucial information about what these figures actually mean. The 
government has been working on the SARS-CoV-2 issue since January and they 
still do not grasp what relevant information is. It is not so that the crucial 
information isn't there, but they simply do not collect or present it. Somehow the 
world of medicine and epidemiology are still at a far distance from the world of 
public health (economics and statistics). (See also the Appendix, Section 36.10, 
example 6 on the "dashboard".) 
36.4 The exit strategy 
The following could also have been discussed and settled in January / February, 
with the information available then (and the R0 estimated back then at 2.7). See 
the articles that had been published in The Lancet in January. 609 RIVM failed in its 
task of protecting the country from the epidemic. See the next section with some 
causes why it wasn't settled back then. 
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In all exit strategies, there is (i) research for vaccines, tests and treatment, and 
(ii) while such do not exist yet, society better is segmented, and the vulnerable 
section of society (currently the 60+ aged and those with comorbidity) would be 
shielded by a "quarantine border" of test, test, and test of source and contact 
tracing (SCT). The only issue is what to do with the less vulnerables. 
(1) Containment, and at best eradication. The age <60 healthy population is less 
likely to suffer an infection, but when they do have an infection then the virus 
may have nasty properties. This suggests that eradication is a better strategy. 
Thus, test, test, and test, with source and contact tracing (SCT) and 
quarantine of those who have been in contact with someone infected (or 
suspected of being infected). Eradication is only feasible if the WHO 
establishes the virus as unacceptable indeed, with international agreement. 
My preference has shifted to this scenario, see Tabarrok (2020). 610 It is urgent 
that the Dutch ZiN provides clarity about the burden of disease and the qaly 
corrections. 
(2) Mitigation. The virus can be used as its own vaccine. See here how this could 
be done in Holland. Since even the less vulnerables might still appear to be 
vulnerable after all, we need to reserve ICU capacity. Also, shielding of the 
vulnerables might not be perfect, and there still may be quarantine breaches 
with some transmissions. Since a vaccine may take a while, or might not work 
well for this part of society, many vulnerables might prefer to move to gated 
communities or larger protected areas, with specialisation of hospitals and 
such to particular service areas. With proper management, the number of 
deaths and life-years lost would be comparable to other diseases. (De Vlas & 
Coffeng (2020), Van Bunnik et al. (2020), Colignatus (2020e), Eichenberger et 
al. (2020).) 
(3) Muddling through and lock on-off. This assumes that the above two options 
are not feasible, or society doesn't make a decision, and we muddle through, a 
bit as we have been doing. This would be the "Harvard study", Kissler et al. 
(2020), 611 but they do not elaborate on the effect on the economy, as RIVM 
hasn't done either. Overall, the WHO commission on macro-economics and 
health (CMH) 612 is underdeveloped, even though it is a key chapter for public 
health (economics). 
36.5 How did we get into the emergency brake of the lockdown ? 
The choice between containment (eradication) or mitigation could already have 
been made in Holland in early February, with the information available from China. 
There is the WHO PHEIC of January 30, the article by Wu et al. (2020) 613 in The 
Lancet January 31, and the WHO research roadmap of February 12. 614 We ought 
to assume that the epidemiologists know about pandemics. They ought to be able 
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to inform their medical colleagues, public health authorities and policy makers 
about the risks of a pandemic. 
Dutch microbiologist and former president of the Dutch federation of 
associations for research in medicine, John Jacobs, states that the Dutch 
agencies were lost in a well-mapped world (Dutch). 615 
Example countries who chose for containment are Taiwan and South Korea, and 
in Europe there is Greece (though I did not see excess  mortality yet). Sweden 
adopted mitigation with the deliberate build-up of herd immunity, and later 
admitted to having misjudged the protection of the vulnerables in care homes. 
In Holland, RIVM (the Dutch CDC), supported by the advisory council called 
"Outbreak Management Team" (OTM) from the medical world and universities, on 
January 27 advised 616 the minister of health 617 to declare the virus as a risk of 
category A, meaning that mandatory quarantine was possible. However, RIVM still 
underestimated the problem so that the month of February was lost, see the 
convention on the virus at the Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW) on February 
21. 618 Even virologist Marion Koopmans (Erasmus MC), who has been warning 
for some years about the risk of a pandemic, now (interview June 19 619) 
acknowledges that she underestimated the asymptomatic transmission of the 
virus, even while it had been reported. However, the Dutch system of source and 
contact tracing (SCT) failed more structurally,  see below. 
In March, the government and RIVM applied the emergency brake of the 
national lockdown. The cost of the delay was 9000 deaths and economic disaster, 
but the emergency brake prevented some 240,000 deaths and other economic 
fall-out. At least Holland is not like the USA or Brazil. (PM. Also for comparing 
hospital data, it is important to recall that the USA has a different system, and that 
not all infected persons have the option to go to the hospital. Perhaps the notion of 
universal health care might make more sense to Americans now ?) 
PM. Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet, regards the UK handling of the issue 
as catastrophic: 
“Individually, they’re great people, but the system was a catastrophic 
failure.” 
In a review of Horton's book, 620 reviewer Mark Honigsbaum, with a background 
in politics, philosophy and economics at Oxford and a PhD on the history of 
influenza (cv), makes a very strange comment: 
"Horton is on firmer ground when he points out that by the end of 
January, the Lancet had published five papers setting out the risks of a 
global pandemic and how Sars-CoV-2 could be controlled using track-
                                                                
615 https://hartblik.weebly.com/dwalen.html 
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and-trace measures successfully employed during the first Sars outbreak 
in 2003. However, given the confusing data coming out of China in 
January, it is an exaggeration to say that the WHO’s declaration of an 
international public health emergency on 30 January was the “wake-up 
call” the world needed, especially as the WHO did not recommend travel 
bans and waited until 12 March to declare a pandemic." 
This is very strange since: 
(1) The PHEIC is by definition the wake up call, that announces the risk that there 
can be a pandemic. By definition it differs from the observation that there is a 
pandemic. 
(2) Honigsbaum does not extend on what would be "confusing" about the articles 
published in The Lancet (having passed some peer review as opposed to 
media reports). (Let me again refer Dutch readers to the review by Jacobs that 
Holland got lost in a well-mapped world.) 
(3) Overall this review is misrepresenting and sloppy, and uses a gimmick to 
seem "balanced and unbiased" (as is expected from a review). Honigsbaum is 
advised to retract this or his thesis. 
36.6 The medical world and litigation 
Remarkably, the medical world will not use the virus as its own vaccine, but they 
will allow the virus to spread "by itself", so that "herd immunity" can be built up. 
Think about this for a while. You reject the responsibility of creating and 
monitoring driver's licenses but will allow that people simply start driving and learn 
it the hard way. How much sense does this make to you ? 
It must be an issue of legal responsibility. A vaccinator apparently might be sued 
for malpractice but cannot be held accountable when looking away. The "Harvard 
study" (Kissler et al. (2020) in Science) mentions the process towards "herd 
immunity": those infected get a fair chance at the ICU, even though 30-50% of the 
vulnerables would die at the ICU. It is your own responsibility, or a "natural 
phenomenon" when you get infected. 
It is scientifically sound of course when mathematical properties of reduced 
infection rates are described (perhaps also with the label "herd immunity" even 
when the label is inaccurate). 
However, the issue now is whether you can use such phenomenon as an 
acceptable component in a public health strategy. 
The ethical view is that if you allow a virus to spread then you must also 
consider using it as its own vaccine. And if you reject using it as its own vaccine 
(and thus don't consider it safe enough), then you should not allow it to spread. 
Dutch viewers might look at the tv interview with Jaap van Dissel (RIVM) by 
Marielle Tweebeeke, “Hoe werkt groepsimmuniteit?”, broadcast March 16. 621 The 
interview shows Van Dissel as incompetent and manipulative and untrustworthy. 
• Van Dissel does not mention the strategy of containment / suppression by 
SCT. 
                                                                
621 https://www.npostart.nl/hoe-werkt-groepsimmuniteit-tegen-corona/16-03-
2020/POMS_NOS_16034089 
 275 
• He does not mention that RIVM goofed in February by not developing this 
scenario so that they needed the emergency brake of the lockdown. He does 
not present any excuse for his failure. 
• He presents the psychological frame of three options, of which two are 
extreme and the third is the proposed one. This is clearly a political frame and 
no scientific listing of the options. 
• He does not mention that the virus has nasty properties that can show also in 
younger and healthier persons. (Personally I only discovered this rather late in 
tracking the discussion about the virus, and I suppose that doctors knew this 
much earlier.) 
• He allows people to get infected "by natural processes" but doesn't mention 
that if he considers the virus to be so safe that he allows it to run around, that 
by implication it can also be used as its own vaccine. He focuses on the 
younger and healthier persons and suggests protection of the elderly and 
comorbid risk groups, but is vague on the contacts between the groups. 
• He mentions herd immunity as a goal (which later will become a by-product) 
but does not specify that this goal cannot be attained when the lockdown 
reduces Rt to a much lower value. 
Apart from Van Dissel's disingenuity on RIVM's goofing on SCT, this kind of 
reasoning in epidemiology is rather conventional, see also the Harvard study, 
though it still is (horribly) irrational. The reasoning dates from medieval times 
before Bismarck and the creation of public health. It is akin to the Anglo-Saxon, 
but rather Viking, mentality of preferring contest above co-operation. However, we 
are no longer in pure nature anymore. Public health by definition has the objective 
to balance benefits and costs. 
The issue of legal responsibility for allowing a potentially lethal virus to run its 
course better be discussed in the open. 
In Holland RIVM on January 27 activated SCT but later tended to emphasize 
"herd immunity" (exit strategy 2 or 3) rather than containment (with SCT). (See this 
discussion. 622) Indeed, if you want people to become infected then you don't need 
to test them. In this manner, however, RIVM tended to overlook the importance of 
SCT for the quarantine protection of the vulnerables too: and many deaths were 
recorded in the care homes, while others at home were not tested and showed up 
as "excess mortality". 
36.7 The failure of Dutch source and contact tracing (SCT) 
RIVM might not have been aware enough of the situation for SCT for a 
pandemic, though they did warn about understaffing at GGD before. An early 
RIVM document of January 27 2020 already advised the ministry to give alert 
status A to the infection by the virus, but only in case of symptoms. 623 The 
document did not deal with one of the known key properties of this virus of 
asymptomatic transmission - which had been reported about in China. When the 
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number of cases exploded, the Dutch stopped SCT instead of hiring more people 
to do it. The Dutch system of SCT failed: 
• The Dutch GGD are bureaus assigned to municipalities without a central 
headquarter. They still have responsibility for source and contact tracing 
(SCT) for the entire country. Eventually the nestor spoke up for all but without 
legal position. They appear to have been underfunded and less prepared for a 
pandemic, see here. 624 The GGD in 2014 reported to "being below the 
capacity of a pilot light", and RIVM in 2015 confirmed that more than half of 
the GGD bureaus had insufficient numbers of doctors to do the job of infection 
control. Apparently, GGD even lost the capacity to understand what was 
needed for a pandemic even though it is their job. They waited for instructions 
from others while it is their job to do something. In April almost four weeks 
were lost on "waiting". 
• We now see a blame game between RIVM, GGD and the ministry of health 
about who would be responsible for the January / February disaster and also 
the lost month of April, while Dutch parliament takes a vacation and hopes that 
all will be clear by September 1, and properly prepared if the 2nd wave would 
arrive. 
• Unfortunately, the Dutch method of SCT is lackluster compared to the German 
manner anyway. The Dutch instruction looks at symptoms indeed while the 
German instruction allows for contacts with an infected person anyhow. At 
first, the GGD nestor suggested to "write a letter", like with a sexually 
transmitted infection, instead of using the phone. 
• RIVM stated that there would not be enough capacity for testing, which might 
have been literally true at some point, but did not investigate the issue. It later 
appeared that such capacity could easily be expanded. RIVM misinformed the 
Dutch. 
• The ministry announced recently that in July there would be an app for contact 
tracing by phone. 
36.8 What are major unknowns ? 
I am an econometrician and teacher of mathematics and no medical doctor. The 
literature about this virus is already huge and there will be more known than I can 
oversee. Key issues with lack of knowledge for me are: 
• What kind of model will cover epidemiology (days) and the national budget 
cycle (year and medium term) and long term sustainability (world population in 
2100) ? Acemoglu et al. (2020) 625 suggest that we might need another 
modeling format and more complex modeling for all the interactions that are 
relevant for a more realistic discussion of the pandemic. Even these authors 
do not explicitly mention the life-years - though they link the life-years to lost 
economic output. 
                                                                
624 https://www.platform-investico.nl/artikel/uitgeklede-ggden-tastten-weken-in-het-duister-over-
corona-strategie/ 
625 https://www.nber.org/papers/w27102 
 277 
• Apparently we still know relatively little about the aetiology (natural history) of 
the virus. Also a study by Ganyani et al. (2020) 626 in which RIVM participated 
uses data of some 200 follow-up cases from the early outbreak in China. 
There are some 40,000 hospital cases in Holland for which GGD might have 
performed a statistical analysis for key model parameters, and comparable 
cases known by general practitioners. As far as I know, there is no such study 
yet. Perhaps such study has been delegated to GGD but then they do not 
have the funds to do so ? 
• For testing, a fairly quick method, comparable to a pregnancy test, apparently 
has been developed at MIT ("Sherlock"). 627 It is not clear to me whether the 
race for a vaccine and the race for a treatment are accompanied by a similar 
race for such testing. The criteria for a vaccine appear to be rather tough (see 
above on litigation, and using the virus as its own vaccine), but the criteria for 
a test might be much easier (including sensitivity and specificity). Perhaps 
such a test might be taken as a pill and produce an artificial symptom (e.g. a 
different colour of one's urine), so that asymptomatic transmission by the virus 
need no longer be such a problem: for the person with such an artificial 
symptom knows that self-quarantine is required. 
• RIVM (the Dutch CDC) still publishes only deaths and not (quality adjusted) 
"expected life years lost", and thus still has an epidemiological and no Public 
Health focus (though their mission and very name concerns public health and 
the environment). My first weblog on the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic also pointed 
to the Unit-Square-Root as a compromise between lives and years (March 31 
628). The combined CDC's and National Institutes of Health of Europe ought to 
be able to present a study of the cost-effectiveness of handling SARS-CoV-2, 
and such study ought to have the same quality as a cost-effectiveness study 
on the annual flu vaccine - using measures that avoid a national lockdown. It 
is too simple to argue that the medical world can only do cost-effectiveness 
studies when a vaccine already exists: if there is no vaccine yet then consider 
measures other than the emergency brake of the lockdown of the national 
economy. 
• There now is an official proposal about triage in the 3rd stage of ICU 
treatment, in which the life-years gained criterion has been given more 
attention. 629 Medical ethics can be rather mundane at times - like "first come 
first served" - with rules that allow for emergency decisions based upon little 
information. In the modern world, with electronic patient dossiers, such 
information however tends to be available, and the emphasis lies on the 
willingness of the medical world to consider more complicated algorithms. 
They are advised to consider that also other areas - like construction, 
transport, economics - have considerations about the value of life. There is a 
key distinction between macro problems, like allocating funds for food security 
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versus national defense, and the micro problem about the next available bed, 
but such aspects can better be discussed than neglected. (At least, if you 
neglect it, do not base this upon an axiom as if medical problems would be of 
special uniqueness, or that issues of life and death are medical by definition.) 
• CBS Statistics Netherlands has mortality statistics that look at the "recorded 
cause" like "pneumonia" or "heart failure", or whatever doctors record as the 
cause of death, and it is quite a statistical exercise for example to determine 
the impact of a flu season. 630 Apparently such statistical exercise is still in the 
making for SARS-CoV-2 (with uncertainty about excess mortality), and it is 
unclear why there was no immediate action on this (e.g. with taking of 
samples of people dying since February, with the option to test them later). 
Overall, medical research would be served by a more sophisticated recording 
of diseases, treatments and causes of death. (For cancer, risk factors are 
body mass (number of cells), age (time for processes to go wrong) and cell 
specialisation (specialised cells don't change much).) 
• There is no clarity about the delay in the normal health care due to the SARS-
CoV-2 episode in the first half of 2020. What is the burden of disease and 
death of this effect ? It is no use crying over spilled milk but what can we learn 
about maintaining common care if there would be this 2nd wave or the next 
pandemic (if we don't do anything about environmental sustainability) ? 
• What is the situation on immunity and mutation ? As we know little about this, 
what are the risks and how will we be dealing with those ? 
• What would be the relevant path to allow the WHO to decide, with proper data, 
on whether the virus better be eradicated or not ? 
36.9 Repair of national trust 
National trust has corroded. The captain of the ship had been given the task to 
steer the ship between Scylla and Charybdis, but hit Scylla with 9000 deaths and 
hit Charybdis with a dent in the economy and people's income and savings. 
It is true that the government and RIVM by using the emergency brake have 
prevented some 240,000 deaths, but today the same arguments on content apply 
that already existed in January / February, so that the delay since February 
doesn't make sense. 
More and more people understand that this delay, of now a half year, was not 
caused by lack of information, as RIVM claims, but by indecision at the cost of the 
general public. 
Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet, can say: “Individually, they’re great people, 
but the system was a catastrophic failure.” However, for a government it is 
expected that it observes that something is amiss structurally. When that 
conclusion isn't made and when repairs aren't started, then people become 
restless and wonder why there is such delay at their cost. Not far away is the 
question: Would the government dodge the issue again at the next event ? Can I 
still trust that my life and livelihood are safe in their hands ? 
Overall, I would also say that the Dutch government structurally misinforms the 
public also about the situation on environmental sustainability (see here) and the 
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options for economic policy (see here). But okay, the objective is to focus on 
SARS-CoV-2 now. 
Today, the government and RIVM and NiZ are still ambiguous about 
"containment" (with SCT) and "mitigation" (with "herd immunity"). The situation has 
improved, with few infections and hardly any recorded new deaths anymore, and 
with the availability of personal protection equipment (PPE), and testing and SCT. 
Nowadays, policy makers can choose for containment more easily. 
But economic uncertainty is still large, and employers and employees still fear 
the Fall and the risk of a second wave. The lack of clarity in choice, the lack of 
admission of mistakes, and the highly problematic economic situation: they now 
have created a smoldering fire of distrust. 
And Dutch parliament intends to take a two-month vacation ? 
NB. An evidence-based diagnosis of the corrosion of trust might require an 
opinion poll, 631 but opinions might also be misguided, as the media still tend to 
portray RIVM as an anchor in the storm. Journalists love authorities and distrust 
outside scientists. This weblog diagnoses corrosion not by opinion poll but on 
content. When people refer to these points of content and state that they no longer 
trust the government and RIVM, then they cannot be said to be incorrect. When 
the media still portray RIVM as an anchor in the storm then the media apparently 
neglect this evidence. The appendix contains some other examples how RIVM 
clearly destroyed trust. Such examples might be seen as anecdotal only but the 
above clarifies that they are a result of a decision making structure. 
36.10 Appendix. Some examples of corroding national trust 
These examples might be seen as anecdotal only but the above clarifies that 
they are a result of a decision making structure. 
Example 1. Earlier, the Dutch government did not want an evaluation by 
September 1. It required a petition and parliamentarian involvement before the 
government agreed to have it made. It still is not clear what the evaluation will 
involve in particular. 
Example 2. John Jacobs is a biomedical researcher and has a clear statement in 
favour of containment and suppression (in Dutch). 632 Why is this clarity missing at 
RIVM ? What is their answer ? Jacobs explains that scientific advice must be open 
access. When scientists participate in the OMT and longer have open access, 
then they no longer do science in this OMT. 
(If RIVM keeps information secret (perhaps to avoid panic in the population) then 
they should not parade the involvement of scientists. But okay, it would be another 
extreme when the very existence of such contacts would be secret too ... My 
diagnosis is that the position of scientists and scholars also involved in actual 
advice requires a key improvement, see here.) 
Example 3. Jasper Lukkezen, editor of the Dutch economics journal ESB, 
reports 633 that it now has occurred twice in the last months that an article about 
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the cost-effectiveness of the virus policy has been withdrawn by the authors 
themselves. In one case, there was too much uncertainty about key assumptions. 
(Such uncertainty indeed holds in general. Lukkezen doesn't say so, but I infer that 
it also relates to the lack of information by RIVM: you cannot check what they do 
when they control the information. In economics, we have a distinction between 
CBS that establishes the statistical data and CPB that does the planning.) For 
another case there was the "large political and social pressure concerning the 
lockdown measures". This author referred to the case of Alfred Kleinknecht who 
since the 1990s presents an analysis that the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
disagrees with, so that they no longer gave him contracts for research. (See: (a) 
Kleinknecht's website, 634 (b) my disagreement with Kleinknecht. 635) 
Example 4. There was the focus on the (end of pipe) ICU and the lack of 
attention for the (begin of pipe) home care that sends patients to the ICU. There 
was the curious discussion about closing schools and the role of children. There is 
the issue of aerosols and ventilation. RIVM first rejected the relevance of face 
masks 636 and later agreed with using them in public transport. As said, RIVM 
misinformed the Dutch about the capacity on testing. There is the ambiguity and 
inconsistency on SCT and herd immunity. RIVM has made many errors and has 
tried to cover up and spin those errors too often. 
Example 5. If Rt = 10 holds in one week then R(t+i) = 10 need not hold also in 
subsequent weeks, because the situation can change. Maurice de Hond rightly 
criticises RIVM for stating only Rt < 1 or Rt > 1 without clarifying the effect size. 
When the number of infected people concerns a small number of people, like the 
1715 people on a population of 17.4 million, as reported on June 25, then even a 
value like Rt = 10 may have a limited impact. If over 5 days 1715 * 10 = 17150 
people would be infected, and if these people would be youngsters with IFF = 
0.06%, then 10 youngsters would die, while traffic accidents have 55 deaths per 
month. There can be safeguards, like proper reporting also about the effect size, 
so that Rt and the effect go down again. De Hond denounces the RIVM focus on 
Rt only as scaremongering and "malevolent". 637 I regard De Hond's denunciation 
as over the top. It may also be a result from an overall lack of communication 
between RIVM and De Hond: however, we should expect a government institution 
to decently answer to fair questions. My impression is that RIVM is aware of this 
issue of the effect size, but simply hasn't been creative enough to develop the 
proper dashboard. Aspect are: (1) RIVM refuses to state forecasts of expected 
deaths, as "speculative", but then neglects that this is precisely the kind of 
information that is required (with nuances on qaly's and cost-effectiveness). (2) 
Epidemiological models give projections of the developments of infections, 
clearing and deaths, and it is precisely this kind of information that best is provided 
by such a dashboard, so that users can see what is involved over what time 
horizon. (3) While RIVM states that it calibrates the calculation of Rt with hospital 
                                                                
634 http://alfredkleinknecht.nl/en/ 
635 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2017/05/13/disinformation-and-trauma-at-tu-delft/ 
636 https://medium.com/@Cancerwarrior/covid-19-why-we-should-all-wear-masks-there-is-new-
scientific-rationale-280e08ceee71 
637 https://www.maurice.nl/2020/06/13/zo-neemt-prof-wallinga-ons-in-de-maling/ 
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admissions, I think that they use a more complex model, while De Hond suggests 
that they use those numbers directly. I suppose that this can be clarified. 
Example 6. Science journalist Jop de Vrieze reported on May 20: 
"Hans Heesterbeek is not comfortable with the situation. The professor of 
theoretical epidemiology at Utrecht University also founded a Slack group 
in late March, together with chief modeler Jacco Wallinga of RIVM and 
professor Sake de Vlas of Erasmus MC, with the objective to also give 
RIVM an opportunity to submit modeling questions to experts from 
outside the institute, notably questions that are relevant for the Dutch exit 
strategy. "But these questions have not yet been asked since RIVM has 
been so busy." As a result, precious time has been lost. Although contact 
tracing is now being scaled up, and the lockdown is being relaxed step by 
step, the substantiation for the dashboard that the Cabinet wants to use 
is minimal, says Heesterbeek." 638 
Example 7. Science journalist Jop de Vrieze reported on May 6: 639 Yaneer Bar-
Yam, who has been warning about a pandemic for 15 years and who set up 
www.endcoronavirus.org, sent a letter to RIVM on March 9, advising to do more 
and asking why RIVM wasn't doing more. He did not get a reply yet. One might 
argue that RIVM may select itself whom it communicates with, but one cannot 
exclude valid questions by fellow scientists. 
On May 5, De Vrieze quotes Bar-Yam on face masks: 
Question: "The WHO does not yet advise the public to wear masks." 
Answer: "Well, the question remains: if something is evident, are you 
waiting for an extensive study, or will you assume that it helps if you 
apply them correctly? We want to stop the outbreak. A good article has 
appeared that covers all of this: Why we all need to wear masks. 640 If you 
continue to emphasize that masks are of no use, you swap absence of 
evidence with evidence of absence. That It [has no proven use][?] 
becomes a kind of mantra. They think they are talking about science, but 
they don't." 641 
                                                                
638 Dutch; "Hans Heesterbeek is er niet gerust op. De hoogleraar theoretische epidemiologie aan 
de Universiteit Utrecht richtte nota bene eind maart samen met hoofdmodelleur Jacco Wallinga 
van het rivm en hoogleraar Sake de Vlas van het Erasmus MC half maart een Slackgroep op, 
waarin het rivm aan experts van buiten het instituut modelleringsvragen kon voorleggen die 
relevant zijn voor de Nederlandse exit-strategie. ‘Maar die vragen zijn er door de drukte nog niet 
gekomen.’ Hierdoor is er kostbare tijd verloren gegaan. Het contactonderzoek wordt nu 
weliswaar opgeschaald, er wordt stap voor stap versoepeld, maar de onderbouwing voor het 
dashboard dat het kabinet wil gaan gebruiken is minimaal, zegt Heesterbeek." 
639 https://jopdevrieze.nl/internationale-pandemie-expert-nederland-laat-de-kans-lopen-om-het-
virus-in-te-dammen/ 
640 https://medium.com/@Cancerwarrior/covid-19-why-we-should-all-wear-masks-there-is-new-
scientific-rationale-280e08ceee71 
641 Dutch: "De WHO geeft nog niet het advies om massaal mondkapjes te dragen. ‘Tja, de vraag 
blijft: als iets evident is, wacht je dan op een uitgebreide studie of ga je er vanuit dat het wanneer 
je ze goed toepast helpt? We willen de uitbraak stoppen. Er is een goed stuk verschenen dat dit 
allemaal behandelt: Why we should all wear masks. Wie blijft benadrukken dat maskers geen nut 
hebben, verwisselt absence of evidence met evidence of absence. Dat Het [geeft geen bewezen 
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Example 8. Science journalist Jop de Vrieze on April 15 reported 642 that Denny 
Borsboom invites government institutes to use open access methods to better use 
expertise at the academia and research institutes. There is this grassroots project 
but the harvest is not great. Scientists are aware that it isn't efficient to put in 
energy without knowing that results will be used. 
Example 9. On April 5, Maarten Keulemans, who studied history and 
antropology but still got a job as "science journalist" at Volkskrant, distorted a view 
that had been expressed by lawyer Jort Kelder. The latter had proposed to protect 
the elderly and make more speed with RIVM / Van Dissel's "herd immunity" so that 
the economy could be saved. Keulemans applied the case fatality rates as 
published by the Imperial College in The Lancet, with instant flooding of the ICUs 
and not spreading the case load over time, and then he criticised Kelder instead of 
RIVM. Thus he distorted a critical view and was not critical enough w.r.t. the figure 
of authority. To this day Keulemans portrays Van Dissel as the wise national 
doctor instead that he performs critical journalism and informs the newspaper 
readership about the failure and spin. (This is not the first error made by 
Keulemans over time.) (The Volkskrant readership tends to be in education and 
health care.) 
Example 10. I saved explicit lunacy for the last. Pepijn van Erp deconstructed 643 
the reasoning errors by Willem Engel, but the latter still managed to set up a 
demonstration on June 20 that ended in violence with 400 arrests. 644 Remarkably 
Engel called for an end of the lockdown and such ending was quite in sight for July 
1 but they still had the demonstration. Lunatics might not see their own errors but 
they might spot errors made by the national authorities (and then regard such 
errors by officials as proof that they themselves would not make errors). There is a 
tv channel around gold-bug 645 Willem Middelkoop which tv channel parasitically 
feeds upon unrest and conspiracy theories, but there were two remarkably correct 
tv interviews, one with Cees Hamelink (on the government abuse of science 646) 
(wikipedia) and another with Michaela Schippers (on mass hysteria 647) (cv). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
nut][?] wordt een soort mantra. Ze denken dat ze het over wetenschap hebben, maar dat doen 
ze niet.’" 
642 https://jopdevrieze.nl/het-rivm-moet-de-modellen-openbaar-beschikbaar-maken/ 
643 https://kloptdatwel.nl/2020/06/06/de-denkfouten-van-willem-engel-het-coronavirus/ 
644 https://nos.nl/artikel/2337992-onrustige-dag-in-den-haag-na-betoging-op-malieveld-400-
aanhoudingen.html 
645 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2014/05/29/the-fun-of-the-fringe/ 
646 https://www.cafeweltschmerz.nl/overheid-misbruikt-wetenschap-overheid-misbruikt-
wetenschap-cees-hamelink-en-flavio-pasquino/ 
647 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3rCPv-IXHE 
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37. Conclusions of this book 
 
Let researchers of science and learning in each nation set up their own National 
Assembly of Science and Learning. While Chapter 4 itemises the other main 
conclusions upfront, we can recapitulate for statistics: 
The scientific, and thus independent, governance of the National Statistical 
Offices in the European Union has been seriously damaged because of the 
Eurozone crisis in 2010.  
In that year, the board of the Greek National Statistical Office El.Stat had all 
authority, and the director was only a member of that board. The IMF wanted this 
situation changed. In a Memorandum of 2012 for the IMF, the Greek government 
promised to change the law and assign the authority to the director.  
In 2010, director Andreas Georgiou, already claimed this authority, and gave 
Eurostat “official figures” about the Greek government deficit and debt for 2009, 
without first seeking approval by the El.Stat board. In 2018 the Greek Supreme 
Court found Georgiou in violation of his duty. He was guilty as charged. 
Statistical organisations ISI, RSS, ASA, IAOS, FENStatS and SFdS 648 are in 
uproar and hold that Georgiou is a victim of a miscarriage of justice. The 
statisticians neglect to look at the Greek law in 2010, recognised by the IMF, and 
they do not respect the separation of powers between the Executive (themselves) 
and the Judiciary branches of the Trias Politica model of democracy. They also 
neglect the fellow statisticians on the board.  
The scientific world is advised to set up an investigation into what happened at 
El.Stat and Eurostat, and at why and how the statistical organisations reacted in 
such wrong manner. 
By reflex, the EU now in 2020 assigns statistical authority to single directors. For 
a knowledge society this is unwise and highly risky, as a single person is more 
vulnerable to error and pressure.  
In 1899-2016, Holland had a much better governance with a Central 
Commission for Statistics (CCS), that established the programme (also for non-
CBS), and CBS Statistics Netherlands, that executed its programme and 
determined the figures and publication. In the last decades CBS also had 
multiperson boards in practice. 
The EU is advised to reconsider and look at the Dutch experience and restore 
the status quo ante. 
Dutch parliament is advised not to wait for international bodies and set up its 
own enquiry, and consider to restore the governance of CCS and CBS.  
                                                                
648 International Statistical Institute (ISI), Royal Statistical Society (RSS), Americal Statistical 
Association (ASA), International Association of Official Statistics (IAOS), Federation of European 
National Statistical Societies (FENStatS), Société Française de Statistique (SFdS). 
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Due to the orginal setup of this book – with the 1st edition published in February 
during the relative calm before the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic – 
Chapter 4 didn’t and doesn’t present an “upfront conclusion” concerning the 
pandemic. This 2nd edition in July includes the experience of the last half year. 
Conclusions w.r.t. the pandemic are: 
(1) Nations show a wide variety of reactions, which in a way is helpful for 
science, since it generates variety in the data, while scientists and scholars 
cannot experiment with people to generate the same variety.  
(2) We cannot say that the world or EU or USA would have done better if policy 
makers had co-ordinated their policies. The “deficiency in co-ordination” in 
the EU allowed Greece and Germany to show better results which otherwise 
might have been forbidden due to the imposition of a general policy. The 
denial by the Trump administration aggravated the US national situation but 
can also be seen as a more or less “co-ordinated action by the executive 
branch”, which does not necessarily present an argument in favour of policy 
co-ordination itself. Instead, in all cases, we can identify key problems in the 
handling of information from science and learning itself. The present mental 
frame allows for the distinction between politics and advice, but there is also 
the third role of expertise and in particular expertise w.r.t. the quality of 
information. While it may be too early to draw conclusions on outcomes also 
on (quality adjusted) life-years gained and economic performance, it seems 
safe to conclude that already much can be improved on the relation between 
society on the one hand and science and learning on the other hand.  
(3) A showcase example would be Holland. Pueyo (2020) (June 9) states:  
“The Netherlands is an especially interesting country, because it has 
nearly controlled the crisis despite toying with herd immunity. They 
are in a unique position in the world: It’s the only country that could 
easily start Dancing, but is deciding not to. This makes no sense. 
They should simply apply the measures for Dancing that are proven 
elsewhere, and save their economy and thousands of lives.”  
The discussion in Chapter 36 clarifies how Holland got where it is, which is 
not as good as could have been (still 9000 deaths), which also explains why 
the next phase for the upcoming Fall and Winter 2020 can be problematic. 
Overall, Holland shows a sound national preference for a low death toll and 
a restart of the economy. The problem rather lies in the communication 
within the community of science and learning, and the channels of 
information from there to policy making and society as a whole. Dutch 
governmental research institutes for science and learning based statistics 
and planning have grown used to procedures that insulate themselves from 
outside critical thinking by the wider forum. Perhaps those governmental 
institutes have ample reasons to be cautious, since the wider forum is 
fragmented and not as organised as criteria of forum theory require. The 
clear conclusion is that this forum better gets organised. 
(4) The pandemic provides additional evidence for the risk of environmental 
unsustainability, and then see Part 5 of this book. 
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38. Appendix. Origin of national statistics in Holland 
38.1 Website of Dutch KVS Royal Society for Political Economy 
The KVS Royal Society for Political Economy (“Koninklijke Vereniging voor de 
Staathuishoudkunde”) presents this history on its website, my translation: 649 650 
“In 1999, the Royal Society for Political Economy celebrated its 150th 
anniversary with an jubilee conference in which foreign experts reflected 
on the role of the Netherlands in economic history. As the Society only 
celebrated its 125th anniversary in 1987, it seemed that the Society was 
going through a rapid aging process. Historical research, however, 
showed that 1849 should be regarded as the year of birth of the Society. 
The meeting of authors and contributors of the "Staatkundig en 
Staathuishoudkundig Jaarboekje" for 1849, organized by the first 
chairman of the Society, Jonkheer J. de Bosch Kemper, now appears to 
be acknowledged officially as the founding meeting of the Society. 
The background to the establishment of the Society for Political Economy 
(at the time Society for State Statistics) was the desire of De Bosch 
Kemper and his associates that more and better statistical data on the 
whole state government (and also more widely national economy) should 
be made available for the benefit of government policy making. In fact, 
                                                                
649 https://esb.nu/service/overkvs 
650 Dutch: “In 1999 vierde de Koninklijke Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde haar 150-jarig 
bestaan met een jubileumcongres waarbij buitenlandse deskundigen hun licht lieten schijnen 
over de rol van Nederland in de economische geschiedenis. Aangezien de Vereniging pas in 
1987 haar 125-jarig jubileum heeft gevierd, had het er de schijn van dat de Vereniging een snel 
verouderingsproces doormaakte. Uit geschiedkundig onderzoek was echter naar voren gekomen 
dat 1849 als het ware als geboortejaar van de Vereniging moet worden aangemerkt. De door de 
eerste voorzitter van de Vereniging, jonkheer J. de Bosch Kemper georganiseerde bijeenkomst 
van medewerkers aan het "Staatkundig en Staathuishoudkundig Jaarboekje" voor 1849 blijkt nu 
officieel als de oprichtingsvergadering van de Vereniging te moeten worden aangemerkt. 
De achtergrond van de oprichting van de Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde (indertijd 
Statistiek) was de wens van De Bosch Kemper en zijn medestanders dat er ten behoeve van het 
Regeringsbeleid meer en betere statistische gegevens over de totale staatshuishouding (en ook 
ruimer de volkshuishouding) beschikbaar zouden komen. In feite loopt deze lobby als een rode 
draad door de beginjaren van de Vereniging heen. Uiteindelijk zag de Vereniging zijn streven 
bekroond met de installatie van de Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek in 1892 en met de 
oprichting van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek in 1899. 
Na de installatie van de Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek besloten de leden het werkterrein 
van de vereniging te verbreden en dienovereenkomstig de naam van de vereniging aan te 
passen. Als de "Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde en de Statistiek" verlegde zij definitief 
haar aandacht naar de staathuishoudkunde en introduceerde zij de preadviezen, die lange tijd 
het voornaamste product van de vereniging waren. Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd de 
vereniging andermaal herdoopt. Ook dit keer werd de naam in overeenstemming gebracht met 
het feitelijke werkterrein. Als de "Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde" behield zij haar 
forumfunctie, maar ondervond zij in toenemende mate concurrentie van andere 
wetenschappelijke instanties. Gaandeweg ontwikkelde zij zich tot een beroepsvereniging voor 
economen. Tenslotte is het ter gelegenheid van het vorig jubileum aan de Vereniging toegestaan 
het predikaat "Koninklijk" te voeren.” 
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this lobby runs like a thread through the early years of the Society. 
Eventually the Society saw its endeavors rewarded by the installation of 
the Central Commission for Statistics in 1892 and the establishment of 
the Central Bureau of Statistics in 1899. 
After the installation of the Central Commission for Statistics, the 
members decided to broaden the scope of the Society and adjust the 
Society's name accordingly. As the "Society for Political Economy and 
Statistics", she definitively shifted her attention to Political Economy and 
introduced the Preadviezen (pre-advices), that for a long time were the 
Society's main product. After the Second World War the Society was 
renamed again. This time too, the name was brought into line with the 
actual field of activity. As the "Society for Political Economy", it retained 
its forum function, but it increasingly faced competition from other 
scientific bodies. She gradually developed into a professional association 
for economists. Finally, at the occasion of the last anniversary, the 
Society has been granted the use of the predicate "Royal".” 
The claim that KVS is turning into a professional association for economists is 
overrated. The field of political economy is too small for such a diverse profession, 
and many economists are professionally engaged in other areas than science. It 
would be better that KVS enhances its scientific profile. In the past, the journal “De 
Economist” was published by KVS but it has now been transferred to Springer, 
and that was an error, because it should have been retained as the journal of 
KVS. 651 Similarly, the label ESB 652 is owned by KVS, but the journal is not open 
access. There are easy open access solutions for both journals by a better link to 
the universities, see my letter to VSNU. 653 
38.2 Dutch law of 1899 
For Dutch readers it may be striking to see the law of 1899, that stipulates that 
there are both a CCS and a CBS. 654 The research topics / publications are 
determined by the CCS and the director presents the statistical data 655 that he 
thinks are useful for practice or science. 
                                                                
651 https://link.springer.com/journal/10645 
652 https://esb.nu/service/overesb#het-vakblad-voor-economen 
653 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2016/10/12/letter-to-vsnu-and-others-on-membership-
dues-and-open-access-publishing/ 
654 “Organisatiebesluit van het Centrale bureau en de Centrale commissie voor de statistiek: 
Koninklijk besluit van 9 Januari 1899” (Staatsblad 43) (published on January 18 1899, 
Staatscourant) 
https://www.delpher.nl/nl/kranten/view?coll=ddd&query=%28Centraal+Bureau+Statistiek%29&cq
l%5B%5D=%28date+_gte_+%2209-01-1899%22%29&cql%5B%5D=%28date+_lte_+%2201-12-
1899%22%29&facets%5Bspatial%5D%5B%5D=Landelijk&redirect=true&identifier=MMKB08:000
173055:mpeg21:a0004&resultsidentifier=MMKB08:000173055:mpeg21:a0004 
655 Dutch “statistische opgaven”. This term is out of use, but with “prijsopgave” Dutch readers will 
recall that the meaning is “vermelding van gegevens” (recording of data).  
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39. Appendix. Backgrounds of some people  
39.1 Xeni Dimitriou (Supreme Court Prosecutor) 
Xeni Dimitriou is mentioned in various protests as a key person in the Greek 
juridical system in the prosecution of Andreas Georgiou. Over the years she has 
become a prosecutor at the Greek Supreme Court, for the tenure period of 2016-
2019. Since I have no expertise on law and the Greek language or system, I only 
refer to some reports.  
Apparently, when a lower court arrives at a verdict, then a higher court may 
decide that something still isn’t okay, so that a new round is started. In Holland, 
Lucia de B. was convicted as a serial killer nurse, and it took quite some effort to 
reopen the case so that she could be acquitted. More flexibility can be advisable 
(see Richard Gill, also on Ben Geen 656 657).  
Also, one can understand that a prosecutor in Greece would not want that there 
would be a shade of doubt about any wrongdoing at El.Stat. Eventually Georgiou 
was convicted in 2018 and guilty as charged – for violation of duty. One can only 
wonder why it took so long. Malconduct by Snorrason and likely Eurostat are 
important factors here too, see the discussion in Part 6. 
Dimitra Kroustalli in To Vima 2019 has a discussion. 658 PM. Zoe Georganta 
becomes “Sophia Georganta”.  
There is this press release: 659 
QUOTE 
Athens, November 26, 2018. 
1st International Conference on the Establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor's Office 
 The 1st International Conference on the Establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor's Office was held in Athens on 23rd to 25th of November 2018, 
organized by the Supreme Court Prosecutor's Office under the auspices of the 
Presidency of the Greek Republic with the assistance of the General Secretariat 
Against Corruption and the General Inspector of Public Administration, was 
successfully completed. 
The General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Greece Mrs. Xeni Dimitriou 
opened the conference in the presence of the President of the Hellenic Republic, 
[his excellency] Prokopis Pavlopoulos while Minister of Justice, Transparency and 
Human Rights M. Kalogirou addressed welcome speech. 
The President of the Supreme Court, General and Federal Prosecutors from 
Europe, third-country Prosecutors, the President and Vice-President of Eurojust, 
representatives of the European European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the 
                                                                
656 https://www.math.leidenuniv.nl/~gill/ 
657 https://bengeen.wordpress.com/ 
658 https://www.tovima.gr/2019/07/02/international/xeni-dimitriou-works-and-days-of-a-willing-
prosecutor/ 
659 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/14012019_athens_conference_on_eppo_en.pdf 
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European Commission, as wel as Greek Prosecutors, senior judges and 
representatives of auditing bodies were among the participants. 
The General Secretary Against Corruption, Mrs. Xepapadea, in her inaugural 
speech, (...) concluded by praising the importance of cooperation in the 
effectiveness of the investigations on corruption and fraud cases, in accountability 
and in the process of charging amounts, and outlined the need to improve the 
mechanisms for asset recovery. 
UNQUOTE 
39.2 Andreas Georgiou (econometrician, former IMF, president El.Stat) 
The following is taken from Breugel (see Appendix 39.10): 660  
“Andreas Georgiou was born in Patra, Greece, in 1960. He received a 
Bachelor of Arts from Amherst College in Economics and Political 
Science/Sociology. He continued his studies in Economics at the 
University of Michigan, where he received a Ph.D. with specialisations in 
Monetary Theory and Stabilisation Policy and in International Trade and 
Finance. From October 1989 until July 2010 he worked at the 
International Monetary Fund, holding positions in the following 
departments: Statistics Department, African Department, European 
Department, Exchange and Trade Relations Department (currently 
Strategy and Policy Review Department). 
 In August 2010 he returned to Greece to head the newly established 
Hellenic Statistical Authority (El.Stat) — the successor of the National 
Statistical Service of Greece following the onset of the economic crisis in 
Greece. He was President of the Hellenic Statistical Authority until 2 
August 2015, in its first five years as an independent National Statistical 
Office. He led the reorganisation and rebuilding of the institution (both 
regarding statistical production and administration) on a new basis of fully 
conforming to international and European statistical standards and 
practices, leading to the establishment of the credibility of Greek 
statistics. 
 Amongst his tasks was also the coordination of the newly defined and 
constituted National Statistical System of Greece (Hellenic Statistical 
System) and he was, inter alia, responsible for the certification of other 
national agencies’ official statistics. Moreover, he organised and led the 
2011 National Census in Greece, meeting EU Regulation provisions and 
applying new quality controls and standards. He has been an elected 
Member of the Partnership Group of the European Statistical System 
(2012-2013); Member of the Partnership Group of the European 
Statistical System (on account of Greek Presidency of the Council of the 
EU in 2013-2014); Member of the European Statistical System 
Committee (2010-2015); elected Member of the Bureau of the European 
Statistical Forum (2013-2015); elected Member of the Editorial Board of 
the European Statistical System Report (2014-2015); and Chairman of 
the Council Working Party on Statistics during the Greek Presidency of 
                                                                
660 https://bruegel.org/author/andreas-georgiou/ 
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the Council of the EU (2014). In 2013 he was elected Member of the 
International Statistical Institute. He has been Visiting Associate 
Professor in Finance, Banking and Investment, at the Economics 
University Bratislava, in the Slovak Republic. 
 He is currently Visiting Lecturer and Visiting Scholar at Amherst College, 
USA, where he teaches statistical ethics and macroeconomics. He is 
elected member of the Council of the International Statistical Institute 
(2019-2023) and is currently serving as member of the Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the American Statistical Association (2018-2020). 
He has published on institutional and legal frameworks for national and 
supranational statistical systems, on financial crises and on 
macroeconomic programming.” 
Wikipedia is a portal and no source. It has on Georgiou (2019-12-18): 661 
“Georgiou's prosecution has been denounced as a violation of scientific 
freedom and human rights by the American Statistical Association's 
Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights [10] and the 
editorial board of The Economist. [11] The Financial Times reported, "The 
case has sparked outrage from economists and statisticians worldwide 
who believe Mr. Georgiou has become a scapegoat for Greece's political 
class." [12]” 
I suppose that it is a matter of time before these statistical institutes and news 
media start to retract and also Wikipedia discovers the misquote and 
misrepresentation by ISI. 
39.3 Hallgrímur Snorrason (economist, director Statistics Iceland, repr. Eurostat) 
A problem with Hallgrímur Snorrason is his dual role as both participant-
associate of Georgiou and “independent outsider”, see Sections 25.16 and 33.1. 
Snorrason was apparently hired by Eurostat in 2010 as “permanent resident 
representative” and “High Level Exptert” at El.Stat, with the task that he “provides 
independent advice to El.Stat”. Georganta (2012b) 662 (search for his name, and 
do not forget about pages 22- 23, and remember that she got copies of emails via 
her lawyer), and see her letter to ISI, 663 claims, though she also indicates that she 
was in the building of El.Stat only a few times, that he chose to assist only 
Georgiou rather than the board in general, in her view mainly in helping in 
changing the governance rules of El.Stat. At ISI, Snorrason adopted the role of 
“independent outsider” to defend Georgiou, showing partiality.  
Snorrason’s website gives this information, 664 with his retirement on January 1 
2008, and recall the role of Iceland in the 2008-2011 financial crisis. 665  
                                                                
661 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andreas_Georgiou 
662 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/European-Commission-Decision-
prejudice1.pdf 
663 http://www.zoe-georganta.co.uk/Letter%20to%20ISI%20from%20N.%20Logothetis%20and 
%20Z.%20Georganta%20(ELSTAT).pdf 
664 http://snorrasonstatistics.net/ 
665 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008%E2%80%932011_Icelandic_financial_crisis (portal, no 
source) 
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“SnorrasonStatistics is the working name of the consulting services in 
official statistics and related fields offered by Hallgrímur Snorrason, 
previous Director General of Statistics Iceland – the national statistical 
institute of Iceland. Hallgrimur retired from that post on 1 January 2008 
having held that office for 23 years. During that time he led the evolution 
of Statistics Iceland and Icelandic official statistics from a minimalistic 
domestic operation to a fully fledged but small national statistical institute 
actively participating in international statistical cooperation and fulfilling 
the major part of the obligations posed by the international and European 
statistical systems for comparable statistical undertakings and data. 
During his career at Statistics Iceland, Hallgrimur played an active role in 
the cooperation of the main international and supra-national agencies in 
the field of statistics. Since retiring from Statistics Iceland, Hallgrimur has 
worked as independent consultant in official statistics, in several 
countries and for various organizations, mainly in developing countries 
and on capacity building issues.” 
39.4 Nikos Logothetis (informatics, vice-president El.Stat) 
This takes only education and employment from the website of Georganta. 666  
(In this book: see Section 31.3 and Appendix 44.) 
QUOTE 
PERSONAL 
Place of birth: Kavala, GREECE  
Nationality: Greek / British 
EDUCATION - DEGREES OBTAINED 
A. Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) 
from: University of Nottingham, England, 1981  
main subject: Ergodic Theory and Information. 
B. Master of Science (M.Sc.) 
from: University of Sheffield, England, 1977 
main subjects: Probability and Statistics, Computing. 
C. Diploma (equiv. to an M.Sc. for Greece) 
from: University of Patras, Greece, 1975  
main subjects: Mathematics, Statistics. 
D. Certificate of LEAD AUDITOR: 
Lead Auditor of Quality Assurance Systems 
Institute of Quality Assurance (IQA), IRCA Registration Scheme,  
Certificate Serial No: LA/96/GR/257 
EMPLOYMENT 
(A) HELLENIC STATISTICS AUTHORITY (El.Stat), Piraeus, 2010- 2011 
Position: Vice-President, appointed by the Hellenic Parliament through a public 
open call. 
(Β) T.Q.M. HELLAS SA, Athens, Greece, 1991 - today 
                                                                
666 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CV-Nickolas-Logothetis.pdf 
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(Management Consulting Firm providing training and advisory services on 
matters of ISO-9001, ISO-14001, OHSAS-18001, STATISTICS and Total Quality 
Management) 
Position: Managing Director 
(C) HELLENIC OPEN UNIVERSITY 2000 - today: 
Member of Associated Educational Personnel (Teaching Counselor and Diploma 
Theses-Supervisor) on the Postgraduate Course “Advanced Methods for Quality 
Assurance and Quality Improvement” 
(D) BRITISH TELECOM (BT) (London, UK) 1989 - 1990 
Position: Senior Consultant with BT's Management Science Consultancy Unit, 
(Level-3 Manager in the Unit's Management 5-level hierarchy) providing a 
consultancy service to Senior Management of BT (...)  
(E) GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (GEC): 
(Hirst Research Center, London, UK) Feb. 1985 - Mar. 1989 Positions: 
(a) Head of the Statistical Advisory/Research Unit 
(b) Member of GEC's Technical Directorate. 
(c) Member of GEConsult as Management Consultant on the development and 
application of modern cost-effective methods for Quality, Productivity 
Improvement, ISO-9000, and Total Quality Management. 
(F) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS - University of London:  
(London, UK) Dec. 1980 - Jan. 1985 
Positions: 
(a) Research Advisor and Part-time Lecturer 
 (Department of Statistical and Mathematical Sciences) 
(b) Lecturer (Department of Extra-Mural Studies.) 
UNQUOTE 
 
39.5 Zoe Georganta (econometrician, member board El.Stat) 
PM. Thanks to Google I also spotted this: In the commercial edition of his thesis 
“Externality and Institutions” with Amartya Sen, Andreas Papandreou jr (1994) 
includes Zoe Georganta in the list of people that he thanks (and then I could walk 
to the bookcase and check in my copy). 
This takes only education and employment from her CV on her website. 667 From 
these dates I estimate that she was born around 1950 and thus in 2020 would be 
around 70 years of age. 
PM. KEPE 668 is an indicative planning agency, somewhat comparable to the 
Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB). 
(In this book: see Section 31.2 and Appendix 43.) 
                                                                
667 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CV-Nickolas-Logothetis.pdf 
668 https://www.kepe.gr/index.php/en/to-kepe-2.html. “It is governed by a board of directors 
appointed by the Minister for Development and Investments and the research staff concentrates 
on four areas of empirical research: (a) Macroeconomic analysis and projections, (b) Fiscal and 
monetary policy, (c) Human resources and social policies, and (d ) Sectoral analyses and 
policies.” 
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QUOTE 
I. EDUCATION 
1. Ph.D. in Applied Econometrics, University of Leeds, School of Economics 
Economic Statistics, UK, 1980. 
Thesis Title: A Quarterly Econometric Model of the Balance of payments 
of Greece. Supervisor: Professor C.E.V. Leser, Professor of 
Econometrics, and Professor Emeritus of Econometrics. 
2. M.Α. in Economic Statistics, University of Leeds, School of Economics, 
Economic Statistics, UK, 1976. 
Subjects Studied: Advanced Econometric Theory, Applied Econometrics, 
Advanced Statistical Theory, Applied Statistics, Cost Benefit Analysis, 
Welfare Economics. 
3. B.A. in Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, 1971. 
4. Post Graduate Institute in Business Administration, Athens University of 
Economics and Business. Protocol No. 12264, 1974. 
5. UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Organization) Certificate – KEPE (Center 
of Planning and Economic Research) in Analysis and Evaluation of 
Investment Projects, Prof. Paul-Andre Rey, 1984. 
IΙ. EMPLOYMENT 
 
2013 – today  • Supervision of Ph.D. Theses  
• Own Economic Research  
• Provision of consulting services in quantitative economic analysis 
and educational strategy 
2012 Retirement 
2010 Aug.-
Oct 2011  
 Member* of the Hellenic Statistics Authority (El.Stat.)  
*Approved by the Greek Parliament as nominated by the Minister of 
Finance after an open public call. 
2003-2012 Professor of Applied Econometrics and Productivity  
Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia Economic 
and Social Sciences 
2009 Οκτ.- 
Apr.2010 
Visiting Scholar: Cambridge University - UK, Faculty of Economics.  
Project: Statistical Measurement Issues in Electronic Commerce. 
1995-2003 Associate Professor of Applied Econometrics and Productivity.  
Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia Economic 
and Social Sciences. 
2000-2001 Visiting Scholar: Harvard University, Department of Economics, and 
NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research), Cambridge MA, 
USA. 
Project: Measurement Issues in Producer Prices, Productivity and 
Technology. 
1996-2000
 
Senior Consultant and Project Manager: Ministry of Development. 
Project: Competitiveness SME (Small and Medium Enterprises). 
1996-1998
 
Senior Consultant and Project Manager: SBBE (Federation of 
Industries of Northern Greece). 
Project: Competitiveness of SME. 
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1992-1995 Assistant Professor of Econometrics. 
Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia Economic 
and Social Sciences. 
1993-1994 Visiting Scholar: Harvard University, Department of Economics and 
NBER, Cambridge MA, USA. 
Project: Data Mining and Statistical Measurement Issues of Quality 
Change Effects on Prices, Productivity Change and Technology. 
1990-1993 Senior Consultant: Regional Office of Central Macedonia Greece 
Project areas: 
(1) Information Systems of statistical observation of the labor market 
(2) Business Software  
(3) Evaluation of Vocational Programs  
(4) Price Indices and Productivity Measurement  
1990-1993
 
Senior Consultant: Cambridge Econometrics. 
Project: Regional Growth of European Cities. 
1990-1992
 
Assistant Professor of Econometrics. Department of Economics, 
University of Macedonia Economic and Social Sciences. 
1992  
(Dec.-April)
 
Consultant for Statistical Surveys and Macroeconomic Planning: Royal 
Government of Bhutan, Planning Commission. 
1990  
(Dec.-June)
 
Teaching Assistant (sophomores): Harvard University, Department of 
Economics, Cambridge MA, USA. 
Subject: Productivity and Technological Change. 
1989-1990 Visiting Scholar. Harvard University, Department of Economics, 
Cambridge MA, USA. 
Project: Income and Productivity Measurement. 
1981-1990 Research Associate KEPE (Center of Planning and Economic 
Research)  
Research areas: Econometrics, Statistics, Productivity, Industrial 
Studies, 5year Plans of Economic Development, short-term 
Forecasting. 
1986-1988
 
Professor of Statistics and Econometrics 
Athens Post Graduate School of Public Administration. 
1987-1988
 
Senior Consultant: Ministry of Youth. 
Project: Program for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship of Young 
People. 
Responsibilities: Statistical and Econometric analysis.  
(Approval of KEPE, Gov. Board meeting 2/3.2.87, Subject 13) 
1985-1987
 
Visiting Professor of Statistics and Econometrics, Quantitative analysis 
of Manpower planning, Athens Technological Institute (ΤΕΙ). 
1983-1985 Senior Consultant. OECD, Paris. 
Responsibility: Regional and Urban Economic Development. 
1974-1981
 
Research Assistant: KEPE. 
Research areas: Statistics, Econometric Analysis of Monetary Issues, 
Short-term Forecasting. 
1979-1980
 
Teaching Tutor in Statistics: University of Leeds UK, School of 
Economics, Department of Economic Statistics. 
1969-1972 Civil Servant of the Public Power Corporation: Department of Financial 
Services, appointment after successfully sat national exams. 
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UNQUOTE 
39.6 IJ Partners in Switserland 
The “Informed Judgement” firm was founded in 2009 to serve family equity 
funds. Common financial sources state: 669 670 
“Managing partner Theodore Margellos, a former senior director at the 
World Economic Forum, said: "We want to provide our clients with a new 
paradigm in managing their wealth." (...) Maximilian Martin, the former 
head of philanthropy at UBS, was among those to join IJ Partners. Nobel 
Prize winner Robert Mundell sits on the wealth manager's advisory 
board.”  
Dusan Sidjanski, special adviser to José Manuel Barroso, President of the 
European Commission, has this document about the opening invitation. 671  
However, in 2019, the firm may be over-indebted. 672 
Theodore Margellos 673 674 has this “about me” page: 675 
QUOTE 
He has had an outstanding career in Agribusiness for the last forty years. 
An entrepreneur who founded, managed and developed agribusiness 
investments around the world, from Ukraine to Canada, creating 
significant shareholder value. He was also an “angel investor” in the high-
end restaurant chain project – “L’Atelier de Joël Robuchon” – which 
achieved a remarkable presence worldwide. In 2007, together with Yale 
University, he established the Margellos World Republic of Letters series, 
which was designed to bring to the English-speaking world leading poets, 
novelists, essayists, philosophers, and playwrights from around the world. 
A Greek and Swiss citizen, he graduated from HEC, University of 
Lausanne (1975). He is fluent in Greek, English, French, Italian and 
Russian. 
Work      Education 
ILTA COMMODITIES S.A.  University of Lausanne 
UNQUOTE 
                                                                
669 https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/ij-partners-new-breed-20100222 
670 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704002104575290462495992430 
671 http://www.dusan-sidjanski.eu/sites/default/files/PDF/IJ_Partners_investment_programme.pdf 
672 https://gothamcity.ch/2019/10/17/lhomme-daffaires-theodore-margellos-est-accuse-de-
gestion-deloyale/ 
673 No source but portal: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Margellos 
674 https://www.ilta.com/history/ 
675 https://about.me/theodore.margellos 
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39.7 Miranda Xafa (economist, former IMF, financial consultant, politics) 
The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) is a think-tank in 
Waterloo, Canada, and has this statement on Xafa: 676 677 678  
“Miranda Xafa is a CIGI senior fellow. She is also chief executive officer of EF 
Consulting, an Athens-based advisory firm focusing on euro-zone economic 
and financial issues. At CIGI, Miranda focuses on sovereign debt crises and 
drawing lessons from the Greek debt restructuring for future debt crises. 
From 2004 to 2009, she served as a member of the executive board of the 
IMF in Washington, DC, where she had previously worked as a staff member. 
Miranda served as chief economic adviser to Greek Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, from 1991 to 1993. From 1994 to 2003, she was a 
financial market analyst and senior expert at Salomon Brothers/Citigroup in 
London. Miranda holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of 
Pennsylvania and has taught economics at the Universities of Pennsylvania 
and Princeton. She has published several articles and papers on international 
economic and financial issues.” 
Wikipedia has that she was on the board of liberal party Drasi 679 680 while she 
also was candidate, 681 and here are some of her views as a candidate. 682 
Her website also states that she worked from 2009 as senior investment 
strategist and member of the advisory board of IJ Partners in Geneva. 683 
There are some complicating points. 
• Miranda Xafa wrote the paper Xafa (2019a), that passed peer review, but we 
found it deficient by not referring to the proper 2005 Code of Practice and the 
actual March 9 2010 law on El.Stat. When asked for a copy of the police 
report she was referring to, she stated that she did not have it. 
• She also signed the declaration about Georgiou, 684 which declaration is not 
impartial and makes the same errors as she did.  
• “From 2004 to 2009, she served as a member of the executive board of the 
IMF in Washington, DC”, i.e. when Georgiou was there too, but this need not 
have any implication. 
• She worked for “Konstantinos Mitsotakis, from 1991 to 1993”, while the 
present prime minister is son Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and the newspaper article 
Xafa (2019b) clarifies that the 2009 issue is still sensitive for Greek politics. 
• She was implicated by the Panos Kammenos – unsubstantiated – allegation 
on the 2009 CDS issue and IJ Partners, which was apparently cleared by the 
courts, see Section 30.8.  
                                                                
676 https://www.mirandaxafa.com/contents_en.asp?id=4 
677 https://www.cigionline.org/person/miranda-xafa 
678 https://web.archive.org/web/20191102041401/https://www.cigionline.org/person/miranda-xafa 
679 No source but portal: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drasi 
680 No source but portal: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miranda_Xafa 
681 http://www.ekathimerini.com/141183/article/ekathimerini/business/imf-concerned-about-
election-result 
682 http://www.grreporter.info/en/greeks_have_not_yet_lost_battle_euro/7118 
683 https://web.archive.org/web/20100417131904/http://www.ijpartners.com:80/board.html 
684 https://www.amstat.org//asa/files/pdfs/GeorgiouStatement.pdf 
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39.8 Sigrun Davidsdottir (Iceland, writer and journalist) 
39.8.1 Background in literature and not economics 
Sigrún Davídsdóttir (b. 1955) has a degree in literature (1981) and is an 
Icelandic journalist, broadcaster and writer, now based in the UK. Following the 
Icelandic banking crisis of 2008 she has a weblog.  
With professor Matthiasson she wrote in 2015 about a suggestion for Greek 
banks, following the example of the Icelandic bank restructure. 685 A text by her is 
“Lies, Damned Lies, and Greek Statistics” of 2015. 686  
Problematic is that Davidsdottir also signed the ISI-statement of 2013, which 
means that she supports its errors and takes a side, which she does not retract in 
2015. 687 Her update in 2019 is here. 688 
About Sigrún Davíðsdóttir's we only have wikipedia (portal and no source) 689 
and her Icelog. 690 On her Icelog she remarkably refers to webpages in Greek, and 
perhaps she knows the language, or people who can translate for her, or perhaps 
Google Translate. Wikipedia has: 
“Sigrún Davíðsdóttir (born 1955) is an Icelandic journalist and writer. She 
became the London correspondent for the Icelandic national broadcaster 
RÚV in 2000 and has been nominated as RÚV's Reporter of the Year.[1] 
She is particularly noted for her coverage, since the 2008 Icelandic 
financial crisis, of financial crime, tax avoidance, and corruption, 
documented through her blog Icelog.[1][2] She has, however, published a 
wide variety of books alongside her journalism. (...) She moved from 
Iceland to Denmark in 1988, where she wrote a study of the return of 
manuscripts from Denmark to Iceland in the 1970s, before moving to 
London to work for RÚV in 2000.” 
On 2016-09-16, she wrote: 691 
“The reason I find the El.Stat case so interesting and important is that in 
my view it’s a test case for the willingness of the Greek political class to 
face the misdeeds of the past, the corruption and all the things that hinder 
prosperity in Greece. In addition, a country without reliable statistics can’t 
really claim to be a modern and accountable country.” 
Some of her texts on the Georgiou case are here. 692 693 694 She states, based 
upon a cartoon: 695 
                                                                
685 http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/the-good-the-bad-and-the-foreign-icelandic-lesson-for-stabilising-
the-greek-banks/ 
686 https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/07/lies-damned-lies-and-greek-statistics.html 
687 https://web.archive.org/web/20170711001907/https://isi-web.org/index.php/news-from-isi/695-
supportgreece 
688 http://uti.is/2019/05/the-El.Stat-case-in-greece-exposes-the-weak-rule-of-law/ 
689 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sigr%C3%BAn_Dav%C3%AD%C3%B0sd%C3%B3ttir 
690 http://uti.is 
691 http://uti.is/2016/08/El.Stat-case-old-and-new-powers-in-greece/ 
692 http://uti.is/2017/07/no-end-to-the-greek-governments-relentless-persecution-of-El.Stat-staff/ 
693 http://uti.is/2019/05/the-El.Stat-case-in-greece-exposes-the-weak-rule-of-law/ 
694 http://uti.is/?s=El.Stat 
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“The political figure behind the El.Stat persecution: Karamanlis. [prime 
minister of Greece 2004-2009 696] Even before the verdict at the end of 
July, Kathimerini was clear about the direction of the El.Stat trial – Kostas 
Karamanlis is the driving force as shown on a cartoon where Karamanlis, 
playing a video game, is hell-bent on not letting Andreas Georgiou get 
away.”  
39.8.2 About her main story 
Her main story would seem to be “Lies, Damned Lies, and Greek Statistics” of 
2015. 697 A strong point is her discussion of the earlier episode starting 2004, when 
Eurostat already had problems with the National Statistical Service of Greece 
(NSSG) still under the Ministry of Finance, leading to the 2005 ESS Code of 
Practice and the EU Commision 2010 document. Another strong point is that her 
article provides the leading narrative – so that we have a clear summary of that 
narrative – of Saint Georgiou against the political forces that want to reduce the 
2009 debt to 3.7% as originally estimated in 2009.  
Weak points are: 
• She repeats the errors in the ISI statements (Appendix 40), and also overlooks 
the law of March 9 2010 and the 2005 Code of Practice. 
• She acknowledges that Georgiou was busy changing that law in 2010, but 
does not ask why, or whether he can act against a law that wasn’t changed 
yet, and apparently she doesn’t wonder whether the conviction was on target. 
• She has no background in economics and might not understand distinctions 
between accounting for banks and national accounting. She seems to suggest 
that deficit figures must have a unique true value instead of allowing discretion 
and stewardship for a board, also concerning the “mark to market” issue as 
discussed by Pozen (2009), see Section 20.3. As a non-economist she has 
every right to ask questions but she increases the noise when she happens to 
pick the wrong sources as supposedly authorative. 
• She states that board members were appointed “politically”, while Georgiou 
was also appointed by the body politic. She mentions that three members of 
the board had also applied for the directorship, and creates the suggestion as 
if this would invalidate their views, and impair their professional integrity. She 
does not really treat their views as also deriving from statistical integrity (until 
proven differently). She states “Logothetis has denied accessing the account” 
(hacking), and perhaps there is a difference in meanings for whistleblower 
behaviour, like people rejecting the Snowden hacking but journalists still using 
the findings, but she does not further investigate this, and does not provide the 
police report on the hacking and/or an English translation, leaving us to 
wonder whether perhaps something else has gone wrong in Greece, see 
Chapter 32. It is okay if Davíðsdóttir doesn’t have all this information herself, 
but please do not present issues as facts when you have not been able to 
verify them as facts. 
                                                                                                                                      
695 http://uti.is/?s=Georgiou 
696 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kostas_Karamanlis 
697 https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/07/lies-damned-lies-and-greek-statistics.html 
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PM. Despite her 2015 suggestion that Greece in 2015 adopts the Icelandic 
model to reorganise the banking system, she does not acknowledge or investigate 
that Greece in 2009 could already have done the same (instead of what Greece 
actually ded in 2009, like Ireland, nationalising debt and bailing out creditors). See 
Section 18.3.  
It is useful to restate her 2015 conclusion, 698 and I insert my comment: 
“In December 2008, while Iceland was still in shock after the banking 
collapse, its parliament set up a Special Investigation Committee, SIC, 
which operated wholly independently of parliament. The three SIC 
members were Supreme Court Justice Páll Hreinsson (the chairman), 
Parliament’s Ombudsman Tryggvi Gunnarsson and lecturer in economics 
at Yale University Sigríður Benediktsdóttir. Together, they supervised the 
work of about 40 experts. Their report of 2600 pages was published on 
April 10th 2010. 
 The report buried politically-motivated explanations of the collapse being 
caused by foreigners and instead recounted what had actually happened, 
based on both documents and hearings (private, not public hearings). 
One benefit of the SIC report is that no political party or anyone else can 
now tell the collapse saga as suits their interest: the documented saga 
exists and this effectively ended the political blame game. Importantly, 
the report points out lessons to learn. 
 Sadly, nothing similar has been done in Greece. The two committees set 
up by the Greek parliament do not seem entirely credible, because the 
allegations of El.Stat misconduct and manipulation under Georgiou are 
being recycled. [In 2018 Georgiou was convicted for breach of duty, 
and guilty as charged, and Davíðsdóttir writing in 2015 could have 
discovered this herself if she had looked at the March 9 2010 law on 
El.Stat. On falsification, see Section 25.8] Further, their scope seems 
myopic, as no effort is made to explain what went on at the institutions 
that from before 2000 until 2010 were reporting faulty statistics and 
forecasts and lying about the GS [Goldman Sachs] swaps. [Yes, we 
would want to know more about this, but also about why Greece 
bailed out the banks in 2008-2009, see Section 18.3. However, NSSG 
was under the Ministry of Finance, and now we look at independent 
El.Stat.] 
 All of this taken together shows a political class, including within Syriza, 
not only unwilling to face the past but actively fighting any attempt to 
clarify things in a battle where even national statistics are a dangerous 
weapon. The fact that leading Greek political powers are still fighting the 
wrong fight on statistics [Georgiou was guilty as charged] is 
unfortunately symptomatic of political undercurrents in Greece. And this, 
in part, explains why the Troika and the EU member states find it so hard 
to trust Greece.” [Partly true, but also unbalanced, because earlier in 
the article she also had stated that there was a partial responsibility 
for the EU, with a quote by Mario Monti.] 
                                                                
698 https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/07/lies-damned-lies-and-greek-statistics.html 
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39.9 Yanis Varoufakis (mathematical statistics, game theory, politics) 
Yanis Varoufakis apparently hasn’t tried to resolve the issue that we have been 
looking at. My only reason to mention him here is that some people might think 
that a story about Greece in crisis is not complete without mentioning Varoufakis 
increasing the crisis. 
In my judgement since 2011 he may be competent in game theory (but I did not 
check this) but he is rather incompetent in macro-economics and political 
economy, and likely also in banking. 699 700 I tend to regard him as rather 
inconsistent. 
There is the Wikipedia page (a portal, no source). 701 
There is the review of James Galbraith (2016) by the Financial Times. 702 My 
impression is that Galbraith lost a lot of time and energy on this.  
I tend to agree with the Toussaint (2020) deconstruction of Varoufakis’s 
performance in Greek politics, and have reservations on other conclusions by 
Toussaint (2020) because I did not study those details. 
39.10 Nicolas Véron 
A key agent in the defence of Andreas Georgiou is economist Nicolas Véron. 
Apparently he has an independent position and is motivated against injustice, and 
he simply did not check some key facts. His weblog states: 703 704 
“Nicolas Véron co-founded Bruegel, the economic policy think tank in 
Brussels, in 2002-05. In addition to his affiliation with Bruegel (as Senior 
Fellow since 2009), he joined the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics in Washington DC in 2009, as a Visiting Fellow. 
He became an independent board member of the global derivatives trade 
repository arm of DTCC (the Depositary Trust & Clearing Corporation) in 
2013. He is also a member of the scientific advisory board of AMF, the 
French securities regulator.” 
39.11 Hetan Shah (no statistician, executive director RSS) 
39.11.1 Background 
Wikipedia (a portal, no source) has:  
“Shah studied philosophy, politics and economics at the University of 
Oxford and graduated in 1996. He earned a postgraduate diploma at 
Nottingham Law School and a master's degree in history and politics at 
Birkbeck, University of London. He earned a further postgraduate 
certificate in economics at Birkbeck, University of London in 2003. (...) 
Shah served as Executive Director of the Royal Statistical Society from 
2011 to 2019. (...) In 2019 it was announced that Shah would join the 
British Academy as Chief Executive in 2020.” 
                                                                
699 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/05/30/competing-theories/ 
700 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/angela-merkel-and-the-minotaur/ 
701 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yanis_Varoufakis 
702 ‘Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice’, by James K Galbraith 
703 https://www.nicolasveron.info/about.html 
704 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolas_V%C3%A9ron 
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It is useful to verify that Shah has no background in statistics proper, but still 
propounds about statistics as the executive at the Royal Statistical Society. He 
seems to have a talent to sell “statistics” but it may well be that he does not really 
know what it is. 
39.11.2 On the El.Stat case 
As executive director of the RSS, Shah wrote “How to save statistics from the 
threat of populism”, Financial Times of October 21 2018, thus months after the 
Greek Supreme Court had convicted Georgiou, so that he had had ample time to 
check the facts, but he stated in his best manner of “popularising statistics”: 
“There are worrying examples from around the world of governments 
undermining good statistics. The former Greek chief statistician Andreas 
Georgiou was recently given an award for statistical integrity by the 
world’s leading statistical societies. Meanwhile, the Greek government 
continues to pursue him through the courts for producing numbers it did 
not like.” 
Check the slanderous falsehoods by Shah – and he is not just being sloppy but 
there is a system, namely lack of adequate training, in his lack of awareness that 
he should check the facts and not jump to easy views: 
• It is not “the” government but the judiciary branch, with an office for a 
prosecutor. National statistics are regulated by law, and statisticians are 
advised not to argue that they are above the law. 705 
• The prosecution is not because “numbers it did not like”. The points brought 
up are well-specified and provided with evidence. 
• If Georgiou had admitted in 2012 that he knew that he was in breach in duty 
(and he knew this because he had started working on changing the law) then 
he could have been convicted in 2012 and this hadn’t taken so long. 
(However, the world of statistics, including RSS, did not debunk his 
smokescreen.) 
The RSS journal Significance had two reports about the Georgiou case before, 
by journalist and editor Brian Tarran on May 16 2018 706 and journalist Robert 
Langkjær-Bain on August 2 2017. 707 Both reports are crucially deficient, not only 
by journalistic standards, but also by standards of statistical science, perhaps 
caused by the decision by RSS that statistics has a grey image and needed a 
more flashy presentation. These journalists apparently did not meet with public 
criticism by Shah. 
                                                                
705 For my own case, I hold that either (a) the Dutch law on civil servants does not adequately 
protect scientists in civil service or that (b) the existing law was executed and handled in courts in 
deficient manner. I had been appointed as scientific co-worker, and I presume that this comes 
with adequate protection, thus likely (b) is the case, and the abusive dismissal must still be made 
undone. Potentially though, the legislative branch wants to learn from the case and provide for 
improved clarity in the regulations. 
706 https://www.significancemagazine.com/10-news/589-greece-s-former-national-statistician-is-
heading-back-to-court 
707 https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2017.01052.x 
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39.11.3 Emails with RSS on the 2016 Brexit Referendum Question 
As a disclaimer, let me report that I have an earlier experience with superficial 
thinking at RSS and by Hetan Shah. Check these three emails: 
 
(1) Date: Mon, 01 May 2017 
To: D.Spiegelhalter at statslab.cam.ac.uk 
From: Thomas Cool / Thomas Colignatus  
Subject: Searching for a look by a statistician on the Brexit referendum question 
Cc: rss at rss.org.uk 
To the RSS 
c/o its chair 
Dear professor Spiegelhalter, 
I appreciated reading about your background at the RSS website and am duly 
impressed. 
This article of mine in the Newsletter of the Royal Economic Society (RES) argues 
that the Brexit referendum question is scientifically unwarranted: 
[relocated to https://www.res.org.uk/resources-page/april-2017-newsletter-voting-
theory-and-the-brexit-referendum-question.html] 708 709 
I already expressed this last year but it is useful that it is published just now too. 
This issue would be important for voters in the UK general elections of June 8 
2017. 
As an econometrician I have some awareness of statistics, and I think that the 
referendum question also fails for a statistical survey of what people actually think. 
But I am not a specialist on statistical surveys and my own diagnosis like[ly] 
carries little weight for others who would tend to rely on those specialists. 
I am wondering whether you or others in the RSS would agree with me. I would 
like to be able to quote some statistician(s) on this (pro or con, and why) and am 
wondering whether you or the RSS could help me finding some. An option would 
be to republish the memo in a statistical medium and record some responses. I 
am wondering whether you would be able to help out. 
Sincerely yours, 
Thomas Cool / Thomas Colignatus 
Econometrician (Groningen 1982) and teacher of mathematics (Leiden 2008) 
Scheveningen, Holland 
PS. In the same RES Newsletter, there is an obituary by Larry Summers, formerly 
president of Harvard, on his uncle Kenneth Arrow. It appears that Summers does 
not understand Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It might be that some statisticians 
would not do so either. See this discussion: 
https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2017/04/29/larry-summers-apparently-
doesnt-understand-arrows-impossibility-theorem/ 
                                                                
708 https://www.res.org.uk/site-search.html?q=Colignatus 
709 It was: http://www.res.org.uk/view/art4Apr17Features.html 
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(2) Date: Sat, 6 May 2017 
Subject: Re: Searching for a look by a statistician on the Brexit referendum 
question 
To: "Thomas Cool / Thomas Colignatus" 
Cc: "Shah, Hetan"  
From: "david spiegelhalter"  
Dear Thomas 
many thanks for this message and apologies for being slow in response. 
As an individual I have some sympathy for your arguments, although I think 
currently they may be of academic interest only as things move inexorably on. 
I am forwarding this to Hetan Shah, Executive Director of the RSS, to see if he has 
a different view. 
best wishes 
David 
 
(3) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017  
From: "Shah, Hetan"  
To: "D.Spiegelhalter",  "Thomas Cool / Thomas Colignatus"  
Subject: RE: Searching for a look by a statistician on the Brexit referendum 
question 
Dear Thomas, 
Thanks. I agree with David's assessment. 
Best, 
Hetan 
Hetan Shah  
Executive Director 
 
39.12 Roefie Hueting (economist at CBS 1969-1994, UNEP Global 500 Award) 
Hueting’s cv can be found in Hueting & De Boer (2019). 710 
For the citations score of the work by Hueting, it is useful to mention that he set 
up the environmental accounts at CBS Statistics Netherlands. Those accounts of 
the Netherlands and Canada were model for accounting at UNEP and UNSTAT 
(UNSD), following the first conference in Stockholm 1972. 711 Those accounts 
were also transformed by Steven Keuning at CBS into de NAMEA system which 
again became a model for UN SEEA. Researchers tend to refer to such accounts 
for their data, but if they would also refer to the original work by Hueting and his 
co-workers at CBS then Hueting would have a quite impressive citation score. 
                                                                
710 http://www.sni-hueting.info/EN/NA-eSNI/index.html 
711 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Environment_Programme 
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39.13 Tjark Tjin-A-Tsoi (theoretical physicist, manager, DG CBS 2014-2020) 
It is useful to mention that the (recently departed) CBS = DG 2014-2020 dr. Tjark 
Tjin-A-Tsoi might not have a strong background in national accounting and 
statistics. However, under the law that applied in 2014, he has been, as the 
announcement 712 states, the selected choice of the Central Commission for 
Statistics (CCS), with the CCS in 2014 still in the old role. One would think that this 
would be okay, till one considers the background of the chairperson of CCS at that 
time, see next Section 39.14. 
“On Friday 24 January 2014 the Cabinet has adopted the proposal by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr Kamp, and the Central Commission for 
Statistics to appoint Dr. T.B.P.M. (Tjark) Tjin-A-Tsoi as Director General 
of Statistics Netherlands as of 1 April 2014. 
Mr. Tjin-A-Tsoi will succeed Mr. G. (Gosse) van der Veen, who was 
Director General of Statistics Netherlands from 2004 to 2014. Tjark Tjin-
A-Tsoi (1966) is currently the General Director of the Netherlands 
Forensic Institute. Before this he worked amongst others as the Director 
of the Competition Department at the Netherlands Competition Authority 
and in various positions at Ernst & Young, Rabobank and Shell. Mr. Tjin-
A-Tsoi graduated and received his PhD in theoretical physics at the 
University of Amsterdam.” 
One can imagine that a theoretical physicist knows about statistical mechanics, 
while the jobs at Ernst & Young, Rabobank and Shell might have brought him into 
the world of accounting, and while the jobs at NMA and NFI might generate 
experience going into the direction of forensic accounting. 713 Potentially most 
emphasis in the last jobs was on managing a large professional bureau though. 
Colignatus (2020a) (THAENAES) 714 has a longer discussion. There is the 
distinction between the standard figure of national income (NI) and the figure of 
environmentally sustainable national income (eSNI). In 2015 and 2019 Tjin-A-Tsoi 
was informed that CBS gave wrong information, e.g. in its reports about the 
national accounts, about NI and eSNI and the figure of “economic growth”. 
Internally, statisticians at CBS gave wrong information to their DG. However, Tjin-
A-Tsoi apparently did not resolve this state of wrong information yet.  
It can be much appreciated that DG Tjin-A-Tsoi invited Hueting and De Boer to 
present their 2019 book at an internal session at CBS, attended by some sixty 
statisticians, and that CBS made a video available to the public (in Dutch, sheets 
are in English too). 715 Namely, for progress in science, it is important that 
scientists can look at new information and the evidence with open minds in a 
                                                                
712 https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2014/04/tjin-a-tsoi-new-director-general-of-statistics-
netherlands 
713 Dutch readers would appreciate that the murder of Marianne Vaatstra was resolved in 2012 
by aid of DNA matching by NFI under his directorship, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Marianne_Vaatstra 
714 The 2020 draft section 20.11.13 CBS Statistics Netherlands 2014-2018 
715 http://www.sni-hueting.info/EN/NA-eSNI/index.html 
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situation without pressure. 716 We must distinguish such scientific discussion on 
the one hand and governance and actual management on the other hand. 
However, it is no use here to restate or even summarise the dealings of CBS w.r.t. 
NI and eSNI, see again Colignatus (2020a). 
39.14 Inge Brakman (lawyer, chair CCS 2010-2017) 
The website of the Foundation Administratiekantoor ABN AMRO (STAK AAB) 
gives this CV 717 of lawyer and newly appointed director Inge Brakman (my 
emphasis): 
“Ms Brakman (1961) is a Dutch national. She was appointed a director of 
the Foundation on 20 July 2015 and has been chairman of the board of 
STAK AAB since 20 July 2019. Ms Brakman studied law at the University 
of Amsterdam. She was deputy general secretary for the Dutch 
Association of Journalists from 1989 to 1999. She was a member and 
chairman of the Dutch Regulatory Media Authority from 1999 until 2009. 
Until recently, she was a board member of the Dutch Foundation 
Freedom of the Press (2013-2017), a member of an investigation 
commission housing ROC Leiden (2015) and chairman of the Monitoring 
Commission Dutch Banking Code (2015-2017). From 2009 onwards, she 
has worked as an independent advisor, chairman and supervisor. 
Ms Brakman is currently chairman of the Netherlands Red Cross and 
SKO (Foundation for Viewers Research). She is a Supervisory Board 
member of DSM Nederland, Shell Nederland and Accenture Nederland 
en Coach at Quist leading humans. 
Her previous supervisory functions include chairman of Foundation De 
Baak VNO-NCW (2004-2013), the Board of Trustees University of 
Amsterdam (2004-2012), Supervisory Board member of Fortis Bank 
Nederland (2008-2010), member of the Foundation Preference Shares 
TMG (Telegraaf Media Groep) (2010-2013) and a member of foundation 
Fondsenbeheer Nederland from 2012 until June 2015. Until 2017 she 
was also Supervisory Board member of Royal Duyvis Wiener, the 
Central Commission of Statistics and trustees Staatsbosbeheer (State 
Nature Preserve). 
Her previous advisory functions include chairman of the Monitoring 
Commission Dutch Banking Code, chairman of the Committee Future of 
Public Broadcasting (2013-2014), member of the commission Rules for 
Gambling on the Internet in 2010 and a member of the Sustainability 
Advisory Board of the Group from March 2011 to June 2015.” 
Her appointment as chair CCS was in 2009 starting January 1 2010, 718 and this 
is an interview in 2015. 719 See Section 21.8 for her deficiency in understanding 
law and the history and governance of CSS and CBS. 
                                                                
716 https://www.managementissues.com/index.php/duurzame-ontwikkeling/100-duurzame-
ontwikkeling/1054-national-accounts-and-environmentally-sustainable-national-income 
717 https://www.stakaab.org/en/about-stak-aab/board/i-brakman/index.html 
718 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2009/48/nieuwe-voorzitter-centrale-commissie-voor-de-
statistiek 
719 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/corporate/2015/25/betrouwbare-cijfers-voor-een-betere-samenleving 
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39.15 Angelique Berg (public administration, DG CBS 2020) 
The newly appointed DG CBS has no background in statistics and scientific 
advice. As DG Public Health since 2015 she also played a role in not providing 
adequate protection against a pandemic (like listening to warnings about a 
pandemic, and in providing for a system of source and contact tracing, see 
Section 36.7). The press release at her appointment was. 720 
 
“Ms Angelique Berg has been named as the new Director General of Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS). Minister Wiebes of Economic Affairs and Climate has 
appointed Ms Berg on the recommendation of the CBS Advisory Council. The 
appointment will take effect on 1 September 2020. 
Ms Angelique Berg, MSc. (1969) has led the Directorate-General Health at the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) since January 2015. Prior to this, she 
served as Director General of Fiscal Affairs at the Ministry of Finance, with 
previous positions at the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (VROM), the Office of the Prime Minister and the Government 
Finance Inspectorate. Ms Berg studied Public Administration at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. She will be succeeding Mr Tjark Tjin-A-Tsoi, who took up a 
new position as Chairman of Sanquin on 1 April 2020. 
Chairman of the CBS Advisory Council Mr Gerrit Zalm welcomes Ms Berg’s 
appointment and praises her broad experience in public administration: “I am 
delighted that Minister Wiebes has appointed Angelique Berg as the Director 
General of CBS. Ms Berg is a top talent and has highly broad managerial 
experience in a wide range of areas. Her appointment will enable CBS to further 
increase its contribution to government and society in its capacity of data partner 
and independent statistical information provider.” 
Angelique Berg says: “CBS is a wonderful institution with a social task that 
continues to gain in importance. I consider it an honour to be able to play a role in 
performing this task, and look forward tremendously to working within the CBS 
organisation.” 
In a society where the amount of information is growing explosively, open 
access to reliable, integral data is crucial. As the national statistical office of the 
Netherlands, CBS provides insight into social issues by publishing reliable 
statistical information and data. In doing so, CBS contributes to the social debate, 
policy development and key decision making.” 
                                                                
720 https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/corporate/2020/21/angelique-berg-appointed-as-new-director-
general-of-cbs 
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40. Appendix. ISI Statement about the Georgiou case 2013 
 
40.1 Reproduction of the declaration 
ISI did no investigation as I requested in my 2012 letter. 721  
The text below reproduces the 2013 ISI statement, 722 723 with my comments in 
bold. The statement came with a call for signatures by statisticians, and those are 
here. 724 Observe that ISI did not learn over the years, see 2017 in Section 26.5 
and 2019 in Section 25.8, even though there was the Greek Supreme Court 
conviction in June 2018. 
PM. Historically ISI takes office within the CBS Statistics Netherlands building. 
QUOTE 
International Statistical Institute  
Permanent Office 
P.O. Box 24070  
2490 AB The Hague  
The Netherlands  
Tel: +31703375737  
Fax: +31703860025  
Website: http://isi.cbs.nl 
E-mail: isi [at] cbs.nl 
28 February 2013  
Statement 
On the prosecution [correct, i.e. not persecution] of the President and two 
managers of the Hellenic Statistical Authority, El.Stat 
The International Statistical Institute (ISI) is a scientific society with more than 
5,000 members worldwide and a network that include numerous government 
agencies, international organisations, statistical associations and groups around 
the world. The undersigned ISI representatives are making this statement to 
express their profound disappointment and serious concern over the prosecution 
of Mr Andreas Georgiou, President of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (El.Stat) 
and two of his El.Stat Managers. The charges against Mr Georgiou and two of his 
Managers of exaggerating the estimates of Greek government deficit and debt for 
the year 2009 are fanciful and not consistent with the facts. [This misrepresents 
the true case, of breaching his duty to seek approval by the board, see 
Section 27.1.] 
Mr Georgiou was appointed by the Greek Parliament in 2010 to help with the 
production of reliable Greek statistics. He has a background with the IMF and is 
fully aware of the importance of the integrity and trust in official statistics to the 
effective governance of countries. [But ISI could check in 2013 that he violated 
the El.Stat law of March 2010. Does ISI really need the Greek Supreme Court 
                                                                
721 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2012/06/10/letter-to-the-isi-on-greek-statistics/ 
722 https://www.isi-web.org/index.php/about-isi/policies/isi-statements-letters 
723 https://www.isi-web.org/images/news/20130304ISIGreece-Statement.pdf 
724 https://www.isi-web.org/index.php/news-from-isi/695-supportgreece 
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to explain the law to them ?] The public finance problems of Greece were due in 
part to poor and erroneous statistics over a number of years which meant that the 
seriousness of the situation was not addressed earlier with less austere economic 
and social policy adjustments. [Reverse causality: irresponsible politicians 
covered up their tracks.] The poor state of Greek public finance statistics before 
2010 is spelled out in a Report on the Greek Government Deficit and Debt 
Statistics, published by the European Commission in January 2010. [NSSG was 
under the Ministry of Finance. In March 2010, El.Stat was created as an 
independent body. Please give these facts too.] 
Assisted by Eurostat, the statistical authority of the European Union, Mr 
Georgiou and his team at El.Stat [excluding the board ?] went about their work 
to recompile Greek public finance statistics in accordance with the standards of 
the EU. [False. The EU and ESS Code of Practice 2005 required Georgiou to 
stick to the law and seek approval by the board, and he did not do so.] 
Eurostat monitored this work and endorsed that it conformed with EU rules and 
standards with which Greece as a member of the EU is obliged to comply. 
[Eurostat might also have agreed with figures approved by the board, see 
Section 27.5.] Eurostat has published the Greek public finance statistics compiled 
by Mr Georgiou and his team [excluding the board] without reservation 
biannually for five consecutive times. [This skips the malfeasance in the first 
place, see Section 27.2.2.] In a recent public announcement the Director General 
of Eurostat said that Mr Georgiou retains his full confidence. [The Eurostat 
director in 2013 was Walter Radermacher, and was complicit with Georgiou, 
see Chapter 33.] Further the Director General emphasized that Eurostat refutes 
allegations that the deficit of 2009 was over-estimated or that any pressure was 
put on El.Stat to falsify data. [See Chapter 33.] 
 We believe there is absolutely no merit to the charges brought against Mr 
Andreas Georgiou and his two El.Stat colleagues. [Because you did not check 
the facts properly, see Chapter 25.] If they were to proceed it would not only be 
harmful for these statisticians. It would also undermine both the professional 
independence of official statistics in Greece in the long term and international 
confidence in Greek statistics and the Greek government and institutions. [The 
malconduct by ISI works to this effect.] 
We call on the Greek institutions to ensure the integrity, independence and 
professionalism of Greek statistics [The Greek Supreme Court did, and then ISI 
rejected the outcome .... ? But that was in 2018 and not 2013.] and abstain 
from further prosecution of the [El.Stat] President. [Statistics is above the law ?] 
Signatures  
ISI President Jae C Lee Chair  
ISI Advisory Board on Ethics Dennis Trewin  
 
UNQUOTE 
 313 
40.2 Dutch signatures of the ISI letter 
The 2013 ISI letter had 29 Dutch signatures of a total of 339, accounted by 
residence. 725 For some I can mention backgrounds. 
Aart van der Vaart – mathematical staistician, in 2020 Scientific Director of the 
Mathematical Institute of Leiden University 
Ada van Krimpen – lawyer, director of ISI, in 1993-2009 Head of International 
Relations at CBS Statistics Netherlands 726 
Frits Bos – economist, former CBS, now CPB, also historian of national accounting 
who misrepresents the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, see Colignatus 
(2020a) (THAENAES) 
Ineke Stoop – either head of methodology at SCP retired in 2019 727 or younger 728 
Jan W. van Tongeren – national accountant, former CBS, later UNSD, 729 thesis 730 
Kees Zeelenberg – chief methodologist at CBS 
Marcel Timmer – Groningen economic growth project, 731 co-director at CPB 2020, 
continuing the censorship of science since 1990 
Peter van de Ven – former head National Accounting at CBS, where he maltreated the 
Tinbergen & Hueting approach, see THAENAES, in 2020 head National 
Accounting at OECD 
Richard Gill – mathematical statistician, 732 retired since 2017, known for the release of 
Lucia de B., also supportive for critical questions about the Ben Geen 
and CPB cases, signed this petition w.r.t. the CPB issue. 733 
 In a personal communication of 2020-01-26 in response to my criticism 
Richard Gill states that he in 2020 has revised his view about the case. It 
would be recommendable that he clarified whether he had really studied 
the case in 2013 in the first place or just relied upon the biased report by 
ISI, and whether ISI ought to make amends too. 
W.F.M. (Willem) de Vries (1942-2019), see THAENAES, former President of the 
International Association for Official Statistics and former Deputy Director 
of UN Statistics Division 
Other persons are: 
Abby Israels Bas van den Elshout Brugt Kazemier 
Eric Schulte Nordholt Gerrit J. Stemerdink M.M. Beekman 
Jan Willem Altena Jelke Bethlehem Marius Ooms 
Margreet van Brummelen Marieke Rensman Paul van der Laan 
Martin Luppes Paul Eilers Robert J. Mokken 
Peter Lugtig Peter Struijs  
Shabani Mehta V. Spits-Kouri  
 
                                                                
725 https://web.archive.org/web/20200124095729/https://www.isi-web.org/index.php/news-from-
isi/695-supportgreece 
726 https://web.archive.org/web/20171225034441/https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/executive-
committee-members-2017-2019/203-ada-van-krimpen-member 
727 https://www.scp.nl/Nieuws/Ineke_Stoop_onderscheiden_met_life_time_achievement_award 
728 https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/staff/c-m-p-stoop 
729 https://ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/Methodology 
730 https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/1353141/thesis.pdf 
731 https://www.rug.nl/staff/m.p.timmer/ 
732 https://www.math.leidenuniv.nl/~gill/ 
733 https://www.ipetitions.com/petition/pe_werk_cpb 
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41. Appendix. IAOS and 80 former chief statisticians 
 
41.1 Blindly fighting for the wrong cause 
The International Association of Official Statistics (IAOS) on the El.Stat case, 
shows a zealot persistence to push one storyline and not research or allow other 
views or criticism. Sections 27.2 and 28.3 mentioned the 80 former chief 
statisticians. The IAOS website recycles Hetan Shah’s article on “How to save 
statistics from the menace of populism”. 734 See Section 39.11 on Shah. There is 
the following letter. 
41.2 IAOS presidential letter November 2019 
The following is reproduced from their website, 735 with my emphasis: 
QUOTE 
President’s message, November 2019 
Dear IAOS Members 
I have been enjoying getting to know lots more people over the last month. The 
more I see, the more impressed I am with what is going on in our network. I can 
also more clearly see the potential for the official statistics community to have a 
stronger voice and greater impact for public good in countries around the world. 
The Young Statistician Prize 2020 is well underway. Please reach out to your 
networks and encourage submissions. This year we have introduced a new 
category of Honourable Mention for an author from a developing country. We have 
also brought the submission date forward to 30 November in order to make 
announcements ahead of the 2020 Conference in Zambia. So please, if you 
haven’t put in a submission yet, get writing soon. 
We have also announced the call for papers for the 2020 conference. [736] 
The conference Better Lives 2030: Mobilising the power of data for Africa and 
the world - 17th IAOS Conference / 1st ISI Regional Statistics Conference for 
Africa, Hosted by the Zambia Statistics Agency will take place at the Avani Hotel, 
Livingstone, Zambia, 19-21 May 2020. Proposals for sessions, papers as well as 
events before and after the conference close on 31 December 2019. 
Members will also be interested to read these attached two pieces about Andre-
as Georgiou. The first, from the American Statistical Association [737], updates on 
eight years of persecution of Andreas and the second, by Miranda Xafa in World 
Economics [738], gives a history of Andreas’ plight. An event hosted by the ICAEW 
featuring Andreas (and Ed Humpherson from the UK) is also worth a look [739]. 
                                                                
734 http://iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/235-statistics-under-pressure-around-the-world-hetan-shah 
735 http://iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/256-iaos-members-newsletter-november-2019 
736 https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/conferences 
737 https://www.amstat.org/asa/News/Eight-Years-of-Government-Persecution-of-Greek-
Statistician.aspx 
738 https://www.worldeconomics.com/Files/Xafa.pdf 
739 https://audioboom.com/posts/7379312-350m-truth-lies-and-numbers 
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In my last message I mentioned four events I was due to attend. The first, the 
Bloomberg Data for Good Exchange (DG4X) [740], was an inspiring gathering of 
mainly private sector data scientists keen to work on public good projects. Michael 
Bloomberg’s influence as former Mayor of New York was clear through a number 
of excellent project case studies featuring cities from around the world.  
The second event was the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development 
Data Board meeting [741]. We discussed how best the Partnership can scale its 
impact now it has become well established. Learning from the very positive 
developments in official statistics in Ghana provided an excellent touch point for 
our discussion. 
The third event was meetings with Stefan Schweinfest, Director of the United 
Nations Statistics Division and two of his Branch Heads Francesca Perucci and 
Ronald Jansen (Ronald is also an IAOS EXCO member). They are all keen to 
build links with our community and I discussed with them opportunities coming up, 
including through our conference next year. 
The fourth event was the conference on Valuing Statistics hosted by the United 
Kingdom. This event was about taking the conclusions of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) report [742] and turning them into 
concrete actions. I used the occasion to set out the important role played by the 
IAOS. 
As well as these events I met Roger Taylor, the Chief Executive of the United 
Kingdom’s new Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation [743]. Roger was interested 
to explore the role of the National Statistical Office in an ethical data ecosystem. 
Finally, I was a speaker at the PARIS21 Cross-Regional Forum [744] which has 
been focused on the issue of trust in Official Statistics. There was a super line up 
of speakers to help delegates get creative and inspired to act. PARIS21 launched 
their Trust Initiative at the event [745]. Do consider whether you want to apply. 
In the weeks ahead, following a meeting of EXCO, I will be visiting our 
colleagues at the Zambia CSO to help take forward planning for our conference 
and also attending the ISI/IFC meeting on Data Governance in Tunis. 
If you have some other opportunities to spread the word about the IAOS, or 
have information to share with others interested in official statistics, contact me at 
contactIAOS [at] gmail.com 
 
John Pullinger 
IAOS President 
November 2019 
 
UNQUOTE 
 
 
                                                                
740 https://www.bloomberg.com/lp/d4gx 
741 www.data4sdgs.org 
742 www.unece.org/index.php?id=51139 
743 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/centre-for-data-ethics-and-innovation 
744 https://paris21.org/news-center/events/cross-regional-forum-2019 
745 https://trustinitiative2020.paris21.org/ 
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41.3 Statistical Journal of the IAOS 
At their journal SJIAOS, published by IOS Press in Holland, we find that their 
new editor should, because of his background at Eurostat, also know about the 
Greek March 9 2010 law that created El.Stat, my emphasis: 
“The executive extends a very warm welcome to the incoming Editor in 
Chief, Dr Pieter Everaers. Dr Everaers has over 30 years of experience in 
official statistics. Most recently Pieter retired from his position in Eurostat, 
the statistical office of the European Union, as Director responsible for 
Cooperation in the European Statistical System, International 
Cooperation and Resources. Pieter also worked in Statistics 
Netherlands.”  
Indeed, on page 18 in this document, 746 with a message by Snorrasen to 
Radermacher of September 18 2010, there is a CC to Pieter Everaers.  
In the Volume 35 Issue 4, December 2019 issue, we find Radermacher (2019b) 
about the governance of official statistics, 747 see Section 33.7. 
On the Hueting & De Boer (2019) book, Dr Everaers wrote to me that SJIAOS 
doesn’t do book reviews.  
41.4 Dutch signatures of the IAOS declaration of 80 former chief statisticians 
The former chief statisticians are no longer responsible for their national 
statistics and thus may feel a bit more free to express support 748 in personal 
capacity.  
It is awkward that we see Walter Radermacher and Hallgrimur Snorrason on the 
list, judging their own case. There is also Ron Wasserstein, Executive Director of 
the American Statistical Association (ASA), who never was a chief statistician at 
an ONS. 749 There is also Ada van Krimpen, Executive Director of the International 
Statistical Institute (ISI), who is a lawyer and who was in 1993-2009 Head of 
International Relations at CBS Statistics Netherlands, and thus no “chief 
statistician”, see Section 41.4. 
As said, I did not count the numbers or check all backgrounds. Valid Dutch 
signatures are: 
Gosse van der Veen – Former Director General CBS Statistics Netherlands, 
former Chair of the ESS Partnership Group 
W.F.M. (Willem) de Vries (1942-2019) – former President of the International 
Association for Official Statistics (IAOS) and former Deputy Director 
of UN Statistics Division, see THAENAES 
                                                                
746 http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/European-Commission-Decision-
prejudice1.pdf 
747 https://content.iospress.com/journals/statistical-journal-of-the-iaos/35/4 
748 https://www.iaos-isi.org/index.php/latestnews/221-80-former-chief-statisticians-condemn-
prosecution-of-andreas-georgiou 
749 “Prior to joining the ASA, Wasserstein was a mathematics and statistics department faculty 
member and administrator at Washburn University in Topeka, Kan., from 1984–2007. During his 
last seven years at the school, he served as the university’s vice president for academic affairs.” 
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42. Appendix. Statement by the crowdfunding for Georgiou 
 
The crowdfunding for the legal expenses of Andreas Georgiou in the El.Stat 
case 750 was done in May-June 2018 by Patrick Armstrong (Senior Analyst, 
European Securities and Markets Authority) and Maximilian Reisch. In June 2018, 
751 the (closed) case had had 397 backers with US$41,031 (target $40,000). 
Georgiou had been informed on June 8 about the conviction, as Reisch states on 
the crowdfunding website on June 15 2018, 752 but Reisch either saw no need to 
adapt the original text for the fundraising or the system blocked him for doing so. 
 
QUOTE 2020-02-01, my comments 
 
Justice for Andreas Georgiou, Former Head of Greek Statistical Agency 
 
This website is dedicated to rectifying the political [prove this] persecution 
[quite a denouncement of juridical proceedings] of Andreas Georgiou, who 
has been unjustly [guilty as charged, and you should have checked this too] 
subjected to an onslaught of criminal and civil suits in Greece. [why did he not 
confess ?] This treatment arose because [false reason] Andreas – from his 
position as President of the Hellenic Statistical Authority [El.Stat], Greece’s 
National Statistical Office – insisted on keeping accurate statistics covering 
Greece’s public financial situation. [true reason: because he breached his duty] 
All of this has imposed extraordinary hardship on Andreas and his family.  
Andreas’ plight has elicited an international outcry. [based upon deliberate 
false information by Georgiou, Snorrason and Radermacher] Various 
statistical organizations and other professional bodies from around the world have 
expressed their deep concern to the Greek Government about Andreas’ treatment. 
[in disrespect of the separation of powers] A recent statement by the American 
Statistical Association supporting Andreas was signed by over 1000 individuals 
from around the world, including nine Nobel Laureates. [who did no proper 
check] The Washington Post, 753 the Wall Street Journal, 754 Bloomberg, 755 and 
the Economist, 756 among others, have all editorialized in Andreas’ favor. [all 
these organisations and individuals should be ashamed and send their 
apologies] 
                                                                
750 https://gogetfunding.com/justice-for-andreas-georgiou-former-head-of-greek-statistical-
agency/ 
751 https://web.archive.org/web/20181126143305/https://gogetfunding.com/justice-for-andreas-
georgiou-former-head-of-greek-statistical-agency/ 
752 https://gogetfunding.com/blog-single-update/?blogpre=5507722&single=25663 
753 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/13/how-does-jailing-the-
statisticians-fix-greeces-financial-crisis-it-doesnt/?utm_term=.ec82b5a3be80 
754 https://www.wsj.com/articles/greeces-response-to-its-resurgent-debt-crisis-prosecute-the-
statistician-1486396434 
755 https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-04/the-scandalous-persecution-of-greece-
s-budget-whistle-blower 
756 https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21706276-disturbing-prosecution-
greeces-chief-statistician-called-account 
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Having served 21 years at the International Monetary Fund, Andreas returned to 
Greece in 2010 to serve his country as President of [El.Stat]. [and perhaps have 
a better job and earn a good salary] He effected a massive improvement in 
Greek official statistics. [do not confuse his personal contribution and the new 
independence from the Greek Ministry of Finance] For example, in the five 
years preceding Andreas’ tenure, Eurostat six times put reservations on Greek 
deficit and debt statistics, meaning Eurostat could not certify the quality of these 
statistics. In contrast, during Andreas’ 5-year tenure, Greek public finance data did 
not receive any Eurostat reservations, a credit to the dramatic improvements 
Andreas made. [which again is above confusion, and see this book Part 6] 
However, this commitment to accurate statistics led to a political backlash in 
Greece [there is a House of Mirrors indeed, see Section 25.9], fueling [prove 
this, because now you are suggesting an impact on the independent 
judiciary] a broadside of criminal and civil charges against Andreas personally. 
These have included, among others, criminal charges for “false statements and 
complicity against the State” and “repeated violation of duty” as well as criminal 
and civil charges for “slander”. [ever heard of due process ?] 
These legal threats are very real. For example, Andreas has already been found 
guilty of “violation of duty”; he is requesting the Greek Supreme Court to annul the 
conviction. [the fundraising ended in June 2018 when the Greek Supreme 
Court upheld this conviction. Perhaps the system did not allow to update 
this text ?] Moreover, the charge of “false statements and complicity against the 
State” carries a potential life sentence and the Supreme Court is considering for a 
second time whether to reverse Andreas’ acquittal by a lower court. In this context, 
Andreas has had to retain Greek counsel at significant expense. This saga, of 
multiple prosecutions, some of which have been revived a number of times, has 
beleaguered Andreas for seven years. [If you are innocent then this indeed is 
quite an ordeal, but Georgiou violated his duty] 
The financial cost has been very difficult to bear, but the stress on Andreas and 
his family has been staggering. No one should have to face such circumstances 
simply for patriotically [with a good job and a good salary] performing public 
service for their country. No official statistician should be persecuted 
[denouncement] for implementing existing statistical laws and international 
statistical principles and ethics in their work. [but you might agree that they 
must be “persecuted” (submitted to due process) when they violate their 
duty ?] 
Andreas deserves [no he does not] the support of every person committed to 
accurate and transparent official statistics. [at best you can say that the case 
deserves investigation, also in non-legal manner, also looking at the other 
statisticians, dismissed by or because of Georgiou] If official statisticians in 
Greece are persecuted [denouncement] for producing accurate statistics, the 
integrity of Greek statistics will be jeopardized. [but you cannot hold that 
Georgiou produced accurate statistics because the decision about what 
would be accurate was up to the board, which had discretion, and which 
could have retained acceptance by Eurostat. Did you ever consider the 
notion of a range of error ?] Moreover, the European Union and its economic 
system, as well as its democratic values, are all critically undermined. [rhetorics 
w.r.t. Georgiou, and true for the Eurostat delusion to require single heads 
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(chiefs) of the national statistical offices] Furthermore, a terrible precedent is 
created, increasing the risks for objective and impartial statistical production in 
countries around the world, even undermining the international financial system. 
[are you suggesting that statistics should be above the law ?] 
We ask you to support Andreas [you mean believe his and your falsehoods] 
by speaking out on his behalf – and by contributing to his legal defense. The funds 
will be transferred to an account set up only for the legal fees of Andreas. In the 
case legal fees turn out to be lower than expected, half of the remainder will be 
given to Elpida, 757 a Greek charity that works with children needing bone marrow 
transplants. The other half of any potential remainder will be given to the 
International Statistical Institute 758 for use, at the discretion of its Executive 
Committee, in the promotion of reliable and impartial statistics. [except that ISI 
did not check the false statements by Snorrason] 
The following links provide more information [falsehoods] on the persecution 
[denoucement] of Andreas, the international press coverage of the issue, and 
documentation demonstrating the support shown for Andreas by respected [but 
failing on checking basic facts, and also not-respecting other fellow 
statisticians on the board] individuals throughout the world. Please join us in 
support of Andreas Georgiou. 
This link 759 leads to the statement by the American Statistical Association. 
This link 760 leads to a collection of articles on Andreas' case, encompassing 
major journals in Europe and the US. 
This link 761 leads to a chronology of Andreas‘ case provided by the International 
Statistical Institute. 
[and of course you do not link to the protest e.g. at the website of 
Georganta] 
 
UNQUOTE 
                                                                
757 http://www.elpida.org/en/history.html 
758 https://www.isi-web.org/index.php/about-isi 
759 https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/pressreleases/2018-
Sign_on_Letter_Andreas_Georgiou.pdf 
760 https://thefriendsofgreece.wordpress.com/ 
761 https://www.isi-
web.org/images/news/Court%20proceedings%20against%20Andreas%20%20Georgiou.pdf 
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43. Appendix. Georganta and the German conquest of Europe 
 
I advise Georganta to retract this interview, see Sections 29.11 and 31.1. 
The interview has been reproduced here (in part) with much appreciated 
permission, granted on 2019-12-26 by dr. Michael P. Nevradakis, 762 Producer & 
Host, Dialogos Radio & Media, https://www.dialogosmedia.org. 
NB. In the introduction to the interview, Nevradakis states: 
“Further fueling these claims, former IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
has publicly admitted that in April 2009 [likely though October] he met 
with George Papandreou, who was then campaigning in Greece on a 
platform of promises of new social services and benefits, claiming on the 
campaign trail that “we have money” for these programs.” 
This must be wrong, Papandreou and Strauss-Kahn must have talked after the 
elections in October 2009, because the different figure for the deficit is stated. 763 
My disclaimer: 
This interview is a transcript of a radio interview. When an interview is 
published in print, normally one needs to check whether the interviewee 
has authorised the publication. It often happens that the interviewer 
distorts what was actually said. This risk would not be present with a 
transcript. However, in a radio interview some interviewees may not be 
as cautious as they would be in an interview of which it is clear that it will 
be printed, and for which they need to authorise what will be printed. 
Thus, in transcript below, there may still be statements that the 
interviewee, on close thought, would rephrase differently, or not say at all. 
PM. A Dutch saying about sheep is: “When you get sheared you better sit still.” 
My sympathy lies with Georganta because of various reasonable arguments and 
the documentation that she provides on the case itself. She is alleged to make 
some errors in accounting and in presentation, but people can correct errors and 
overall she retains credibility. Her English is Greek-English, perhaps with nuance 
lost in her own translation. The interview in 2017, some years after 2010, has an 
outcry about dominance by Germany and that outcry is weird, and we must allow 
that a whistleblower succombs to stress. (I am a bit amazed that Klaus Kastner 
has so little to say about her, compared to the incompetent Varoufakis. 764) 
Some of her statements and my comments are as follows (and check the other 
statements in the interview that I do not comment on).  
                                                                
762 “Dr. Michael Nevradakis is an independent journalist presently based in Athens, Greece. 
Michael is the host of Dialogos Radio, a weekly radio program featuring interviews and coverage 
of current events in Greece, and is a member of the communication faculty at Deree - The 
American College of Greece. He was previously a Fulbright scholar and completed his Ph.D. in 
Media Studies from The University of Texas in 2018.” 
763 http://en.protothema.gr/strauss-kahn-i-had-spoken-with-papandreou-in-2009-about-a-
memorandum/ 
764 https://klauskastner.blogspot.com/search?q=Georganta 
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Zoe Georganta, May 23 2017 765 (Greek-
English) (around 67 years of age then) (not 
the full interview) (brackets are by the 
interviewer Michael P. Nevradakis (MPN)) 
Comments February 5 2020 (only where 
chosen) 
“Mr. Stroblos’ comments were a catapult. 
He said that those numbers were wrong and 
they were fixed by violating Eurostat 
regulations and methodology, which are 
described in the ESA manual. (...) By 
investigating the issue, we found out that Mr. 
Stroblos was right.” 
The head of the department of national 
accounting Stroblos had more experience in 
ESA95 than the board. Where is his view on 
the case ? Given his dismissal, he might opt 
to be silent, given employment laws. A 
scientist might require immunity for speaking 
one’s mind. 
After he sacked Mr. Stroblos, Mr. Georgiou 
went on to neutralize all six members of the 
EL.Stat board, with the help of the IMF 
representative in the troika Poul Thomsen, 
who, according to evidence, asked ECOFIN, 
the group of the finance ministers of the EU, 
to force the Greek government to change the 
statistical law so that EL.Stat would [fall 
under] Mr. Georgiou’s rule without a board of 
directors. This was finally done in 2011 and 
all six of us were sacked without explanation, 
just [as a result of] a clause within a law of 
economic austerity measures. 
Georganta gives the fact that IMF wanted 
that the law of 2010 was changed, but she 
does not draw attention to the implication, 
that the IMF then implicitly admits that 
Georgiou in 2010 worked under a different 
law: which did not give him full authority. She 
does not present the case as forcefully as 
can be done, and focuses on the injustice 
and abuse of power. 
Perhaps ASA members can check that 
their ASA leaderschip misrepresents the 
legal situation in 2010, see Section 28.8. 
Not mere allegations, but by indicating the 
exact violation of the Eurostat regulations 
and by referring to particular sections of the 
European methodology which were violated. 
I did that for the first time in October 2010. 
Apparently Georganta (2011) contains a 
summary of this. Since I am no expert on 
ESA95, and Stroblos was the Greek expert, 
this becomes a mine field. It suffices to call 
for an investigation.  
Apparently, as we found out later, [this 
was] in order to justify their unnecessary 
loans to Greece according to the 
memorandums of understanding that they 
had signed with the Greek government, and 
also to justify the second memorandum of 
understanding, after the augmentation of the 
deficit figure to 15.6 percent of GDP. 
It is unclear why the loans were unnecess-
ary. When you have borrowed unnecessary 
funds, then you can use these funds to 
redeem the loans. What are we missing in 
this way of expression ? The situation is 
described in Section 18.3 and 27.4 above, 
but she does not provide this clear summary. 
Greece bailed out the creditors and national-
ised the debt. Why would different figures of 
deficit and debt “justify” anything ? 
Perhaps she means to say that the debts 
of the State Enterprises should not be put 
onto the account of the General Government 
and then not included in the euro rules ? 
He lied to the Greek state in order to gain 
the post of EL.Stat president, 
Prove or retract. The Greek government 
apparently issued wrong information about 
                                                                
765 https://www.mintpressnews.com/whistleblower-greek-debt-crisis-manufactured-unscrupulous-
accounting/228076/ 
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Georgiou’s CV and position at IMF (if I am 
correct: he was no deputy of all statistics but 
at financial institutions), but it is not proven 
that Georgiou had submitted a false CV, and 
it is more likely that it was just a sloppy 
presentation by the Greek government or a 
glossy for the press. 
I also found out he was very rarely in 
Washington, [spending most of his time] in 
Africa. I know people, real statisticians at the 
IMF, and I contacted them as part of my job 
as an applied econometrician, and I also 
found out that he is not a statistician and his 
only publication is a book about martial arts! 
He has no scientific publications, only a 
discussion paper [co-authored] by another 
three people, and he is not the first name, at 
first. So far, he has no scientific publication in 
any field, and in particular in the fields of 
economics, finance and statistics.  
 
Georganta did try to do a background 
check, but was she thorough enough ? It is 
curious indeed, and a difficulty for her and 
us, that there apparently is no ready list of 
publications, but perhaps this happens with 
institutional employees (not at academia). 
(1) Who at IMF would be willing to say so on 
record ? 
(2) What about Georgiou (2009) ? 
(3) What about his “Ph.D. with 
specialisations in Monetary Theory and 
Stabilisation Policy and in International 
Trade and Finance” ? 
(4) What about some works here 766 ? There 
are many more Andreas Georgious, but 
5 works can be attributed to him.  
Obviously, he was imposed on Greece 
because the IMF and the European 
Commission knew, in my opinion, that he 
could be their man, I mean a puppet of his 
bosses. This is his character, as far as I 
understood him from his “collaboration” with 
us. 
Retract. This is ad hominem. Or prove that 
IMF hires “useful idiots” to do hatchet jobs. 
Retract a judgement on character, which is 
ad hominem, and only look at actions . 
Relevant: Did Eurostat discuss matters 
with him before he started on August 2 ? 
By my opinion and not only my own 
opinion, he was the most unsuitable person 
for the Greek case.  
One might also say that the Greek 
government, EU and IMF did a honorable 
job, given the funds provided by the first 
bailout package, to find someone with a 
Greek background, PhD and IMF 
credentials. Yet he should not have broken 
Greek law of course (and he did so 
knowingly, given that he started to work on 
changing the law). 
He did not even write in Greek, and he had 
not been in Greece for 25 years after 
completing high school at the American 
Community Schools, not even for holidays. 
Retract. Ad hominem. This plays into “he is 
no real Greek” sentiments. 
Now, at the age of 53 or 54, as I read in a 
recent article in The Wall Street Journal, he 
escaped from Greece [to his Maryland 
mansion] when he [faced prosecution]. And 
Retract the part that is ad hominem, 
playing into feelings of jealousy. Potentially, 
there are reasons why the IMF job comes 
                                                                
766 http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-no95020097/ 
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now, at an early age, he is an IMF pensioner 
while everyone in Greece and in Europe 
[receives their] pension at the age of 67 and 
not before that. 
with such retirement rules.  
I want to say at this point that the IMF 
calculated wrong multipliers for Greece, [but 
this does not come as a surprise] because 
the statistics were based on incorrect data. It 
was not only the debt and deficit data that 
were wrong, but also the data on 
expenditures and production that Mr. 
Georgiou manufactured, together with 
Eurostat. 
A technical issue. Were sufficiently long 
time series corrected to calculate such 
multipliers with some confidence ?  
The situation as a whole is problematic. 
The ESA95 issue on the deficit and debt is 
more sensitive to arbitrary choices on 
accounting. For GDP and tourism there 
should be harder data, and why would 
Georgiou doctor those ? The interview refers 
to this text 767 by Olivier Blanchard at IMF 
2015. Perhaps there arrives a moment when 
I can look at that too.  
The result was unnecessary loans to 
Greece and the deep recession we [have 
been] experiencing for seven years now. You 
know, correct economic policies are based 
on correct data, and this was not the case for 
Greece. 
The IMF in 2019 still sees 13 years ahead 
for recovery, see Section 16.2. Again the 
unclear word “unnecessary”. Please be clear 
about the causality, for now it is unclear what 
your reasoning is. 
Was the selection of this particular man an 
IMF mistake? All Greeks are wondering 
about that. Or [maybe] it was a plan to save 
the French and German banks by loading 
debt upon debt on the Greek people. It is a 
real Ponzi scheme, what has been done to 
Greece, and this is a shame on the part of 
the IMF, the European Commission and the 
ECB. After so many loans, the Greek debt 
has tripled between 2009 and 2016.  
Greek commercial (bank, company and 
government enterprise) debt (to foreign 
banks) was taken over as government debt, 
to prevent the collapse of the Greek 
economy, but the banks could also have 
been nationalised with haircuts on foreign 
creditors, see Section 18.3. There indeed is 
a motive by creditor countries to save their 
banks. Please do not deny that those loans 
existed to start with. The Greek government 
apparently had the motive to save the Greek 
economy. I did not check this paper about 
the bargaining positions. 768  
This is no Ponzi scheme. There is 
obviously speculation in the financial markets 
but there are also real fears about a default 
of Greek government debt and return of the 
Drachma.  
Is this justice [that is being] shown by our 
supposed partners, with whom we have 
fought together in world wars? 
The Godwin moment. All in all, it is a valid 
point. Leaders of the EU emphasize regularly 
that the EU exists to make sure that there is 
no other war on our continent. Overall, the 
EU should have shown more stewardship. 
                                                                
767 https://blogs.imf.org/2015/07/09/greece-past-critiques-and-the-path-forward/ 
768 “The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts” 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43189946?seq=1 
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The EU partners however have a tendency 
to question whether Greece itself has the 
conduct of a partner. 
In itself Georganta’s comment is curious, 
since “fighting together” neglects Greeks and 
Germans fighting each other.  
ZG: After so many unacceptable 
interventions with letters threatening the 
Greek government from the European 
Commission, under the guise of the 
International Statistical Institute or the 
administrative personnel of the American 
Statistical Association, asking the Greek 
government to intervene in the Greek court 
system and to stop the court cases against 
Georgiou, there were three proposals by 
three individual judicial representatives who 
asked for Georgiou’s exoneration. All three 
were turned down by the court committees. 
Georganta sees some “guise” but in all 
likelihood (institutional) members of ISI 
etcetera have worked themselves into 
hysteria by not properly checking the facts.  
At the time of this interview in 2017, Greek 
intellectuals have had ample time to write a 
book that explains all. If you don’t then you 
leave matters to such vague processes.  
And Eurostat has had many statiticians 
from other countries, like Holland, visit 
El.Stat, to help with making better accounts. 
If you don’t provide these people with 
counter-information then you get stuck. 
I would like to mention that Georgiou has 
been sentenced twice to one year of 
imprisonment for libel against the ex-director 
of the national accounts division of El.Stat, 
Nikos Stroblos, who was [fired] when he 
simply expressed his scientific opinion and 
reservations about the numbers, which were 
coming as if they were falling down from the 
sky, without any explanation. 
Xafa (2019a) relates that Georgiou stated 
something true but wasn’t allowed to say it. 
Compare the situation when you say: “I think 
that there is something wrong with X. She 
has been married three times.” Both 
statements can be true, but it would be libel 
since it is suggestive and defamatory.  
So, what happened exactly ? Why not give 
the facts: statement and judgement ? 
There was the EU January 2010 report. 
Georgiou was director of El.Stat and could 
have investigated whether the figures of 
2000-2008 had indeed been made with 
fraud. Merely correcting figures and claiming 
that there was fraud is not enough, because 
it might also have been a different judgement 
at the time or political influence at NSSG 
before the creation of El.Stat or plain old 
incompetence (all perhaps by others). 
It is not only me and Logothetis as 
witnesses against him. We are three out of 
the six members of the EL.Stat board who 
were brave enough to be witnesses.  
Perhaps an issue of Greek-English. First 
there are six witnesses and then there are 
three. A witness differs from an accuser. 
The other three members include two 
representatives of the ex-minister of finance 
[Giorgos Papakonstantinou] because he 
committed other crimes, fraud, against 
Greece, and the other was a representative 
of the Bank of Greece [and former governor] 
George Provopoulos. 
The word “because” does not make sense. 
Who committed crimes and fraud ? 
PM. “Giorgos Papakonstantinou” has 135 
thousand hits, and there are 161 thousand 
hits for the “c”, including his book at Amazon. 
Latin has no “k”, see: Μέγας Κωνσταντίνoς.  
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Those people were afraid to come out, 
although within the meetings, we were all 
together against Georgiou, asking questions 
about the ad hoc numbers that he was 
bringing to us. There are also other 
witnesses, other officials from EL.Stat and 
other statisticians.  
Is it fear or wisdom ? 
Would it not be possible to collect such 
statements and publish a book with 
convinding arguments and data ? 
Regarding the breach of duty, all six 
members of the board have come out 
against [Georgiou] as witnesses, not only in 
court, but in the Greek parliament. 
I suppose that this is an important 
statement. The board of El.Stat 2010 (except 
Georgiou) defends the law of 2010 at El.Stat. 
One would hope that ASA also defends 
these statisticians, instead of sending 
derogatory letters to the two who contacted 
them about their misconceptions about 
Georgiou. 
I would like to say at this point that the 
European Commission keeps accusing 769 
Greece’s judicial system of intervening in 
[Greece’s handling of] financial data. This is 
ridiculous and outrageous. It is clear that 
Georgiou broke the law and he has to be 
brought to court. 
This is indeed a disrespect by the EU for 
the separation of powers within a Member 
State. 
He broke the law, it is very simple, and all 
the rest is to cover up the IMF’s and 
Eurostat’s responsibility for Greece’s deep 
recession, because of the unnecessary laws 
that they gave to Greece due to the wrong 
and untruly augmented numbers for Greece. 
Again an annoyingly vague “unnecessary”. 
I support you in the causality: surprise deficit 
→ rising stigma in the rate of interest since 
the Fall of 2009. Speculation might force you 
to give all debt a haircut, but Greece chose 
to bail out the banks. From that point your 
story is vague. My description of the impact 
of El.Stat in 2010 is in Section 27.4. The true 
effect came from policy around March 2011. 
In October 2011, EU 10 year bonds had 
widely different rates of interest. Germany 
paid 2% while Greece paid 18%. The 2% 
can be regarded as the market risk free rate 
and the difference 16% is a premium that 
covers both default risk and some stigma, 
see Colignatus (2011b). 770  
Now, what would the IMF and Eurostat 
want to cover up ? Was Georgiou a mere 
minion ? Is there a conspiracy ?  
ZG: Tell me which statistical authority or 
statistical office in Europe, or [in the rest of 
the world], is under one person’s rule, as has 
been imposed on Greece. 
(1) Well, Holland has adapted its law to 
this effect, see Chapter 21. (2) Your point is 
correct: a National Statistical Office should 
not be run by a single person. 
                                                                
769 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ess/-/european-commission-calls-on-greek-authorities-to-
defend-independence-of-El.Stat 
770 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Crisis-2007plus/2011-11-18-Haircut.html 
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So El.Stat today is under one person’s 
rule. How unbiased and independent can the 
numbers be?  
Would current El.Stat director Athanasios 
Thanopoulos not be independent of mind ? 
It is not enough to doubt or cast doubt. 
Give evidence where things are wrong, or 
retract. 
My argument is that the risk of a single 
person head is too large. This is a different 
type of argument. 
That’s why there are all these arguments 
between the IMF and the Europeans—not 
between the IMF and Greece or the 
Europeans and Greece—because Greece 
has no say. Eurostat manufactures the data 
about the debt, and they claim that the debt 
is viable. But the debt is not viable. 
Just to be sure: according to Georganta, 
deficit and debt before 2010 were viable, but 
because of the 2010 crisis, Greek debt 
became government debt, and then no 
longer was viable. Part of the story of course 
is the economic depression, with less GDP 
to service the debt. 
Thanopoulos, in my opinion, has 
shown…[that] he has to obey the orders of 
the Eurostat and the European Commission 
regarding the numbers, and especially 
numbers regarding Greece’s debt and deficit. 
And of course, he has to support the deep 
depression policies for Greece. 
In 2017, there is tension between 
Georganta’s view that the debt would not be 
viable in 2017 and Georganta’s view that the 
numbers would be incorrect in 2017 too. 
Most likely she means that debt at the State 
Enterprises and nationalised debt of the 
banks are inviable when accounted at the 
General Government and would be viable if 
accounted differently or privatised ? If so, 
this is dubious. At best she mixes up a 
message of 2010 with an economic situation 
in 2017. Perhaps the situation in 2009 was 
viable until George Papakonstantinou 
scrambled the eggs, perhaps not wanting to 
be held accountable for the deficit and debt 
by his predecessor. However, once the eggs 
were scrambled, and speculation on the 
financial markets unleashed, there was no 
going back to the idea that the rising debt 
was viable. All Greek companies were hit 
because of being Greek. 
Are these policies [implemented] due to 
the incompetence of the Europeans and 
Thanopoulos? No. Our German pseudo-
partners have said it openly, that Greek 
people are undisciplined and must be 
broken. Because of this, I think that the 
Eurozone is going to be doomed. 
Georganta thus thinks, derailed, that there 
was a deliberate policy in 2010, apparently 
by Germany and IMF, to put Georgiou in 
El.Stat, to create a second excuse after 2009 
for the financial markets to speculate, and 
unload more debt upon the Greek 
government, to break the undisciplined 
Greek people into submission. She does not 
explain why the Eurozone is doomed.  
Greece’s economic history has been 
forged, first by Georgiou, and Thanopoulos 
continues in the same way because they 
have changed the data. Since 1995, the data 
Thus there are real data about Greece, 
and newly created data since 1995.  
Who is going to prove what are the good 
data? You cannot refer to your CV for the 
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has been changed in a completely ad hoc 
manner. I have all the old data, and they 
wanted to show a smooth increase in 
Greece’s indebtedness, which is wrong. I 
have evidence because I have worked for 42 
years as an applied statistician, as an 
economic researcher, as a professor at the 
University of Macedonia, and as a visiting 
professor at Harvard’s National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
evidence that the data are correct. The old 
data must be on paper in the archives, also 
at IMF. Thus the current El.Stat must provide 
an explanation why the new data would be 
an improvement.  
This is quite a job. Exactly the kind of job 
why one has a National Statistical Office. 
I have not managed [to publish] yet 
because of my court cases, but very soon 
my bombshell book will be out in English.  
Two and a half years later, in February 
2020, this hasn’t happened yet.  
However, Thanopoulos’ behavior, I must 
admit, is not as absurd or stupid or 
nonsensical as Georgiou’s behavior was 
towards everybody, even towards the MPs of 
the parliament, the prime minister and the 
ministers. Thanopoulos seems smarter but 
more secretly cunning, so he can survive 
better than Georgiou. 
Why would one need the phrase “secretly 
cunning” ? Perhaps this is a strange 
translation of a common Greek expression, 
perhaps idiom like English “streetwise” ?  
An inadequate translation can turn 
someone’s point of view upside down. 
MPN: The current SYRIZA and 
Independent Greeks coalition government is 
claiming to have achieved a primary budget 
surplus, initially 3.9 percent and now 4.2 
percent, well above the targets Greece’s 
lenders had initially set for 2016. Does this 
surplus exist in reality or is it a product of 
creative accounting? 
 
ZG: This is a very good question. It is for 
sure creative accounting. 
It is unclear how Georganta would know 
this, when she is not at El.Stat and doesn’t 
have the data. 
Those surpluses are not healthy, if they 
exist. How can a country whose GDP has 
shrunk by 28 percent have primary 
surpluses? If it does, of course those 
surpluses are not healthy. They do not come 
from growth, but from squeezing public 
expenditures for health and education, from 
stealing the revenues of the research 
organizations of Greece, changing them into 
public servants and public corporations so 
that [the state takes] their revenue that they 
make out of collaborating with foreign 
institutions. 
Well, yeah, that is called “austerity”. 
 
In the past, salaries in Greece were 
increased because Greece could borrow 
money from European banks, and, according 
to the Basel rules, government debt could be 
counted as risk free.  
The Greek crisis meant that the party was 
over. Even economist Georganta has to 
adapt to the new world of broken dreams ?  
Also, those surpluses come, of course, 
from taxes that are choking any private 
entrepreneurial initiatives made by Greeks, 
and of course by giving nothing for growth. 
The EU & IMF austerity packages indeed 
seem unwise for getting the Greek economy 
up and running again.  
What would be crazy about servicing old 
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The Greek debt has come to a point that it 
cannot be served anymore, because as I 
said, the troika, or “institutions,” load Greece 
with debt in order to pay previous debt. Isn’t 
it crazy? All of this is creative accounting, 
unfortunately. 
debt with new debt ? Does Georganta plea 
for more austerity instead ? What would be 
creative about this accounting ? 
There are many Greek economists, and 
remarkably none has reacted to Colignatus 
(2011a). There has been lots of attention for 
Varoufakis and his extravaganzas. A 
baseline is that a country is responsible for 
its own incompetence. 
ZG: The Greek parliament has actual 
correspondence between the former 
European commissioner of economic affairs, 
the general director of Eurostat, the IMF 
representative Poul Thomsen, and Georgiou, 
as well as the former minister of finance of 
Greece, showing the involvement of the 
European Commission and Eurostat in 
untruly augmenting the Greek debt and 
deficit for 2009. 
See Georganta (2011) for a discussion of 
how debt and deficit were increased. I have 
not been in a position to check these figures, 
and some statements seem rather vague.  
For some aspects one must be a specialist 
in national debt accounting. For example, 
ESA95 has rules for swaps. These rules 
might be unwise, but still exist. The Greek 
board in 2010 might have had discretion 
about how to account for those swaps. 
This correspondence exists because 
Logothetis pressed charges against 
Georgiou for wrongly accusing [Logothetis] 
of “hacking” [Georgiou’s] personal email.  
It is very useful to know that there is a 
different route how these emails became 
available, for the existence of those emails 
(in documents) otherwise seems to confirm 
that there was a hack. Xafa (2019a) 
mentions police reports about a hack but has 
no link, and when asked doesn’t have them. 
I want to say here that all charges against 
Logothetis have been dropped,  
Xafa (2019a) has the story that Georgiou 
filed charges, and that the prosecutor 
pressed them, but that eventually the time 
limit expired, so that judges did not refer 
Logothetis to trial. This is quite different from 
“dropping charges”. This doesn’t seem to be 
a problem in translation but in understanding. 
See Section 32.2. 
although the Wall Street Journal had a 
recent article by Marcus Walker which 
completely distorts the facts, showing his 
outrageous bias in favor of Georgiou. It is a 
pity, but it has happened. I am saying that to 
be clear, because Logothetis was not 
hacking anybody. His [proficiency with] 
computers is not at that level. How could he 
break passwords and all this that Georgiou 
accused him of? 
Marcus Walker reported on 2017-02-06: 
“From Mr. Georgiou’s first day, Mr. 
Logothetis hacked his emails after learning 
private access codes, a court trying him for 
that hacking later found. The court acquitted 
Mr. Logothetis, ruling he committed the deed 
but acted to protect state interests.” 771  
This ending of the hacking case is 
unfortunate. When Logothetis denies the 
charges, he hasn’t been offered a chance to 
be cleared by a court. 
Walker also points to the accounting 
                                                                
771 https://www.wsj.com/articles/greeces-response-to-its-resurgent-debt-crisis-prosecute-the-
statistician-1486396434 
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principle that input = output: “Bond markets 
could see Greece’s 2009 new borrowing, a 
rough proxy for its deficit, was at least €35 
billion—around 15% of GDP.” 
Walker indicates that some Greek 
politicians welcomed Georganta’s claims: 
“Prokopis Pavlopoulos, a leading New 
Democracy lawmaker, began championing 
the allegations, telling radio listeners Mr. 
Georgiou failed to resist European demands. 
Mr. Pavlopoulos, as interior minister of the 
Karamanlis government until 2009, had 
overseen a steep public-payroll expansion. 
Now Greece’s president, he declined to be 
interviewed.” 
Regarding the parliamentary debt audit 
commission, its work was interrupted 
because the prime minister [Alexis Tsipras] 
sacked Zoe Konstantopoulou 772 773 as 
president of the parliament and also as 
member of the governing party [SYRIZA]. 
 
(Editor’s note: Georganta added, in a 
Greek-language version of this interview, her 
belief that Konstantopoulou was insincerely 
adopting a populist pose). 
 
However, although my name is not 
mentioned in the final report, I gave data to 
that committee in parliament, but not all of it 
was publicized. Still, the outcome is that a 
sizable portion of the Greek debt is illegal 
and odious. I want to say at this point that 
the restructuring of the Greek debt that is 
under discussion now is completely 
nonsensical because it means a time 
extension of its repayment schedule, which 
is unfair for the future generations of Greece. 
Now, it is in the next 50 years that the Greek 
debt is to be repaid, but they want to extend 
it to 80 or 100 years. Actually, [the 
institutions] have set a number: 99 years. 
Specify what would be illegal. 
 
The alternative is that the creditors accept 
another haircut. An argument might be that 
they should have been wiser than lending to 
Greece without better checking the 
creditworthiness.  
Much, however, runs counter to the Basel 
rule that government debt is risk-free. So 
now there would be pension funds who have 
lended money to the Greek State, and you 
want to tell them that a part evaporates. Why 
not hold Greek politics and their voters 
accountable ? 
The Supreme Court of Greece came to the 
conclusion, in August 2016, that 210 billion 
euros is the measured damage done to 
Greece by the false augmentation of the 
public deficit of 2009. This damage to the 
Greek state has to be paid back to Greece, 
The stakes are high ! Why not give a link to 
this calculation ? 
I agree that DG Eurostat Walter 
Radermacher is complicit with Georgiou, and 
supported the violation of duty in an EU 
                                                                
772 https://www.mintpressnews.com/greeces-syriza-neoliberal-wolves-anti-austerity-sheeps-
clothing/221554/ 
773 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zoe_Konstantopoulou 
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because the European Commission and 
Eurostat are among the partners in 
Georgiou’s crimes, with evidence which has 
been kept in parliament and in the Greek 
justice system. 
Member State.  
The impact of the recalculation of the 2009 
deficit and debt was initially lacklustre, and 
the real impact had to do with precedent, see 
Section 27.4.  
I believe that [the institutions] are aware of 
fraud committed by [members of the Greek 
government], and they tell them, if you go on 
to publicize the threats, we are going to 
reveal to the Greek people your actual 
fraudulent behavior, the bribes you receive 
from German companies like Siemens, 
which has come out actually, and then a lot 
of other organizations in Europe. 
If I understand you correctly: Greek 
politicians are corrupt, foreigners take 
advantage of this, provide bribes, and then 
can extort the corrupt person, because they 
can threaten to expose the corruption. 
 
For example, the Greek government has 
purchased submarines, spending a huge 
amount of money for submarines that go 
down to the bottom of the sea and never 
come back up. The Greek people have paid 
all this money, in addition to huge bribes on 
the side for particular [government] ministers, 
for “well-working” submarines and a lot of 
other weapons actually, planes which fall 
down and all these kinds of things. All of 
these European governing [authorities] know 
of this fraud [that has been perpetrated] by 
Greek politicians, so they actually tell them, 
“go on, publicize our threats, we’ll reveal 
everything you’ve done so that you will not 
be re-elected by the stupid Greek people.” 
This might be a credible example of 
corruption. 
I have no experience with this. I presume 
that there have been hundreds of years of 
corruption, with laws and court cases. 
Suppose that Hans bribes Giorgos to take a 
loan of EUR 1 to buy a yellow submarine. 
They are caught and put in prison. How is 
the EUR 1 going to be divided ? 
Complications abound. If the submarine is 
not to specifications, appears to be a lemon, 
the patron of Hans (Germany) is in trouble. If 
the specifications are lousy (perhaps for a 
lemon) the patron of Giorgos (Greece) is in 
trouble. Etcetera. 
ZG: There is evidence that the German 
and French banks were bankrupt in 2008, 
because they had a lot of toxic American 
debt. Also, they owned a sizable quantity of 
Greek state bonds. Falsely augmenting the 
Greek deficit [was done] in order to load us 
with unnecessary loans which go back to 
their banks, so that Greece buys back [its] 
bonds, so that the German and French 
banks can refinance their debts. This was a 
very appetizing idea [for the banks]. This has 
been actually said by people like [Paul] 
Krugman 774 and a lot of other researchers 
and scientists, American and European. 
German and French banks also bought 
American junk. Banks that “refinance their 
debt” is a wrong expression for a creditor. 
They did not have to write off their loans to 
Greece. Potentially a problem in translation / 
Greek-English. 
Why would this be “falsely augmenting” ? If 
Greece buys back its bonds then its debt is 
reduced and not augmented. Also, would 
Georganta want Greek companies to fail and 
become bankrupt, because they cannot 
serve their debt, whence the Greek economy 
would collapse ? 
“Unnecessary loans” would still leave you 
with loads of cash, that you can use to pay 
off debt, after which you would no longer 
have those loans.  
                                                                
774 http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=133112932 
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Georganta makes sense that if Greek 
banks and State Enterprises would collapse, 
then the German and French banks would 
get in problems even more, requiring support 
by their governments. For this to happen, 
she would want to see the collapse of the 
Greek economy, and a pariah status of lost 
creditworthiness. 
Krugman discusses something else in that 
particular reference. Perhaps the editor 
linked to the wrong article ? 
MN: Before we wrap up this interview, 
Professor Georganta, and if I may… we have 
seen that the allegations that whistleblowers 
like yourself have made have been largely 
ignored by the Greek and foreign media.  
 
Just to be sure: the international press has 
mentioned the accusations, and made fun of 
them, but we have not seen a deep 
investigation.  
Some have spotted an error by Georganta 
in a calculation (or someone spotted it, and 
the others repeated the statement), see 
Section 30.6.3, but this is rather a mistaken 
assumption, and some errors do not prove 
overall incompetence. (It is not like the error 
that Radermacher made w.r.t. eSNI.) 
A government [SYRIZA] is in power which 
prior to being elected had promised to tear 
up the austerity agreements and to abolish 
them with one law and one article, which had 
also promised to halt the privatizations of 
Greece’s public assets and utilities, and 
which is now implementing the exact 
opposite policies from what it had promised. 
The “no” in the Greek referendum of July 
2015 was very quickly turned into a “yes” by 
this same government. The European Union 
and Greece’s so-called “partners” and 
lenders have not shown even the slightest 
amount of flexibility with regard to Greece’s 
debt or other financial matters. And my 
personal impression is that the Greek people 
are resigned to their fates, allowing all of this 
to continue taking place in their country. In 
your estimation, what should be done and 
what can be done, in order for Greece to turn 
the page and change direction? 
There is indeed an article by MPN that the 
Syriza government got elected on a ticket of 
stopping the austerity, and then increased it. 
A problem with this kind of question by 
MPN is that he now turns Georganta from a 
witness in the El.Stat case into a guru on 
world matters. MPN should know that it is 
risky for the credibility of a witness when one 
starts discussing other topics. For example, 
the witness might remark that he or she likes 
dancing in the rain in a pink pyjama, which is 
quite immaterial to the calculation of the 
national deficit, but suddenly outsiders start 
wondering whether all statements are weird. 
It is for good reason that National Statistical 
Offices adopt a low profile, as grey and 
uninteresting, but amazingly competent, 
accountants. 
ZG: This is a very difficult question. Greece 
has through the centuries been under foreign 
invaders, first military and now economic, but 
we have always survived. Greece is a rich 
country in terms of physical and human 
resources. However, our politicians have 
systematically been generously bribed by 
If Greek people are being bribed by 
foreigners, perhaps both should be blamed, 
and not only the foreigners ? 
And what about Greeks bribing Greeks ? 
And what about Greeks bringing their 
money to foreign banks ? 
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Western foreigners in order to be able to rob 
Greece’s wealth.  
Also, our geopolitical situation is very 
attractive to world powers in their struggle to 
govern the world.  
The Greek geopolitical position is rather a 
source of worry than advantage. It forms 
Europe’s border with the Middle East (unless 
Turkey joins the EU). The EU has an interest 
to keep Greece stable. This doesn’t mean 
submissive. 
These days, as Germany is trying its last, 
and I hope unsuccessful, attempt to rule 
Europe and the world, is using our long-
suffering little country as a guinea pig to 
[conquer] the rest of the European countries. 
Please retract, because it is derailed. 
Germany lost its currency to a single seat in 
the ECB. 
The German surplus in exports is much 
caused by weaker wages due to the German 
Reunion of East and West Germany. This 
wasn’t a grand plan to conquer the world. 
The stronger German Länder like Bavaria 
already have to support the weaker Länder, 
and they are annoyed that they also have to 
support France and Southern Europe. 
In my opinion, in Greece, a patriotic and 
caring government has to get out of the 
Eurozone. We have to have our own 
monetary policy to control our banks, and to 
have our own currency.  
In itself this is a decent position. The UK 
never became a member of the Eurozone, 
and even has Brexit now. 
Some Greeks had Plan B or X. 775 
This will be difficult, of course, because we 
have sold such a great portion of our wealth, 
but a good government can reverse this.  
 
If you sold your wealth W, then you 
substituted W for money, and you still have 
money, which would be equal to W.  
Is this a translation problem again ? 
If you mean that you sold your wealth and 
then consumed it, then there is no easy way 
to get it back. 
We have to have our own monetary policy 
and our own central bank that we control, in 
order to go on to growth.  
This would still imply much lower real 
wages. But Greece alreay can lower its 
wages, so why not try itwithin the current 
framework? 
Also, we have to ask the United Nations to 
implement the human rights clauses of 
international law, because Greece has a 
large portion of its people who are very 
hungry.  
There is no need to ask the UN, since you 
can ask this of the EU. 
Why not tax the rich in Greece ? 
Why not tax the Greek Orthodox Church, 
with its huge holdings of land ? 
I live in a rich suburb of Athens [and also] 
in Thessaloniki, and I see, in the night, old 
people in these suburbs, previously good-
standing people who worked until 65 or 67 
years of age—and all claims to the contrary 
are nonsense and lies—and they are 
The situation is a disgrace indeed, but why 
do the rich Greek people not care more for 
their fellow poor ? Why should it be the UN 
or the EU to step in and resolve the disgrace 
? 
What is wrong with the notion of taking 
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searching in the waste bins in the street to 
find some little vegetables thrown out by 
other people. Also, the supermarkets in 
Greece ask the customers to buy rice and 
milk for children of families who are in 
absolute hunger and poverty. I have seen 
people, families with two and three children 
in Thessaloniki, who live in their own cars, 
they don’t live in a house. They come to the 
university, where there are rooms for the 
visiting scholars and professors to have a 
place to stay, and they come there to take a 
bath. This situation is a shame for Europe. 
responsibility for your past errors, like voting 
for irresponsible political parties ? 
Also, they have loaded us with lots, with 
millions of refugees.  
Millions ? In 2015 there were 0.8 million 
arrivals, causing the Syria migration crisis, 
but these have not all stayed Greece, and 
the arriving numbers are now lower. 776 Still 
too high of course.  
The Syrian people are suffering and we 
have to accept them and we are caring for 
them, but also there are people who are not 
refugees. They come to Greece from a lot of 
other places in the world, from Africa, from 
Asia, from Bangladesh, from India and from 
a lot of other places. We don’t hate these 
people, we are actually helping them and we 
are famously, from antiquity, people with 
good intentions towards foreigners and 
visitors. But, you can’t have so many people, 
young people in Greece who have no work.  
These comments are made all over 
Europe. 
The unemployment among the young 
people in Greece, from 25-45 years of age 
[is very high]. We have all these young 
people who have a lot of energy, and what 
are they going to do? It’s natural and logical. 
We have a lot of crime here, by Greeks, they 
will steal even one euro or ten euros. All this 
is known to the United States government 
and the European Commission and the 
governing parties, the European Parliament, 
officials who receive such high salaries, 
25,000 euros per month with all the 
privileges. It’s a shame.  
At the same time, the Greek people are 
suffering here. Very few people are those, 
the politicians and their friends, who are 
doing well. Also people who have married 
Again, one might also blame the Greek 
governments and their voters themselves. 
From the EU Parliament: 777 
“The monthly pre-tax salary of MEPs, 
under the single statute, is € 8.757,70 (as of 
July 2018). This salary comes from 
Parliament's budget. All MEPs pay EU tax 
and insurance contributions, after which the 
salary is € 6.824,85. In addition, most EU 
countries oblige their MEPs to pay an 
additional national tax to their home country. 
The final salary (salary after taxes) for an 
individual Member therefore depends on the 
taxation rules in the Member's home country. 
The MEPs' basic salary is set at 38.5% of the 
basic salary of a judge at the European 
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[foreigners] and who have some other 
sources of income, like myself. I have 
married an Englishman, and he helps me 
with my 99 year old mother. I have worked 
for 42 years, and my salary is not enough to 
support the medicine and all the care for my 
mother. There are other people in much 
worse situations than me. 
Court of Justice, so MEPs do not, and 
cannot, decide on their own salary.” 
Could the EU Parliament not change the 
38.5%, or raise the salary of the judge, or 
raise “travel expenses” ?  
A patriotic Greek government should go to 
the United Nations and ask for the 
implementation of the humanistic clauses of 
international law, to stop paying the debt 
[immediately]. Later, when we start growing 
we can pay the debt, but the debt which is 
legal, not the odious debt. We have to find 
out which is the odious debt, with a real 
accounting committee. 
Please provide figures and a substantiation 
what debt is proper and what is not.  
Greece may be little and is governed by 
corrupt and unpatriotic governments, but it is 
hard to die. The Germans and whoever else 
will learn it the hard way, I believe. 
But Greece is a democracy, with a free 
press, and they voted for these governments 
?! 
MN: Well Professor Georganta, thank you 
very much for taking the time to speak with 
us today here on Dialogos Radio and the 
Dialogos Interview Series, and for sharing 
your views and insights with us. Best of luck 
with your continued efforts. 
This is a bit lame of MN, because he now 
has created an interview with Georganta, 
which rather destroys much of her credibility. 
This is like kicking someone into a 
wheelchair, and then wish good luck at the 
paralympics. 
ZG: Thank you very much for letting me 
express my opinion here, and to have foreign 
people understand what the truth is, because 
the truth is hidden under the carpet in 
Greece. [I would like to add] that Greek 
people can go on with only bread and olives 
to feed themselves, if they have hope that 
we are going to get our country back and we 
are going to have some growth. They can 
suffer some sacrifices and be happy about it, 
but now they have lost hope and they are 
desperate and a lot of them commit suicide. 
We can survive if we get out of the terrible 
euro which is a disguised German 
Deutschmark, which serves only German 
interests and nothing else. 
(1) If you can survive on bread and olives, 
please do, reduce wages, and start the 
economy again, instead of all this 
complaining. 
(2) Why lose hope, when there are the 
examples of Sweden, Holland and Germany 
how you can create countries that somehow 
work (but then there are plenty of Swedes, 
Dutch and Germans who complain ...) ? 
(3) The euro serves the Eurozone, and has 
prevented huge chaos on the currency 
markets, during the financial crisis of 2007+. 
Obviously, there are many errors in the 
structure of the euro, but these can be 
corrected, rather than going back to national 
currencies (with the same errors). 
Please excuse any typos or errors which 
may exist within this transcript. 
Of course, except for the conceptual and 
factual errors. 
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44. Appendix. Logothetis and the conspiracy 
 
I advise Logothetis to retract this interview, see Sections 29.11 and 31.1. 
The interview has been reproduced here (in part) with much appreciated 
permission, granted on 2019-12-26 by dr. Michael P. Nevradakis (see footnote 
762, page 320), Producer & Host, Dialogos Radio & Media,  
https://www.dialogosmedia.org. 
My disclaimer is: 
This interview is a transcript of a radio interview. When an interview is 
published in print, normally one needs to check whether the interviewee 
has authorised the publication. It often happens that the interviewer 
distorts what was actually said. This risk would not be present with a 
transcript. However, in a radio interview some interviewees may not be 
as cautious as they would be in an interview of which it is clear that it will 
be printed, and for which they need to authorise what will be printed. 
Thus, in transcript below, there may still be statements that the 
interviewee, on close thought, would rephrase differently, or not say at all. 
PM. A Dutch saying about sheep is: “When you get sheared you better sit still.” 
 
Logothetis, November 15 2017 778 (Greek-
English) (around 67 years of age then) (not 
the full interview) (interviewer Michael P. 
Nevradakis (MPN)) 
Comment February 5 2020 (only where 
chosen) 
Georgiou has been working in the 
International Monetary Fund since the late 
1980s. For a few years before he came to 
Greece, he was deputy head of a division of 
the IMF’s statistics department, the financial 
institutions divisions. However, the Ministry 
of Finance announced the appointment of 
EL.Stat’s board of directors through a press 
release to all Greek newspapers. In that 
press release, it presented Georgiou as 
deputy head of the entire IMF statistics 
department, a very big department in the IMF 
and a very important one, hiding his actual 
organizational position in the IMF, an 
economic nature position rather than a 
statistical nature position, in a subordinate 
division of the statistics department. 
This point has also been mentioned by 
Georganta.  
It should be possible to retrieve the CV 
used at the job interview, and to see the 
press release at the appointment. 
A discrepancy could be human error but 
might feed into the notion of a “conspiracy”, 
but in that case the Greek Ministry of 
Finance would take part in it. 
 
 
 
Obviously, the objective of the Minister of 
Finance then was to present him as an 
experienced statistician with a significant 
Try to make a distinction between national 
accounting and “statistics”. As far as I can 
see Georgiou’s staff papers concerned 
                                                                
778 https://dialogosmedia.org/transcript-interview-with-whistleblower-nikos-logothetis-on-El.Stat-
scandal/ 
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management position at the IMF, who 
supposedly left America and came here to 
“save” Greece by putting in order all its 
statistics. In fact, this gentleman was not only 
unable to run an important institutions such 
as EL.Stat, with over 1,000 employees, but 
he wasn’t even a statistician, with no 
academic publications and no knowledge of 
statistics. 
evaluations of GDP and trade balances. He 
understood the use of the figures, and 
indeed may likely not have understood 
details at first. 
For publications, see Georganta’s 
interview, above p322. 
Moreover, for at least six months after 
assuming the EL.Stat presidency, Georgiou 
still held his organizational position at the 
IMF, something that was explicitly forbidden 
by EL.Stat’s founding law, 3832/2010. It was 
explicitly forbidden. 
It is okay to bring up the point, but the 
Greek court has rejected it.  
One would not want to see someone in 
foreign service. However, it here concerned 
future health care arrangements (in the 
USA). There were no strings attached, for 
there was no suggestion that Georgiou 
would return to the IMF. However, he might 
have felt grateful to his former employer. It 
would have been wiser to have found a 
different arrangement, perhaps a one-time 
allotment by the Greek government to the 
IMF ? 
NL: First of all, Georgiou’s first moves were 
to remove from the other members of the 
board any ability and initiative to propose 
discussion topics or to be involved in the 
calculation of the deficit or the debt. They 
were forbidden even to communicate with 
the remaining staff of EL.Stat! This behavior 
of Georgiou was not only due to his inability 
to act as a manager, but also due to the fact 
that he understood from the very beginning, 
even from the second meeting of the board 
in September 2010, our refusal to adopt the 
deficit and debt calculation procedures he 
wanted to follow. He knew that eventually the 
majority of the board members would not 
approve his deficit figures to be officially 
published before the end of October 2010. 
The board’s refusal to adopt Georgiou’s 
calculation needs clarification. One supposes 
a discussion on content. Why this, why that ? 
Clarity is required whether Georgiou had 
been advised in advance by Eurostat to treat 
the board as only advisory, and to assume 
all authority himself, or whether this was 
entirely an initiative by himself.  
In the court case he apparently referred to 
the Code of Practice of the wrong year, and 
if so, this can only be deliberate, and it is not 
clear whether the prosecutor and judges also 
paid any attention to his effort to change the 
law.  
Shortly afterward, after the last meeting of 
the board in early October 2010, the final 
silencing of the whole board followed and we 
were never convened again, thus leaving the 
way free for Georgiou, always under the 
auspices of senior Eurostat executives, on 
the one hand to change the founding the 
law—as he always wanted, to turn EL.Stat 
into one-person authority—and on the other 
hand, to inflate the 2009 figures. Exactly how 
he did this became clear later, but we had 
Suspected, or known via a computer hack? 
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suspected soon enough what he was going 
to do. 
My first disagreement with him was when I 
realized he would add on the deficit figures 
and on the national debt of Greece the 
Simitis swaps, that is, the swaps that Simitis 
had made use of in 2001 in order for Greece 
to get accepted to the Eurozone.  
This is wrong. The Simitis swaps were 
after Greece joined the euro. See above 
p195. 
Allow me here, Mr. Nevradakis, if you don’t 
mind, to briefly explain what these swaps 
are, as they indicate clearly an activity typical 
of the statistical mishandlings that had 
always been used and are still taking place 
in our country, every time the government’s 
leaders want to achieve something that aims 
in communication or financial benefits for 
themselves or for third parties.  
Logothetis apparently doesn’t want to 
please any government just like that. 
Swaps are a type of a bond, a banking 
derivative or simply a stock exchange bet, a 
bet of currency exchange. Many countries or 
people who have a personal debt do it, after 
having a loan, for example. Even now they 
are doing it, converting their existing debt 
into currencies of other countries, say in 
Swiss francs or Japanese yen, betting that 
the value of that currency will rise and at the 
maturity of this debt, the owner will gain from 
the difference in the value of currencies. 
 
In a way, what happened at that time is 
that much of Greece’s debt was converted 
into yen, but at a price that the yen had in 
1995, which was higher than that of 2001! 
Remember, the swaps were made in 2001, 
but the price of the yen in 1995 was the one 
used for this swap. We can put a big 
question mark here because I don’t know 
how legitimate this was, to consider as valid 
the exchange value of the yen of six years 
ago. But anyway, this was what happened. 
From this action, we were theoretically 
winning an amount of 2.8 billion euros, which 
again theoretically reduced our debt by this 
amount, and also the annual deficit below 3 
percent, thus meeting the requirement of the 
Maastricht Treaty for our entry into the 
Eurozone. But let us not forget, however, 
that this was a bet, let’s say a stock 
This is wrong. The Simitis swaps were 
after Greece joined the euro. See above 
p195. Greece qualified in 2000, and entered 
on 1 January 2001. However, one can 
imagine that it would have been unwise to 
show a larger deficit in 2001, the very year of 
entering. The euro banknotes and coins 
were introduced in 2002. 
There is discussion whether there would 
not be rules for this swap, as ESA95 already 
had rules for swaps. 
Radermacher in his 2010 letter to 
Georgiou states, rather reasonably, that 
there was no regulation that stated that the 
swaps should not be counted as debt, see 
the appendix of Georganta’s memo in Greek. 
779 
                                                                
779 https://zoe-georganta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Illegal-swelling-hospitals-SWAP.pdf 
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exchange bond with a starting and a maturity 
date. Its expiration time was in 30 years, and 
at that time, there was no European 
regulation that could apply in order to cash in 
this swap before its maturity. As a result, 
your debts go up or down. 
- Radermacher -  See p204 above. 
Another illegal swelling of our deficit made 
by Georgiou included the addition of 3.6 
billion euros in hospital costs that were not 
even approved by the Court of Auditors. The 
Court of Auditors is one of the three 
institutions of Greek justice, along with the 
Supreme Court and the Council of State. 
Anyway, that was not approved by the Court 
of Auditors. This cost, as it turned out later, 
no one committed to it and no one was 
paying for it. And finally, the major swelling of 
the budget deficit was accomplished by the 
overnight inclusion of the deficits of 17 public 
utilities, violating many Eurostat criteria and 
rules. That alone added 18.2 billion euros, 
equivalent to 20 billion dollars, to the fiscal 
debt of Greece. 
Well, the devil hides in the details. 
It is awkward to hold that Georgiou acted 
against Eurostat rules, when Eurostat 
approved his figures. But theoretically it is 
possible that Eurostat did not look at the 
underlying construction. It is hard to believe, 
though, that Radermacher acted alone, and 
it is more likely that he had a team assisting 
him. 
It is remarkable that debts somewhat exist 
but also do not exist. It invites for an error 
range. 
Who wants to check all of this ? My 
suggestion is an investigation. But such 
investigation might also want to try to 
reconstruct what the board of El.Stat would 
have decided, if it had not be blocked by 
Georgiou. 
As a result of all the above, Greece ended 
up with a huge deficit for the year 2009, of 36 
billion euros, or equivalently, 15.4 percent of 
gross domestic product. This legitimated the 
first memorandum, paved the way for the 
second and worse memorandum, and 
justified the imposition of these cumbersome 
austerity measures, such as the pension cuts 
and the tax increases, huge tax increases, 
measures that we are still suffering today. 
The term “legitimated” is overused. 
Logothetis is at risk of arguing that such 
debts did not exist but let us suppose that he 
only argues that originally they were 
manageable. The original event was in the 
Fall of 2009 and not 2010. The financial 
speculation and stigma on Greek debt 
started then, turning the financial crisis into 
an euro crisis. This necessitated the 
Memorandum of May 2010. Thus the eggs 
were scrambled and there is no way to 
unscramble them. It would be an issue 
whether the Karamanlis figure of 6% or the 
Papakonstantinou figure of 12.5% satisfied 
the Eurostat rules. We now have the 
Georgiou – Eurostat figure but not the El.Stat 
board – Eurostat figure. But actual policy 
making had to deal with the unleashed 
speculation on the financial markets, 
regardless of what figure. 
An element in this reasoning is that the 
austerity forced a recession, with less 
government revenues, and a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that the deficit was large, and that 
 339 
more debt financing was required. And it 
mattered that the Georgiou – Eurostat figure 
was more restraining, e.g. by including State 
Enterprises. 
Otherwise, if the deficit figure was creative 
bookkeeping to make the situation look 
worse, the economy might have been 
sturdier, and the impact less severe. It would 
be tricky modeling to try to gauge the 
different counterfactual paths. 
- conspiracy -  See Section 31.3 on page 213 above. It 
may be that the conspiracy forms an 
important aspect in Logothetis view on the 
matter, and perhaps it is important for him to 
observe that a talk between Papandreou and 
Strauss-Kahn apparently was after the 
election in October 2009 and not in April 
2009. 
In order to achieve all of this of course, 
they had to plant the appropriate person in 
EL.Stat at a time when certain statistical 
adjustments were required, in order to 
support their treacherous plan. Where did 
this lead eventually? To the consolidation 
and time extension of Greek state 
bankruptcy. 
Would it really make such a difference if 
the deficit rises from 13.6% (April estimate) 
to 15.4% (November estimate) ? The 
austerity would be much of the same.  
There was the surprise effect on the 
financial markets in 2009, that enhanced 
stigma. There was the policy issue starting 
2011 that really increased stigma.  
It is okay to argue that the board was the 
proper authority to determine the figures for 
2009, because this is the legally assigned 
role, but why speak about a treacherous plan 
(that gave the board such authority) ? Why 
speak about a treacherous plan when your 
job does not concern policy but is to get the 
figures right ? 
MN: We are speaking with Nikos 
Logothetis, former board member of the 
Greek Statistical Authority EL.Stat, here on 
Dialogos Radio and the Dialogos Interview 
Series. From what I understand, Andreas 
Georgiou is no longer in Greece, despite the 
fact that various legal cases and judicial 
decisions are outstanding against him. 
Where does Georgiou find himself today and 
what is he presently involved with? 
It is not wise of the interviewer to ask these 
questions of another witness. It would be 
wiser for Logothetis to decline to speculate 
about another witness. 
NL: He’s away, because he knows what 
he’s faced with, with trials and legal cases. 
Georgiou is currently in his comfortable villa 
in Maryland. He left Greece in the summer of 
2015, one month before the end of his five-
Such facts can be checked.  
One may sub-poena a witness. 
 
 
 340 
year term as EL.Stat chairman. 
Coincidentally, this was shortly after the call 
from the house of Parliament to testify in the 
examination committee that had been 
formed at that time to investigate the reasons 
for our ascension to the first memorandum. 
He never came to the examination room, 
pretending to be in the hospital with 
“pneumonia.” Who on earth has ever heard 
of a pneumonia case in the middle of the 
Greek summer? 
Anyway, immediately after his “discharge” 
from the hospital, he left for America, I 
repeat, one month before the end of his term 
and without requesting a renewal of the 
presidency position for another five years. 
He could do that, but he didn’t, apparently 
having realized that he could not have 
avoided the imminent court hearing about 
the prosecutions for breach of duty and for 
the felony of inflating the deficit figures, 
which in the legal language is expressed as 
“felony of false certification at the expense of 
the state” together with the “aggravating 
order for public abusers,” a very impressive 
legal phrase. This is a legal category that 
leads to life imprisonment. 
Perhaps it needs to be remarked that we 
only look at analysis here and not at the size 
of the penalty. 
I presume at this time that he’s engaged in 
preparing his defense, through statements 
via his lawyers in Greece, with him being 
absent, missing from every trial that has 
taken place about him. 
Well, a person has some rights of 
representation by legal counsel. 
MN: A few months ago Georgiou was 
found guilty by the Greek justice system. 
What were the charges for which Georgiou 
was convicted and sentenced? 
It is not wise of the interviewer to ask these 
questions of another witness. It would be 
wiser for Logothetis to decline to speculate 
about another witness. 
NL: There are two convictions he had this 
year. In March, Georgiou, in a criminal court, 
was convicted irrevocably for libel and for 
written defamation, and he was given one 
year imprisonment with a three year 
suspension, in the first instance of that 
verdict. He appealed through his lawyers, but 
the penal court of appeals condemned 
Georgiou again, giving him the same 
sentence as in the first instance. Georgiou’s 
crime was that in an official EL.Stat news 
release, Georgiou accused Dr. Nicholas 
Stroblos of being a statistical swindler, 
obviously trying to divert guilt from himself for 
See Georganta on page 324 above on the 
same issue of libel. 
 
Properly stated, Stroblos was the head of 
national accounting at NSSG, when it was 
under the Ministry of Finance, and had 
transferred to the independent El.Stat. 
It is curious that the El.Stat board allowed 
director Georgiou to fire Stroblos as stated. 
However, board meetings were apparently 
monthly and we may count four meetings 
before the board was abolished. 
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statistical fraud. I’m pointing out here that Dr. 
Stroblos is the former director of the national 
accounts department of EL.Stat, whom 
Georgiou illegally replaced with one of his 
now co-defendants. Consequently, Dr. 
Stroblos sued him in both criminal and civil 
courts for this, and apart from the one year 
imprisonment conviction by the criminal 
court, the civil court fined Georgiou 10,000 
euros for false character damages. 
His most recent conviction is concerned 
with one of the three accusations included in 
the prosecution for breach of duty. The first 
accusation was related to the fact that he 
was in parallel for several months, from July 
to November 2010, as head of the statistical 
authority in Greece but also as an employee 
of the IMF, a duplication of employment 
explicitly prohibited by EL.Stat’s founding law 
3832. The law demanded him to work 
exclusively and with full employment in the 
EL.Stat board. In this way, Georgiou deluded 
the Greek parliament about his ongoing post 
with the IMF—and note that the IMF is one of 
the lenders of Greece—while at the same 
time he had accepted the post of the chair 
for EL.Stat’s board. He would not have been 
selected as EL.Stat president, not even as a 
simple member of the board, had the 
parliament known about his double post. 
This might be legally correct but materially 
seems like looking for a stick to hit a dog. 
See the discussion above that it was 
merely a practical arrangement. 
Perhaps parliament had accepted the 
double post, when it had been explained 
what it contained. Perhaps another solution 
had been found.  
The arrangement clearly wasn’t thought 
out well. 
Georgiou has not been convicted for this. 
The second accusation was concerned 
with the fact that he did not convene the 
EL.Stat board for a whole year, violating the 
law which required meetings at least once a 
month.  
He has not been convicted for this. 
Apparently he had the right not to convene 
the board. He pointed to his reason: a 
breakdown of trust: hacking of his computer. 
(In a good movie, with a real conspiracy, 
someone hacks the computer, and gives the 
login-codes to Logothetis, so that he can be 
exposed as a hacker, after which the director 
can claim that the board is no-good.) 
I cannot follow the court on this. Obviously, 
I do not have the evidence on the alleged 
hacking by Logothetis, see Chapter 32. Still, 
when Georgiou would hold that Logithetis 
would be the culprit, there could still be 
meetings with the other board members. 
Even, one might hold that the hacking was 
immaterial to the reason and law to have 
board meetings. 
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The third accusation, and the most 
important of all three, was concerned with 
the fact that the decision to endorse the 
revised figures for 2009’s deficit was taken 
only by him, without the agreement of the 
other members of the board, which had been 
selected, I remind you, and approved exactly 
for this purpose by the conference of the 
parliamentary presidents with a majority of 
four-fifths. For this accusation, he was 
convicted in the context of breach of duty, 
and this had to do with the publication of 
deficit figures without our approval, as 
required by law. Georgiou appealed to the 
Supreme Court for this conviction, and we 
are waiting to see what the Supreme Court 
will say about it. 
The Greek Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction. 
However, [Georgiou] was acquitted for the 
accusation that he did not convene the 
EL.Stat board, although this is intimately 
interconnected with the non-convening of the 
board for the approval of the data, for which 
he was convicted. So we ended up with an 
oxymoronic situation here.  
The term “oxymoronic” (i.e. “apparently 
contradictory terms appear in conjunction”, 
like “cruel kindness”) does not really apply. 
I tend to see tension too. If the director 
wanted to send figures to Eurostat, which he 
did, then he also should have convened the 
board. A meeting really differs from asking 
approval one by one. I have not seen the 
considerations by the court why they arrive 
at a different judgement. 
He was also acquitted of the charge that 
while he was a member of the IMF, that is to 
say, a servant of the lender, he was also 
chairman of EL.Stat, that is, a servant of the 
borrower, something that is inconceivable 
worldwide and yet happened in today’s 
occupied and economically enslaved 
Greece.  
This issue pops up for the third time in this 
interview. The arrangement of the ending of 
the contract with IMF need not make him a 
“servant of the lender”. Perhaps legally so, 
but not materially. It was an unwise 
arrangement, and you may say that it is 
unwise, but you cannot present it as proof of 
duplicity. 
Retract terms like “occupied and 
economically enslaved Greece”. 
Naturally, the people who were present in 
the courtroom were annoyed and protested 
these acquittals, but when they heard the 
announcement of the third charge they were 
relieved, of course, and for this charge he 
was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment 
with a three year suspension, without being 
granted, of course, any mitigation. 
Even the Greek appear to have problems 
in respecting their juridical system. 
I, together with Mrs. Georganta, filed an 
objection against the court judgment for the 
two accusations for which he was acquitted, 
and we expect a Supreme Court decision as 
In 2020, it seems that these issues have 
become irrevocable because of the Supreme 
Court ruling in 2018. 
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to whether or not Mr. Georgiou will go to a 
new trial for these new accusations. At the 
moment, the two acquittals cannot be 
considered irrevocable.  
But it is true that the most important 
accusation, for which Georgiou desperately 
wanted to be acquitted, was the one for 
which he got convicted. Indeed, the fact that 
Georgiou published the inflated elements of 
the deficit without approval by the EL.Stat 
board does not only prove his guilt of the 
second accusation, of not convening the 
board as he should have, but it also implies a 
deception, because he knew that his swollen 
deficit figures will never be accepted by a 
majority of the board members, and that this 
disagreement would sooner or later become 
public and reveal the irregularities he used 
with the help of Eurostat itself, resulting in a 
failure of the whole plan to legitimize the first 
memorandum and to impose the onerous 
austerity measures. That was not 
acceptable, and of course they had to use 
him. 
This book argues that this issue is the 
most important one indeed. 
The board members had indicated 
questions about Georgiou’s earlier 
statements about his calculations, and thus 
Logothetis has a fair prediction “he knew that 
his swollen deficit figures will never be 
accepted”. 
The term “irregularities he used with the 
help of Eurostat itself” might be an 
“oxymoron”, so to say. The idea is to 
implement the ESA95 of Eurostat, and it is 
awkward to suggest that Eurostat might not 
know how this is done. 
What is conceivable, is that the director by-
passed the board, did not give full 
documentation to Eurostat, and that the DG 
of Eurostat thus became biased: had 
inadequate information and trusted too much 
on the director. A matter of contagion. But 
the Eurostat DG should have insistent upon 
following the law and request approvial by 
the board anyhow. 
Please give more details, and possible 
also more facts, about this “plan to legitimize 
the first memorandum and to impose the 
onerous austerity measures”, and who would 
be the authors of this plan. 
If we would be writing the script of a film, 
we might presume that Logothetis himself 
might be a supporter of Karamanlis, and that 
he would want to show that Papandreou was 
in error, when Papandreou “exposed” the 
true deficit as 12.5% while Karamanlis had 
said 6%. See Section 25.2 above for these 
figures. But I don’t think that this is the true 
situation. Most likely Logothetis simply did 
not get all information that he needed as he 
saw fit for a board member and VP. 
Georgiou should rather have given him all 
information and sent him on a national 
accounting course, instead of blocking him. 
MN: Following the guilty verdicts against 
Andreas Georgiou this past spring, a barrage 
of positive coverage and PR in favor of 
An excellent question. 
Logothetis however doesn’t answer the 
question about the network. 
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Georgiou appeared in the Greek and 
international media, including Bloomberg, the 
Washington Post, and Politico. We also 
heard numerous statements of support from 
major political figures in Greece, the 
European Union, and elsewhere. These 
statements criticized the supposed lack of 
independence of the Greek justice system in 
the verdicts against Georgiou. How would 
you describe or characterize Georgiou’s 
network of support within and outside of 
Greece, and these arguments made in his 
favor? 
NL: Yes, indeed various statements have 
been heard and continue to be heard in 
support of Georgiou, trying to sanctify him, to 
elevate him as a serious personality and as 
an honest scientist.  
Retract statements about the character. 
The discussion is about acts and not about 
character. One should allow a witness or 
accused to profess “I am a honest person” 
(since a person has freedom of expression, 
also about indignation) but it is improper for a 
prosecutor to retort “you are dishonest”: just 
show the facts. 
All this in order to justify everything he 
illegally did as EL.Stat president. All that is 
said are myths that are circulated by the 
domestic and foreign supporters of 
Georgiou, who are desperate to succeed that 
the case is not brought to the court of justice, 
for the major case of swelling of the deficit 
figures. 
A court would be in an awkward position to 
judge about “swelling of the deficit figures”. 
Judgement about what the true figures are is 
a matter of professional competence, and of 
juridical compentence of an El.Stat board. 
See Section 27.1 above. Official statistics by 
nature depends upon legal arrangements, 
and national accounting by convention. 
Without such parameters it is everybody’s 
guess, but the very idea is that we do not 
want such chaos and opt for an institution. 
But this also proves their own guilt in the 
matter. If they really believe that Georgiou is 
innocent and that we are the slanderers and 
the liars, why don’t they let Greek justice do 
its job and prove his presumed innocence in 
a court hearing? I would even expect 
Georgiou himself to be the first to grab this 
opportunity to be redeemed. 
Yes, said network has some guilt, since 
they did not properly study the facts. 
Unfortunately, Logothetis does not point to 
the phenomenon that also IMF wanted the 
law of 2010 changed.  
Part of the protest in the network is that the 
Greek prosecution “never stops”, and that 
when the director is acquited in some court, 
then there is a new round. There are also 
vague rumours about “political motives”. 
Logothetis would know about those 
considerations, and it is too simple for him to 
just say “let Greek justice do its job”. 
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But this furious effort of all his supporters 
to prevent the case from being brought to 
trial reveals their panic as well as their guilt, 
because they know very well that in the 
forthcoming court hearing all the evidence 
will be revealed proving that Greece has 
suffered the greatest national betrayal since 
the time of the Thermopylae treason. Their 
own participation in the betrayal will also be 
revealed.  
The Thermopylae treason was that a 
Greek showed a goat trail to the Persians. 780 
Logothetis’s hope for final justice hasn’t 
come true yet. As said, courts will be hard 
put to decide that the figures would be 
“falsified”. Why not put all evidence into a 
bestseller book, so that other 
econometricians can check it ? Admittedly, 
you do not have access to all data, having 
been evicted from the board, but, then, how 
would you know about the true state of 
affairs, as you seem to suggest, if you don’t 
have the data ? Why not focus on your role 
as witness and call for an investigation ? 
Indeed, the core of this support network 
includes primarily Eurostat, whose senior 
staff advised Georgiou on how to inflate the 
2009 deficit 
Is there a Greek court case concering 
Eurostat ? 
How would one call Eurostat to account ? 
and also how to change EL.Stat’s founding 
laws in order to neutralize the rest of the 
board. 
Logothetis merely states this in this 
interview, and does not provide the link to 
the evidence. We have verified the role of 
Snorrason, see Sections 25.14 and 39.3. 
Fact is that the law was changed in 
December 2010. 
Imagine therefore what impact Georgiou’s 
conviction would have on Eurostat’s image, 
whose political chief is the European 
Commission, Brussels, that is one-third of 
the troika, whatever that implies, of course, 
for many high-ranking political figures in the 
European Union and beyond.  
Well, the director was convicted in June 
2018 by the Greek Supreme Court for 
breach of duty, and the international 
response in official statistics and statistical 
organisations and the media has been that 
there is a miscarriage of justice. 
We could imagine another reaction, but 
that might be dreaming. My reaction anyway 
is that the Greek Supreme Court was right 
about the breach of duty, and that 
Radermacher assisted Georgiou in violating 
the law of an EU Member State. 
So one can clearly understand why high-
level managers from Eurostat and major 
political figures from the EU itself are 
continuing in building a wall of protection and 
support for Georgiou, in the hopes that the 
government and the Supreme Court of 
Greece will believe all these myths they are 
promoting, the most usual of which are the 
following: 
You could easily deconstruct that wall by 
providing a good story. Why not do so ? 
                                                                
780 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ephialtes_of_Trachis 
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The first myth they say is that in recent 
years Georgiou was acquitted many times 
but the persecution against him continues. 
That’s what they say. The supporters of 
Georgiou claim again and again that 
Georgiou was acquitted, but it’s not true. The 
acquittal may occur only after the irrevocable 
final judgment in a court trial, or after an 
exonerating court order is accepted by the 
Supreme Court.  
Well, it is partially true on their part, since 
there were acquittals by lower bodies.  
And you are right that there is a Supreme 
Court.  
The underlying problem is that the 
international statistical societies did not 
properly check the facts, and e.g. were side-
tracked by their trust in Snorrason and 
Eurostat. 
Until now, all rulings for Georgiou were 
appealed against by the Supreme Court. He 
has not been acquitted irrevocably for any 
trial or for any [charges] that he had against 
him.  
In 2018 the breach of duty became 
irrevocable. (Yet, see the international 
response.) 
On the contrary, he has had an irrevocable 
conviction for defamation, as I said before, 
and a conviction for one of the three 
accusations for breach of duty, for which the 
Supreme Court decision is awaited, whether 
or not it will become irrevocable. But the 
other two accusations for breach of duty for 
which he has been acquitted, as I have 
already said, for these we have filed a 
complaint and they cannot therefore be 
considered irrevocable or as something that 
he can get away with. So it’s not surprising 
that the prosecutions against him still 
continue. So it’s a myth, when they say that 
he was acquitted many times. Nothing 
happened so far. 
It is too simple to say “Nothing happened 
so far”. It would help the situation if 
Logothetis tried to better listen to the 
international criticism and tried to spot where 
the commucation falters. First give people 
the relevant facts before inferring that there 
would be a conspiracy. 
Obviously, Logothetis is not to blame. He 
is involved as a participant and victim and 
whistleblower. The statistical societies like 
ISI, RSS, ASA etcetera are not directly 
involved and should have maintained 
impartiality – but Snorrason, while being a 
participant, pretended that he were impartial. 
The second myth goes as follows: 
Georgiou took over the presidency of EL.Stat 
after the first memorandum. He cannot 
therefore be regarded responsible for the 
memorandum and the economic crisis that 
followed. Well indeed, when Georgiou took 
action in EL.Stat, we were already under the 
first memorandum.  
 
If you remember, our entry into the first 
memorandum was announced by Mr. 
George Papandreou with his speech in 
Kasterllorizo in April 2010, and the reason for 
this was allegedly the high level of the 2009 
deficit, which was put by Papandreou at 13.6 
Please mention that Papandreou 
discovered in October 2009 that the deficit 
was rather 12.5%. 781 782 
Indeed, 13.6% was the figure mentioned in 
April 2010. For that figure, Eurostat indicated 
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percent of GDP. That’s equivalent to about 
30 billion euros.  
a margin of error of 0.5%. In April, the NSSG 
was still under the Ministry of Finance. 
However, it was not the real deficit, but the 
prediction of Papandreou of what it would be 
after all relevant calculations took place. And 
Papandreou did not have the right to take 
such an important decision that would affect 
Greek society so much, based only on a 
prediction that had not even been approved 
by the Court of Auditors.  
The prime minister, in setting up a bailout 
with the IMF, would not be in a position to 
give an estimate of the deficit ? 
If it is clearly stated that it is a government 
estimate, then no-one can object to this. It is 
not clear what the role of the Court of 
Auditors is w.r.t. government estimates. 
Why don’t you sue Papandreou or the 
Greek government for giving estimates ? 
We would be the ones, as EL.Stat’s 
management board, to supervise these 
calculations of the actual deficit, to approve it 
and publish it in October 2010, six months 
later.  
Exactly ! Thus your last statement was 
very confused about an estimate and the 
determination of the final official figure. 
Actually, if we were given the opportunity 
to do that and find these deficit figures to be 
less than 10 percent, we would be able to 
denounce the first memorandum and cancel 
it!  
It is highly unlikely that you could cancel 
the April 2010 memorandum and bailout. 
I did not check the text of the 
memorandum but I do not expect to find a 
statement that the issue is annulled when the 
final official figure would be lower than 10%, 
including the rule that Greece would have to 
pay back the loans received under the 
bailout. 
And of course, the rest of the 
memorandums which followed. But 
obviously, this would not be something that 
the designers of the first memorandum 
wished to happen, and so the appropriate 
person should be found who, with specific 
statistical adjustments, the deficit of 2009 
would “confirm” the “validity” of 
Papandreou’s deficit “forecast” in April 2010, 
and fully justify our entry into the first 
memorandum. This is what they wanted. 
The choice of words makes this sound 
bonkers. The 2010 bailout cannot be 
annulled, but the director of statistics would 
be appointed with the purpose to prevent 
that it is annulled. A wonderful conspiracy !  
A point remains that Greece had more 
options to restructure its banks and debts, 
see Section 18.3. See also the IMF IEO 
(2016) report that the IMF failed to impose 
haircuts on creditors. 783 There obviously 
would be a reaction in the public mind when 
it appeared that policies had been based 
upon wrong data. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid any 
controversies with the rest of the board that 
could endanger their plan, it was decided to 
neutralize not only the dissidents of the 
board but the whole of EL.Stat’s board.  
Is it meaningful, in any way, to start a 
discussion about a distinction between 
“dissidents of the board” and “the whole 
board” ? Are you running out of side-paths 
and do you need to invent ever more 
epiphenomena to prevent a focus ? 
As a result of all three unlawful actions, Let us try to distinguish: 
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three or four, I don’t even remember how 
many, the first memorandum was 
legitimized, the door opened for the second 
and worst memorandum, and obviously the 
rest of the memoranda that followed, and for 
the austerity measures that have been going 
on since then.  
(1) quality of data (our topic) 
(2) possibly too lenient versus needlessly 
strict austerity measures based upon good 
versus wrong data 
The focus is on the quality of the data, and 
not the responsibility of what others are 
going to do with the figures. Agreed, there is 
stewardship, but this does not pertain to 
policy reactions themselves, see Section 
20.8 and Chapter 27 and especially 
Section 27.4. 
Therefore, it’s perhaps wrong to say that 
the first memoranda was due to Georgiou. 
It’s more appropriate to say that all 
memoranda and their relevant medieval 
austerity measures that we still have on our 
backs are actually due to Georgiou! 
Why “perhaps wrong” when it is absolutely 
wrong ? 
Neither it is “appropriate” to attribute all 
such events and responsibility to the director. 
Namely, you first identified a conspiracy by 
EU, ECB and IMF, and now you reduce this 
to the director alone ! Perhaps you are 
thinking again in terms of Ephialtes of 
Trachis and his treason of Thermopylae in 
480 BC though. 784 Better say so, otherwise 
other people will not understand what you 
are speaking about. 
The third myth: since Eurostat has 
approved Georgiou’s practices and figures, 
they must be right, they must be correct. But 
would it be possible [for] Eurostat not to 
approve the statistics, these statistics, 
provided by Georgiou, and the methods of 
administration that he was using? 
A fair question. 
Eurostat in November 2010 should reject 
the director’s figures because they were not 
approved by the El.Stat board of 2010. 
This legal hole was plugged likely already 
in December 2010 by revising the Greek law, 
so that the director became responsible, and 
could also revise the figures for earlier years. 
It was Eurostat’s director himself, Mr. 
Radermacher, who gave orders to Georgiou 
as to what data to add to the deficit. 
Correspondence has been revealed, from 
Radermacher to Georgiou, which shows how 
to add this amount of debt that was incurred 
by the Simitis swaps, how to add it into four 
year’s deficits until 2009, prior to the expiry 
date, as we previously explained, and 
although no European regulation existed at 
the time that would allow this. But anyway, 
they added this to the total fiscal debt that we 
had, for four years from 2006 to 2009.  
See page 204 above for discussion of this. 
The swaps were restructured in 2005 and 
2008 in significant manner, and Eurostat 
judged that those changes should be 
recorded as new swaps. 
 
Also, it was the permanent representative 
of Eurostat at EL.Stat, Mr. Sorensen, who 
“Sorensen” must be “Snorrason”. 
It is incriminating evidence that Eurostat in 
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with the assistance of Eurostat’s legal 
adviser, Mr. Samuelson, who advised 
Georgiou on how to change EL.Stat’s 
founding law in order to turn EL.Stat into 
one-man authority.  
2010 knew that the director had to seek 
approval by the board, but accepted figures 
form the director that had not received such 
approval. 
Still, potentially, Eurostat might say: “When 
we received the figures in 2010, then we 
assumed that the director had taken all 
relevant steps for approval, and we were not 
aware of any illegal act (as has now been 
established, irrevocably, by the Greek 
Supreme Court in 2018).” 
So, did Eurostat also know that the director 
had not received such approval ? 
However, given that Eurostat never 
expressed surprise about the conviction of 
bypassing the board, and only contested its 
legal base, we can infer that Radermacher 
knew about the bypassing. The argument 
that Eurostat thought that Georgiou had the 
legal authority cannot convince, as Eurostat 
assisted in changing the law. 
So it’s not surprising therefore  This is a false inference. The change of the 
statute need not be relevant for the 
subsequent acceptance of the figures. 
that Eurostat approved the practices, the 
deficit figures of Georgiou. Of course, that 
does not mean that they were correct. 
Well, if the director followed Eurostat’s 
advice, then it is logical for them to accept 
his figures. 
We are back at the (second) “oxymoron” 
situation on page 343, see there. 
The final myth that I want to mention is that 
they’re saying Georgiou applied all proper 
European regulations. On the contrary, most 
European regulations and Eurostat’s own 
criteria for the deficit and debt calculations 
were violated by Georgiou and his advisers 
from Eurostat, in order to justify the 
unjustifiable integration of deficits of many 
public utilities in the 2009 deficit, something 
that requires a thorough study of several 
months for each public utility. You can’t just 
decide to include the deficit of a utility in the 
public debt, you need a thorough study, for 
several months, six months. So what kind of 
European regulations did Georgiou actually 
apply, I wonder. No one knows. 
This may well be a fair point. Eurostat 
reports: “From discussions with El.Stat, it 
became clear that there has been no 
systematic examination of the accounts of 
public units for some considerable time, 
despite evident substantial operating losses 
and (in some cases) repeated calls on state 
guarantees.” (p10) 785 
 It would help when Logothetis would 
mention national accountants who would 
agree with him. If you have the accounts of a 
public utility you might establish fairly quickly 
in a few hours whether revenues over a 
string of years are below 50% of costs (so 
that costs are covered by subsidies and 
borrowing and “selling shares”). It is tricky 
though when subsidies for public transport 
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are intended to encourage environmental 
use, and thus might be seen as sales too. 
It remains a fair point that the board has 
discretion, see again the discussion of 
stewardship in Chapters 20 and 27. 
MN: We are on the air with Nikos 
Logothetis, former board member of the 
Greek Statistical Authority EL.Stat, here on 
Dialogos Radio and the Dialogos Interview 
Series. What is plainly evident is that there is 
a very extensive and very powerful network 
of support for the likes of Andreas Georgiou, 
a network which includes powerful media 
voices, major politicians and political figures, 
major centers of power and influence and 
decision-making. How can such a powerful 
and seemingly unified network of political 
and media forces even be countered by the 
Greek people? 
It may be a translation issue “the likes of 
Andreas Georgiou”. 
The question “How can such a powerful 
and seemingly unified network of political 
and media forces even be countered by the 
Greek people?” strikes one as rather curious. 
 
 
NL: Indeed, Georgiou’s support network, 
perhaps composed of high-ranking political 
executives — domestic and foreign — is 
powerful.  
It would seem to be a wrong diagnosis. 
The director doesn’t have a powerful 
network, but has deceived a powerful 
network. 
If the scientists in the network are given 
the proper information that the director is 
guilty as charged, and that they are 
misinformed also by Hallgrimur Snorrason, 
who took part in the process but portrays 
himself as an impartial outsider, then the 
network likely quickly evaporates, and the 
EU is stuck with the problem at Eurostat. 
But no matter how much influence this 
network can have on political affairs in 
Greece, I think that it is not in a position to 
influence the Greek justice system, which I 
consider impartial. The fact that the case has 
reached up to the level of the Supreme 
Court, which so far the Supreme Court has 
justified many of our objections and appeals 
against Georgiou, gives us hope that 
ultimately the systemic power network that 
exists supporting [Georgiou] can be 
successfully dealt with.  
There is trust in the Greek system as long 
as it has the same opinion as Logothetis 
himself. 
At the end of the day, our justice system, 
perhaps the only irreproachable institution in 
our country, seems to have borne the burden 
of this matter. I believe that the truth will 
soon be revealed, no matter how many 
powerful political and media forces try to 
Well, the truth was revealed in the verdict 
of June 2018, and the world chose to say 
that the Greek judicial system doesn’t work. 
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impose an acquittal verdict. 
MN: What are the judicial cases which are 
still outstanding regarding the EL.Stat case 
and Andreas Georgiou, what are the charges 
which Georgiou is still facing, and what is 
your expectation regarding the outcome of 
these cases? 
Again, this is not a proper question to ask 
of a witness. The witness is put into the 
position of an accuser, which changes the 
focus of the testimony away from the facts 
instead to their evaluation.  
NL: Most importantly, the case of the false 
inflation of data and of the breach of duty by 
Georgiou, are crimes of public document 
forgery. As I have already said, Georgiou 
was convicted of one and the more important 
accusation related to the breach of duty, that 
of the publication of the 2009 deficit figures 
without the approval of [by] the EL.Stat 
board. However, he has been acquitted for 
the other two, as we said before, the 
duplication of his appointment in the IMF and 
EL.Stat and for the non-convening of the 
board, but we have appealed against these 
two verdicts of innocence, and we hope that 
the Supreme Court will decide to repeat the 
trial for these two related charges. 
Apparently, the Supreme Court does not 
yet adopt the interpretation that the breach of 
duty also amounts to a document forgery.  
See Section 27.1. 
But the most important judicial case we are 
waiting for is for the felony of inflating the 
deficit, something that as I said before had, 
as a result, the legalization of the first 
memorandum, the imposing of the second 
and worst memorandum, and the justification 
of the cumbersome austerity measures. This 
is the time when these measures were 
imposed, obviously under the excuse that 
otherwise we would not be able to pay the 
related loan agreement. If this affair reaches 
the trial courts, we certainly expect Georgiou 
to be convicted, because the evidence we 
have against him is irrevocable and 
undeniable. This is what Georgiou’s 
supporters know. That’s why they push as 
hard as they can to prevent the case from 
reaching the high court of justice. 
This is repeating the repeats. 
Stuck in a groove without any additional 
facts. 
 
MN: We are speaking with Nikos 
Logothetis, former board member of the 
Greek Statistical Authority EL.Stat, here on 
Dialogos Radio and the Dialogos Interview 
Series. In what way do you believe the 
verdicts which will be reached by the Greek 
justice system concerning the EL.Stat and 
Georgiou cases, impact the future of Greece 
and particularly with regard to the austerity 
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policies and memorandums which are being 
imposed and the non-serviceable public debt 
of Greece? 
NL: I agree with you that Greek debt is 
non-serviceable. Even if we get away from 
the memoranda, we don’t get away from the 
related loan agreements, and we will 
continue to be under supervision by the EU 
until we pay 75 percent of our debt, 
something impossible for the next 60 years!  
Georganta stated that Greek people can 
survive on bread and olives. 
If, however, as we hope, there is going to 
be an irrevocable conviction of Georgiou for 
the act of inflating the deficit figures, this will 
prove that we were imposed all these 
medieval memoranda using false figures, 
which gives Greece the right to claim 
compensation from the European Union for 
the damage we suffered in the last seven 
years of the financial crisis. 
In repeat: let us try to distinguish: 
(1) quality of data (our topic) 
(2) possibly too lenient versus needlessly 
strict austerity measures based upon good 
versus wrong data 
The focus is on the quality of the data, and 
not the responsibility of what others are 
going to do with the figures. Agreed, there is 
stewardship, but this does not pertain to 
policy reactions themselves, see Section 
20.8 and Chapter 27. 
Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union gives us the right to 
claim this compensation, and we have even 
estimated the financial loss since Georgiou 
set foot in Greece, a cost that may well 
exceed 210 billion euros. A compensation of 
this level will certain overturn the disgraceful 
economic situation we are experiencing 
today.  
There are more provisions, but one is:  
“In the case of non-contractual liability, the 
Union shall, in accordance with the general 
principles common to the laws of the 
Member States, make good any damage 
caused by its institutions or by its servants in 
the performance of their duties. “ 786 
This applies to Radermacher who assisted 
Georgiou in violating the law of an EU 
Member State. See the deduction above that 
Radermacher knew about this. The damage 
must be related to Section 27.4 in this book. 
However, the Greek law was changed in 
December 2010, so one might argue that the 
damage was limited. The argument then 
becomes that Eurostat with false arguments 
persued the dogma of the single head (chief) 
of a National Statistical Office. 
Now what about the Eurozone law, that 
adopting the euro means that Greece must 
provide for the relevant figures on deficit and 
debt ? 
However, I emphasize again that a 
necessary condition is an irrevocable 
conviction of Georgiou regarding the felony 
This is not necessary. It is sufficient that 
Georgiou was in breach of duty for not 
seeking approval by the board. This is also 
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of inflating the deficit figures. sufficient to conclude that also Rader-
macher and Snorrason were wrong. Rader-
macher should not have accepted the figures 
in 2010. Snorrasen in 2010 likely only did 
what he was told by Eurostat. He failed 
however in his task to reply to El.Stat = 
board (since he basically only communicated 
with the director): “The High Level Expert 
appointed by the Commission provides 
independent advice to El.Stat and acts as a 
contact point for the Commission (Eurostat).” 
787 He was wrong later in the reports to ISI 
and the other associations.  
The evaluation of the austerity policy in 
Greece is better based upon economic 
principles than a discussion about the quality 
of the data.  
See also the responsibility of the Greek 
authorities mentioned in Section 18.3. 
There is no direct causal link between the 
figures produced and published by the 
director and Eurostat, and subsequent policy 
reactions. Stewardship is different, see 
Section 20.8 and Chapter 27. 
PM. Remarkably, though: “Contrary to 
prosecution claims against Mr Georgiou, EU 
officials have repeatedly argued that he 
played a decisive role in improving the 
reputation of Greek statistics that had been 
shattered by Athens’ repeated understating 
of the deficit in the years before the crisis 
erupted in the country in 2009.” 788 
These EU officials do not mention that the 
real change was from the NSSG under the 
Ministry of Finance to an independent 
El.Stat, and that one should not put too much 
emphasis on the contribution by Georgiou 
himself. It remains a counterfactual what 
would have happened had the board been 
able to steer Greek statistics towards calmer 
waters. 
And what about these instigators who used 
Georgiou to carry out their treacherous 
plans? Even Grigoris Peponis, the 
impeccable investigator who proposed the 
criminal prosecution of Georgiou in the first 
Yes, it is obvious now that the EU has a 
problem at Eurostat too. 
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place, has suggested that the possible 
existence of certain instigators within the 
Greek and European political systems, who 
directed Georgiou on what to do, have to be 
taken into consideration. 
These are the ones who do not want the 
case to reach an open court hearing, the 
ones who are so desperate for the acquittal 
of Georgiou as early as possible in order to 
cover their own involvement in the above 
crime, because they’re well aware that we 
have evidence of their unlawful intervention 
in inflating the deficit  
It still needs to be established that the 
figure of deficit and debt was inflated.  
We may wonder whether we can ever 
establish this, since the board was not 
convened, and we are hard put to 
reconstruct what they might have decided. 
and also in transforming EL.Stat from an 
independent authority into one-man 
authority. 
Such transformation itself is not illegal. We 
can only say that the argumentation was 
false, and apparently deliberately so. Why 
cannot Logothetis focus on what is relevant 
and what is not relevant ? Why the noise ? 
What is deceitful by Georgiou and 
Snorrason is claim publicly that you have all 
authority and at the same time, in 
confidential texts, work on the change of the 
law to give you this authority. 
If the Supreme Court sends Georgiou to 
trial in the high court of justice, all his 
supporters know that this will mean a certain 
conviction for him. The support network will 
then collapse, and they will find themselves 
accused for their betrayal against their 
homeland and crimes against its citizens. 
Our country will then pass from an 
underprivileged position of a beggar, to the 
strong position of a challenger, on the basis 
of specific articles of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union itself. 
The Supreme Court in 2018 convicted the 
director for a breach of duty, and the network 
did not collapse but holds that Greek justice 
doesn’t work. 
Above, I stated agreement with some link 
between the Georgiou ordeal and such 
“compensation” by the EU, but the relation is 
more complex and different than you state. 
Isn’t there any awareness about issues in 
Greek society itself, and taking responsibility 
for the mess that you created yourself ? 
As far as we are concerned, we do not 
really care about the strict or non-strict 
punishment of Georgiou, who is now a 
pensioner of the IMF.  
Why is it necessary to say this ? Why 
would it be important if you did nor didn’t ? 
What interests us is to prove his guilt and 
to remove the injustice that has been 
committed against Greece through the false 
inflation of the public debt and deficit of 
2009, and also prove the criminal 
involvement of the European Commission 
and Eurostat.  
Can you please keep Greece out of it ? 
Your position in the case concerns your 
role at the board of El.Stat in 2010. Give 
witness statements, and don’t claim what 
you cannot prove. Specify what the criminal 
involvement of Eurostat is, instead of leaving 
this to the world to figure this out. 
This will only be done when the case is 
referred to an open court hearing, in which 
Eurostat and Georgiou will have to be 
They will tend to declare under oath that 
they acted professionally as accountants.  
Please provide facts that would show this 
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present, in order to testify under oath 
whether or not they have falsely inflated the 
statistical figures of Greece, and the reasons 
they did so. 
to be perjury. If you don’t have facts, then 
you are doing them a favour by allowing 
them to restate their view under oath. 
I do not know when and if this will happen, 
and how many battles we have to give from 
now on in order to achieve this. Some say, 
some tell us that there’s no point in 
continuing to fight, as it seems that with such 
a front of support for Georgiou by strong 
decision-making centers, the battle has 
already been done against us. We reply by 
saying that if we stop fighting, there will 
simply be no other battle, something we 
don’t want, because let’s not forget what 
Bertolt Brecht said once: he who fights, can 
lose. He who doesn’t fight, has already lost. 
Why the words “battle” and “fight” ? 
Bertolt Brecht should also have said: Who, 
even with an academic degree, still fights 
windmills, has already lost from reality. 
MN: Before we wrap up, and looking at the 
situation in Greece today and the economic 
claims that are being made by the Greek 
government, that the country has returned to 
economic growth, that Greece has turned a 
corner, do you believe that the Greek 
statistical figures today are credible, or are 
they perhaps still being manipulated? 
Good question, but likely the wrong person 
to ask. 
NL: Unfortunately, the statistical figures 
have already been exploited by any 
government in power so far in Greece. We 
have seen this happen with the alchemies of 
swamps [swaps] in order to get into the 
Eurozone. By the way, I wish that we had 
never gotten into the Eurozone in the first 
place! Our economy was not in a position to 
handle such a strong and competitive 
currency. We saw another exploitation of the 
statistical figures, of the deficit, this time. 
They became the reason for an economic 
crisis of the past seven years. 
Logothetis first needs a sidetrack before 
getting to answering the question. 
 
Swaps were in 2001, and were not used to 
get into the Eurozone in 2000. 
I cannot say what is happening these days 
with the statistical figures, I am not in 
EL.Stat, but anyway, we will find out sooner 
or latter what is happening.  
Exactly, you are not at El.Stat, and thus 
you were not the person to ask this particular 
question. Why not say so directly ? 
The truth always comes out for any case of 
mishandling of the statistical figures. We’ve 
seen this happening. But as long as there is 
no reliable team to correctly manage the 
handling of the statistical data in the Greek 
Statistical Authority, I’m afraid we should 
again expect irregularities and alchemies of 
It is a fairy tale that “the truth always 
comes out”.  
Remarkably, Logothetis still knows that 
current El.Stat cannot be trusted. Would this 
be a case of defamation, punishable with a 
fine of EUR 10 thousand ? Or the freedom of 
expression by a man fighting windmills ? 
 356 
the statistical data, unfortunately. 
MN: Well Mr. Logothetis, thank you very 
much for taking the time to speak with us 
today here on Dialogos Radio and the 
Dialogos Interview Series, and for sharing 
your insights with us today. Best of luck with 
your continued efforts. 
“Continued efforts” indeed sounds much 
better than “battle” and “fight”. 
NL: Thank you very much, Mr. Nevradakis. 
I would be glad to hear from you again. 
 
Please excuse any typos or errors which 
may exist within this transcript. 
Of course, except for the conceptual and 
factual errors. 
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his software in The Economics Pack. Applications of Mathematica. He also writes 
science fiction, under the name Acapulco Jones. Key weblinks are: 
http://thomascool.eu/ 
http://econpapers.repec.org/RAS/pco170.htm  
https://zenodo.org/communities/re-engineering-math-ed 
https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
45.2 Discussion 
My degrees are for econometrics from Groningen 1982 and for teacher of 
mathematics from Leiden 2008.  
After graduating in 1982, I worked at the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 
in 1982-1991. In 1989-1990 I was involved with the long term scenario study 
1990-2015: Scanning the Future and Nederland in Drievoud (The Netherlands in 
Triplo). It was a good choice back then to include the Global Crisis scenario for 
2015. 
At CPB a major aim of research is to look for consensus to get the job done. The 
government budget cycle requires a forecast and one doesn't have the academic 
luxury of questioning everything. Outside of CPB, research tends to focus on the 
news that deviates from consensus. A key factor for me is also what happened in 
1990-1991. Developments caused me to become much more outspoken than I 
prefer. 
In 1989, running the first projections to 2015 I observed that unemployment 
would remain high, which doesn't make sense, since unemployment can be solved 
in the medium term, especially when policy makers know about such a threat. I 
grew more aware of the tricky issue that wrong policy might be caused by wrong 
modeling. Policy makers look for economic advice but the selection of the proper 
economic theory and actual choice of econometric model may not be done with 
sufficient quality of science, and there can be political meddling. This dismal state 
could already be observed in the period 1970-1990. My suggestion is to extend 
the Trias Politica model of democracy with an Economic Supreme Court (ESC). 
The CPB is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs but the ESC is at the 
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level of Parliament, Executive and Judiciary, and has a scientific and thus 
independent role, namely guarding the quality of information for policy making. 789 
After reporting my findings in 1989, I was given a separate room with the task of 
reading and writing. It wasn't a promotion, for I wasn't allowed to run the model, 
and all papers that I wrote were blocked from discussion and publication, which is 
censorship of science. I found myself dismissed with untruths in 1991. The civil 
servants court assumes that the Dutch government and its directors don't lie. It 
only looks at documents put before them and doesn't test them. There is no 
prosecutor or agency with a Sherlock Holmes to investigate such abuses of 
power. 
The CPB-director Gerrit Zalm who censored my papers and who dismissed me 
with the abuse of power was no scientist but made his career within the 
bureaucracy. CPB claims to have scientific status but Zalm neglected this, first for 
himself and then for me. He became minister of Finance in 1994 and CEO of 
ABN-AMRO in 2009, not known as establishments for scientific research though 
they obviously do studies and keep an eye on research. More on Zalm in Chapter 
34. 
45.3 Dutch culture and limits to tolerance 
Holland has the reputation of tolerance but reality shows its limits. Dutch culture 
is quite sensitive to social tension. Don't rock the boat. All too soon, Dutch people 
may presume that there is something about my person that causes turbulence 
without useful results. Perhaps Chinese culture allows for more personal freedom. 
At the same time, inconsistently, the Dutch think that they live in an open society 
so that people can say and publish what they want and so that there is no 
censorship. 
The Dutch simply do not understand that censorship must be lifted before you 
can see the analysis that is being censored.  
People also seem to think that an economist declares himself to be an absolute 
weirdo when he gives the summary that mass unemployment is a medium term 
problem only, and that the real problem is the structure of democratic decision 
making that gives not enough room for science and too much room for political 
manipulation. 
There is no solution but for Dutch culture to grow up.  
I advise to boycott Holland till the censorship by the directorate of the CPB has 
been lifted. This is the main message from my weblog 790 and also from an 
economics book from 2012 that discusses the cause and cure of the financial 
crisis since 2007 and actually the Great Stagflation since 1970. 791 
                                                                
789 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html. 
790 https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/about/ 
791 http://thomascool.eu/Papers/CSBH/Index.html 
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